Politics
Making Sense of the Lukewarm Response of African Leaders to the ‘Guangzhou Crisis’
9 min read.The mistreatment of Africans living in China has tested the quality of African leadership. The responses of African leaders to this crisis were predictably technical, tactful, and softly worded. This has generally been registered by the wider African public as a failure by the political elite to provide a voice and accountability to African citizens.
Back in early April, countless images, video footage and media reports emerged of the racial profiling and accompanying discrimination against Africans living in Guangzhou, the capital of China’s southern province of Guangdong and home to China’s largest African community. Amid public fear of the second wave of COVID-19 in China, people of African descent had become primary suspects as potential sources of the virus. They were rounded up and harassed by the Chinese police, forcibly evicted from their residences and hotels, and explicitly denied access to restaurants, shopping malls and even hospitals. Some had their passports confiscated and were targeted for forced testing and quarantine, regardless of their travel history, whether or not they tested negative for coronavirus, or had been in contact with known COVID-19 patients.
For many observers, especially less ardent followers of developments in China, the recent incidents in Guangzhou might seem unprecedented. The ideology of “race” in China, however, dates as far back as the late 19th century when Qing imperial reformers sought to revive China in the face of European and Japanese colonialist expansion. Race, “minzu” (nation or nationality) and nationalism have since been entrenched into Chinese republicanism since the early 20th century and are now institutionalised in the Chinese Communist Party.
Where racism is found in China today, no group seems to have been more racially maligned than persons of African descent. As detailed in a recent Human Rights Watch report, some job advertisements in China explicitly exclude “heiren” (or blacks) or offer less pay to Africans, while non-Africans receive better pay for the same jobs. The report also explains that, before the McDonalds “Black people cannot come in” sign, restaurants, shops and taxis had already been turning blacks away.
So, the fear of a COVID-19 resurgence only served to amplify this long-standing racial discrimination targeting Africans in China. On Weibo (one of the biggest social media platforms in China – China’s version of Twitter), for example, anti-African rants have increased following the second wave of COVID-19, especially after a Nigerian man allegedly assaulted a Chinese nurse while attempting to escape from his quarantine ward at a hospital in Guangzhou. Africans have since been compared to animals and referred to as “sanfei”, a pejorative term meaning “three illegals” (illegal entry, residence, and work), implying that Africans are undocumented migrants. Some Weibo users have campaigned against inter-marriages between Africans and Chinese in a bid to preserve the “purity” of the Chinese nation (zhonghua minzu), and calls for Africans to be deported have grown louder.
Where racism is found in China today, no group seems to have been more racially maligned than persons of African descent. As detailed in a recent Human Rights Watch report, some job advertisements in China explicitly exclude “heiren” (or blacks) or offer less pay to Africans…
The fierce anger, shock and indignation this aroused manifested on social media, mainly through the #ChinaMustExplain and #DeportRacistChinese campaigns. Africans and other observers vociferously condemned the discriminatory acts as racist, demanded explanations from China and pressured African governments and institutions to take action, including by effecting state-sponsored evacuations of Africans stranded in China.
African leaders’ muzzled response
The crisis presented Africa with a leadership moment as states and various societal actors raced to respond. Rather uncharacteristically, the African leaders who responded did so swiftly, albeit barely protesting Beijing’s maltreatment of Africans in Guangzhou. Also worth noting is that no African Head of State actually made a public statement on the incidents. It is only from the Twitter handle of the Office of the African Union Commission Chairperson that the online African community learned that the African Union had invited the Chinese ambassador to the African Union to express “extreme concern at allegations of maltreatment of Africans in Guangzhou”.
Various African governments – notably Ghana, Nigeria, Uganda and South Africa – summoned Chinese ambassadors in their countries to register their disappointment at the “ill-treatment and racial discrimination” against Africans. Several African ambassadors in Beijing wrote to China’s State Councillor and Foreign Minister, “immediately demand[ing] the cessation of forceful testing, quarantine, and other inhuman treatments meted out to Africans”. At the time of writing, no further diplomatic process seems to have been pursued by Africa’s political elites, at least in the immediate term. On the contrary, they publicly concluded, not even a week after the incidents took place, that the matter had been sorted out.
Taken together, the responses of African leaders were predictably technical, tactful, and softly worded. Needless to say, this has generally been registered by the wider African public as a failure by the political elite to provide a voice and accountability to their citizens at the highest level. On the one hand, African citizens were left feeling paralysed by the racism targeting their fellow Africans in Guangzhou. On the other hand, they were left feeling alienated and dismissed as their governments’ response to the situation left much to be desired. In effect, African governments circumvented their fundamental obligation to protect citizens – one of the most basic functions of a state in its capacity as “guardian” (as per Plato’s designation in the Republic) over its citizens.
Accordingly, either because of personal inclination or the emergent expectations of the general African public, various individuals and groups found themselves adopting a leadership role, or felt obliged to. A noteworthy example of this is of Femi Gbajabiamila, who transcended his orthodox role as Nigeria’s Speaker of the House of Representatives and, in a departure from diplomatic protocol and in search for a solution, openly expressed his dismay at the ill-treatment of Nigerians in China to Nigeria’s Chinese ambassador. In another instance, over 300 human rights groups and approximately 1,800 activists in Africa penned an open letter to the Chairperson of the African Union, “strongly condemn[ing] the recent acts of discrimination, xenophobia and racism against the Africans in China” and called for “immediate remedial action”.
