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FROM ZERO VISION TO VISION ZERO: Eliminating traffic violence in Kenya is possible

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Kenyan roads are among the most dangerous in the world and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that decision-makers in government prefer to keep them that way. By JACQUELINE M. KLOPP

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FROM ZERO VISION TO VISION ZERO: Eliminating traffic violence in Kenya is possible
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The just-concluded holiday season saw people take to the roads en masse. Like in every holiday season, there were several road crashes that led to the death of people. Perhaps this a good time to reflect on why we seem to have made so little progress in addressing this form of deadly violence.

Across the globe, vehicles kill great numbers of people – about one person every 24 seconds. Road crashes are now the number one killer of young people over five years of age. The idea that this massive amount of death can be captured by the term “accidents” needs challenging. What we are talking about is traffic violence caused by deliberate action or inaction in the face of knowledge about how to prevent these deaths.

In African countries with relatively low motorisation rates, citizens primarily use non-motorised means of transport or public service vehicles. This presents an opportunity to build particularly safe streets. Instead the number of deaths per vehicle is sadly very high. The Nigerian trauma doctor, Ola Orekunrin, notes that this is much neglected by the public health community.

Kenya is no exception. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that every year between 3,000 and 13,000 people (mostly pedestrians, cyclists and boda boda riders) die in road crashes. The National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), which to its credit is now trying harder to report “accidents”, tells us that 3,146 people were killed on Kenyan roads last year; most of them were pedestrians. The actual number of deaths is likely to be much larger as many are not reported, especially in remotes areas, and in many cases police do not follow through to discover the fate of victims who pass away in hospitals.

Many more people, including many children, are maimed, left with disabilities or traumatised. Road crashes impose enormous burdens on individuals, their families and communities, the health care system, and the country. Victims must deal with medical bills, legal and insurance wrangles, loss of work and abilities, great emotional distress and grief. As economically productive people die or become disabled or impoverished, the country as a whole takes an enormous economic hit. Some estimates suggest that over 5.6 per cent of Kenya’s GDP is lost to crashes.

A new approach: Vision Zero

The sheer magnitude of this carnage and suffering should prod us towards some new thinking based on a deeper analysis of what causes this form of violence. Indeed, understanding road deaths as a form of violence is the first critical step.

People make deliberate choices at an individual level (to drive while drunk, for example) and also at a policy level (to build streets without safe pedestrian facilities) that result in violence. We should also learn from places where real declines have occurred in road fatalities. In these places, this violence is not accepted as a normal price to pay for mobility, and the goal is, in fact, set for zero deaths or “Vision Zero”.

The sheer magnitude of this carnage and suffering should prod us towards some new thinking based on a deeper analysis of what causes this form of violence. Indeed, understanding road deaths as a form of violence is the first critical step.

Vision Zero interventions start with the premises that humans are flawed and likely to make mistakes in judgement and also that vehicles are very dangerous and get more so with speed. As one of the architects of this approach, Dr. Claus Tingvall, emphasises, “In every situation a person might fail. The road system should not.” Based on this premise, people have to take a more systems-based approach and get to work by designing streets and rules on streets that reflect these realities.

Evidence exists that the “Vision Zero” approach works. In 1997, Sweden’s parliament made it law, giving it force, prominence and legitimacy. The main policy innovation was to place responsibility for road safety squarely on the system’s designers and also to shift the paradigm from acceptance of a certain number of road deaths to the idea that this violence should be eliminated entirely. This meant promoting a collection of measures, including using research and data, to actively redesign streets and to create incentives to reduce crashes.

In Sweden this approach seems to have worked. Official statistics suggest the number of road deaths halved and that the number of deaths among car users decreased by 60 per cent between 2000 and 2010. One scholarly study notes that “while the decrease has stagnated somewhat after 2010, Sweden’s roads are still among the world’s safest, with only 3 of every 100,000 Swedes dying on the roads each year, compared to 10 in the USA.” (In Kenya, WHO estimates that this figure is 34.4 per 100,000 people.) Since the Swedish experiment, “Vision Zero” programmes have been adopted by cities like New York and Los Angeles, working better in the former than in car-dominated Los Angeles in part because New York was more aggressive about redesigning dangerous intersections and reducing speeds.

To illustrate how a Vision Zero approach works, Dr Tingvall gives an example of an intervention in a rural area where people drink a lot. It was discovered that people were dying while trying to pass each other on a two-lane road. To address this specific problem, one intervention that worked was to turn the two-lane road into a narrower single lane, slowing everyone down and making passing impossible. Along with other measures, such as discouraging drinking and driving (also critical in Kenya), this led to a decline in crashes and deaths. Narrowing street space for cars appears to have a psychological impact on drivers and to cause them to slow down.

