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Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Lessons From Malaysia and Singapore

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South East Asia’s Tiger economies have long triggered questions about why and how Kenya was left behind in the post-colonial maendeleo race. Instructively, it is the Tigers’ own ‘left-behind’ stories that may be illuminating – and none more so than the rivalry between Malaysia and Singapore. It is a cautionary tale with many familiar themes: tribalism and corruption, dictatorship and democracy. By DAVID NDII.

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Democracy, Dictatorship and Development: Lessons From Malaysia and Singapore
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Three weeks ago, police raided the residencies of Malaysia’s immediate past Prime Minister, Najib Razak and seized US$ 28.6 million in cash and, among other things, 37 bags stuffed with jewellery and 294 boxes containing designer handbags. The authorities say that it will take time to ascertain the value given the size of the haul, but going by former first lady Rosmah Mansor’s known tastes – she is derisively nicknamed “bag lady”— we could be talking upwards of US$ 10m worth of handbags alone. Her favorite Hermés Birkin tote bags come with price tags ranging from US$10,000 to north of US$ 300,000. The exposé gives us a preview of what we can expect when our mansions give up their Eurobond secrets.

Razak lost the election to an anti-corruption coalition fronted by his 92-year old predecessor and mentor, Mahathir Mohammed, ending 61 years of Barisan National coalition government. At the heart of the political drama is 1MDB, a sovereign bond heist similar to our Eurobond mystery that I have written about in the past.

1MDB is a special purpose investment vehicle set up and controlled by Razak in 2009 to attract private investment for infrastructure projects around Kuala Lumpur. Far from attracting investment, it went on a borrowing binge, chalking up US$ 12 billion in debt in a couple of years, including US$6.5 billion of international bond issues. More than US$ 4 billion was stolen and laundered in the world’s leading financial centres, including Singapore, Switzerland and the USA.

The evidence led straight to Razak, his family and cronies including a smoking gun— US$680m traced to his personal bank account. In an effort to suppress the scandal, Razak fired his deputy, replaced the attorney general and central bank governor with his lackeys, clamped down on the media and internet, whipped up ethnic nationalism, put a top secret lid on the investigation and got himself cleared by his new compliant attorney general.

1MDB is a special purpose investment vehicle set up and controlled by Razak in 2009 to attract private investment for infrastructure projects around Kuala Lumpur. Far from attracting investment, it went on a borrowing binge, chalking up US$ 12 billion in debt in a couple of years, including US$6.5 billion of international bond issues. More than US$ 4 billion was stolen and laundered in the world’s leading financial centres, including Singapore, Switzerland and the USA.

It did not work.

Foreign authorities which had initially steered clear were forced to open investigations as complicity of investment banks in their jurisdictions became impossible to ignore. Goldman Sachs came under scrutiny for charging an incredible nine percent of the bond value as transaction fees, more than 10 times the market rate. Goldman Sachs was a big benefactor of both Obama and the Hillary Clinton campaign.

Money laundered in the US included financing of the Hollywood blockbuster, Wolf of Wall Street, starring Leonardo di Caprio, a luxury yacht, a Picasso and a US$27m diamond necklace. When they finally moved, the US authorities refused to name Razak in the indictments referring only to “Malaysian Official 1”. Malaysia, and Razak personally have been strong US allies in the anti-terror campaign.

Malaysia is one of those Asia’s tiger economies that, as we say, left us behind. What we often don’t realize is that the Asian Tigers have their own leaving-each-other-behind stories, none as dramatic and instructive as that of sister nations Malaysia and Singapore.

On attaining self-rule from the British in 1957 Singapore’s founding fathers championed political union with sister British colonies in the Malay peninsula— just as was mooted between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Malaysia was resource rich with large oil and gas reserves, other mineral resources, and well-developed plantation agriculture. Singapore was a resource poor city-state with only a port in a strategic location. Singapore’s leaders, led by Lee Kwan Yew, saw unification as the best way to secure Singapore’s security and prosperity.

Singapore’s overtures culminated in political federation in 1963. It was a fractious marriage from day one. Two years later, Singapore was bundled out of the federation. In his memoir, Lee Kwan Yew writes about this as a most traumatic experience. Reading between the lines, the rejection and the political vulnerability it precipitated, motivated Singapore’s leaders’ drive to succeed.

On attaining self-rule from the British in 1957 Singapore’s founding fathers championed political union with sister British colonies in the Malay peninsula— just as was mooted between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Malaysia was resource rich with large oil and gas reserves, other mineral resources, and well-developed plantation agriculture. Singapore was a resource poor city-state with only a port in a strategic location. Singapore’s leaders, led by Lee Kwan Yew, saw unification as the best way to secure Singapore’s security and prosperity.