On the one hand, African citizens were left feeling paralysed by the racism targeting their fellow Africans in Guangzhou. On the other hand, they were left feeling alienated and dismissed as their governments’ response to the situation left much to be desired.
Meanwhile, as calls to African leaders for state-sponsored evacuations grew, Ugandan musician-turned-politician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, offered to partner with an American businessman, Neil Nelson, to airlift 285 Ugandans and other Africans from Guangzhou. But his goodwill gesture was declined. Moreover, Uganda’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs allegedly advised him to leave the matter of stranded Ugandans to President Yoweri Museveni, reminding him it was the president’s job to protect Ugandans abroad. The governments of Kenya and Nigeria assisted their stranded citizens to find a way out of China.
It is thus conceivable that the perceived failure of Africa’s political elites to frame the situation in Guangzhou in a way that provided a sense of organisation and direction saw other Africans step up to take the lead in framing the situation in a way that provided a viable basis for action. Interestingly, it was then left to African leaders and Chinese authorities to react to the framing of the context that was presented by African citizens and their allies.
Noticeably, Beijing’s response followed a predictable pattern: from not commenting on the allegations at all; to dispelling the claims as rumours; then further describing them as a “wedge-driving attempt” by the U.S. to “smear China”; and finally (couched in the usual “mutual support and cooperation” and “friendship” language it uses to describe its relations with Africa) passively acknowledging the accusations as “reasonable concerns and legitimate appeals”. There has been no explicit apology, and by extension, no categorical acceptance of culpability from Beijing. Guangzhou authorities have, however, put a raft of new measures in place to combat discrimination against Africans and other foreigners in China since early May.
The official counter-responses by both African and Chinese authorities were exclusively elitist, despite being inspired by the response and activism of African netizens. Instead of responding in a more authentic manner, geared towards providing a lasting solution to this critical challenge facing the populations they claim to represent, Africa’s leaders were more focused on preserving the fundamentals of the elite-level relationship between African states and China. While this approach has implications for China’s relations with African governments, it has certainly had the unintended consequence of deepening and further exposing the scepticism held by many African citizens towards China and its collaboration with African ruling elites.
Quite glaringly, the flare-up in Guangzhou coincided with efforts by African governments to secure debt relief from China owing to severe economic disruptions linked to COVID-19. In mid-April, the G-20 and international financial institutions had granted debt reprieves until the year’s end to 40 African countries from the total 76 eligible countries. This followed the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s earlier approval of six-months debt relief for 25 countries, 19 of them in Africa.
Given the magnitude of Africa’s debts, and China’s “special role” in the continent’s debt relief campaign, it seems that African governments found themselves having to decide between publicly speaking up for their mistreated population in Guangzhou, on the one hand, and jeopardising the opportunity for possible debt relief from China, on the other. Ostensibly stuck between a rock and a hard place, it is, therefore, highly likely that their muzzled response was an attempt to protect the cause of possible debt relief by China.
Previous cases show that political elites from some of Africa’s most indebted countries have backed Beijing on questionable matters: Uganda publicly reaffirmed Beijing’s sovereignty over Hong Kong at the height of the island’s pro-democracy protests in 2019; and 22 African states, including Angola (which alone accounts for up to 30 per cent of China-Africa loans), Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe (with notably strong relations with China) backed Beijing’s mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities in the Xinjiang region of northwest China. This shows, however implicitly, that the response to incidents in Guangzhou was largely influenced by the transactional character of Africa’s relations with China.
Given the magnitude of Africa’s debts, and China’s “special role” in the continent’s debt relief campaign, it seems that African governments found themselves having to decide between publicly speaking up for their mistreated population in Guangzhou, on the one hand, and jeopardising the opportunity for possible debt relief from China, on the other.
Similarly, the official responses showed how the institutionalised narratives of those in formal leadership positions can easily be established as the dominant narratives, thus stifling more marginal attempts to frame contexts. In this way, emergent leadership can easily be superceded by institutionalised leadership, especially when marginal voices are unable to build up a critical mass.
Furthermore, the petty “Whose country is most racist?” blame game that unfolded between China and the U.S. following the Western media’s initial coverage of the events in Guangzhou illustrates how a situation that Africans tried to frame around their experiences was instrumentalised as a gambit in the US-China rivalry. This disturbing but unsurprising expropriation of African agency across the board suggests that the concerns of African actors only matters insofar as they affect big power politics.
Making sense of the response through a leadership lens
Reflecting on the work of Professor Funmi Olonisakin, the renowned peace, security and leadership scholar, one cannot help but draw on at least three insights that are important for our understanding of the response by Africa’s political elites to early April’s incidents in Guangzhou.
First, the Guangzhou incidents show that effective leadership is a function of the interaction between the person who emerges as the leader and the situation at hand, where the situation consists of the followers and the context confronting them. In being interactive, leadership is by nature dialectical; that is, it is shaped through the interplay of at least two points of reference – that of the leader and of the led. This dialectic is often the source of powerful internal tensions within leadership situations. What this situation illustrates about followership in Africa is how, despite the often defunct relationship between African leaders and their followers, the double crisis presented by the pandemic and the mistreatment of African citizens in China caused a brief shift in the ways that African publics prototyped their leaders as they anticipated a response. Research has shown how, in extreme situations, followers tend toward primitive prototyping of their leaders, and develop a desire for powerful, charismatic and protective leadership. This is useful for thinking about the reasonable expectation from African citizens for more proactive, protective and robust responses to the situation in Guangzhou, despite potentially not expecting this kind of leadership in ordinary contexts as African leaders have poor track records on accessibility, accountability and delivery.