Another example is keeping roundabouts in place instead of lights at four-way intersections, because even though the crashes might be reduced by lights, the higher speeds involved in collisions in a four-way intersection are deadlier. Human life rather than speed should take the priority in design.

Vision Zero for Kenya?

Could Kenya take such a “Vision Zero” approach and adapt it to its situation? Would it work? I will argue that advocating, adopting and adapting some aspects of this approach seem critical to addressing traffic violence in Kenya. A systems approach would, in fact, mean facing some of the entrenched problems on Kenyan roads (and a health care system that needs more resources to cater to the scale of the problem but we will focus on prevention).

Some of these problems include: 1) “failure” of police enforcement which, as we all know, is a system of extraction from road users; 2) failure of the government (especially the engineers who choose for Kenyans what kinds of roads to build) to take responsibility for systems problems such as design that kills; and 3) car-dominant and elitist investment decisions with a self-interested focus on rapid highways for a minority of car users.

We know that the police enforcement system in Kenya is broken and needs repair. In 2009, the Ransley Report on Police Reform argued that the traffic police need revamping. This includes building traffic management systems that do not require their direct involvement. The police also need better training and ICT systems, including for keeping track of crashes. The NTSA is working on some of these reforms. While this is a step in the right direction, it does not address some of the deep problems that undermine enforcement.

It is well known that some senior police officers and politicians who are supposed to play an oversight role over traffic police and public service vehicles have serious interests in the sector. The 2009 Ransley Report noted the profound conflict of interest and breach of ethics when traffic police own public service and breakdown vehicles and emphasised that “the problem of conflict of interest has become so widespread that it has undermined the capacity of police to impartially enforce regulations”. We skirt this issue every time there is an outcry after yet another horrific crash. The reaction is always to blame and crack down on matatus as if public service vehicles are the only problem rather than the broader institutional context in which they operate.

The Ransley Report also suggests harsher fines that can be tied to all offenders, including private vehicle owners. Ideally, those who consistently get into crashes should be made to pay higher insurance rates and should eventually lose their licences. However, this approach, especially with the current enforcement problems, is unlikely to work in the near term under present conditions. Instead of only looking at punishment as a means of penalising irresponsible road users, a Vision Zero approach would push us to ask what kind of positive incentives and design changes we can use to address traffic violence.

It is well known that some senior police officers and politicians who are supposed to play an oversight role over traffic police and public service vehicles have serious interests in the sector. The 2009 Ransley Report noted the profound conflict of interest and breach of ethics when traffic police own public service and breakdown vehicles and emphasised that “the problem of conflict of interest has become so widespread that it has undermined the capacity of police to impartially enforce regulations”.

In the matatu sector, one of the potentially largest but most neglected factors in road crashes is the poor labour conditions of drivers. This includes working very long hours in difficult conditions and a target system (instead of a fixed salary) that encourages speeding and reckless driving. Emerging evidence from experiments in Nairobi suggest that drivers will slow down and improve driving if they are monitored with devices and paid more. eThekwini Municipality in South Africa is experimenting with Moja Cruise, a programme to give service contracts to minibus operators so that they get paid for better service, including reduced speed, and this can be monitored with tracking devices.

Rather than looking at positive incentives for change, the reaction of the Kenyan government always appears to be punitive, avoiding to take responsibility for its own failure to design a safer public transport system. Instead, it persists in blaming the matatus by imposing new costs and fines without putting resources into the system to reduce the incentives for drivers to speed and drive recklessly. An increase in punishment and requirements under the current poor enforcement system tend to raise revenues and feed the police extraction system, which ironically can mean that drivers will need to try to make up any lost revenue, probably by driving faster.

Secondly, we know, and the Vision Zero experiments have proven, that road design is also a big factor in crashes. A standard “safety audit” is available to test for many of these flaws. Kenyans know this: they talk about “black spots” – places that are well known for having an inordinate number of flaws that cause crashes and death. To my knowledge few of these black spots have been analysed and redesigned as a Vision Zero approach would demand. Mandatory safety audits by independent parties with real power to enforce safe design is also key and not yet required by law in Kenya.

Street guideline-but adapted to local conditions- are critically important to develop. This is an idea of what redesign can do for a street from the Global Street Guidelines developed by NACTO.

