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A Lesson for ATMIS from AMISOM

6 min read.

ATMIS will suffer the fate of AMISOM unless a negotiated settlement is sought with Al-Shabaab to end the Somalia crisis.



A Lesson for ATMIS from AMISOM
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On 3 May 2022, Al-Shabaab stormed and temporarily seized the African Union military base in the village of El-Baraf in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region where Burundian forces serving under the AU mission were stationed. The attack is the first by the group since the transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union’s new Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

On 31 March 2022, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize the African Union’s new Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with a mandate to fight Al-Shabaab after 15 years of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM.) This followed the 8 March 2022 authorization of ATMIS by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC).

While there have been some changes to the mandate of ATMIS, mainly at the margins, the mission will face the same challenges and suffer a similar fate to AMISOM’s when its mandate ends in December 2024 unless three things happen.

First, the Somalia government must resolve its persistent governance issues, including providing services in the regions liberated from Al-Shabaab by ATMIS troops. Secondly, donor countries must provide ATMIS with sustainable and predictable funding, force multipliers, and force enablers. Third, the Troop Contributing Countries must pursue a unified agenda and refrain from interfering with Somalia’s internal affairs.

Conflict in Somalia

The collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991 spurred multiple regional and multilateral efforts to resolve the country’s security and political crisis. Regional countries hosted peace conferences or intervened militarily—unilaterally and via the African Union (AU). The African peacekeeping mission was initially to be deployed for six months to support the transitional government formed after the 2005 peace agreement.

Uganda was the first country to deploy in March 2007 with some 1,650 Ugandan troops. But Al-Shabaab’s attacks on Kampala in July 2010 prompted the deployment of additional forces from Uganda and Burundi.

By mid-2013, AMISOM forces had grown to nearly 18,000 personnel, primarily from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, with smaller contingents from Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. The troops were spread across Somalia, dividing the country into four sectors: Mogadishu Sector 1, led by Uganda; Kismayo Sector 2, led by Kenya; Baidoa Sector 3, led by Ethiopia; and the town of Beledweyne Sector 4, led by Burundi. The deployment of the troops did not deter Al-Shabaab from conducting attacks inside Somalia and sometimes targeting AMISOM troops.

Military operations

AMISOM conducted operations against Al-Shabaab, taking over territory and the group’s sources of revenue. Between February and May 2011, AMISOM launched multiple offensives against Al-Shabaab’s strongholds throughout Mogadishu. By early 2011, AMISOM had gained control of 13 of the capital’s 16 districts, including key revenue sources such as the Bakara market. On 28 September 2012, during Operation Sledgehammer, the Somali National Army and Kenyan naval, air, and ground forces launched a surprise attack on Kismayo, capturing the city and the lucrative port of Kismayo with little resistance from by Al-Shabaab. Operation Eagle commenced in March 2014 and was followed by a second wave of expansion under Operation Indian Ocean in August 2014.

AMISOM conducted operations against Al-Shabaab, taking over territory and the group’s sources of revenue.

These operations drove Al-Shabaab forces out of more than 20 towns across 10 districts in south-central Somalia—an estimated 68 per cent of the strategic locations Al-Shabaab had controlled in 2014.

The operation cut off the group from crucial supply routes and removed Al-Shabaab from its remaining coastal strongholds, including the port of Barawe, the group’s administrative headquarters 100 kilometres south of the capital Mogadishu. Other liberated towns included Tayeeglow, Bulomarer, and Kurtunwaarey.

Delayed elections

While liberating these towns from Al Shabaab was critical, the tension between the president and the prime minister, and the conflict between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States has delayed the elections, diverted attention, resources, and political capital from the provision of services. Somalia conducts its elections indirectly; clan leaders select delegates to electoral colleges, who then choose the parliamentarians to fill the seats of the Lower House. Federal Member State assemblies elect Upper House parliamentarians, and the two houses elect the president who appoints the prime minister.

