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Striking a Balance Between Judicial Immunity, Independence and Accountability: The Kenyan Situation

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There is a need to re-engineer these parameters of the Judiciary to strike a functional balance between immunity, independence, impartiality and accountability of members of the bench for Kenya to enjoy a trued independent Judiciary.

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Striking a Balance Between Judicial Immunity, Independence and Accountability: The Kenyan Situation
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Kenya’s Supreme Court is in the eye of a storm. Four members of the apex court face allegations of bribery and impropriety. The Chief Justice himself faces a petition. The Deputy Chief Justice faces the prospect of criminal charges if an ongoing constitutional case is determined against her. One of the Supreme Court judges has declined to appear before the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), citing constitutional immunity.

Lower down the rung, a judge of the High Court who was found unfit has challenged the decision. His appeal has, however, been dismissed by the Supreme Court. Several other High Court judges could face tribunals depending on the findings of the committees set up to investigate the complaints against them. Some of the complaints may turn out to be not worthy of the formation of a tribunal. However, the fact that there are so many complaints against members of the Supreme Court erodes the confidence that should be attached to the apex court, and by extension, to the whole Judiciary.

It is said that when Julius Caeser’s wife, Pompeia, allowed a man dressed as a woman into a Roman religious festival strictly reserved for women, Caeser divorced her. The whole thing had been a prank and Pompeia had no intentions of impropriety. Aware of this, the citizens of Rome enquired why Caeser had divorced his wife. “The wife of Caeser must be above suspicion,” was the Great Emperor’s response. Hence the comparison with the level of integrity expected of a judge.

Perception plays an important role in the discharge of justice. Some 118 years ago, Lord Charles Bowen, while setting aside the ruling of the Lord Chief Justice who had determined an appeal in a case involving his own brother’s architectural firm, said, “Like Caeser’s wife, a judge must be beyond suspicion.”

Now one may ask where Caeser’s wife fits in all this? What does Caeser’s wife have to do with the integrity of a judge?

It is said that when Julius Caeser’s wife, Pompeia, allowed a man dressed as a woman into a Roman religious festival strictly reserved for women, Caeser divorced her. The whole thing had been a prank and Pompeia had no intentions of impropriety. Aware of this, the citizens of Rome enquired why Caeser had divorced his wife. “The wife of Caeser must be above suspicion,” was the Great Emperor’s response. Hence the comparison with the level of integrity expected of a judge.

A transparent, reliable and accountable Judiciary is vital in the furtherance of the rule of law, which is fundamental to constitutionalism and democracy. It cannot be gainsaid that right from the recruitment, functioning, supervision, to the removal of judicial officers, the process must be rigorous, transparent, accountable and free from influence. To properly carry out their mandate, judicial officers must be insulated from victimisation arising from the discharge of their judicial functions. Conversely, they must conduct themselves with the propriety expected from those entrusted with great power.

Justice before 2010

Prior to the enactment of the 2010 constitution, the appointment of the Chief Justice was the sole prerogative of the president. He was also the appointing authority in the appointment of judges, the only rider being that with such appointments, he was to act in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).

An examination of the composition the JSC, however, clearly showed that the president held sway in such appointments. Composed of the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, two judges appointed by the president and the chair of the Public Service Commission, all members of the JSC were direct or indirect appointees of the president and, therefore, beholden to him.

Another contract judge, Patrick O’Connor, was sacked by the Chief Justice when he resisted a transfer to Meru. When O’Connor questioned whether the Chief Justice had the powers to sack him, he was criticised by the political class. Not long after, in 1988, Parliament amended the constitution to remove the security of tenure of judges.

Then there were the “contract judges”, who were mostly British citizens. Their contracts were renewable at the government’s discretion. Some of these judges were so beholden to the Executive that, in one instance, the by then Chief Justice, Alan Robin Hancox, in 1991 went as far as advising members of the bar and bench that their loyalty was to the head of state.

Another contract judge, Norbury Dugdale, found himself in conflict with lawyers and members of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) due to the consistency of his decisions in favour of the Executive. Supporting an earlier call by nine members of the LSK in 1991 to have a tribunal established for the removal of Chief Justice Hancox and Justice Dugdale in September of that year, 107 lawyers signed a memorandum calling for the resignation of the two. (The Weekly Review Sep 6, 1991, page 4.)

