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The Political Polling Season Is Upon Us: What You Need to Know – Part I

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This is the first of a series of articles that will review and comment on surveys related to the August 2022 general election, providing analytical tools to enable readers to assess their credibility and potential impact.

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The Political Polling Season Is Upon Us: What You Need to Know - Part I
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I have been engaged by The Elephant to provide its readers with a series of pieces about surveys related to the forthcoming election. They will both review and comment on such surveys published during the weeks since the previous piece, and highlight events that are deemed likely to influence the results of subsequent polls that will be likewise interrogated over the coming months. In doing so, the pieces aim to provide readers with several analytical tools to better enable them to make their own assessments of such surveys in terms of their credibility and potential impact — an issue that will also be considered, based mainly on the expressed reactions to them by key political actors and analysts. Given such ambitious aims, the author welcomes readers’ comments and suggestions.

More broadly — though not always explicitly — the series also seeks to address the question as to the contribution — positive or otherwise — such surveys make to Kenya’s still very much in-progress “democracy”, though largely leaving aside the profound and never-ending debate among scholars as to just what “democracy” means, and how its criteria can be empirically measured. Such an evaluation must unfortunately include both scientifically sound and bias-free polls, as well as those that fail to conform to such standards, whether or not such failure is obvious to those who consume them.

For transparency, let me begin with a brief personal note. As is widely known, I have been associated with several market research firms in Kenya as a research analyst, beginning with The Steadman Group in 2005. While we conducted a number of surveys on a variety of governance topics for individual and in some cases, confidential, clients, most of my work was in connection with the periodic surveys conducted on various public issues. This includes, in the “early years”, the 2005 constitutional referendum for which we conducted two polls, and the 2007 election, both of which attracted considerable attention from both the general public and the political class, and quite prominent, if not always accurate, media coverage.

I continued in this capacity after Steadman was sold to Synovate, a UK firm, in 2008, and then from 2012, when Ipsos, a French company, bought Synovate.  In March 2019, the management in Paris made a decision (for reasons that remain unclear – to me, at least) that the Kenya office would no longer conduct and release survey results “of a political nature” and therefore had no further need for a political scientist/analyst like me. Reverting to my earlier role as an independent consultant, I began part-time work with Ms. Maggie Ireri, who after resigning as Ipsos CEO in 2015 had launched her own market research firm, Trends and Insights for Africa (TIFA). In the last two years, we have conducted six national surveys on public issues (among other work) and are planning to continue to do so, with an increasing focus on the 2022 elections.

In brief, therefore, whereas I shall seek to be objective in my assessments of the current polling environment in Kenya in general and of the survey products of particular firms, including TIFA’s, I cannot guarantee my analyses will be completely free of unconscious bias, which shall be for my readers to judge. At the same time, I am confident that I now know much more about survey research than I did twenty years ago and recognize that I, along with my colleagues, could have done and still could do certain things better.

In subsequent articles, I will address the technical requirements of methodologically sound surveys, but for now, let us assume that all such requirements are met and that their results are accurate, within the limitations of survey science. Adopting this assumption, we can ask: of what use are election-related surveys?

In the last two years, we have conducted six national surveys on public issues (among other topics) and are planning to continue to do so, with an increasing focus on the forthcoming election.

Consumers of such surveys can be roughly divided into several overlapping categories, reflecting their needs and interests: candidates for elective office together with their strategists; the public at large and especially voters; the media; actual and potential campaign donor-supporters and investors; and regional and more distant governments.

While perhaps obvious, the specific ways in which such information may be put to use vary, largely depending on the user. Political parties and coalitions, for example, need to establish the popularity of potential candidates ahead of nominations. Subsequently, nominated (and independent) candidates may want to know how viable their campaigns are, and the potential impact of particular campaign strategies.

For their part, the media may use polls to decide how much coverage to give particular candidates and issues based on their popular appeal, in order to focus scrutiny on those deemed more likely to occupy important public offices, while at the same time aiming to attract a wider audience for purely commercial purposes.

Similarly, those prepared to invest in campaigns would want an accurate measure of the popularity of parties and candidates in order to more accurately calculate their potential for success, especially if their primary motivation is to benefit from the eventual victors, whether directly in terms of contracts, for example, or indirectly in terms of policies that support their material and/or ideological interests.

Yet another category of potential poll consumers are conflict prevention and mitigation actors who could use them to assess the likelihood of violence based (at least in part) on an assumption that the closer the result, the more likely there will be post-election contestation (especially if the official results are less than universally acknowledged as “true”). In addition, having a more accurate understanding of the issues that divide the country and the intensity of such divisions can also inform the development of strategies early enough to at least mitigate more serious conflict outcomes.

Such pre-election assessment benefits also apply to Investors whose decisions may depend on the likely future policy environment based on which parties and candidates, with what agendas, will be in power. Similar concerns also apply to foreign governments and NGOs whose operations and interests in the country are also likely to be affected by the make-up and orientation of the next government (in some cases, at both the county and the national level).