Second, the incidents reveal that situations make leaders. The Guangzhou situation proved to be a real test of the quality of leadership that exists on the African continent. When the appeals by ordinary Africans for direction in this moment of crisis left them feeling they were not being led, emergent leadership became apparent in diverse ways across the continent. As Africans looked to their leaders to frame and concretise the situation for what it truly was, the absence of a unified pattern of meaning provided impetus for the negation of leadership. Femi Gbajabiamila, Bobi Wine, the group of civil society organisations and activists, together with the African online community, mobilised meaning by articulating what Africa’s political elites left implicit or unsaid, and in so doing, enacted a system of shared meaning that provided a basis for organised action. Thus framed, the nature of leadership and how it is exercised in relation to societal mobilisation are central to understanding the response patterns and the outcomes achieved in this crisis situation. A comprehensive response to the situation in Guangzhou required certain types of action, as articulated by the needs of the Africans in Guangzhou and the voices of the individuals and groups that engaged in leadership to amplify these needs. Arguably, therefore, the interplay between African leaders and the population they claim to represent within the context of incidents in Guangzhou made some leaders in Africa, while vitiating others.
When the appeals by ordinary Africans for direction in this moment of crisis left them feeling they were not being led, emergent leadership became apparent in diverse ways across the continent.
Third, and perhaps more significantly, “the sense of common purpose between the person(s) engaging in leadership and the population to whom leadership is directed” – or mutuality – remains an important indicator for assessing the exercise of leadership in any situation. Mutuality between Africa’s leaders and the people they lead was clearly in short supply in the various responses to dealing with the Guangzhou situation. Arguably, therefore, the manner in which influence was exchanged between Africa’s political elites and the African public that looked up to them for direction in this moment of crisis was far from compelling.
Forging new paths
As reporting on the situation in Guangzhou begins to slow, it is worth emphasising the need for Africa’s leaders to continue working toward a comprehensive and clearly articulated China strategy, both at the state and continental level. This strategy not only needs to set out diplomatic and economic policies for engaging China, but also needs to articulate how African citizens and people-to-people relations fit into visions for the future of Africa-China relations. In the long-term, as David Mwambari prescribes, Africa needs to look at itself differently for the rest of the world to seriously consider it as a partner [emphasis intended].
The quality of leadership exercised on the continent, as illustrated, has so much to offer this debate. In the short term, African governments, together, preferably through the African Union, need to exercise leadership by publicly and unequivocally calling on the Chinese government to accept responsibility for the racially-driven maltreatment of Africans in China and enforce the already-in-place anti-discrimination measures against Africans, in particular. Short of this, the trust deficit in the relationship between the broader African public and their leaders will continue to widen, and the opportunities for the exchange of influence between the political elites and African citizens will spiral downwards, especially on matters concerning Africa-China relations.
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Politics
Is Somalia’s Quest for Membership of the EAC Premature?
Somalia must first ensure sustained progress in stability, infrastructure development, governance, and economic growth before considering full membership of the East African Community.
The current members of the East African Community (EAC) are Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan. The Somali Federal Government, under the leadership of Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, has expressed a strong interest in joining the EAC, sparking questions among Somali citizens as to whether the country is ready to join such a large and complex regional bloc.
During President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud initiated Somalia’s pursuit of EAC membership during his previous term as a president from 2012 to 2017. However, little progress was made during his first term and, following his re-election, President Hassan reignited his pursuit of EAC membership without consulting essential stakeholders such as the parliament, the opposition, and civil society. This unilateral decision has raised doubts about the president’s dedication to establishing a government based on consensus. Moreover, his decision to pursue EAC membership has evoked mixed responses within Somalia. While some Somalis perceive joining the EAC as advantageous for the country, others express concerns about potential risks to Somalia’s economic and social development. President Hassan has defended his decision, emphasising that Somalia’s best interests lie in becoming a member of the EAC.
To assess Somalia’s readiness to join the EAC, the regional bloc undertook a comprehensive verification mission. A team of experts well versed in politics, economics, and social systems, was tasked with evaluating Somalia’s progress. The evaluation included a thorough review of economic performance, trade policies, and potential contributions to the EAC’s integration efforts. During this process, the team engaged with various government institutions and private organisations, conducting comprehensive assessments and discussions to gauge Somalia’s preparedness.
One of the key requirements for Somalia is demonstrating an unwavering commitment to upholding principles such as good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Somalia must also showcase a vibrant market economy that fosters regional trade and collaboration.
Successful integration into the EAC would not only elevate Somalia’s regional stature but would also foster deeper bonds of cooperation and shared prosperity among the East African nations. While this is a positive step towards regional integration and economic development, there are several reasons for pessimism about the potential success of Somalia’s membership in the EAC.
Somalia must also showcase a vibrant market economy that fosters regional trade and collaboration.