Not all of the contract judges acted as gatekeepers for the Executive. Not all of them were malleable to the whims of the head of state. The fierce independence of Justice Derek Schofield, a contract judge, comes to mind. In 1978, a family filed a writ of habeas corpus seeking the production of their family member, Mbaraka Karanja. When Justice Schofield ordered the production of Karanja, the police said that he had been shot while escaping and had been buried. The judge then insisted the body be exhumed. Even after the opening of 19 graves, there was still no body of Karanja. Justice Schofield then threatened the Director of Criminal Investigation with contempt, prompting Chief Justice Cecil Miller to remove the case from the judge and to transfer him to Meru. Justice Schofield chose to resign than put up with this blatant interference. He would later say that the Chief Justice had informed him that his actions had been at the behest of President Moi. (Nairobi Law Monthly 49. Feb/Mar, 1992, and also Nation newspaper, 11 October 2008, interview with Okwemba.)

Another contract judge, Patrick O’Connor, was sacked by the Chief Justice when he resisted a transfer to Meru. When O’Connor questioned whether the Chief Justice had the powers to sack him, he was criticised by the political class. Not long after, in 1988, Parliament amended the constitution to remove the security of tenure of judges. ( Weekly Review, 5 August 1988, page 3.)

At the lower tier of the judiciary were the magistrates. Greater in number than the judges, and considered the true face of the Judiciary, they worked in far-flung stations. The JSC exercised complete control over their appointment. The law afforded them nothing in terms of security of tenure and they could be sacked at any time through mechanisms that were not transparent.

They worked alongside police prosecutors. Often considered enforcers for the Executive, their courts acted arbitrarily with little regard for the law or procedure. The extent of their emasculation by the Executive was at its most obvious during the Mwakenya trials. Scores of intellectuals, students, politicians and ordinary wananchi were arrested, tortured and charged with belonging to proscribed groups. The accused persons were “tried” and convicted in the magistrate’s courts, outside court hours, usually in the evenings without the benefit of counsel. (See KNHRC 2009 publication “Surviving after Torture”, pages 41-42.) One of the accusations against the twelfth Chief Justice, Benard Chunga, in 2003 when a tribunal for his removal was constituted, was that during his tenure as the Deputy Public Prosecutor, he had condoned and executed programmes of torture and illegal trials in the magistrate’s courts.

Executive interference was not the only factor that influenced the decisions of judicial officers. Far from it. In many cases, it was corruption that subverted the course of justice. So rooted was this vice that the popular saying, “Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?” was an accurate depiction of the state of corruption in the Judiciary. The corridors of “justice” had become a marketplace where the highest bidder carried the day.

Magistrates who displayed independence were punished. A case in point was in 1994 when Senior Principal Magistrate, Onesmus Githinji; while acquitting six accused persons (famously known as the Ndeiya Six) charged with breaking into a chief’s camp, censured the police and ordered an investigation over allegations of torture. Soon after, he was transferred to a remote court in Kitui, which prompted him to resign.

Executive interference was not the only factor that influenced the decisions of judicial officers. Far from it. In many cases, it was corruption that subverted the course of justice. So rooted was this vice that the popular saying, “Why hire a lawyer when you can buy a judge?” was an accurate depiction of the state of corruption in the Judiciary. The corridors of “justice” had become a marketplace where the highest bidder carried the day.

The impunity with which some judicial officers conducted their affairs was in some instances almost hilarious. In Kisumu, an advocate obtained a photograph of a judge being transported in a vehicle that the same judge had irregularly allowed an auctioneer to attach and sell. When the advocate confronted the judge with this evidence and asked that he disqualify himself from the still ongoing proceedings, he declined. (The same judge would resign rather than face a tribunal during the 2003 “radical surgery” of the Judiciary initiated during the Mwai Kibaki administration.) In Nairobi, a magistrate was found with two sets of written judgments for the same case, one acquitting the accused, the other convicting him. His reason for this embarrassing situation was anyone’s guess.

In remote stations, magistrates were a law unto themselves. Feared by a populace that had long accepted corruption as a way of the courts, they went about their sordid business without a care in the world.

The Radical Surgery

By the time the country was going to the 2002 polls, it was plain to see that it was just a matter of time before some serious intervention was made to try and salvage a Judiciary gone rogue. And come it did in the form of what came to be known as the Radical Surgery.