Three additional categories of poll-users can be identified.  First, there are academics and other researchers seeking to test hypotheses about campaign activity, political party processes, voter motivation, turnout levels, and the salience of particular political parties’ or candidates’ policies and identities in terms of attracting votes. Such analyses can be country-specific or part of wider, cross-national studies.  Second are the survey firms themselves.  They may use elections to test various methods of data collection and analysis both for internal purposes and to publicly demonstrate their ability to gather reliable information as a way to attract future business.

Finally, we have the voters – at least those whose votes are not “set in stone” due to embedded patronage relations or any of the various forms of automatic “demographic support” including but not limited to common ethnic identity or religious affiliation. They may wish to know the viability of particular political parties and candidates to ensure they don’t “waste” their votes, especially if the race(s) in question appear close.  (One challenging area of post-election research is to discover whether any voters actually changed their ballot choices based on an awareness of polls, since many respondents are not prepared to admit this.)

The obvious focus for all of these various entities is on the election’s outcome. However, beyond the “horse races”, such surveys can be used to reveal just how deeply divided any political community is, as well as the levels of confidence in election integrity among particular sections of the electorate, and how much faith they have in the utility of elections in terms of actually making a difference in their lives. The latter would be partly reflected in the level of participation in various aspects of the electoral process such as registering to vote, attending campaign rallies and other meetings and engaging in party nominations — in addition to turning out to vote on election day.

But all of these uses of election-related polls depend on one crucial factor: their credibility.   Unless poll consumers can be sure that the results are reasonably accurate, it would be folly to rely upon them for anything more than “entertainment”.  Here, a key factor inspiring such confidence is having results from a number of reputable firms that are largely similar.

Beginning with the first factor, we can speak of “safety in numbers” — the “numbers” here being not the survey results themselves, but the number of firms undertaking such election-related polls.  That is, the more firms that undertake such surveys, the easier it is to spot “outliers”, while also allowing for the calculation of average results in order to minimize inevitable, but hopefully minor, variations in methodology.

Unfortunately, with less than six months to the election, far fewer “political” polls have been released/published than was the case in connection with any of the last three general elections. This is mainly a consequence of the reduced number of firms engaged in such survey work for public release. Over that period, the most prominent among them was Ipsos, but which has been largely silent since late 2018, with its few releases on public issues completely avoiding “politics”.  In this regard, it has joined Strategic Africa (formerly Strategic Public Relations) and Consumer Insight, both of which undertook/released voting-intention polls prior to the 2007 and 2013 elections but have been “silent” since prior to the 2017 election. Their “disappearance” has only been partly compensated for by the arrival of TIFA, which has undertaken several national and county-level polls, and more recently RealField, a British firm that released the results of its first Kenya survey last January. On the other hand, most visible throughout this period have been Radio Africa with its now monthly polls (and which broadcasts results on its various radio stations while publishing them in its newspaper, The Star), and Infotrak, even if, over the years, the latter’s results — as will be shown in subsequent pieces — have often been somewhat at odds with those of other “established” firms.

The “disappearance” of these firms has only been partly compensated for by the arrival of Trends and Insights for Africa.

Before reviewing their results – and setting aside any insinuations of deliberate falsification – it is important to note the main factors that could explain different results that fall outside standard margins-of-error among two or more surveys. Most relevant are the following: the samples are of considerably different sizes and/or do not match in terms of relevant demographics (and which any post-survey data-weighting has failed to rectify); the data collection dates are different so that at least some respondents in more recent surveys have been influenced by relevant events; questions even on the same topics are worded differently (in whatever interview languages are used), or are placed in a different sequence-order, so that the subject matter of what has been asked previously differentially influences responses to the question-data being compared; the interviewers are not equally qualified and/or fastidious in terms of accurately recording responses, coupled with different levels of quality control in data-capture and analysis among the firms involved.

Keeping the above factors in mind, we may conclude this first election poll piece by trying to answer the question: how congruent have the presidential contest poll results released by the currently active firms been? Based on the figures, several points can be made.

Recent Survey Presidential Contest Results (Rounded Figures in Percent)

First, what might explain the significant reversal of position between Deputy President William Ruto and Raila Odinga as shown in Radio Africa’s most recent survey: an increase of 20 per cent by the latter with the former gaining just 5 per cent, even as the proportion who declined to name any candidate decreased by 24 per cent (thus largely accounting for combined gains of the two main candidates)? Such a major change awaits confirmation by future polls.

Second, in comparing Radio Africa’s previous poll with TIFA’s most recent one, even if Ruto’s lead over Odinga was nearly identical (just over 10 per cent) why is it that the combined figures for “undecided” and “no response” about respondents’ preferred presidential candidate were so different (i.e., 30 per cent for TIFA vs. only 13 per cent for Radio Africa)? Also, and in large part based on the results of these two firms, how, according to Infotrak’s poll of late December (thus conducted a few weeks before the Radio Africa and TIFA polls) could these two main candidates be in a statistical tie? Further, even if the gap between Ruto and Raila (5 per cent) reported by RealField is at a mid-point between those of Radio Africa/TIFA and Infotrak, how could its combined figure of those who declined to mention any preferred candidate (7 per cent) be so much lower than that of any of the other three firms?