Somalia has faced significant challenges due to prolonged conflict and instability. The decades-long civil war, coupled with the persistent threat of terrorism, has had a devastating impact on the country’s infrastructure, economy, governance systems, and overall stability.
The following fundamental factors raise valid concerns about Somalia’s readiness to effectively participate in the EAC.
Infrastructure development
Infrastructure plays a critical role in regional integration and economic growth. However, Somalia’s infrastructure has been severely damaged and neglected due to years of conflict. The country lacks adequate transportation networks, reliable energy systems, and while communications infrastructure has improved, internet penetration rates remain low and mobile networks – which are crucial for seamless integration with the EAC – can be unavailable outside of urban centres. Rebuilding such infrastructure requires substantial investments, technical expertise, and stability, all of which remain significant challenges for Somalia.
Political stability and governance
The EAC places emphasis on good governance, democracy, and the rule of law as prerequisites for membership. Somalia’s journey towards political stability and effective governance has been arduous, with numerous setbacks and ongoing power struggles. The lack of a unified government, coupled with weak state institutions and a history of corruption, raises doubts about Somalia’s ability to meet the EAC’s standards. Without a stable and inclusive political environment, Somalia may struggle to effectively contribute to the decision-making processes within the regional bloc.
Economic development and trade
Somalia’s economy has been heavily dependent on the informal sector and faces substantial economic disparities. The country needs to demonstrate a vibrant market economy that fosters regional trade and collaboration, as required by the EAC. However, the challenges of rebuilding a war-torn economy, tackling high poverty rates, and addressing widespread unemployment hinder Somalia’s ability to fully participate in regional trade and reap the benefits of integration.
Security Concerns
Somalia continues to grapple with security challenges, including the presence of extremist groups and maritime piracy. These issues have not only hindered the country’s development but also pose potential risks to the stability and security of the entire EAC region. It is crucial for Somalia to address these security concerns comprehensively and to establish effective mechanisms to contribute to the EAC’s collective security efforts.
Economic Disparity and Compatibility
Somalia’s economy primarily relies on livestock, agriculture, and fishing, which may not align well with the more quasi-industralised economies of the other EAC member states. This mismatch could result in trade imbalances and pose challenges for integrating Somalia into the regional economy. For instance, according to the World Bank, Somalia’s GDP per capita was US$447 in 2021 whereas it is US$2081 for Kenya, US$1099 for Tanzania, and US$883 for Uganda. Furthermore, Somalia faces significant economic challenges, including capital flight that drains resources from the country, contributing to its status as a consumer-based economy.
This divergence in economic structures could lead to trade imbalances and impede the seamless integration of Somalia into the regional economy. The substantial economic gap between Somalia and other EAC member states suggests a significant disparity that may hinder Somalia’s ability to fully participate in the EAC’s economic activities. Additionally, Somalia has yet to demonstrate fiscal or economic discipline that would make it eligible for EAC membership. While Somalia has a functioning Central Bank and the US dollar remains the primary mode of financial transactions, the risk of integration lies with the other EAC members; cross-border trade would occur in an environment of instability, posing potential risks to the other member state.
Somalia faces significant economic challenges, including capital flight that drains resources from the country, contributing to its status as a consumer-based economy.
While these fundamental challenges remain, it is important to acknowledge the progress Somalia has made in recent years. This includes the gradual improvement in security conditions, the establishment of key governmental institutions, and the peaceful transfer of power. One can also argue that many of these fundamental economic, infrastructure, political instability, and security concerns exist across the East African Community. However, what makes Somalia unique is the scale of the challenges it faces today. Somalia has adopted a federal political structure, which has not worked well so far. This level of fragmentation and civil political distrust makes Somalia’s case unique. More than ever, Somalia needs meaningful political and social reconciliation before it can embark on a new regional journey.
The absence of an impact assessment by the relevant ministries in Somalia is alarming. Without this assessment, it becomes challenging to make informed decisions about the potential benefits of joining the EAC and the impact on our economy and society. Conducting this assessment should be a priority for Somalia’s ministries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the potential benefits and risks involved in EAC membership. Furthermore, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s decision to pursue Somalia’s integration into the EAC lacks political legitimacy as a decision of this nature would normally require ratification through a popular vote and other legal means through parliament. The failure to achieve this could potentially allow another president in the future to unilaterally announce withdrawal from the EAC.
Fragile state of Affairs and internal disputes
The recent reopening of the Gatunda border post between Uganda and Rwanda after a three-year period of strained relations indicates a fragile state of affairs. The East African Court of Justice has ruled that Rwanda’s initial closure of the border was illegal, highlighting the contentious nature of inter-country disputes. Furthermore, Tanzania and Uganda have formally lodged complaints against Kenya, alleging unfair advantages in trade relations, and have even gone as far as threatening Kenya with export bans. These grievances underscore the underlying tensions and competition between member states, which could potentially hinder the harmonious functioning of the East African Community. These political and economic disagreements among member states increase the risks associated with Somalia’s membership. Somalia must carefully evaluate whether it is entering a united and cohesive bloc or one plagued by internal divisions. Joining the East African Community at this juncture carries the risk of being drawn into ongoing disputes and potentially being caught in the crossfire of inter-country rivalries.