Half a century on Singaporeans enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world with the ninth highest average income (US$52,000), the wealthiest Asian country with an average income one third higher than Japan (US$38,000), close to double that of South Korea (US$28,000) and five times that of Malaysia (US$10,000). Today, one of Malaysia’s vexing economic challenges is brain drain as its techies and professionals cross over to Singapore for lower level but better paying jobs. Malaysians cannot help but ask themselves how Singapore left them behind.

In popular discourse, the view that democracy is a luxury that poor countries cannot afford, that what we need are progressive autocrats has considerable following. Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew and Malaysia’s Mahatir Mohammed are both held up as pin-up benevolent dictators. If benevolent dictatorship is the holy grail of economic transformation then how is it that resource poor Singapore ends up five times wealthier than better endowed Malaysia? Malaysia and Singapore’s divergent economic paths can be summed up in two very familiar words: tribalism and corruption.

The rocky marriage began with Malaysia adopting Islam as the state religion, despite the protestation of the significant non-Muslim minorities. Malaysia’s leaders adopted socio-economic policy that privileged natives (the “bumiputura”, or sons of the soil) over the immigrant, predominantly Chinese and Indian population. The Chinese (23 percent) and Indians (seven percent) minorities make up 30 percent of Malaysians. Singapore is the opposite, majority Chinese with Malays (15 percent) and Indians (7.5 percent). As with our Africanization and South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, the affirmative action lent itself to unjust enrichment by the state elite. Once they were bundled out of the union, Singapore’s political leadership set their country on the opposite course— adopting equality, inclusivity and meritocracy as its foundational values.

Mancur Olson observes in Democracy, Dictatorship and Development, the paper that featured in my last column, that while “poor countries can grow extraordinarily rapidly when they have strong dictators who happen to have unusually good economic policies, such growth lasts only for the ruling span of one or two dictators.”

Lee Kwan Yew was Prime Minister of Singapore for 31 years (from independence in 1959 to 1990, and he continued as 1st Senior Minister of Singapore for another 14 (1990-2004) and as Senior Mentor Minister of Singapore, a post created for him for another seven (2004 – 11). Thus Singapore had the good fortune of having the leadership and counsel of an exceptional leader for 59 years—his constituents for 60. He led the Peoples Action Party (PAP), which he co-founded, to eight successive election victories. He was no academic slouch, having graduated from the London School of Economics and from Cambridge with a “double first” law degree.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (doctor as in physician) was Malaysia’s Prime Minister for two decades from 1983 to 2003. Although he is more closely associated with Malaysia’s economic rise than anyone else, Malaysia’s rise was well underway when he assumed office. The economic miracle did not survive him. During the first decade of his tenure, Mahathir implemented economic plan he inherited. During the second one, he launched his Vision 2020, which aimed to propel Malaysia to a high income country through mega-projects. His flagship Silicon Valley copy paste Multimedia Super Corridor did not fly.

Mahatir’s more enduring legacy is deepening authoritarianism. He pushed through constitutional changes that centralised power, undermined the monarchy, and weakened the judiciary. He also mismanaged his succession, following the acrimonious fallout with his long term deputy and heir apparent, Anwar Ibrahim. While not personally corrupt, he promoted crony capitalism. His protege Razak repurposed the authoritarianism for corruption.

History has been unusually kind to Mahathir Mohamad. He now gets a second bite at the cherry. Perhaps the greatest irony of his comeback is that after all he did to undermine it, it is through democracy that he has succeeded in his second run for the premiership. And much of the credit for the survival of democracy in Malaysia goes to his erstwhile heir-turned-nemesis, Anwar Ibrahim. Indeed, Anwar Ibrahim, who has been in jail, is the de facto leader of the political movement that has propelled Mahathir to power. One of his campaign pledges, on which he has delivered, was to secure Ibrahim’s pardon. Although he has apologized, and he will in all likelihood be succeeded by him, Ibrahim’s political persecution is one blot on his legacy that he will find difficult to erase.

It has helped that Malaysia is a parliamentary system. Had the dictatorial power that Mahathir amassed been in a presidential system, bringing Razak down would have been considerably harder. In presidential South Korea, it took weeks of massive demonstrations to bring down President Park Geun-hye. Closer to home, it took the army to remove Mugabe after close to two decades of rigging himself back in power in presidential Zimbabwe, while parliamentary South Africa has now ousted two presidents in its 24-year post-apartheid history.