Reported differences in methodology do not provide a sufficient basis for answering such questions, even if, for example, Infotrak indicated that its 1,600 respondents represented only 26 counties – which seems strange, given that TIFA’s slightly smaller sample included respondents from all 47. Regarding RealField, among its methodological details was the declaration that interviews were conducted by 500 “fielders”, who were somehow able to complete nearly 22,000 interviews in just four days — meaning an average of eleven interviews per day by each of them, a very ambitious “completion rate” for a household-based survey, even for interviews of shorter duration.

One thing is clear, however: the variation in sample sizes cannot explain the variations in findings. An additional note about the RealField survey: based on its abundant sample size, data-collection alone would likely cost at least US$10,000, and with professional costs and company profit, at least twice that.  Further, several questions were raised by The Star, the only mainstream media outlet that gave the survey any coverage. Among these was the source of funding for the survey, which a representative of the firm identified (as required by Kenyan law for all voter-intention surveys conducted during the twelve months preceding an election) as the Kenya National Muslim Advisory Council. This largely unknown entity was described to me by a senior official of another, much better known, Muslim organization as a “one-man show”, with the “one man” in question not known for his personal wealth and thus not in a position to afford such a massive survey. He was also a quite vocal supporter of the BBI amendment bill last year, according to several media sources.

Finally, something should be said about the confusion, or deliberate “spinning”, of the issue as to whether Ruto’s lead, as reported by Radio Africa and TIFA in their February polls, is sufficient to achieve an outright victory in the first round of the presidential election. When both Radio Africa and TIFA released the results of their November surveys (as shown above), the Deputy President and several of his political associates attacked them (without naming either company) during one or more campaign rallies in western Kenya. According to the Deputy President, as reported in several TV newscasts, these polls were false “because we’ve done our own survey that shows us at 56 per cent”.

It is hard to determine how the Ruto “campaign” figure was arrived at. Yet if the figures for the Radio Africa and TIFA polls are re-calculated having removed those stating they were “undecided” as well as any other respondents who failed to identify a preferred candidate (i.e., “will not vote”; “no response”), the results are both nearly identical and mirror the DP’s claim as shown in the chart below:

Chart 1

In both cases, they suggest a first-round win for Ruto, even if claiming this so far in advance of the election, with so many uncertainties remaining, including choice of running mates, would be highly misleading.  Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all, or even a significant proportion, of those who failed to mention a preferred candidate will not, in fact, vote, suggesting that one analytical challenge is to try to discern from the data which way such respondents are “leaning”, and thus how they are likely to vote — among those who will do so.

Just how such an analysis can be undertaken, and how reliably the media report such findings, are subjects to be considered in the next piece in this series.

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Dr Wolf is an independent governance/research consultant currently associated with TIFA Research.

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Tigray is Africa’s Ukraine: We Must Build Pan-African Solidarity

A genocide is taking place in Tigray. Why is there no mobilization of African civil society organizations, non-governmental bodies, religious institutions, and individuals in support of Tigrayan refugees?

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Tigray is Africa’s Ukraine: We Must Build Pan-African Solidarity
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Two months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, more than  5 million Ukrainians fleeing the war have crossed the borders into other European countries. While this is largely a testament to the massive scale of the attack by Russian forces that has forced millions of Ukrainians to flee their homes in all directions, it also has a lot to do with the warm welcome and sympathy extended to these refugees by European nations.

Europeans both individually and collectively stood in solidarity with and committed to supporting Ukrainian refugees in all ways. Member states of the European Union established reception centres and facilitated the right to travel, stay, and work for all Ukrainians within days of the war starting. Families across Europe (and in the United Kingdom) volunteered to host Ukrainian families, organizations raised funds, individuals donated basic necessities, and many even travelled to borders to personally welcome Ukrainian refugees.

While this “gold standard” welcome by European countries—who are generally accused of being hostile to other (particularly black and brown) refugees—has been the subject of heated discussion, a question that is yet to be thoroughly addressed is why such solidarity is not seen in other parts of the world. More particularly, using the experiences of refugees from the Tigray war as a case study, we would like to ask why the multiple conflicts ravaging the African continent fail to inspire such a response by African countries.

The Tigray war, characterized as the world’s deadliest war, has been ongoing for seventeen months. Thus far, more than 500,000 people are reported to have died. Terrible atrocities amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity, including scores of massacres, weaponized sexual violence, and a total humanitarian blockade have all contributed to creating conditions aptly described by the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) as “hell”.  Despite the length and brutality of this conflict, however, the number of Tigrayans who have managed to escape into neighbouring African countries is relatively minuscule.