Conflict in South Sudan
The prolonged conflict in South Sudan, which has been ongoing since its admission to the East African Community (EAC) in 2016, serves as a cautionary tale for Somalia. Despite the EAC’s efforts to mediate and foster peace in the region, the outcomes have been mixed, resulting in an unsustainable peace. This lack of success highlights the challenges faced by member states in resolving conflicts and maintaining stability within the community. Somalia must carefully evaluate whether its participation in the EAC will genuinely contribute to its stability, economic growth, and development, or if it risks exacerbating existing internal conflicts. Joining the community without a solid foundation of political stability, institutions, and peace could potentially divert resources and attention away from domestic issues, hindering Somalia’s progress towards resolving its own challenges. South Sudan’s admission to the EAC in 2016 was seen as a major step towards regional integration and stability. However, the country has been mired in conflict ever since, with two civil wars breaking out in 2013 and 2016. The EAC has been involved in mediation efforts, with mixed results.
Assessing Readiness
Somalia must evaluate the readiness of its institutions, infrastructure, and economy to effectively engage with the East African Community. Comprehensive preparations are crucial to ensure that joining the community is a well thought-out and strategic decision, rather than a hasty move that could further destabilise the nation. Somalia needs to assess whether its infrastructure, institutions, and economy are sufficiently developed to cope with the challenges and demands of integration. Premature membership could strain Somalia’s resources, impede its growth, and leave it at a disadvantage compared to more established member states.
Somalia must carefully evaluate whether it is entering a united and cohesive bloc or one plagued by internal divisions.
Somalia must ensure sustained progress in stability, infrastructure development, governance, and economic growth before considering full membership of the EAC. A phased approach that prioritises capacity building, institution-strengthening, and inclusive governance would enable Somalia to lay a solid foundation for successful integration and reap the maximum benefits from EAC membership in the long term. Failure to address these concerns would make Somalia vulnerable to exploitation and market monopolies by stronger economies, and could also risk a lack of seamless convergence for Somalia’s membership. While there is political will from EAC leaders to support Somalia’s membership, it is vitally important that they make the right decision for Somalia and the EAC bloc as a whole to ensure a successful integration. I believe that, at this juncture, the disadvantages of Somalia joining the EAC outweigh the benefits.
Politics
2023 Marks 110 Years Since the Maasai Case 1913: Does it Still Matter?
It was a landmark case for its time, a first for East Africa and possibly for the continent. A group of Africans challenged a colonial power in a colonial court to appeal a major land grab and demand reparations. They lost on a technicality but the ripple effects of the Maasai Case continue to be felt.
In the name Parsaloi Ole Gilisho there lies an irony. It was spelled Legalishu by the colonial British. Say it out loud. He gave them a legal issue, all right. And a 110-year-old headache.
This extraordinary age-set spokesman (a traditional leader called ol-aiguenani, pl. il-aiguenak) led non-violent resistance to the British, in what was then British East Africa, that culminated in the Maasai Case 1913. Ole Gilisho was then a senior warrior, who was probably in his mid- to late thirties. In bringing the case before the High Court of British East Africa, he was not only challenging the British but also the Maasai elders who had signed away thousands of acres of community land via a 1904 Maasai Agreement or Treaty with the British. This and the 1911 Agreement – which effectively rendered the first void – are often wrongly called the Anglo-Maasai Agreements. In Ole Gilisho’s view, and those of his fellow plaintiffs, these elders had sold out. The suit accused them of having had no authority to make this decision on behalf of the community. This represented a very serious challenge by warriors to traditional authority, including that of the late laibon (prophet) Olonana, who had signed in 1904, and died in 1911.
The British had expected the Maasai to violently rebel in response to these issues and to colonial rule in general. But contrary to modern-day myths that the Maasai fought their colonisers, here they resisted peacefully via legal means. They hired British lawyers and took the British to their own cleaners. Spoiler: they lost, went to appeal, and lost again. But archival research reveals that the British government was so convinced it would eventually lose, if the Maasai appealed to the Privy Council in London (they didn’t), that officials began discussing how much compensation to pay.
The facts are these. The lawsuit was launched in 1912. There were four plaintiffs, Ole Gilisho and three fellow Purko (one of the 16 Maasai territorial sections) Maasai. In Civil Case No. 91 they claimed that the 1911 Maasai Agreement was not binding on them and other Laikipia Maasai, that the 1904 Agreement remained in force, and they contested the legality of the second move. They demanded the return of Laikipia, and £5,000 in damages for loss of livestock during the second move (explained below). Ole Gilisho was illiterate and had never been to school. But he and his fellow plaintiffs were assisted by sympathetic Europeans who were angered by the injustice they saw being perpetrated against a “tribe” that British administrators conceded had never given them any trouble. These sympathisers included people who worked for the colonial government, notably medical Dr Norman Leys and some district officials, lawyers, a few missionaries, the odd settler, and a wider group of left-wing MPs and anti-colonial agitators in Britain.
What had led up to this? After the 1904 Agreement, certain groups or sections of Maasai had been forcibly moved from their grazing grounds in the central Rift Valley around Naivasha into two reserves – one in Laikipia, the other in the south on the border with German East Africa. The British had pledged that this arrangement was permanent, that it would last “so long as the Maasai as a race shall exist”. But just seven years later, the British went back on their word and moved the “northern” Maasai again, forcing them at gunpoint to vacate Laikipia and move to the Southern Reserve. In all, it is estimated that the Maasai lost at least 50 per cent of their land, but that figure could be nearer 70 per cent. The ostensible reason for moving them was to “free up” land for white settlement – largely for British settlers but also for South Africans fleeing the Boer War (also called the South African War).