The benevolent dictatorship school of development posits benevolent dictatorship and democracy as mutually exclusive. But what we see in both Singapore and Malaysia is progressive autocrats and working electoral democracies. Lee Kwan Yew did not change the constitution and elevate himself to an imperial president like Jomo Kenyatta, who never once faced an opponent in an electoral contest.

Lee Kwan Yew developed Singapore politically and economically. In 1998 he proposed the Group Representation Constituency (GRC), a kind of multimember constituency to protect the minorities participation in parliament. In GRC people are elected as a group that must include individuals from the minority groups. We could easily solve the one-third gender rule problem with something similar. I have advocated adoption of a modified proportional representation at the county level (the parliamentary seats in a county would be pooled and allocated to parties based on popular vote).

The benevolent dictatorship school of development posits benevolent dictatorship and democracy as mutually exclusive. But what we see in both Singapore and Malaysia is progressive autocrats and working electoral democracies. Lee Kwan Yew did not change the constitution and elevate himself to an imperial president like Jomo Kenyatta, who never once faced an opponent in an electoral contest.

And the spirit of inclusive politics lives on. Singapore has recently elected its first woman president. Halima Yacob is Malay, Muslim, and only the second Malay president after the country’s first president, Yusof Bin Ishak, who died 47 years ago. Two years ago the constitution was amended again to ensure that minorities ascend to the presidency. Specifically, it provides that the presidential election will be reserved for a racial group if a member of that racial group has not held the presidency for five consecutive terms. This is how Halima Yacob became president. This is another political innovation that we could adopt to make the presidency inclusive. It is worth noting that the president is responsible for the group representation constituencies. The president’s other functions include control of the country’s financial reserves, and oversight of the anti-corruption agency.

African leaders are fond of benchmarking pilgrimages to East Asia. Some even claim to be inspired by Lee Kwan Yew – how so, one wonders. Lee Kwan Yew left office with no personal wealth to speak of. He did not own a single business. Those claiming to be so inspired by him are as rich as kings. They see political power as entitlement to wealth. Given their materialistic obsession, they only see hardware. They can hardly be expected to see the political software that drives the economic success they wish to copy. They see bullet trains, they want. They see Cyberjaya (a failure), they want.

And the spirit of inclusive politics lives on. Singapore has recently elected its first woman president. Halima Yacob is Malay, Muslim, and only the second Malay president after the country’s first president, Yusof Bin Ishak, who died 47 years ago. Two years ago the constitution was amended again to ensure that minorities ascend to the presidency. Specifically, it provides that the presidential election will be reserved for a racial group if a member of that racial group has not held the presidency for five consecutive terms. This is how Halima Yacob became president. This is another political innovation that we could adopt to make the presidency inclusive.

As Olson observes in the paper referred to earlier, “dictatorships are by their very nature susceptible to succession crises and uncertainty about the future”. Nothing illustrates this better than the anxiety, political intrigue and foreboding that gripped Kenya in the mid-1970s as Jomo Kenyatta’s death became an inevitability. By maintaining a parliamentary democracy, however dominant their political parties/coalitions were, both Lee Kwan Yew and Mahathir Mohammed ensured that they did not subject their countries to the political and economic costs that this uncertainty portends.

Far from resolving the transfer of power problem, our multiparty politics, and presidentialism in particular, has aggravated it. Until we solve this one, those benchmarking trips to East Asia will continue to bring home bridges to nowhere.

David Ndii
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David Ndii is a leading Kenyan economist and public intellectual.

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The Violence in Ethiopia

The imminent and existential danger to Ethiopia is not Abiy Ahmed and an oppressive government. It is violent ethno-nationalism.

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The Violence in Ethiopia
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The deadly violence that rocked Ethiopia this summer following the death of artist Hachalu Hundessa has been a subject of much speculation and contention. The facts as we know them are that immediately following the assassination close to 250 people died and thousands were jailed, mostly in the regional state of Oromia and Addis Ababa.

What is contested, and less clear, is the nature of the violence, its perpetrators, and victims. Two prominent narratives have emerged following the crisis to explain what unfolded. One holds that the violence was a brutal government crackdown on Oromo protesters grieving Hundessa’s death. The other describes the events as targeted attacks by armed Oromo youth against ethnic and religious minorities. While both narratives contain elements of truth, ignoring one or the other is either ignorant or intentionally misleading.

recent Africa Is a Country article highlighting the poor coverage by Western media of the situation in Ethiopia, for example, makes no mention of ethnic and religious violence, aside from denouncing media outlets that reported it. Rather, the author’s objective is to “set the record straight” by showing that the underlying cause of violence and instability in Ethiopia is the consequence of a political struggle between an oppressive government and Oromos who have been and continue to be marginalised.