On 25 July 2020, parliament passed a vote against Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheire, accusing him of failing to turn the tide against insecurity and failing to provide a plan for universal suffrage. As required by the constitution, the president appointed a new prime minister on 18 September 2020 and on 24 September parliament unanimously approved the appointment of the new prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble. The honeymoon between the president and the prime minister did not last long. On 27 December 2021, the president suspended the prime minister over corruption allegations. The prime minister refused to resign, leading to tension on the streets of Mogadishu between their supporters, with security agencies and clan militias taking sides.

There has always been antagonism between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu, but it has grown sharper since President Mohammed Farmajo came to power in 2017. The tension between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States revolves around delineating power and resource sharing. However, elections require cooperation between the two levels of government. Due to the lack of cooperation, the November 2020 parliamentary election and the February 2021 presidential election were postponed.

On 12 April 2021, President Farmajo signed the bill passed by the Lower House extending his term and that of the parliament by two years. When Farmajo was elected, there was an understanding that the 2020 election would apply the principle of universal suffrage.

The president’s actions have inflamed the country’s already fragile political and security situation. It galvanized the opposition, fractured the security agencies, widened the rift between the federal governments of Jubaland and Puntland, and ignited a bitter power struggle between the president and the prime minister. 

The electoral impasse was resolved on 9 January 2022, after leaders struck a deal to complete parliamentary elections by 25 February 2022.

Troop Contributing Countries

Kenya and Ethiopia have been the two central countries in Somalia’s crisis. They have hosted peace conferences or undertaken military intervention both unilaterally and via the African Union (AU). Some of the outcomes of their actions have been inimical to Somalia’s long-term stability.

Kenya and Ethiopia had a united goal regarding Somalia until Kenya sent its military to Somalia in November 2011. Central to their divergence was Jubaland and who controls it. Jubaland is the centre of gravity in Somalia; it is the breadbasket of the country and the location of the port of Kismayo, giving significant leverage to whoever controls it.

Since coming to power in 2017, President Farmajo has prioritized bringing Jubaland under Mogadishu’s control. But he has faced resistance from Ahmed Mohamed Madobe, the current president of Jubaland. While Ethiopia was always wary of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia, Abiy Ahmed’s accession to power in Ethiopia in April 2018 dramatically shifted Ethiopia’s Somalia policy. Abiy wanted to mend Ethiopia’s relations with regional countries.

When Farmajo was elected, there was an understanding that the 2020 election would apply the principle of universal suffrage.

Kenya-Ethiopia differences played out ahead of the 7 August 2019 Jubaland presidential polls. Tensions escalated between Madobe and Kenya on one side, and Ethiopia and Somalia on the other, with Kenya supporting Madobe while Ethiopia allied itself with Somalia’s President Farmajo in pushing for Madobe’s ouster. Madobe won the election but Mogadishu refused to accept the results.

Following the Jubaland elections, the Leader of the Majority in the National Assembly, Adan Duale—who had been the Kenyan Minister for Defence when Kenya intervened in Somalia—and Yusuf Haji attended Madobe’s inauguration. The plane carrying the Kenyan government delegation flew directly to Kismayo, the capital of Jubaland, against a directive by the Federal Government of Somalia that all international flights pass through Mogadishu.

Under President Farmajo, Kenya and Somalia’s diplomatic relations have witnessed episodes of disagreement where both countries have expelled each other’s ambassadors in protest.


Sustainable and predictable funding has been a constant issue throughout the lifetime of Somalia’s peacekeeping mission. Since 2004, the European Union (EU) African Peace Facility (AFP) has been the primary funding stream for the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including peacekeeping missions. Since 2007, the EU has provided nearly €2.3 billion to AMISOM.

In January 2016, the EU cut AMISOM peacekeeper stipends by 20%, reducing each soldier’s payment from US$ 1,028 to US$822 per soldier per month. As a result, some troops have gone for months without pay.

The move led to protests by troops from contributing countries. In December 2016, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza threatened to withdraw Burundian troops from AMISOM. In 2015 the EU suspended all its aid to Burundi after violence broke out, prompted by President Nkurunziza’s bid to seek a third term in office, contrary to the 2000 Arusha Accord.

There has always been antagonism between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu, but it has grown sharper since President Mohammed Farmajo came to power in 2017.