But just seven years later, the British went back on their word and moved the ‘northern’ Maasai again, forcing them at gunpoint to vacate Laikipia and move to the Southern Reserve.
By the time the case came to court, Ole Gilisho had become a defendant, even though he was in favour of the plaint. So were at least eight other defendants. He had signed the 1904 Agreement, and now stood accused with 17 other Maasai of having no authority to enter into such a contract. The first defendant was the Attorney General. Ole Gilisho’s son-in-law Murket Ole Nchoko, misspelled Ol le Njogo by the British, and described as a leading moran (il-murran or warrior) of the Purko section, was now the lead plaintiff. The plaint was called Ol le Njogo and others v. The Attorney General and others.
Challenges facing the plaintiffs
Most Maasai were illiterate in those days, and this obviously placed them at a major disadvantage. They could not write down their version of events. They were forced to rely, in their dealings with officials and their own lawyers, upon translators and semiliterate mediators whose reliability was questionable. But it is evident, from the archival record which includes verbatim accounts of meetings between Maasai leaders and British officials in the run-up to the moves and case, that the level of verbal discourse was highly sophisticated. This comes as no surprise; verbal debate is a cornerstone of Maasai society and customary justice. Unfortunately, that alone could not help them here. They knew they needed lawyers, and asked their friends for help. Leys, who was later sacked from the colonial service for his activism, admitted in a private letter: “I procured the best one in the country for them.” This was more than he ever admitted openly.
Local administrators used intimidation and all kinds of devious means to try and stop the case. (I didn’t come across any evidence that the Colonial Office in London sanctioned this; in fact, it ordered the Governor not to obstruct the main lawyer or his clients.) They allegedly threatened Ole Gilisho with flogging and deportation. They threatened and cross-questioned suspected European sympathisers, including Leys and the lawyers. They banned Maasai from selling cattle to raise the legal fees, and placed the Southern Reserve in continuous quarantine. It was hard for the plaintiffs, confined to a reserve, to meet their lawyers at all. At one point, lawyers were refused passes to enter the reserve, and their clients were prevented from leaving it.
We hear Ole Gilisho’s voice in the archival record. Forced to give a statement explaining his actions to officials at Enderit River on 21 June 1912, when asked if he had called Europeans to his boma, he replied: “Is it possible for a black man to call a white man?” He denied having called the Europeans (probably lawyers or go-betweens), saying they had come to him. Leys later explained to a friend that Ole Gilisho had probably been “terrified out of his wits”, and hadn’t meant what he said.
What happened in court
The case was thrown out when it first came before the High Court in Mombasa in May 1913. The Maasai appealed, and that is when the legal arguments were fully aired by both sides – lawyers for the Crown and the Maasai. The appeal was dismissed in December on the grounds that the plaintiffs’ claims were not cognisable in municipal courts. The two agreements were ruled not to be agreements but treaties, which were Acts of State. They could not, therefore, be challenged in a local court. It was impossible for the plaintiffs to seek to enforce the provisions of a treaty, said the judges – “The paramount chief himself could not bring such an action, still less can his people”. Claims for damages were also dismissed.
The Court of Appeal’s judgement centred on the status of a protectorate, in which the King was said to exercise powers granted to him under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890. Irrational as it sounds, the Crown claimed that British East Africa was not British territory, and the Maasai were not British subjects with any rights of access to British law, but “protected foreigners, who, in return for that protection, owe obedience” to the Crown. As Yash Pal Ghai and Patrick McAuslan later put it, when discussing the case in a 1970 book: “A British protected person is protected against everyone except the British.” On the plus side, the judges ruled that the Maasai still retained some “vestige” of sovereignty. (The Maasai’s lawyer argued that they did not.) This triggered later moves by Maasai politicians, in the 1960s, to float the idea of secession from Kenya and the possible creation of a sovereign Maasai state. John Keen had threatened this in 1962 at the second Lancaster House Conference in London, attended by a Maasai delegation.
Alexander Morrison, lawyer for the Maasai, argued that British rule and courts were established in the protectorate, which had not been the case 30 years earlier. The Maasai were not foreigners but equal to other British subjects in every way. The agreements were civil contracts, enforceable in the courts, and not unenforceable treaties. If one took the Crown’s claim about Acts of State to its logical conclusion, he argued, a squatter refusing to leave land reserved for the Maasai could only be removed by an Act of State. None of his arguments washed with the judges. (See my 2006 book Moving the Maasai for a fuller account.)
Morrison advised his clients to appeal. It seems they couldn’t raise the funds. However, oral testimony from elders reveals a different story: Ole Gilisho had planned to sail to England to appeal to the Privy Council, but he was threatened with drowning at sea. This is impossible to verify, but it rings true.
In an interview carried out on my behalf in 2008 by Michael Tiampati, my old friend John Keen had this to say about the outcome of the case: “If the hyena was the magistrate and the accused was a goat, you should probably know that the goat would not get any form of justice. So this is exactly how it was that the Maasai could not get any fair justice from British courts.”