As far as we are able to establish, about 70,000 Tigrayans crossed into Sudan during the first few days of the war. We can add to these the thousands of Tigrayans who worked and lived in Djibouti before the war and the few hundreds that managed to flee to Kenya following the ethnic profiling and mass arrests they faced in Ethiopia. It is possible to argue that the number of refugees from Tigray has remained low mainly because the borders have been blocked by the Ethiopian regime and its allies. This draconian blockade has indeed been used as a tool of war by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to completely cut off Tigray from the rest of the world in order to hide atrocities and control the narrative. It is also believed to have the approval of key members of the international community seeking to mitigate the impact of the war on the broader Horn of Africa region and its potential contribution to the migration crisis in Europe.

Even so, taking into account the precarious situation of the millions of Tigrayans in the region itself and in the rest of Ethiopia along with well-known patterns of illicit migration from conflict areas, it is reasonable to wonder if the low number of Tigrayan refugees is due to the receptiveness—or lack thereof—of neighbouring countries as well as the blockade. With this in mind let’s look more closely at some policies and practices in the region that can be perceived as obvious deterrents to those seeking refuge.

Political and diplomatic support given by African countries to the regime in Addis Ababa 

The Tigray war is happening in the host country of the African Union (AU) and the second-most populous country on the continent. However, this conflict has not been included as an agenda item in any of the meetings of the AU heads of states that have been convened since its onset in November 2020. The only significant statement that was made regarding this conflict by the Chairperson of the AU, Moussa Faki Mahamat, was one that endorsed the war. Since this early statement, the AU has assiduously ignored the overwhelming evidence of the gruesome atrocities and violations of human rights and humanitarian laws perpetrated during this conflict. Nor has the AU acknowledged the direct involvement of Eritrea and Somalia—both members of the AU—who deployed troops into Tigray and have been credibly accused of committing grave atrocities.

Diplomatically, African countries have given cover to the Ethiopian regime in all multilateral forums including the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The passionate and well-received speech by Kenya’s ambassador to the UN, Martin Kimani, in opposition to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, makes one wonder why the same passion is absent for crises nearer home, including Tigray. Sadly, however, not only do the so-called A3 countries on the UNSC continue to frustrate action against the Ethiopian regime, African countries have voted against measures to establish investigative mechanisms into the atrocities committed in Tigray. Even more disappointingly, on the 31st of March, Kenya voted in support of a bill introduced by the Ethiopian regime to halt funding for the International Commission of Human Rights Experts set up to investigate the crimes and human rights abuses that took place in Tigray.

The AU has assiduously ignored the overwhelming evidence of the gruesome atrocities and violations of human rights and humanitarian laws perpetrated during this conflict.

These actions indicate that the AU and its member states have either failed to recognize the gravity of the human rights and humanitarian violations in Tigray or are unwilling to address violations by other member states, however grave, as a matter of policy.

Forced Repatriation to Ethiopia

This policy and the attendant practices in turn mean that Tigrayans or other minorities seeking refuge from state-sanctioned violence in the region are denied official welcome and feel insecure even when they are sheltered there as refugees under UN protection. Tigrayan refugees in the region are under continuous threat from Ethiopian and Eritrean intelligence and security officials that are fully capable of crossing borders to harm or forcibly repatriate them. Just to look a bit more closely at the experience of Tigrayan refugees in the region, in Sudan, senior Ethiopian officials and supporters of the regime have on several occasions threatened to forcefully repatriate Tigrayan refugees from the Sudanese refugee camps that are under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

In Djibouti, the threat of forced repatriation was realized when several Tigrayans, who had committed no known crime, were apprehended and returned to Ethiopia. This clear breach of the principle of non-refoulement has excited no response from other African governments or African Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). 

Tigrayans also live in fear of forced repatriation even in the relatively more friendly Kenya. The December 2021 abduction of Tigrayan businessman Samson Teklemichael in Nairobi in broad daylight is a prominent example of the insecurity of Tigrayan refugees in Kenya. In addition, personal accounts from Kenya suggest that newly arriving refugees can fall victim to immoral actors demanding large sums of money to facilitate registration. Tigrayans who have been unable to obtain proper documentation for this and other reasons risk being thrown in jail. The lucky few that are registered are coerced to relocate to remote and inhospitable camps. As a result of this, and due to the increased insecurity created by the presence of Ethiopian and Eritrean intelligence officers operating in Nairobi, Tigrayans in Kenya are increasingly opting to remain hidden. This means that the actual number of Tigrayan refugees in Kenya is unknown.

The December 2021 abduction of Tigrayan businessman Samson Teklemichael in Nairobi in broad daylight is a prominent example of the insecurity of Tigrayan refugees in Kenya.

It also bears noting that in response to the war in Tigray, the Kenyan government tightened its borders with Ethiopia, essentially closing the only avenue open for Tigrayans fleeing conflict and ethnic-based persecution by land. Moreover, Tigrayan refugees who have been stopped at Kenyan border controls in Moyale have at different times been apprehended and returned by agents of the Ethiopian regime.