Such a viewpoint is erroneous and polarising in the current political climate. To advance a narrow agenda, it glosses over human rights violations and the brutal killing of innocent bystanders by non-state actors.

To provide more context, the agenda I speak of is tied to the Oromo struggle for greater autonomy and recognition. That struggle, which paved the way for Abiy Ahmed to assume power as the first Oromo Prime Minister two years earlier, now seeks his departure. At the heart of this reversal is the Prime Minister’s consolidation (rather than actual dismantling) of the ruling ethnic-based EPRDF coalition into the Prosperity Party, which has, nonetheless, left intact Ethiopia’s unique system of federalism based on ethnic majoritarianism.

The night of Hachalu Hundessa’s murder, the Ethiopian government quickly shut down the internet, while a social media whirlwind erupted abroad as Oromo activists insinuated that Hundessa was killed because of his support for the Oromo cause.

Leaving that aside, the EPRDF had always been a highly centralized institution in practice, and the mere symbolism of this move, in addition to the Prime Minister’s rhetoric about unity, have left some Oromos feeling betrayed. Furthermore, fractionalisation among Oromo elites, including within the former Oromo Democratic Party (ODP) faction of the EPRDF (now Prosperity Party), which recently ousted key leader and Defense Minister, Lemma Megersa, has divided and weakened the movement.

Within this broad movement, one vocal part led by diaspora-based Oromo elites and recent returnees has galvanised the energy and anger of many Oromo youth behind a perspective of anti-Ethiopiawinet (anti-Ethiopian-ness). The “us versus them” mentality pits Oromo nationalists against an enemy that has been described manifestly and repeatedly by the terms Abyssinian and Neftegna (“rifle bearer”). Though prominent Oromo activists stand behind their use of these terms, those who are familiar with the context know that these labels are loaded with ethnic connotations.

The night of Hachalu Hundessa’s murder, the Ethiopian government quickly shut down the internet, while a social media whirlwind erupted abroad as Oromo activists insinuated that Hundessa was killed because of his support for the Oromo cause. Accusations that “they killed him” were recklessly thrown around and left open for interpretation. Within hours of the assassination, allegedly at the behest of Oromo leaders like Bekele Gerba, targeted attacks against non-Oromos unfolded.

In towns like Shashamene and Dera in the Oromia region, several accounts of killings and looting targeting Amharas and other minorities by Oromo youth have been independently verified, in addition to accounts of police and federal forces injuring and killing civilians. Witnesses describe how perpetrators relied on lists detailing the residences and properties of non-Oromos and circulated flyers warning bystanders to not help those being targeted (or risk reprisal), indicating a significant level of organization.

Minority Rights Group International, accordingly, sounded the alarm, warning that these actions bear the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing. Despite this and concerns from Ethiopians throughout the world, Oromo activists and other prominent human rights groups, such as Amnesty International, have remained largely silent about these attacks while condemning the government’s violent response to Oromo protestors.

Government figures provide an ethnic breakdown of the July causalities with the majority of those killed being Oromos within the Oromia region, followed by Amharas and other smaller ethnic groups.  Yet, rather than disproving, as some claim, that targeted attacks by Oromo mobs occurred, this highlights what scholar Terje Ostebo describes as the complexity and inherent interconnectedness between ethnicity and religion within Ethiopia.

According to Ostebo, “the term Amhara, which is inherently elastic, has over the last few years gradually moved from being a designation for Ethiopianess to gaining a more explicit ethnic connotation. It has, however, always had a distinct religious dimension, representing a Christian.” Hence, in parts of Oromia some Orthodox Oromos were referred to and referred to themselves as Amhara. For example, one Oromo farmer interviewed by local journalists reportedly said, “we thought Hachalu was Oromo” after watching the singer’s televised funeral rites that followed the traditions of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo church.

The “us versus them” mentality pits Oromo nationalists against an enemy that has been described manifestly and repeatedly by the terms Abyssinian and Neftegna (“rifle bearer”).

According to investigations undertaken by the church, a large number of its parishioners (at least 67 confirmed cases) were among the July causalities—a troubling trend, which also includes a spate of church burnings and attacks on Christians that brought large numbers of Orthodox followers out into the streets in protests last year.

To be clear, the violence that occurred was not only ethnic and religious violence. Growing state violence in Oromia and SNNPR has been and continues to be of great concern. As Oromo activists have made clear, it is necessary to end the abuse of force and ensure accountability for these crimes. Yet, when concerns and demands for accountability for non-state violence are raised, these same advocates deny, ignore or dismiss them as part of a propaganda campaign to discredit the Oromo movement. In effect, this dishonesty, itself, has discredited the movement and lost it support by many Ethiopians—both non-Oromo and Oromo.