Contemporary African resistance
Unbeknown to the Maasai, there was growing anti-colonial resistance in the same period in other parts of Africa. All these acts of resistance have inspired African activists in their continuing struggles. To mention a few: the Chilembwe rebellion in Nyasaland, now Malawi (1915); the Herero revolt in German South West Africa, now Namibia (1904–1908); resistance in present-day Kenya by Mekatilili wa Menza (largely 1913-14); the First Chimurenga or First War of Independence in what is now Zimbabwe (1896–1897); and the Maji Maji rebellion in German East Africa, now Tanzania (1905–1907). But none of these rebellions involved lawsuits. The closest precedent may have been R vs Earl of Crewe, Ex-parte Sekgoma in 1910. Chief Sekgoma, who had been jailed by the British in the Bechuanaland Protectorate (now Botswana) after many attempts to remove him as chief, instructed his lawyer to bring a writ of habeus corpus against the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Crewe. He demanded to be tried in an English court, refusing an offer of release on condition that he agrees to live in a restricted area of the Transvaal. The suit was dismissed, the court ruling that the King had unfettered jurisdiction in a protectorate, and his right to detain Sekgoma was upheld. Sekgoma apparently said: “I would rather be killed than go to the Transvaal. I will not go because I have committed no crime – I wish to have my case tried before the courts in England or else be killed.” Freed in 1912, he died two years later.
Enduring myths
The case, and other key events in early twentieth century Maasai history, have given rise to several myths. They include the idea that the stolen land should “revert” to the Maasai after 100 years, but that was not stated in the 1904 Agreement, which was not limited in time, was not a land lease, and has not “expired” as many people claim. Neither agreement has. Keen knew this, but nonetheless called for the land to “revert”. Other myths include the idea that Olonana’s thumbprint was placed on the 1911 Agreement posthumously, and it must therefore be invalid. But neither his thumbprint nor name are on the document, which was “signed” by his son Seggi. Anyhow, Olonana was a key ally of the British, who had no reason to kill him (which is another myth).
The original of the 1904 Agreement has never been found, which has led some Maasai to believe that it never existed and therefore all the land must be restored and compensation paid for its use to date. There may be sound legal arguments for restorative justice, but this is not one of them. These myths are ahistorical and unhelpful, but may be understood as attempts to rationalise and make sense of what happened. Some activists may wish that the Maasai had resisted violently, rather than taken the legal route. Hence the insistence by some that there was a seamless history of armed resistance from the start of colonial rule. Not true. There are much better arguments to be made, by professional lawyers with an understanding of international treaty rights and aboriginal title, which could possibly produce results.
Ole Gilisho had planned to sail to England to appeal to the Privy Council, but he was threatened with drowning at sea.
Where does all this leave the Maasai today? Over the years, there has been much talk of revisiting the case and bringing a claim against Britain (or Kenya) for the return of land or reparations for its loss. None of this has resulted in concrete action. I attended a planning workshop in Nairobi in 2006 when plans were laid for a lawsuit. VIPs present included the late Ole Ntimama, scholar Ben Kantai and John Keen. Keen declared, with his customary flourish, that he would stump up a million shillings to get the ball rolling. I don’t know how much money was raised in total, but it disappeared into thin air. As did the lawyers.
Leading lawyers have advised that too much time has passed, and (unlike the successful Mau Mau veterans’ suit) there are no living witnesses who could give evidence in court. It is unclear whether the agreements still have any legal validity. The British government might argue, as it previously has, including in response to my questions, that it handed over all responsibility for its pre-1963 actions to the Kenyan government at independence. This is a ludicrous argument, which is also morally wrong. Former colonial powers such as Germany have accepted responsibility for historical injustices in their former colonies, notably Namibia. Has the time come for Ole Gilisho’s descendants to call a white man to court?
Politics
Who Is Hustling Who?
In Kenya, political elites across the spectrum are trying to sell off the country for themselves—capitulation is inevitable.
My drive to Limuru happened on the first Wednesday (July 19) of the protests. Everything was eerily quiet, Nairobi, renowned for its traffic jams, was quiet. Matatus and buses were parked in their hubs. Shops and stalls were closed. Even the hawkers that dot the roads and highways stayed home. Save for the heavy police presence everywhere, it felt like the country had come to a standstill.
We got to Kangemi shortly after the police had shot and wounded two protestors—the road was strewn with stones and armed riot police huddled by the side of the road waiting for the next wave of attacks that never came. In the end, six people would be shot to death throughout the country, and countless were injured and arrested. Coming from the US, where police arrest protestors and shoot black people, there were no surprises here. The US can hardly be the standard of good policing or democratic practices, but the lives lost simply for asking the government to center the people in its economic planning seemed especially cruel.
But it was the emptiness of the roads that made the whole drive eerie. Perhaps I was refracting what was happening in Kenya through what followed the 1982 coup in which 240 people were killed; or the ethnic clashes of the 1990s that culminated in the 2007 post-election violence. Yet, there was a general agreement among people that there was something different about the Kenya of today—that something was already broken and the nightmares to come were slowly but surely revealing themselves—like a bus carrying passengers and the driver realizing the brakes were out just as it was about to descend a steep hill.