Burundi has more than 5,000 troops in Somalia. Uganda, which has 5 000 troops, also threatened to pull its troops out of Somalia in protest. Burundi was not the only country to protest the cuts; Uganda and Kenya also protested the drop in funding.

The Africa Peace Facility transitioned into to the European Peace Facility (EPF) on 1 July 2021, enabling the EU to bypass the AU and directly pay for regional and national military initiatives. For the first time, Brussels will finance lethal equipment for African armies, a move that has implications for ATMIS stability and predictability of funding.

The framing of the Somalia situation as pure counterterrorism has made military force the inevitable solution. However, this approach has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab and turn around Somalia’s fortunes. Instead, it has led to a stalemate. Decades into the conflict—it will be almost two decades by the time the term of ATMIS comes to an end—Al-Shabaab has become the face of Somalia’s crisis.

ATMIS provides an opportunity to examine the current Somalia crisis through a civil war lens. Civil wars end through a negotiated settlement. Political negotiations with Al-Shabaab are a more sustainable means of resolving the decades-long Somalia crisis.

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Abdullahi Boru Halakhe is a security analyst from the Horn of Africa.


Philosophy for the People

For philosophy to be relevant in Africa, it must democratize and address contemporary social problems.



Philosophy for the People
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In late September 2022, a consortium of universities hosted by the Universite’ Catholique d’Afrique Centrale in Yaounde, Cameroon held an “Ethicslab” to deliberate on the theme, “Justice, Democracy and Diversity.” The meeting brought together doctoral candidates in philosophy from Cameroon, Canada, Nigeria, Chad, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to be mentored by experts. Some of those experts included Dany Rondeau (Canada), Geert Demuijnck (France, based in the Netherlands), and Bernard Gagnon (Canada).

The driving force behind the event was Thierry Ngosso, a young Cameroonian philosopher based  at the University of St Gallen, Switzerland. Ngosso’s dream has been to deliver important philosophical lessons in a readily digestible way to younger African scholars while at the same time aiming for social transformation.

The study of philosophy in the continent is marked by all-too-familiar colonial linguistic and political divisions: the anglophone sector fastened to the thought of figures such as John Rawls and analytic philosophy, while francophone countries usually follow the dictates of continental philosophy. Ngosso thinks it is time to collapse these age-old colonial divisions. Also, philosophy seems removed from pressing issues, such as poverty. It can certainly be successfully re-energized by interrogating topics such as ethics and health, ethics and education, ethics and business, politics, the environment, and so on to broaden and deepen linkages between the discipline and urgent contemporary issues.

Nonetheless, philosophy has always been valued in Cameroon’s education system. As early as high school, students are introduced to the discipline. At postgraduate levels, there are various social media forums where students debate philosophical concerns of mutual interest. These debates are usually vibrant and engrossing.

Since its inception in 2019, the Ethicslab has been inviting two or three keynote speakers from disciplines such as sociology, political science and history to brainstorm about the intellectual concerns it seeks to tackle. The Ethicslab is concerned with issues of normativity and social change. Such an approach obviously grants philosophy an urgency, purpose and social transformational energy.

The Ethicslab is an intellectual experiment to identify the future stars of theoretical thought on the continent. During the 2022 edition of the event, quite a few promising upcoming scholars further etched their names;  Benjamin Olujohungbe (Nigeria), Charles Dine (Cameroon/Canada), Hammadou Yaya (Cameroon),  Opeyemi Gbadegesin (Nigeria), Elisanne Pellerin (Canada), Tatiana Nganti (Cameroon), Henri Gbadi Finimonga (DRC), Kakmeni Schaller (Cameroon), Eric Vernuy Suyru (Cameroon) and Ndedi Emma Maximine Ndjandjo (Cameroon). All these individuals are not only being trained in the rigors of theoretical reflection but also in the ethics of mutuality and reciprocity. Although they come from varied national, linguistic, and institutional backgrounds, the objective is to establish commonalities based on universally accepted cultural and human values.