The recent political turmoil lays bare that the future of an Ethiopian state is hanging by a delicate thread. The polarization that exists today goes beyond disagreements on institutions and policies to the very question of whether we can continue to co-exist as a multi-ethnic nation. Regional elections in Tigray, slated for this week despite the disapproval of the national House of Federation (HoF), and its aftermath may bring these tensions to a boil, again.

As unrest, violence and grievances continue to mount, it is clear that Ethiopia is far from consolidating its transition to a stable democracy. The government continues to curb freedom of speech, jail political opponents and is responsible for violence against civilians. But, if history teaches us anything, it is this: the imminent and existential danger to Ethiopia is not Abiy Ahmed and an oppressive government. It is violent ethno-nationalism.

This post is from a new partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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Let It Never Be Said That Kenyans Went to War Over Mammary Glands

The Kenyan government’s aggressive response to Oscar Sudi’s comments, and the open defiance of Sudi’s supporters, suggest that we might be on the brink of a civil war. As one Kenyan on Twitter wryly commented, BBI has turned into a “Burning Bridges Initiative”.

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Let It Never Be Said That Kenyans Went to War Over Mammary Glands
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The furore over Kapsaret MP Oscar Sudi’s recent comments regarding the first family has left many Kenyan women baffled, not least because Kenyan men are not known to be great defenders of women or their body parts. It has been alleged – and the media has erroneously reported – that, in alluding to her breasts, Mr Sudi insulted Mama Ngina, the former first lady and mother of the current president, Uhuru Kenyatta.

When I first heard about this on social media, I thought it was yet another typically crude example of Kenyan misogyny. There are countless examples of Kenyan men, particularly politicians, insulting and deriding women. Female politicians and activists are a favourite target. Women who dare to defy patriarchal norms do not find a comfortable home here. In fact, they have to fight tooth and nail to be recognised.

The late President Daniel arap Moi, for instance, once referred to Nobel laureate Wangari Maathai as a woman who had “dudus in her head” when she was protesting the building of a tall office block in Uhuru Park. Recently, Mutahi Ngunyi, a State House operative, referred to Martha Karua, a former Minister of Justice and a presidential candidate in the 2013 election, as “a grandmother with average intelligence and a bloated ego” after she gave a TV interview that challenged the president and Raila Odinga to come clean on the motives behind their rapprochement. (Note: Ngunyi’s use of the word “grandmother” was to suggest that Karua had reached her sell-by date and that she should focus on family matters, not politics. In this case, the insulting of grandmothers was not viewed as hate speech by the authorities.)

Those of us who have cared to listen to the speech that caused so much uproar in the country will agree that Sudi did not insult Mama Ngina’s breasts. He merely stated that Uhuru Kenyatta should not believe that the breasts that he suckled are better than the breasts that Sudi suckled.

What Sudi was simply trying to say (and which got lost in the state’s accusations of “hate speech” and “incitement”) was that all Kenyans are equal and that Uhuru and his family should not believe that they are more important than the rest of Kenyans or that the country belongs to them.

In any other period in our political history, these comments might even be considered heroic – an act of rebellion against hegemonic forces. I would go further to say that Sudi has the right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by our constitution, so he can say what he wants as long as his utterances are not inflammatory or based on lies. After all, did the young Jomo not say similar things against the British in London’s famous Hyde Park? Is this not what the Mau Mau were saying to the British colonialists when they took up arms against them? Is this not what was conveyed to President Moi during the “Second Liberation” protests? Did Raila Odinga (who was once the leader of the opposition) not challenge election results several times because he wanted Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta to know that Kenya does not belong to just one tribe or to one political party? Fighting for your rights is guaranteed by the 2010 constitution.

But then you have to remember that it was during Jomo Kenyatta’s time that insulting the first family became a criminal offence. Jomo’s Machiavellian Attorney General Charles Njonjo deemed that even imagining the death of the president was punishable. Are we returning to those days of the imperial presidency?

Before I return to the issue of breasts and their significance in the Kenyan imagination, let us recall how we got to this place.

Faustian pact

You may remember that prior to the 2013 elections, Uhuru Kenyatta made a Faustian pact (some call it a marriage of convenience) with William Ruto – his fellow indictee at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The deal – amplified by the likes of Cambridge Analytica, which manipulated a highly gullible electorate – was that the election should be viewed as “a referendum against the ICC”. Part of the pact was that if the duo won the presidency, Uhuru would rule the country for ten years and then hand over to Ruto for the next ten years. In other words, Jubilee – their coalition party – would rule Kenya for the next two decades.