Despite international encouragement and available funding, the government has actively resisted improved standards for road designs. Advocates, including many road engineers, have been asking for these new standards, especially for urban roads where conflicts between pedestrians, cyclists, bodaboda, personal and freight vehicles as well as matatus are strong and need urgent addressing. Out of these conflicts emerge fatal encounters. When road designs prioritise rapid vehicles instead of a complete streets approach to creating a safe and orderly flow of people, including proper sidewalks, matatu stops and crossings for safe passage of pedestrians, the results are deadly. Indeed, the essential insight is that road designers must plan for the flow of people not vehicles.

Finally, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that some decision-makers in the Kenyan government are willing to accept the horrific price of traffic violence (even as its risks their own lives and the lives of those they love) for narrow material gain through road contracts built with minimal transparency and proper safety standards. They continue to distract attention with increasingly hollow refrains about personal responsibility (see this video of a public forum in 2012 on Thika Highway) while adamantly refusing to accept the kind of responsibility for safe systems design that Vision Zero demands.

Even with the increased rhetoric around bus rapid transit (BRT), we see the continued prioritisation of car-oriented investment projects without proper design and safety standards in place. When justifying these projects, proponents always cite a figure for time lost in traffic (ignoring pedestrians) but not the number of road deaths that seem to follow in the wake of these highways, which have long been discredited in most of the world as a means for addressing congestion. As one example, consider the absurd plan in Nairobi for yet another very expensive elevated highway from the airport to the CBD instead of a street and network redesign to improve existing flows of people.

This is all being done even as we have data to show that highway “improvements” have helped create massive numbers of death. The diagram below comes from a superb project by Elisabeth Resor and Ma3Route that mapped crashes over a 6-month period from May to October 2015. It is clear that the upgraded highways are where the most crashes and deaths happen. More data from the NTSA and a new soon-to-be-released study by the World Bank show that these highways are profoundly dangerous and need addressing immediately if we care about traffic violence.

This is heat map of crashes from Nairobiaccidents.com. It shows major black spots (areas with higher than average accident concentrations) in Nairobi; the darker the area the greater the number of crashes.

Even with the increased rhetoric around bus rapid transit (BRT), we see the continued prioritisation of car-oriented investment projects without proper design and safety standards in place. When justifying these projects, proponents always cite a figure for time lost in traffic (ignoring pedestrians) but not the number of road deaths that seem to follow in the wake of these highways, which have long been discredited in most of the world as a means for addressing congestion.

Yet, instead of looking this systems failure squarely in the face an (elevated) highway for rapid vehicle travel is being planned instead of a redesign and improvement of existing problematic highways, which, in turn, could actually address some of the congestion issues as well. For example, why not first focus on improved matatu and bus service on the Mombasa highway, including some form of BRT or dedicated service vehicle lanes, as well as better and safer pedestrian crossings and traffic management, and then see what else might be needed?

Given what we know about traffic violence and some of the best approaches to reducing it, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Kenyan authorities are deliberately failing to address road violence. New approaches and ideas are available, but perhaps some in charge may be distracted by money that can be made through continuing to build expensive, deadly roads. Instead of Vision Zero, it appears we have zero vision on moving forward.

This will continue if proponents of combatting traffic violence do not find ways to hold those designing the road systems to account. Adopting a Vision Zero approach may be a powerful step forward and way to do this. It reorients the responsibility to where it belongs and promotes some proven tools for going from roads for cars to safer, complete streets for people. It may also bring in new allies from cities and countries like Sweden that have proven methods for taming the violence on roads.

Given what we know about traffic violence and some of the best approaches to reducing it, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Kenyan authorities are deliberately failing to address road violence. New approaches and ideas are available, but perhaps some in charge may be distracted by money that can be made through continuing to build expensive, deadly roads. Instead of Vision Zero, it appears we have zero vision on moving forward.

This approach could build on some of the positive work the NTSA has been doing along with some of the counties. Nairobi, for example, has a strong Non-Motorised Transport Policy that includes as a key action item, new road design guidelines and prioritising walking along with traffic calming in the city centre.

A survey my centre conducted in 2015 showed that an overwhelming number of Nairobians want lower speed limits, especially in the vicinity of schools. Activists managed to pass a yet to be fully implemented Traffic Amendment Act 2017, which mandates actions for safer school travel including redesign and calming in streets around schools. A growing number of activists from the heroic “Lollipop Man” to civil society organisations are working to improve streets and safety. Vision Zero might just help give a new frame to push for badly needed change. Given the scale of the everyday terror and carnage of traffic violence in Kenya, it is at least worth a try.

Safari njema!

For further reading see the recent report At the Crossroads: The Politics of Road Safety in Nairobi by ODI and the latest WHO Global Status Report on Road Safety

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Jacqueline Klopp is a Research Scholar at the Center for Sustainable Urban Development at Columbia University.