With the defeat of KANU in the 2002 presidential elections and the ascendance of Mwai Kibaki to power, the stage was set for a radical intervention. An Anti-Corruption Committee chaired by Justice Aron Ringera was promptly constituted to investigate corruption in the Judiciary. Upon completing its work, it tabled a report that chronicled instances ranging from judicial officers receiving money to influence decisions to the seeking of sexual favours to make favourable decisions. It implicated 5 of the 9 Court of Appeal judges, 18 of the 36 High Court judges and 82 of the 254 magistrates country-wide.

This radical crackdown had unmasked powerful men and women, who hitherto, like Caeser’s wife, had been considered above suspicion. Pictures of Court of Appeal judges outside what is now the Supreme Court being helped by family members to load personal belongings into the boots of cars was a reflection of the magnitude of what had transpired.

In a brazen, and most would say unfair, move, the names of the implicated judicial officers were published in the national press even before they were informed of the accusations against them. This was followed by a withdrawal of their benefits and privileges. (These were to be reinstated many months later.) A two-week ultimatum to resign or be dismissed was issued to them. Many opted for the former. Some of the judges decided to face the tribunals. Justices Waki, Anganyanya, Nambuye, and Mbogoli were some of the judges who were later cleared and resumed their duties as judges.

This radical crackdown had unmasked powerful men and women, who hitherto, like Caeser’s wife, had been considered above suspicion. Pictures of Court of Appeal judges outside what is now the Supreme Court being helped by family members to load personal belongings into the boots of cars was a reflection of the magnitude of what had transpired. Men, once the face of justice, were struggling to put as much distance as possible between themselves and the corridors of justice.

Years of corruption and impunity within the Judiciary had eroded public confidence. This now ensured that there was little sympathy for these victims of the purge. It was the reason why there was little protest, despite the process of their removal being unfair and unjust. Even when the President, in an unorthodox move, used his authority to appoint 28 acting judges of the High Court to replace the fired ones, there was hardly any opposition.

The President’s move was irregular. The new acting judges had not been subjected to scrutiny. Many believed their appointment was influenced by political, tribal and other considerations, rather than merit. The process was flawed. Consequently, an opportunity to effectively clean up the Aegean stables that our Judiciary had become was lost.             

In 2003, Evan Gicheru replaced Benard Chunga as the thirteenth Chief Justice of independent Kenya. An embattled Chunga had opted to resign rather than face a tribunal made up of men he had on many occasions crossed swords with, and whose opinion of him could only be negative.

Business as usual

The Radical Surgery having gobbled up a sizeable chunk of the old faces in the judiciary. Many naively expected a reduction in instances of executive interference and corruption and consequently a marked improvement in the delivery of justice. This was not to be and for obvious reasons.

Firstly, the manner in which the Radical Surgery had been carried out, with little regard for the internationally accepted standards for the removal of judges, greatly eroded morale in the Judiciary. The appointment of 28 acting judges to replace those removed was also far from transparent. The appointees were beholden to the appointing authority, which was still the President. The constitution still allowed him the sole prerogative in the appointment of the Chief Justice. Little wonder then that in 2007, Chief Justice Evan Gicheru, who owed his appointment solely to President Kibaki, was agreeable to irregularly swearing him in as president at dusk in a private function at State House after a highly contested election. The culmination of this was an eruption of violence that left over a thousand dead and hundreds of thousands displaced.

The other reason why the Judiciary would still be hobbled with the problems of old was that the institutional deficiencies remained in place. While the faces of the judicial officers had to a great extent changed, the structures and working conditions for a long time remained the same. Soon enough it was business as usual.

The greatest opportunity to truly revamp the Kenyan Judiciary came with the promulgation of the new constitution in 2010. For the first time, the appointment of the Chief Justice would not be the sole prerogative of the president. The new constitution provided for an independent Judicial Service Commission (JSC). Save for the Attorney General and a couple of other members, the JSC was to be composed of a representative elected by magistrates, judges of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, and two members elected by the Law Society of Kenya, amongst others; all independent of the Executive. The members of the JSC were to forward their choice for Chief Justice to the President. Their single nominee – subject to the vetting of Parliament – would be appointed to head the Judiciary.

The new constitution also mandated Parliament to provide legislation for the vetting of all judges and magistrates who were in office on the 27th of August 2010. This culminated in the enactment of the Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act No. 2 of 2011 and consequently the appointment of a vetting board by the President in consultation with the Prime Minister. A seasoned advocate, Sharad Rao, was appointed to chair the board. The decision of the board was not to be the subject of question or review in any court.