Voting with the middle finger
But all this was predictable. President Ruto has been a known quantity since the 1990s when he led the violent Moi youth wingers. He and his running mate and later president, Uhuru Kenyatta, were brought in front of the ICC to face charges of crimes against humanity following the post-election violence in 2007. Some key witnesses disappeared and others were intimidated into silence. Who in their right mind gives evidence against those in control of the state? The ICC was already discredited as being Western-crimes-against-humanity friendly (the US has never been a signatory rightly afraid its former presidents, such as George Bush, would be hauled before the court). The ICC eventually withdrew the case in March 2015.
I kept asking everyone I met, why was Ruto voted in spite of his history? The answers varied: He rigged the elections; he did not rig and if he did, he only managed to be better at it than Raila Odinga; he appealed to the youth with the idea of building a hustler nation (what a telling term); the Kikuyus have vowed never to have a Luo president and therefore opted for Ruto who is Kalenjin as opposed to Odinga who is Luo.
I sat with older Kikuyu men in the little Nyama Choma spot in Limuru Market and they talked about a generational divide between the Kikuyu and youth (Ruto) and the elderly Kikuyus (Odinga). But the one I heard over and over again was that Kenyans are tired of the Kenyatta and Odinga political dynasties. As one Trump supporter was to say, they voted for him with the middle finger. And so, the Kenyans who voted for Ruto were giving a middle finger to the Kenyatta, Moi and Odinga political dynasties. But no one had really expected buyer’s remorse to kick in one year into the Ruto presidency.
I also asked about Odinga’s protests: what was the end game? One theory is that he was looking at power-sharing, having done it once before, following the 2007 elections. In our shorthand political language, he was looking for another handshake. Some said the people have a right to protest their government, and he is simply asking the government to repeal the tax hikes and reinstate the fuel subsidies. Others believed that he wants to be a genuine and useful voice of opposition for the good of the country and its poor.
My own theory is that he is attempting a people-powered, centered, democratic, and largely peaceful takeover—where people take to the streets to overthrow an unpopular government. We saw this in Latin America in the 2000s. In response to Odinga’s absence during the three days of protests (he was sick), some leaders in his Azimio party have started using this language. The only problem with this strategy is that the sitting government has to be wildly unpopular. Ruto still has a lot of support, meaning that he does not have to compromise or give up power. It was to my mind turning into a stalemate and I was worried that the state would respond with more state-sponsored violence.
But real economics broke the stalemate. In a country where people are barely surviving and the majority are poor without savings to rely on, or relatives to reach out to for help, the hawkers, small stall and shop owners simply went back to work. In other words, those that would have been hurt the most by three days of protests (a day at home literally means a day without food for the family) simply went back to work, and the matatus and buses hummed back to life, slowly on Thursday and full throttle by Friday.
Saturday around Westlands might as well have been as busy as a Monday as people overcompensated for lost time to either sell or shop. If the protests were going to succeed the opposition (composed of some of the wealthiest families in Kenya, including Odinga’s) really should have thought about how best to protect those who would be the most affected. They should find legal and innovative ways to put their money where their political mouths are.
Cuba as Kenya’s north star
Odinga had to change tactics and called for a day of protest against police violence instead of three-day weekly protests in perpetuity. He is now in danger of turning into a caricature of his old revolutionary self and becoming an Al Sharpton, who instead of protesting the American government for the police killings of black people, protests the police themselves leaving the government feeling sanctimonious. Obama or Biden could weigh in, in righteous indignation without offering any real change (remember Obama’s emotional pleas over gun shootings and police shootings as if he was not the one occupying the most powerful office in the US)?
The one question that keeps eating at me is this: why is the most apparent outcome at the time a surprise later? Ruto was always going to sell off Kenya with a percentage for himself and his friends. Odinga was always going to capitulate. The end result is that the Kenyan bus will continue to careen on without brakes. So, what is to be done?
I was in Cuba earlier this year. I got a sense of the same desperation I felt in Kenya but the difference is Cubans have free access to healthcare, education, housing, and food security. They have free access to all the things that make basic survival possible. Before calling for the tax hikes and cutting fuel subsidies might it not have been more prudent to have a safety net for Kenyans? Would that not have been the most logical thing? But of course not, Ruto is acting at the behest of the IMF and big money. Ruto has learned the art of pan-African political rhetoric. Abroad he can call for a different non-US-centered economic system and castigate the French president over paternalism but at home, his politics are hustler politics.
Life in Cuba is difficult, as a result of relentless sanctions from the US, but it is far from impossible. It remains the north star for those who understand discussions around fundamental change as the only starting point. We can have arguments about the nature of those fundamental changes, but we can all agree we should not be a country where one family, say the Kenyatta family, owns more than half a million acres of land. Or where, as Oxfam reported, four individuals hold more wealth than that held by 22 million Kenyans. The kind of politics that begin with a necessity for fundamental change will obviously not come from Ruto.
But one hopes it can still come from the Odinga camp. Or even better, from a genuinely progressive people-powered movement that has inbuilt questions of fundamental change in its political, economic, and cultural platform.
In spite of the empty roads, Limuru Market was thriving and Wakari Bar kept its reputation as one of the best places for Nyama Choma and for lively political conversations. People are paying attention, after all, it is their lives and livelihoods on the line. Politicians, especially those in the opposition and the political left should listen as well.
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This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site every week.
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