Ultimately, Ngosso is interested in effecting meaningful social change in African communities through the study and use of philosophy. He plans to find funding for about ten doctoral students and thirty postdoctoral scholars in the discipline within the next five years. He also intends to shift the nodes of perception regarding the African continent from an ostensibly external locus to largely endogenous sources. To realize these grand aims, Ngosso has had to battle with numerous bureaucratic obstacles. The quest to change societies from within also entails transforming the traditional character and functions of academic institutions and establishments. This is no small task. What Ngosso has been able to do is wrest a degree of flexibility in how he operates within and amongst institutions. He is currently employed by the University of Maroua, Cameroon, holds an ongoing research fellowship at the University of St. Gallen, where he is based, and is a research associate of Universite’ Catholique d’Afrique Centrale. Within an African context, and perhaps any other setting in the world, such institutional flexibility and mobility are rare. But this is precisely the sort of liberty Ngosso requires in accomplishing his stated mission of social change.

Perhaps as part of ongoing efforts to demystify the study of philosophy, Ngosso arranged a trip to Kribi for all the participants of the 2022 Ethicslab. Kribi, a coastal town, is a perfect spot to unwind. Its coast is replete with tourist attractions such as the magisterial Lobe Falls, a pristine array of waterfalls nestled within Kribi beach. The Atlantic ocean is always enticingly open for a swim after intense brainstorming or away from the diurnal pressures of everyday life. There are also amazing seaside resorts and restaurants and the most delightful varieties of seafood to savor.

In 2024, Ngosso plans a grand event to mark the fifth anniversary of the Ethicslab. In this, he will have accomplished the entrenchment of modern philosophy in Africa, concomitant globalization of its multicultural potentials and tentacles, and finally, a re-configuration of the discipline for the myriad demands and expectations of the 21st century.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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War of the Worlds: Africa’s Next Great War

The international community’s limited attention span is laser-focused on jihadism in the Sahel and the imploding Horn of Africa. But interstate war is potentially brewing in the eastern DRC.



War of the Worlds: Africa’s Next Great War
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It’s happening again. A Rwandan-backed rebel force threatens the Congolese provincial capital of Goma while foreign intervention is cobbled together to bail out the struggling Congolese army. Unlike the last two or three times this happened, the conflict faces the prospect of horrific escalation into interstate war. Rwandan and Kenyan troops are racing headfirst into a confrontation. As Kenya airlifts troops into the east under the flag of the East Africa Community (EAC), the Rwandan soldiers embedded within the M23 rebellion show no signs of backing down. These two African states, each claiming to have the most professional force in the region, will soon trade blows.

Nearly thirty years of complex, multilayered, and tragic war in the Great Lakes have led to this latest escalation. The eastern DRC never recovered from the deadly inferno that was “Africa’s great war,” a bitter conflict that drew in nine countries and killed as many as five million. While peace was declared in 2003, the embers of war continued to burn in the eastern DRC, where the war had injected violence into local politics. Local violence continues to blend with national- and regional-level politics. Rwanda, which has complex and often competitive relationships with Uganda and Burundi, has a history of repeatedly creating and supporting rebellions in Congo. While this current M23 rebellion has many Congolese members with genuine grievances, the force is historically constructed and supported by the Rwandan state. While it is unclear what exactly motivated this offensive, some point to Rwandan concerns over the growing influence of rival Uganda in the DRC. The relationship between Uganda and Rwanda is not straightforward, and there are reports that Ugandan elements have supported M23. The regional tensions at play here are unclear, as the Ugandan and Congolese states are not unitary actors. According to leaked UN reports, Rwanda is directly assisting this latest iteration of M23 with infantry, artillery, and logistics. It has easily beat back the Congolese regulars and their militia allies and downed UN and Congolese military aircraft.

In response to the escalation, the regional EAC has announced the deployment of a military force at the invitation of the DRC, its newest member. Kenya seems to have been the power player behind this intervention and has begun deploying its forces into the fight. The international community has slowly lost interest in the region, writing off the turbulence in the Great Lakes as an endemic low-intensity conflict, ignoring the possibility of an explosion. Some in Kenya, the regional economic powerhouse, dream of an East African unified market where a pacified region ensures that Kenyan goods are supplied to Congolese consumers. Rwanda believes that it can only be secure if it has influence in Eastern Congo, where various rebel forces opposing the Rwandan regime have sheltered. When that influence wanes, Rwanda backs a rebellion to ensure that its influence continues.