But maybe promising to honour a deal was not part of that deal. That Faustian pact has been broken. Ruto has now been relegated to the sidelines following another Faustian pact called the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) that has brought Raila into the Uhuru fold, and which has resulted in an orchestrated assault against Ruto. Some might say that it is Kikuyu privilege and hegemony reasserting itself by coopting dissent. Others says it is a way of healing past wounds and uniting a country fractured by political divisions and disillusionment. Only time will tell which scenario will unfold.

Unfortunately, this pact might lead to more, not less violence. The government’s unreasonably aggressive response to Sudi’s comments, complete with police raids on Sudi’s home, and the open defiance of Sudi’s Kalenjin supporters, who threaten to go to war to defend their leader, suggest that we might be on the brink of a civil war. As one Kenyan on Twitter wryly commented, BBI has turned into a “Burning Bridges Initiative”.

The “handshake” between Uhuru and Raila, instead of easing tensions, has created different forms of polarisation. Ruto’s Kalenjin supporters feel betrayed. Opposition and civil society activists who would have come to Sudi’s defence are now taking sides; those who might have defended his right to free speech are now silent because speaking up might be construed as siding with Ruto. These fractures are most evident on social media.

Let us be very clear on one fact, which somehow gets conveniently brushed under the carpet. The 2013 election was premised on fear. Fear that if the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu do not unite, there will be a constant threat of violence and mass displacement of Kikuyus in the Rift Valley. Fear that historical injustices will resurface as a rallying cry during elections – a scenario that neither the Kikuyu nor the Kalenjin elite want because both have blood on their hands.

Although many analysts insist that the UhuRuto victory was simply a mathematical probability, in that it united two of Kenya’s largest ethnic groups into one formidable voting bloc, thereby outnumbering the opposition, some believe that the alliance between the two politicians was based more on primal instincts that had to do with self-preservation vis-à-vis the ICC, and the general fear in the country that the 2013 election would be as bloody, if not more, than the 2007one, as the issues that turned Kenyatta’s Kikuyu ethnic group against Ruto’s Kalenjin in 2007/8, and vice versa, had still not been resolved.

“Though tribe was the watchword in this [2013] election, their alliance, and their victory, was nationalistic, not tribal,” wrote James Verini, a Foreign Policy contributor based in Nairobi. “Their unspoken but resounding message was this: Yes, we killed. We killed for you, for Kenya. And we’ll kill again. It’s the most seductive platform in politics.”

At that time, anti-corruption crusader John Githongo said that the wounds of the violence in the Rift Valley – the site of most of the ethnic conflicts that have taken place during every election cycle since the first multiparty elections in 1992 – had still not healed, despite the public hand-holding and hugging among the Jubilee Alliance’s leaders. “Those who doubt his [Ruto’s] grip and the extent of his leverage need only consider the fact that despite the alliance of ‘peace’ and ‘reconciliation’ between the Gikuyu and the Kalenjin that now prevails, Rift Valley IDPs are not racing back to farms from which they were evicted in 2008. All of us know, quietly and without too much fuss, that we aren’t even close. It is such inconveniences that interrupt the ‘move on’ narrative for now,” he wrote in African Arguments on 22 May 2013.

Breasts in the Kenyan imagination

The Faustian pact between Uhuru and Ruto, and now between Uhuru and Raila, has lessons for Kenyans. In the classic German legend from which this pact gets its name, Faust is a highly successful but dissatisfied man who makes a pact with the devil, exchanging his soul for unlimited knowledge and worldly pleasures. By selling his soul to the devil, Faust is condemned to “The Eternal Empty”. However, female spirits of the earth intervene on his behalf and forgive him for his foolish mistake. Faust suffers some tragedies because of his folly, but in the end he is granted redemption and his soul ascends to heaven in the presence of God and the Virgin Mother. (One moral of the story: female energy is more powerful than the devil.)

We might be tempted to believe that the attacks on Sudi and his ilk are invoking female power. The fact that so many Kenyans (including elderly Kikuyu women who have threatened to strip in front of Sudi) have come out in defence of Mama Ngina’s breasts might suggest that we have reached a Faustian moment. Or perhaps we have evolved into country that actually cares about women and their dignity.

But let us not fool ourselves. For one thing, Mama Ngina, arguably the richest woman in Kenya, is hardly “Wanjiku”. I do not recall her ever defending the rights of poor Kenyan women, or women in general. Two, we are not invoking female energy here to seek redemption. If Kenyan politicians, including Sudi, really cared about women, the two-thirds gender rule would have been enforced in parliament by now.