The Mutunga Era

In June 2011, Willy Mutunga, a well-known human rights activist, one-time chair of the LSK and a former detainee, was appointed the fourteenth Chief Justice. Everyone agreed that with his appointment, the third arm of government was on the way to great heights. The state of the Judiciary at the time of his appointment was summed up in his speech delivered in October 2011.

The new Chief Justice was considered an outsider – he had not been a member of the Judiciary nor had he practised much as an advocate. So he was bound to meet opposition to his leadership and any proposed reforms. The advantage was that he would not be bound by the cartels that had for a long time taken root in the Judiciary.

“We found an institution so frail in its structures; so thin on resources; so low in confidence; so deficient in integrity; so weak in its public support that to have expected it to deliver justice was to be wildly optimistic. We found a judiciary that was designed to fail.”

The new Chief Justice was alive to the dire state of the Judiciary he had been tasked to head. With only 16 High Court stations and 111 magistrate’s courts around the country, a total of 53 judges and 330 magistrates were expected to cater for a population of over 41 million. Morale amongst the magistrates was low. Considered the backbone of the Judiciary, they handled most of the cases in far-flung courts under appalling conditions, yet their salaries, in comparison with what the judges were paid, was measly. There was a huge case backlog, which was not helped by the constant disappearance of files instigated by litigants and even advocates. Financing was low, with a paltry 0.05 per cent of the national budget set aside for the Judiciary in 2010-2011, compared with the international benchmark of 2.5 per cent. This was the Judiciary that Mutunga inherited from Evan Gicheru.

Upon assuming office, Willy Mutunga realised that there were many reports by civil society and task forces formed by past Chief Justices, the latest being the 2009-2010 report by Justice Ouko that recommended improvements in the functioning of the Judiciary. Using most of this material, his team developed what he called The Judiciary Transformation Framework.

The new Chief Justice was considered an outsider – he had not been a member of the Judiciary nor had he practised much as an advocate. So he was bound to meet opposition to his leadership and any proposed reforms. The advantage was that he would not be bound by the cartels that had for a long time taken root in the Judiciary. The confidence in the new Chief Justice was soon reflected in the substantial increase in funding of the Judiciary. Parliament more than doubled the Judiciary’s budget allocation in 2011-2012. The World Bank, GTZ and UNDP committed funds towards the intended transformation.

Mutunga also sought to give the Judiciary a more human face by doing away with some anachronistic traditions. He allowed for less formal attire and did away with symbols such as wigs. Encouraging interaction between judicial officers and court users, he sought to bridge the distance that had been created under the guise of independence and impartiality. He introduced new innovations, like the Daily Court Returns Template tracking the progress of cases.

Then Petition Number 5 of 2013 happened. It challenged the election of Uhuru Kenyatta as the fourth President of the Republic. On 30th March 2013, in a brief statement delivered in an almost cavalier manner, Chief Justice Mutunga dismissed the presidential election petition. A full judgment followed on 16th April of the same year. Criticised for its lack of depth and failure to confront the evidence, it left a blot in the image of a Judiciary that was still struggling to erase an inglorious past.

The presidential petition aside, more than any other Chief Justice, it was Mutunga who squarely faced the institutional bottlenecks that had long dogged the Judiciary. He undertook structured efforts to solve them. His earlier standing in civil society also helped marshal the finances required to transform the Judiciary. The current robust engagement between court users and the Judiciary, hitherto lacking, can be attributed to Mutunga’s efforts at giving the Judiciary a human face.

Current state of the Judiciary

On the 1st September 2017, the Supreme Court, chaired by Chief Justice David Maraga, nullified the disputed 2017 presidential elections and called for fresh elections within sixty days. While the world wowed, an enraged President called the judges of the Supreme Court “wakora” (crooks). The political class swore to “revisit” the issue. Confidence in the Judiciary soared.

The nullification of a presidential election by the apex court was a clear indicator of how far the Judiciary had moved in terms of independence from the Executive. Such a move would never have been thought of in the times of Hancox or Miller.

Upon realising that the intimidation of judges no longer worked, the Executive now sought to control the appointment process. One clear instance was the Amendments to the Judicial Service Act that sought to have the JSC forward three nominees to the President, instead of one, for position of Chief Justice. The LSK successfully petitioned a constitutional court to declare the amendments to be in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.