Politics

Who Won Kenya’s “Nominations”?

Being nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine grass-roots legitimacy but it is hard not to suspect that some of the losers in the nominations process might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn.

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Who Won Kenya’s “Nominations”?
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Who won Kenya’s “nominations”, the tense and often unpredictable political process through which parties select which candidates they want to represent them in the general election scheduled for 9 August? That may sound like a silly question. Social media is full of photographs of smiling candidate clutching their certificates of nomination—surely we need to look no further for the winners?

But maybe we do. Beyond the individual candidates in the contests for nominations, there are other winners. One may be obvious: it seems the general feeling is that Deputy President William Ruto came out better from the nominations than did his principal rival in the presidential race, former opposition leader Raila Odinga—about which more below. However, for some, coming out on top in the nominations may prove a poisoned chalice. Where nominations are seen to have been illegitimate, candidates are likely to find that losing rivals who stand as independents may be locally popular and may gain sympathy votes, making it harder for party candidates to win the general election. This means that there are often some less obvious winners and losers.

One reason for this is that nominations shape how voters think about the parties and who they want to give their vote to, come the general election. Research that we conducted in 2017, including a nationally representative survey of public opinion on these issues, found that citizens who felt that their party’s nomination process had not been legitimate were less likely to say that they would vote in the general election. In other words, disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out. In 2017, this appeared to disadvantage Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), whose nomination process was generally seen to have been more problematic—although whether this is because they were, or rather because this is how they were depicted by the media, is hard to say.

In the context of a tight election in 2022, popular perceptions of how the nominations were managed may therefore be as significant for who “wins” and “loses” as the question of which individuals secured the party ticket.

Why do parties dread nominations?

The major parties dreaded the nominations process—dreaded it so much, in fact, that despite all their bold words early on about democracy and the popular choice (and despite investments in digital technology and polling staff), most of the parties tried pretty hard to avoid primary elections as a way of deciding on their candidates. In some cases that avoidance was complete: the Jubilee party gave direct nominations to all those who will stand in its name. Other parties held some primaries—Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA) seems to have managed most—but in many cases they turned to other methods.

That is because of a complicated thing about parties and elections in Kenya. It is widely assumed—and a recent opinion poll commissioned by South Consulting confirms this—that when it comes to 9 August most voters will decide how to cast their ballot on the basis of individual candidates and not which party they are standing for. Political parties in Kenya are often ephemeral, and people readily move from one to another. But that does not mean that political parties are irrelevant. They are symbolic markers with emotive associations – sometimes to particular ideas, sometimes to a particular regional base. ODM, for example, has been linked both with a commitment to constitutional reform and with the Luo community, most notably in Nyanza. So the local politician who wants to be a member of a county assembly will be relying mostly on their personal influence and popularity—but they know that if they get a nomination for a party which has that kind of emotive association, it will smoothen their path.

Disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out.

This means that multiple candidates vie for each possible nomination slot. In the past, that competition has always been expensive, as rival aspirants wooed voters with gifts. It occasionally turned violent, and often involved cheating. Primary elections in 2013 and 2017 were messy and chaotic, and were not certain to result in the selection of the candidate most likely to win the general election. From the point of view of the presidential candidates, there are real risks to the primary elections their parties or coalitions oversee: the reputational damage due to chaos and the awareness that local support might be lost if a disgruntled aspirant turns against the party.

This helps to explain why in 2022 many parties made use of direct nominations—variously dressed up as the operation of consensus or the result of mysterious “opinion polls” to identify the strongest candidate. What that really meant was an intensive process of promise-making and/or pressure to persuade some candidates to stand down. Where that did not work, and primaries still took place, the promise-making and bullying came afterwards—to stop disappointed aspirants from turning against the party and standing as independents. The consequence of all that top-down management was that the nominations saw much less open violence than in previous years.

So who won, and who lost, at the national level?

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates. That brings us to the big national winners and losers of the process. Odinga—and his ODM party—have come out rather bruised. They have been accused of nepotism, bribery and of ignoring local wishes. This is a particularly dangerous accusation for Odinga, as it plays into popular concerns that, following his “handshake” with President Kenyatta and his adoption as the candidate of the “establishment”, he is a “project” of wealthy and powerful individuals who wish to retain power through the backdoor after Kenyatta stands down having served two-terms in office. In the face of well-publicised claims that Odinga would be a “remote controlled president” doing the bidding of the Kenyatta family and their allies, the impression that the nominations were stage-managed from on high in an undemocratic process was the last thing Azimio needed.