Whether you believe that Rwandan meddling and Kenyan-backed EAC intervention are valid responses to the insecurity on their western flanks, the current escalatory track is dangerous. No one is backing down until blood is spilled. Both sides seem to underestimate the other’s will and ability.

The new kid on the block, Congolese President Felix Tshisekedi, demands a military solution and proclaims negotiations a failure. He is inviting foreign armies across the region into the country to bring him the peace he needs to salvage his falling popularity. All the while, the badly needed security sector reform remains stalled by the great Congolese patronage machine. Under the EAC regional force’s flag, Ugandan and Burundian forces are now in the DRC to pursue their own enemies on Congolese soil, raising the possibility of inciting countermobilization. The eastern Congolese conflict ecosystem often reacts to foreign bodies with a violent immune response that would further inflame the conflict.

The limited attention span that the international community reserves for Africa is laser-focused on jihadism in the Sahel and the imploding Horn of Africa. Former US National Security Council Africa lead Cameron Hudson pronounced on Twitter and to The Telegraph that the war in Tigray was “the new great war for Africa.” Unfortunately, the ashes of the last great war are being stoked yet again. Few players in the international game seem to realize the stakes.

The US did send its top diplomat, Secretary of State Antony Blinken, to talk to both the Congolese and Rwandans. Blinken’s public statements were ripe with both-sidesisms and seemed to accept Rwandan behavior as a response to Congolese support to the genocidal Rwandan FDLR rebel group—a problematic assumption. The Congolese political elite, when being generous, complain that the US position is muddled and confused. This reasonable view is much less popular than theories that accuse the Americans of actively backing Rwandan president Kagame’s plots. Unfortunately, these conspiracy theories are grounded in real historical US blindness to—and occasional support for—destructive Rwandan interventionism in the late 1990s.

The apathetic international response to the crisis stands in marked contrast to the global response to the previous M23 rebellion nearly ten years ago, when the US publicly pressured Rwanda to withdraw support for the group. In 2013, a combination of the Southern African Development Community’s intervention under the UN flag, the rise of a capable Congolese army colonel, and US pressure led to successful negotiations with Rwanda and the defeat of M23. This time, attempts by the EAC to bring a diplomatic solution have failed thus far, and it seems that military pressure is the only effective tool the community can bring to bear.

This conflict is not doomed to descend into a larger interstate war, but the region as a whole will have to grapple with the consequences if it does. The international community must bring more diplomatic levers to bear, and the EAC must question the sweeping mandate of their current intervention. Regardless, the war is on an escalatory path, and the Congolese of North Kivu will suffer first as foreign forces battle over their home yet again.

Evan Nachtrieb graduated with an honors bachelor’s degree in political studies from Pitzer College last May, where he wrote his thesis on protest and insurgency trends south of the Sahara. He is currently in California.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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Twitter: Let It Burn!

Whether or not Twitter survives should be irrelevant to those committed to building a democratic public sphere.



Twitter: Let It Burn!
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Elon Musk finally bought Twitter. Although everyone expected the move to quickly prove foolhardy, the speed of the implosion has been impressive. The latest gaffe is a failed attempt to monetize verification by requiring paid subscriptions for them, which has led to all manner of comical impersonations (one macabre highlight was a “verified” George W. Bush account tweeting “I miss killing Iraqis. “Tony Blair” responded with “Same tbh”). Some are watching with shock and horror and wondering if Twitter can be saved. But, when sulfur and fire rains, it is best not to look back.

Africa Is a Country managing editor, Boima Tucker, put it best some years ago: “Contrary to the utopian dreams of the early internet, the idea of a more democratic communications space has given way to a system of capitalist exploitation.” The thing to reckon with is the extent to which we have exaggerated the emancipatory potential of networked communication and social media, partly owing to our own psychic overinvestments in it. Which is not to deny that it has never shown democratic and egalitarian potential, but that’s never been what Twitter is forThere can be no right platform in the wrong world.

What was Twitter for then? In the New York Review of Books, Ben Tarnoff describes it as a “network of influence.” In a world characterized by the economization of everything, social media is the place to commodify the self, to transform one’s unique traits and personality into a product for public display. The main imperative online is to “stay on brand,” to cultivate an appealing enough persona in the endless “production of new genres of being human.”