Harsh conditions facing Tigrayan refugees

Sudan hosts the largest number of documented Tigrayan refugees. An estimated 70,000 Tigrayans fled to Sudan to escape the brutal invasion and occupation of Western Tigray. While these people were welcomed with extraordinary kindness by the people of Eastern Sudan, the refugee camps to which they were relegated are located in remote and inhospitable regions with almost no basic infrastructure. As a result, international organizations have been unable to provide adequate support and Tigrayan refugees have fallen victim to extreme weather and fires.

Similarly, Tigrayans remaining in Djibouti are kept in remote camps under unbearable conditions, facing maltreatment and abuses such as rape and sexual violence including by security forces. The whereabouts of the thousands of refugees who escaped from abuses and starvation at Holhol, one of Djibouti’s remote refugee camps where over 1,000 Tigrayans remain, are unknown.

The disinterest of African media and society

Arguably, the above realities describe the failings of African governments in terms of welcoming and protecting refugees fleeing conflict. But what of other sections of African society? Why are there no responses akin to the mobilization of European civil society organizations, non-governmental bodies, religious institutions, and individuals to support Ukrainian refugees? Even taking into full account economic limitations likely to affect responses to such crises, this could potentially speak to a larger failure in terms of building pan-African solidarity, not just as a political concept but as a grassroots reality. In the specific case of the Tigray war, this is further reflected and augmented by the minimal coverage of the war in African media outlets relative, for example, to the extensive daily coverage given to the Ukraine war. Moreover, African intellectuals and intercontinental forums have shown little to no interest to address an ongoing genocide that is quickly paralleling the worst examples of mass atrocities on the continent thus far.

What can we learn from the European Response to the Ukraine crisis?

In many ways, the European response to the Ukraine crisis has been unprecedented and arguably sets a new standard for welcoming refugees from all regions including Europe itself. In the African context, the Tigrayan experience of policies and practices that endanger and harm the most vulnerable seeking safety reveals an urgent need to take these lessons on board.  With this in mind, we can tentatively outline the following suggestions.

First, we as Africans should find mechanisms for building pan-African solidarity amongst citizens that are not contingent upon the will of our governments. This can only be achieved if African media, civil society organisations, thought leaders, and other influencers commit to prioritizing what is happening on the continent. In this interconnected and highly digital age, it is no longer acceptable that an African anywhere on the continent does not know about what is happening in Tigray as much as, or more than, they know about what is occurring in Ukraine.

We as Africans should find mechanisms of building pan-African solidarity amongst citizens that are not contingent upon the will of our governments.

Second, African citizens should protest policies and practices by African governments that favour state-sanctioned violence and support regimes over vulnerable communities. We all, as Africans, are prone to fall victim to state violence and violations of human rights in our countries and this necessitates pan-African reflection on human rights for all, indigenous communities as well as refugees and migrants.

Third, refugees and migrants are rarely a burden on the host countries and communities. Those fleeing the Tigray war, for example, are generally highly educated and carry unique skills that could contribute to societies wherever they land. Harnessing these resources on the continent should be a priority. Moreover, refugees enrich host communities and facilitate regional and continental integration which the AU and its member states continue to discuss, but never materialize.

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UK-Rwanda Refugee Deal: A Stain on President Kagame

Rwanda’s proposed refugee deal with Britain is another strike against President Paul Kagame’s claim that he is an authentic and fearless pan-Africanist who advocates for the less fortunate.

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UK-Rwanda Refugee Deal: A Stain on President Kagame
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In mid-April 2022, Rwanda and Britain unveiled a pilot scheme in which the latter will ship off asylum seekers who arrive in Britain “illegally” to the former for the whopping sum of £120 million. Although full details of the deal remain sketchy, it is believed that it will target mainly young male refugees who apply for political asylum in Britain. Anyone who entered the UK illegally since January 1, 2022, is liable to be transferred. Each migrant sent to Rwanda is expected to cost British taxpayers between £20,000 to £30,000. This will cover accommodation before departure, a seat on a chartered plane and their first three months of accommodation in Rwanda. Their asylum application will be processed in Rwanda and if they are successful, they will have the right to remain in Rwanda. Those whose applications fail will be deported from Rwanda to countries where they have a right to live. The plan is contingent on the passage of the Nationality and Borders Bill currently before the British Parliament. Britain is planning to send the first set of asylum seekers in May 2022, but this is highly unlikely as human rights groups will almost likely challenge this deal in court and, as a result, delay the implementation.

Rwanda’s Foreign Minister, Vincent Biruta, and Britain’s Home Secretary, Priti Patel, present the initiative as a remedy to what they deem a malfunctioning refugee and asylum system, “(T)he global asylum system is broken. Around the world, it is collapsing under the strain of real humanitarian crises, and because people traffickers exploit the current system for their own gain… This can’t go on. We need innovative solutions to put a stop to this deadly trade.” In a jointly written editorial for the UK’s Times newspaper, they portray the agreement as a humanitarian measure that would disrupt the business model of organized criminal gangs and deter migrants from putting their lives at risk.