What we are doing is weaponising the former first lady’s breasts. And sexualizing them, which is very un-African. As Sylvia Tamale writes in African Sexualities, African women’s sexualities were the antithesis of European mores of sex and beauty. Traditional African women had no problems displaying their breasts because breasts in African culture were not objects of sexual desire or titillation; they had one primary purpose – feeding an infant. So talking about breasts was no different from talking about a nose or a leg. If Sudi had “insulted” Mama Ngina’s ear, would we be so upset? The African breast became the object of forbidden fantasy and fetishisation during colonialism when Christian missionaries began their “civilizing mission” in Africa.

In fact, in certain African societies, nakedness was associated with defiance. The Kenyan mothers of political prisoners who “cursed” the Moi government in the early 1990s by stripping at Uhuru Park – because seeing your mother naked is considered a curse in certain Kenyan communities – were not displaying their sexuality; they were displaying their anger. They were defying Moi. Kenyans with a political conscience saw them as heroines. In fact, these mothers will forever remain as symbols of defiance in the annals of Kenyan history.

Maybe now is the Faustian moment when positive female energy can be invoked, not to redeem those who have made selfish pacts, but to take Kenyans down a more enlightened path.

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A Scorecard on Uhuru’s Presidency

How might one rate a president who has undermined the Constitution, distorted the economy, and failed to address corruption in state institutions?

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Article 129 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states: “Executive authority is derived from the people of Kenya and shall be exercised in accordance with this Constitution…in a manner compatible with the principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their wellbeing and benefit.”

The Executive (the President) must protect the constitution, safeguard our national sovereignty, promote the unity of the nation (including recognising the diversity of the people and communities), and protect human rights. The Executive is bound by national values and principles of governance. Its duties include maintaining good governance, state finance, integrity, transparency, accountability and foreign affairs.

As the CEO of the government, she also has special responsibility for matters assigned to other ministers: a strong economy, peace between communities, foreign affairs and international relations, national security, and international relations. She must also demonstrate respect for the people, and bring honour to the nation, dignity to the office, and promote public confidence in the integrity of the office. Most importantly, she has the responsibility to serve the people, rather than the power to rule them.

The status of the Prime Minister is different. Normally she is the head of the party with the most members in the main legislature. She appoints government ministers from members of the House. At Kenya’s independence, the CEO was designated the Prime Minister (PM). Jomo Kenyatta was PM for a year and then he changed the system to a presidential one, with himself as president – a system that has remained, despite strong support for a parliamentary system at Bomas.

The PM’s support stems partly from the sense that a PM, coming from and accountable to Parliament, is usually far less of a dominant figure, and her power is less centralised in one person, which was one of the objectives of the search for a new constitutional order. Another reversal from a parliamentary to a presidential system – again motivated by individual self-interest – occurred in the closing stages of the Committee of Experts process.

A reason why at Bomas there was strong support for the parliamentary system was precisely to ensure that the government was under greater control and scrutiny of the public. The Prime Minister emerges from the collective will of the people in the elections, and can be removed by the legislature by a vote of no confidence. It is far harder to remove a President.

But a President is not – in theory – some unguided missile. Checks and balances are supposedly more developed in such a system.

So how has our President performed?

The President and the Judiciary

The Judiciary is the third major arm of the State. Our President has little power to make or remove judges. A number of key decisions are made by the Justice Service Commission, an independent body to which the President appoints two lay members. However, the President’s choice has been from those who can take orders from him, not those who can represent the people as the Constitution requires. In defiance of court orders, he has blocked the appointment of many candidates. He has also criticised judges in office, especially in recent years, and often when his own position is challenged (as in elections).

The President and the economy

African governments play a significant role in the nation’s economy. Over the decades, the state has helped to establish a modern economy, increasingly based on the private sector. Governments have established institutions of various kinds to regulate economies at regional and international levels. The Kenyan government has probably retained more of a direct engagement with the economy than many. The state has also affected the economy in financial, monetary and other areas.

A reason why at Bomas there was strong support for the parliamentary system was precisely to ensure that the government was under greater control and scrutiny of the public. The Prime Minister emerges from the collective will of the people in the elections, and can be removed by the legislature by a vote of no confidence. It is far harder to remove a President.

Uhuru Kenyatta is not known for his business skills, nor did he distinguish himself when he was Minister of Finance. Yet he took it upon himself to negotiate deals (largely in secret, as the Chinese prefer) with the Chinese government for skills, equipment, and money. The very costly standard gauge railway (SGR) deal with China is shrouded in secrecy. A court has decided that by-passing the law on public procurement on the excuse of a “government-to-government contract” was illegal. There has been corruption in the purchase of land for the line and stations, little control over the construction of the line, and very little attention given to the position of Mombasa as a county and the country’s major harbour.