The key contradiction of social media use, of course, is that even though these platforms appear to us as complete products that we participate in and consume, we are the ones responsible for ensuring their possibility in the first place. As the media scholar Christian Fuchs notes, “Digital work is the organization of human experiences with the help of the human brain, digital media and speech in such a way that new products are created. These products can be online information, meanings, social relations, artifacts or social systems.” Thus, it is us who create the value of these platforms.

In a better world, these digital communications platforms would be democratically owned and operated. But one also wonders if in a better world they would be as necessary. Perhaps, when we are less socially disaffected, living in societies with social provision, an abundance of recreational public goods and less exploitative, dignifying work, then we would all have less reason to be online. For now, the question is: in a time when this ideal is nowhere close to being within view, how best can we use platforms like Twitter as tools to get us to that world?

The possible answers here are murky. Twitter seems like a critical piece of infrastructure for modern political life. Musk is not alone in thinking of it as a marketplace of ideas, as something like a digital town square. Yet, and especially in Africa, Twitter is not as popular a platform, and even on it, a minority of Twiteratti exert an outsized influence in terms of setting the discursive agenda. But setting aside the question of who is excluded from the digitalized public sphere of which Twitter is a cornerstone, the important question is whether the quality of political debate that takes place is healthy or desirable at all. Granted, it can be fun and cathartic, but at the best of times, amounts to hyper-politics. In Anton Jager’s explanation, this:

can only occur at a discursive level or within the prism of mediatic politics: every major event is scrutinized for its ideological character, this produces controversies which play out among increasingly clearly delineated camps on social media platforms and are then rebounded through each side’s preferred media outlets. Through this process much is politicized, but little is achieved.

We would lack critical self-awareness if we did not admit that Africa Is A Country is a venue whose existence greatly benefits from an online presence—so it goes for every media outlet. Tarnoff points out that “… if Twitter is not all that populous in absolute terms, it does exert considerable power over popular and elite discourses.” To lack an online presence is to reconcile oneself to irrelevance. Although, the news cycle itself is a disorienting vortex of one topic du jour to the next. It makes difficult the kind of long, slow, and sustained discourse-over-time that is the lifeblood of politics, and instead reduces everything into fleeting soundbites.

Nowhere is the modern phenomenon of what Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman called “pointillist time” more apparent than on Twitter. For Bauman, pointillist time is the experience of temporality as a series of eternal instants, and the present moment’s connection to the past and future “turns into gaps—with no bridges, and hopefully unbridgeable.” The consequence of this, is that “there is no room for the idea of ‘progress.’” Living through a mode where everything seems to be happening all at once, is both to experience time as what Walter Benjamin called “a “time of possibilities, a random time, open at any moment to the unforeseeable irruption of the new,” but curiously, at the same time, for everything to feel inert, and for nothing to seem genuinely possible.

For a while, notions of historical progress have been passé on the left, associated with Eurocentric theories of modernity. Now, more than ever, the idea is worth reclaiming. The Right today is no longer straightforwardly conservative, but nihilistic and anti-social, thriving on sowing deeper communal mistrust and paranoia. These are pathologies that flourish on Twitter. The alternative to media-fuelled hyper-politics and anti-politics is not real politics per some ideal type. Politics, in the first instance, is not defined by content, but by form. The reason our politics are empty and shallow is not because today’s political subject lacks virtues possessed by the subjects of yore. It’s because today’s political subject is barely one in the first place, lacking rootedness in those institutions that would have ordinarily shaped an individual’s clear sense of values and commitments. The alternative to digitized human association, as noted by many, is mass politics: only when the majority of citizens are meaningfully mobilized through civic and political organizations can we create a vibrant and substantive public sphere.

AIAC editor Sean Jacobs observed in his book, Media In Post-apartheid South Africa: “the larger context for the growing role of media in political processes is the decline of mass political parties and social movements.” Whether Twitter dies or not, and if it does, whether we should mourn it or not, should be beside the point for those committed to building a world of three-dimensional solidarity and justice.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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