Back in Rwanda, the pro-Kagame newspaper, The New Times of Rwanda, highlighted Rwanda’s experience in hosting refugees: “Rwanda is home to nearly 130,000 refugees from around the region.” The New Times claims that “… even those who arrived in Rwanda as refugees fleeing violence have since been integrated in the community and enjoy access to education, healthcare and financial services. This friendly policy toward refugees and migrants is in part linked to the country’s history.” It concludes by noting that “Kigali’s decision to extend a helping hand to migrants and asylum seekers in the UK who’re unable to secure residence there is very much in keeping with this longstanding policy on migrants and moral obligation to provide protection to anyone in need of safety. It is, therefore, shocking that this act of generosity has come under severe attack by some people, including sections of the media.”

Reaction in the UK has been mostly negative, ranging from the Anglican ChurchAmnesty International. A broad range of 150 organizations, including Liberty and the Refugee Council, sent an open letter to Prime Minister Boris Johnson and his Home Secretary (the UK immigration minister).  Even some MPs from Johnson’s ruling Conservative party condemned the deal. Dozens of Home Office staff have criticized the policy and are threatening to strike because of it.

Deals of this kind between Britain and Rwanda are not new. Britain tried to enter a similar agreement with Ghana and Kenya, but both rejected it, fearing a backlash from citizens. Rwanda has done similar deals before. Israel offshored several thousands of asylum-seekers, many of them Eritreans and Sudanese, to Rwanda and Uganda between 2014 and 2017. A public outcry forced Israel to abandon the scheme when evidence emerged that most of them ended up in the hands of people smugglers and were subjected to slavery when traveling back to Europe. Under a deal funded by the European Union, Rwanda has taken in evacuees from Libya. Denmark has a similar agreement with Rwanda, but it has not yet been implemented.

In 2016, Australia signed a similar deal with Nauru, a tiny island country northeast of Australia. In May 2016, Australia held 1,193 people on Nauru at the cost of $45,347 a month per person – about $1,460 a day or $534,000 a year. That same year, the EU signed a deal with Turkey under which Turkey agreed to take back “irregular migrants,” mainly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, in exchange for reduced visa restrictions for Turkish citizens, €6 billion in aid to Turkey, update the EU’s customs union with Turkey, and re-energize stalled talks regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union.

If these failed deals did not deter Britain, Rwanda’s human rights record should have. Even Kagame’s supporters concede that his human rights record is deplorable. At the 37th session of the Universal Periodic Review (a regular, formal review of the human rights records of all 193 UN Member States), Britain recommended that Rwanda “conduct transparent, credible and independent investigations into allegations of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and torture, and bring perpetrators to justice.” A Rwandan refugee in London told The Guardian that, “Rwanda is a good country for image, but not for freedom of speech…Those who oppose Kagame end up in prison. The Rwandan government use[s] torture and violence against their opponents.”

The deal between Rwanda and Britain also contravenes international law. The principle of non-refoulement “… prohibits States from transferring or removing individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture, ill-treatment or other serious human rights violations.” The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) notes that Britain has a duty under international law to ensure that those seeking asylum are protected. UNHCR remains firmly opposed to arrangements that seek to transfer refugees and asylum seekers to third countries in the absence of sufficient safeguards and standards. Such arrangements simply shift asylum responsibilities, evade international obligations, and are contrary to the letter and spirit of the Refugee Convention . . . [P]eople fleeing war, conflict and persecution deserve compassion and empathy. They should not be traded like commodities and transferred abroad for processing.

Rwanda is the single most densely populated state in Africa, with more than 1,000 people per square mile. It already has its fair share of refugees from neighboring countries. (Biruta told the Financial Times last month: “This program [the deal with Britain] will be dedicated to asylum seekers who are already in the UK … we’d prefer not to receive people from neighboring countries, immediate neighbors like DRC, like Burundi, Uganda or Tanzania.”

Although it has done well economically compared to many other African countries, it remains a poor nation that needs to prioritize addressing its internal economic issues rather than allowing Britain to dump its refugees on them. It is unlikely that the economic benefits of this deal will help get the average Rwandan out of poverty. If Rwanda needs more refugees, it needs to look no further than its neighbors. Many of those who will end up in Rwanda will likely be genuine refugees who would have a right to remain in Britain and white supremacists in the UK do not want them there because they do not have the right skin color.

With this deal, Johnson and Patel are pandering to the racists simply to get more votes. If this deal was in place in 1972, when Idi Amin deported Ugandans of Asian descent to the UK, Patel’s family might likely have been shipped off to Rwanda. For his part, Kagame is pandering for influence and money from Western nations. It undermines his claim that he is an authentic and fearless pan-Africanist who advocates for the less fortunate. What happened to speaking the truth to Western powers? Let us hope a judge in the UK stops this terrible deal.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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Road to 9/8: What Is at Stake?