The environment and industry

There have been concerns about the environmental impact of many big Chinese infrastructure projects, including high-speed trains and big dams. China is financing a coal-fired power project that is strongly resisted by the local community. Evidence suggests it is not needed in view of Kenya’s renewable energy sources. The SGR has also had a negative impact on Kenya’s wildlife as it passes through the Nairobi National Park despite vigorous opposition from civil society, including litigation. The decisions on the railway’s route were made by the Kenyan government. Local firms have suffered as a result of the government’s preference for Chinese firms for construction and other projects.

The State as entrepreneur

There are around 260 state-owned enterprises (commercial, like the Kenya Ports Authority; infrastructural, like the Rural Electrification Authority; regulatory, like the National Environment Management Authority; social, like the Kenyatta National Hospital, and teaching- and research-based, like universities). The general view of parastatals in Kenya is negative, including because of politicisation of the parastatals and poor corporate governance. Their boards and chief executives are appointed by the politically powerful, including the President himself. Thus, many operational decisions are made by the partisan and the non-expert. The role of the state corporations’ advisory committees is just advisory, with little impact on policy or practice. The structure of financing and financial management is weak – many state corporations are allocated funds through line ministries. They are chronically underfunded.

When the President chooses appointees, the whole basis for parastatals is undermined. Indeed, those appointments are usually illegal. By making appointments on an ethno-political basis, the President breaks another obligation of his office: promotion of respect for the diversity of people and communities. The Constitution requires executive authority to be exercised in a manner compatible with the principle of service to the people of Kenya, and for their well-being and benefit. It is heartening to now see that many citizens and organisations have raised their objections to presidential appointments on grounds of violation of the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Self-interest lies at the heart of what ought to be public service for the nation.

A genuinely open and competitive process would far more likely produce competent appointees who are respected by the public. But even if the appointees are the best available, the whole process is wrong – it depends far too much on patronage.

Promoting or fighting corruption?

One of the most critical challenges facing the Executive is, unfortunately, corruption. It started with Jomo, followed by Moi and Kibaki, and now has increased beyond imagination. The economy is largely based on partnerships between businesspeople and politicians or public servants.

Various attempts are made through the Constitution to eliminate corruption. Article 73 sets the high standard demanded of public officers, including bringing honour to the nation and dignity to the office. State officers are expected to promote “public confidence in the integrity of the office” and to make decisions that are “not influenced bv nepotism, favouritism, other improper motives or corrupt practices”. Their task is to serve the people, rather than to rule them. But the grip of the Executive on appointments is a major obstacle to dealing with corruption – indeed it is corrupt.

Rarely are business-related acts conducted without significant bribes (to the extent that more foreign businesses, including multinationals, have left Kenya than come in recently). Corruption within state institutions (taxes, customs, contracts, procurements, land appropriations, schools and universities, etc.) has never been so intensive.

When the President chooses appointees, the whole basis for parastatals is undermined. Indeed, those appointments are usually illegal. By making appointments on an ethno-political basis, the President breaks another obligation of his office: promotion of respect for the diversity of people and communities.

The police (which is often praised by Uhuru even when it commits brutal acts against innocent citizens), whose mandate is to serve the people, is perhaps the most corrupt institution we have. Of late the President has shown an apparent concern to fight corruption. But dealing more firmly with people within his administration who are suspected of corruption should have been a policy from the beginning. The Executive cannot maintain that “others” are corrupt.

Corruption may no doubt make some Kenyans rich. But it also makes an infinitely larger number of other Kenyans poor. On a broader basis, the President has shown little sympathy for the poor, whose numbers have increased, not decreased, not least because of the current coronavirus pandemic, which led to massive job losses and produced “corona millionaires” through dodgy procurement practices and corruption.

The President and the Constitution

Uhuru has little regard for the Constitution, though he pays lip service to it. If the law does not suit him, he ignores it. Indeed, it seems that the Executive takes the view that if it wants to do something, it will do it regardless of its constitutionality. And it will only decide, if a court objects, whether it will observe the court’s rulings. Think of the takeover of Nairobi County, the creation of the post of Cabinet Administrative Secretary, the importation of the military into the cabinet, the effort to muscle in on the appointment of the Chief Justice, and the tendency to order supposedly independent officers (like the Director of Public Prosecutions) to do things that it wants done.

With such a scorecard, it is hard to make a convincing case for Uhuru Kenyatta’s government.

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