Further pointers of independence from the other arms of government were evident in the fearless abandon with which the High Court continued to strike down legislation sponsored by the Executive as unconstitutional. In 2015, a five-judge bench agreed with the views of Justice Odunga and struck out eight offensive clauses in the controversial Security Law (Amendment) Act No 19 of 2014 as being in violation of fundamental human rights. This prompted much criticism from politicians, with threats against sitting judges.

Upon realising that the intimidation of judges no longer worked, the Executive now sought to control the appointment process. One clear instance was the Amendments to the Judicial Service Act that sought to have the JSC forward three nominees to the President, instead of one, for position of Chief Justice. The LSK successfully petitioned a constitutional court to declare the amendments to be in breach of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Executive Director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), George Kegoro, in an opinion piece in the Standard newspaper, pointed out other instances of such interference: In one such move the President revoked the membership of two commissioners of the JSC, namely, Rev Samuel Kobia and Kipngetich Bett, while their term had not expired and in disregard of their security of tenure. Another attempt was the insistence on Parliament vetting Justice Warsame, who had been re-elected by the Court of Appeal to the JSC. It took a judgment of the Court of Appeal to scuttle the intended mischief.

The 2016-2017 State of The Judiciary & Administration of Justice Report shows that the number of judges in 2017 had almost tripled to 158 from just 53 in 2011. The number of magistrates had also risen from 330 in 2011 to 421 in 2017. Judiciary funding had almost doubled to 0.99 per cent in 2017. The maximum salary of a judge of the High Court was now slightly over Sh1 million, while that of a Chief Magistarate was over Sh700,000.

With these marked improvements in the numbers and remuneration of judicial officers, why was it that the Transparency International Bribery Index 2017 still considered the Kenyan Judiciary as the second most corrupt institution in the country after the police? Why was there still a perception amongst Kenyans that corruption was still rife in the Judiciary?

The immunity of members of the judiciary from any action or suit for anything done or omitted in good faith, in the lawful performance of a judicial function, is guaranteed in Article 160(5) of the 2010 constitution. Case law also suggests that no action can lie against a judicial officer for anything done within his or her jurisdiction even if done maliciously and in bad faith. (See Anderson -vs-Gorrie [1895] 1QB, 668. A similar position was held by our courts in Bellevue Dev Co Ltd –vs- Justice Francis Gikonyo & 7 others, [2018] eKLR.) What is suggested is that you can never sue a judicial officer for personal liability over anything he does within his jurisdiction even though it is done with malice. It matters not that his decision is so tainted with malice and militates against the evidence to the extent that it can only be attributable to extraneous factors.

Remedy lies in lodging a complaint with the JSC against such a judicial officer, and that’s just about where it ends. Immunity of judicial officers from personal liability for acts while in office, as provided in Article 160(5), suggests that it survives the officer’s tenure. Not even the President of the Republic is offered such immunity. The immunity accorded to a President under Article 143 of the constitution over acts carried out while in office does not extend past his tenure. It also allows for the period of limitation of time for any anticipated action against the President to stop running during his term in office.

It is common knowledge that the complaint process against judicial officers is slow and can remain undetermined for years. One of the reasons is that commissioners of the JSC hold other demanding jobs and enterprises. These men and women only meet occasionally. Judicial officers facing complaints have been known to brag that such complaints will not see the light of day due to the slow process. Others who have been suspended from office as their cases await determination also complain of the slow pace with which their cases are handled. Perhaps the time is right for the implementation of the Sharad Rao-led Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board recommendations of having a permanent Complaints Tribunal to handle such complaints.

The safeguard of immunity, together with the principles of independence and impartiality, are tailored to assist judicial officers to carry out their onerous task of dispensing justice. This has at times been abused. It is not uncommon for an errant judicial officer to shelter behind the iron veil of independence to escape accountability. There is a need to re-engineer these parameters and strike a functional balance between immunity, independence, impartiality and accountability of members of the bench.

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P. Ochieng Ochieng is a writer based in Nairobi, Kenya.

Politics

Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya

Somali refugees in Kenya should not be held hostage by political disagreements between Mogadishu and Nairobi but must continue to enjoy Kenya’s protection as provided for under international law.