Moreover, perhaps because Odinga seems to have been less active than his rival in personally intervening to mollify aggrieved local politicians, the ODM nominations process seems to have left more of a mess. That was compounded by complications in the Azimio la Umoja/One Kenya Alliance Coalition Party (we’ll call it Azimio from now on, for convenience). Where Azimio “zoned”—that is, agreed on a single candidate from all its constituent parties—disappointed aspirants complained. Where it did not zone, and agreed to let each party nominate its own candidate for governor, MP and so on, then smaller parties in the coalition complained that they would face unfair competition come the general election. That is why the leaders of some of these smaller groups such as Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua made dramatic (or theatrical, depending on your view) announcements of their decision to leave Azimio and support Ruto.

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates.

So Ruto looks like a nomination winner. But his success comes with a big price tag. His interventions to placate disgruntled aspirants involved more than soothing words. A new government will have lots of goodies to distribute to supporters—positions in the civil service and parastatals, diplomatic roles, not to mention business opportunities of many kinds. But the bag of goodies is not bottomless, and it seems likely that a lot of promises have been made. Ruto’s undoubted talents as an organizer and deal-maker have been useful to him through the nominations—but those deals may prove expensive for him, and for Kenya, if he wins the presidential poll.

Money, politics, and the cost of campaigns

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword. In the short term, many of them will have saved considerable money: depending on exactly when the deal was done, they will have been spared some days of campaign expenses—no need to fuel cars, buy airtime for bloggers, pay for t-shirts and posters, and hand out cash. But that will be a brief respite. The disappointed rivals who have gone independent will make the campaigns harder for them—and likely more expensive. The belief that they were favoured by the party machinery may mean that voter expectations are higher when it comes to handouts and donations on the campaign trail. And the fact they were nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine their grass-roots legitimacy.

Others may experience a similar delayed effect. Among the short-term losers of the nominations will have been some of the “goons” who have played a prominent physical role in previous nominations: their muscular services were largely not required (although there were exceptions). The printers of posters and t-shirts will similarly have seen a disappointing nominations period (although surely they will have received enough early orders to keep them happy, especially where uncertainty over the nomination was very prolonged). The providers of billboard advertising may have seen a little less demand than they had hoped for, although they too seem to have done quite well from selling space to aspirants who—willingly or not—did not make it to the primaries. But where the general election will be fiercely contested, entrepreneurs will likely make up any lost ground as the campaigns get going. In these cases, competition has been postponed, not avoided.

Those in less competitive wards, constituencies or counties—the kind in which one party tends to dominate in the general election—are unlikely to be able to make up for lost time. These “one-party” areas may be in shorter supply in 2022 than in the past, due to the way that the control of specific leaders and alliances over the country’s former provinces has fragmented, but there will still be some races in which it is obvious who will win, and so the campaigns will be less heated.

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword.

More definite losers are the parties themselves. In some ways, we could say they did well as institutions, because they were spared the embarrassment of violent primaries. But the settling of many nominations without primaries meant not collecting nomination fees from aspirants in some cases, and refunding them in others. That will have cost parties a chunk of money, which they won’t get back. That may not affect the campaigns much—the money for campaigns flows in opaque and complex ways that may not touch the parties themselves. But it will affect the finances of the parties as organizations, which are often more than a little fragile.

Are the losers actually the biggest winners?

Some losers, however, are really big winners. Think about those candidates who would not have won competitive primaries but were strong enough to be able to credibly complain that they had been hard done by due to the decision to select a rival in a direct process. In many cases, these individuals were able to extract considerable concessions in return for the promise not to contest as independents, and so disrupt their coalition’s best laid plans. This means that many of the losers—who may well have been defeated anyway—walked away with the promise of a post-election reward without the expense and bother of having to campaign up until the polls.

It is hard not to suspect that some of them might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn. In fact, some of them may have been aiming at this all along. For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome. Instead of spending the next three months in an exhausting round of funerals, fund-raisers and rallies, constantly worrying about whether they have enough fifty (or larger) shilling notes to hand out and avoiding answering their phones, they can sit back and wait for their parastatal appointment, ambassadorship, or business opportunity.

For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome.

For these individuals, the biggest worry now is not their popularity or campaign, but simply the risk that their coalition might not win the presidential election, rendering the promises they have received worthless. Those whose wishes come true will be considerably more fortunate—and financially better off—than their colleagues who made it through the nominations but fall at the final hurdle of the general election.

Separating the winners of the nominations process from the losers may therefore be harder than it seems.

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Politics

Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.

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Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning
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The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

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Politics

Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.

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Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement
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“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

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