This is the first of a series of articles that will discuss some of the major issues at stake, and the roles played by various institutions in safeguarding the integrity of the August 2022 general election.

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Road to 9/8: What Is at Stake?
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The past few months have witnessed political activity that is reaching fever pitch ahead of the general elections which are slated for August 9th. Public officers intending to contest in the forthcoming elections have resigned from office and political parties have either held party primaries or issued direct nominations. Already, parties have shared with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) the final list of candidates they intend to field for the elections, and campaigns officially begin by the end of May.

In reality, the campaigns commenced years ago; immediately following the 2017 general election when the president and the leader of the opposition made amends and embarked on the constitutional reform process that was the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), the drumbeat of electioneering became ubiquitous. Since then, the political class has largely been in a preparatory mood, with various outfits coming together in anticipation of forming the next government. Despite the attempted BBI constitutional reform being halted by successive courts including the Supreme Court, the effect it has had on political campaigning has persisted, with broad coalitions being formed in apparent anticipation of power-sharing arrangements akin to those proposed under the BBI Bill.

Based on recent developments, the forthcoming elections are shaping up to be highly unprecedented and unique. This is primarily due to the make-up of the competing factions. In an unsurprising but also unprecedented turn of events, the incumbent has thrown his weight behind the opposition leader against his own deputy. The last time we saw this in Africa was in Malawi when Salous Chilima (current and immediate former vice-president of Malawi), was in direct confrontation with President Peter Mutharika.

Evidence suggests that the president intends to remain in active politics beyond his term. For example, he recently revitalised his Jubilee Party, now a member of the Azimio-One Kenya Alliance Coalition that will be fielding Raila Odinga as its presidential candidate. Further, he was appointed Chairperson of the Council of the Azimio-OKA Coalition. More recently, the Cabinet Secretary for Finance omitted allocations for the president’s retirement in his budget statement apparently out of caution to avoid violating the legal restrictions on retirees enjoying perks while involved in active party politics. “Walking into the sunset” does not seem to be on the president’s agenda.

The president’s involvement complicates attempts to forecast the outcome of the elections. For one, it is presumed that the incumbency advantage will operate in favour of the opposition leader with the president’s backing. Already, Raila Odinga has stated he intends to “walk in Uhuru’s footsteps” to benefit from the president’s achievements and inherit his support base. Unfortunately, this puts him in the difficult position of being unable to wholly distance himself from the blemishes in the president’s record. It also undermines one of Odinga’s hallmarks: being an anti-establishment figure. In addition, one need only recall—especially now following the death of President Mwai Kibaki—that the power of President Daniel arap Moi’s incumbency was in fact a poisoned chalice for candidate Uhuru Kenyatta, who was crushed at the polls, wining just 31 per cent of the vote compared to Mwai Kibaki’s 62 per cent.  Some claim that Raila Odinga was the “king maker” since he backed President Kibaki. There may be some truth to this, but it is also true that Raila Odinga made a political and not an altruistic decision: he read the mood of the country and surmised that he had to distance himself from the establishment that President Moi and then candidate Uhuru Kenyatta represented. So, in a sense, Deputy President William Ruto is today’s Mwai Kibaki, President Kenyatta is today’s Moi and, irony of all ironies, Raila Odinga is today’s candidate Uhuru Kenyatta. Don’t ever be told that musical chairs is a children’s game.

The president’s involvement also raises questions around the use of state machinery to boost Odinga’s candidacy. A supplementary budget estimate tabled in parliament saw an increase in the president’s budgetary allocation for new vehicles from KSh10 million to KSh300 million. In a campaign season where the president has made clear his level of involvement, it is clear that, with the assistance of the National Treasury, the president has elided the lines between state and political candidate.

In a sense, Deputy President William Ruto is today’s Mwai Kibaki, President Kenyatta is today’s Moi and, irony of all ironies, Raila Odinga is today’s candidate Uhuru Kenyatta.

On the other hand, the deputy president is walking an intellectual tight-rope, taking credit for the achievements of the last 10 years and distancing himself from the blemishes. This is an altogether self-serving strategy but, were it not for the resonance of the “hustler” narrative, one would have thought that its transparent hypocrisy would be its own condemnation.

Bearing in mind Kenya’s unique history with election-related fraud, there exists a tangible risk of either side engaging in fraud, but this is more plausible where the state has a vested interest (such as the president’s). While speaking in the US, the deputy president stated that Kenya’s democracy is under threat and further alluded to a plot by several political actors to manipulate the outcome of the election. In his research, Walter Mebane has shown that fraud was prevalent in both the 2013 and 2017 general elections. The vice president was a beneficiary of both results. It is always hard to speak from both sides of your mouth; except if you are a politician, it seems. Without commenting on the accuracy of the deputy president’s assertions, it is clear that the IEBC, election observers, civil society and the judiciary will have to remain vigilant for any signs of fraud. Already, the deputy president’s party—the United Democratic Alliance—has faced allegations of rigging following its recently concluded primaries.

Further context

Perhaps the biggest contributor to the highly consequential nature of this election is the context in which it is taking place. Last year, the president and the leader of the opposition attempted to orchestrate a constitutional reform process that was finally halted by the Supreme Court. Seemingly motivated by a desire to remedy the winner-takes-all nature of elections to which they attribute the violence that always accompanies electoral processes, the president and the opposition leader proposed to expand the executive and to make a raft of other changes to the constitution through the BBI. In contortions only possible when the pursuit of power is the organising principle for decision making rather than any sense of principle, both the president and Odinga were supporters of the constitution but led the BBI movement which would have dismembered that constitution. Deputy President Ruto was a virulent critic of the constitution but has portrayed himself as its chief defender with his opposition to the BBI.  Like Saint Paul, both camps seem to have experienced a moment of conversion, but it is unclear who is on the road to Damascus. To a section of Kenyans, this entire process was an affront to the spirit of the constitution and constituted an elite power-sharing scheme. Some even viewed it as an attempt by the president to stage-manage his succession. As noted, whilst the BBI was overturned by the courts, the broader political aims sought by its promoters are currently being pursued.

The high stakes nature of the election is not lost on the various political factions in formation. Already, parallels are being drawn between the upcoming election and the 2002 general election, which is widely believed to be one of the more credible elections in Kenya’s history. This is in part due to the broad range of support Raila Odinga has been receiving from political actors who were involved in the 2002 NARC Grand Coalition. However, such a comparison immediately fails as John Githongo rightly explains: the upcoming elections seem to be about nothing. This is despite attempts by both sides to centre economic reform in campaign discourse. Without a clear impetus to go to the polls, voter apathy is high.

Whilst the BBI was overturned by the courts, the broader political aims sought by its promoters are currently being pursued.

Kenya is in the middle of a biting economic crisis. As of June 2021, the country’s public debt stood at KSh7.7 trillion—a 300 per cent increase in the country’s debt stock from 2013. As it stands, a significant portion of the country’s revenue is used to service debt. According to the Institute of Economic Affairs, the debt service to tax revenue ratio is currently 49 per cent—a 19 per cent increase from 2013/14. These trends seem to have brought the economic agendas of the various candidates into sharper focus. For example, the deputy president has proposed a “bottom up” economic model that pits “hustlers” against “dynasties”. On the other hand, his opponent has floated the idea of a social welfare programme involving the distribution of a monthly stipend to certain sectors of the population. These economic agendas seem not to have taken root, with significant political commentary focusing on tribal demographics and the candidates’ support bases in various regions. This is a concerning reality as the next administration will be saddled with the enormous burden of economic recovery.  And while the politicians politic, northern Kenya is the grip of a growing famine.

Aside from the state of the economy, these elections come against a backdrop of declining relations between the executive and the judiciary. In recent years, the country has witnessed the flouting of court orders, the interference with the independence of the judiciary, a worrying increase in the rate and normalisation of corruption, and the use of criminal law enforcement agencies for the settlement of commercial disputes.  While the courts have in many ways held the executive to account and stood firmly on the side of constitutional order, in the context of commercial and criminal law, the courts are riven with corruption and this has badly dented the judiciary’s credibility. Besides reducing investor confidence and jeopardising the state of the economy, these trends threaten people’s fundamental rights and freedoms. The further they are entrenched, the less likely we as a country are able to backtrack and rebuild.

Risks 

The upcoming elections are likely to be highly polarising. Election related violence stemming from political division is not new to Kenya; thus far, both sides’ party primaries have been rocked by violence. In what is an unfortunately ironic turn of events, the attempt by the president and Raila Odinga to remedy the “winner-take-all” nature of elections to which they ascribe election-related violence, seems to have had the opposite effect. The broad nature of the coalitions forming only serves to raise the stakes, increasing the likelihood of tensions running high. Take for example the political primaries: the positioning of the two coalitions within their strongholds is such that candidates needed to secure a ticket to maintain a chance at winning in the elections. As a result, some have turned to unscrupulous tactics to do so, and faced with unfavourable outcomes, have resorted to violence.

The broad nature of the coalitions forming only serves to raise the stakes, increasing the likelihood of tensions running high.

The increased digitisation of political campaigning continues to muddy the waters. This election cycle has seen a significant amount of mis- and disinformation. Some of the content tends towards spreading inciteful messages. However, social media platforms have largely remained complacent, jeopardising Kenyans’ access to civic information online, and undermining healthy democratic debate.

Between Kenya’s election history which is fraught with division and violence, and the current state of the economy and the rule of law, the coming elections are likely to be instrumental in shaping the future trajectory of the country and, to an extent, the region, especially at a time when there is increased regional instability. This is further compounded by the changing nature of elections in the digital age.

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