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Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya
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For several years now, Kenya has been demanding that the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, close the expansive Dadaab refugee complex in north-eastern Kenya, citing “national security threats”. Kenya has argued, without providing sufficient proof, that Dadaab, currently home to a population of 218,000 registered refugees who are mostly from Somalia, provides a “safe haven” and a recruitment ground for al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia that constantly carries out attacks inside Kenya. Threats to shut down have escalated each time the group has carried out attacks inside Kenya, such as following the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015.

However, unlike previous calls, the latest call to close Dadaab that came in March 2021, was not triggered by any major security lapse but, rather, was politically motivated. It came at a time of strained relations between Kenya and Somalia. Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County in north-western Kenya, is mostly home to South Sudanese refugees but also hosts a significant number of Somali refugees. Kakuma has not been included in previous calls for closure but now finds itself targeted for political expediency—to show that the process of closing the camps is above board and targets all refugees in Kenya and not only those from Somalia.

That the call is politically motivated can be deduced from the agreement reached between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government last April where alternative arrangements are foreseen that will enable refugees from the East African Community (EAC) to stay. This means that the South Sudanese will be able to remain while the Somali must leave.

Security threat

Accusing refugees of being a security threat and Dadaab the operational base from which the al-Shabaab launches its attacks inside Kenya is not based on any evidence. Or if there is any concrete evidence, the Kenyan government has not provided it.

Some observers accuse Kenyan leaders of scapegoating refugees even though it is the Kenyan government that has failed to come up with an effective and workable national security system. The government has also over the years failed to win over and build trust with its Muslim communities. Its counterterrorism campaign has been abusive, indiscriminately targeting and persecuting the Muslim population. Al-Shabab has used the anti-Muslim sentiment to whip up support inside Kenya.

Moreover, if indeed Dadaab is the problem, it is Kenya as the host nation, and not the UNHCR, that oversees security in the three camps that make up the Dadaab complex. The camps fall fully under the jurisdiction and laws of Kenya and, therefore, if the camps are insecure, it is because the Kenyan security apparatus has failed in its mission to securitise them.

The terrorist threat that Kenya faces is not a refugee problem — it is homegrown. Attacks inside Kenya have been carried out by Kenyan nationals, who make up the largest foreign group among al-Shabaab fighters. The Mpeketoni attacks of 2014 in Lamu County and the Dusit D2 attack of 2019 are a testament to the involvement of Kenyan nationals. In the Mpeketoni massacre, al-Shabaab exploited local politics and grievances to deploy both Somali and Kenyan fighters, the latter being recruited primarily from coastal communities. The terrorist cell that conducted the assault on Dusit D2 comprised Kenyan nationals recruited from across Kenya.

Jubaland and the maritime border dispute 

This latest demand by the Kenyan government to close Dadaab by June 2022 is politically motivated. Strained relations between Kenya and Somalia over the years have significantly deteriorated in the past year.

Mogadishu cut diplomatic ties with Nairobi in December 2020, accusing Kenya of interfering in Somalia’s internal affairs. The contention is over Kenya’s unwavering support for the Federal Member State of Jubaland — one of Somalia’s five semi-autonomous states — and its leader Ahmed “Madobe” Mohamed Islam. The Jubaland leadership is at loggerheads with the centre in Mogadishu, in particular over the control of the Gedo region of Somalia.

Kenya has supported Jubaland in this dispute, allegedly hosting Jubaland militias inside its territory in Mandera County that which have been carrying out attacks on federal government of Somalia troop positions in the Gedo town of Beled Hawa on the Kenya-Somalia border. Dozens of people including many civilians have been killed in clashes between Jubaland-backed forces and the federal government troops.

Relations between the two countries have been worsened by the bitter maritime boundary dispute that has played out at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The latest call to close Dadaab is believed to have been largely triggered by the case at the Hague-based court, whose judgement was delivered on 12 October.  The court ruled largely in favour of Somalia, awarding it most of the disputed territory. In a statement, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta said, “At the outset, Kenya wishes to indicate that it rejects in totality and does not recognize the findings in the decision.” The dispute stems from a disagreement over the trajectory to be taken in the delimitation of the two countries’ maritime border in the Indian Ocean. Somalia filed the case at the Hague in 2014.  However, Kenya has from the beginning preferred and actively pushed for the matter to be settled out of court, either through bilateral negotiations with Somalia or through third-party mediation such as the African Union.

Kenya views Somalia as an ungrateful neighbour given all the support it has received in the many years the country has been in turmoil. Kenya has hosted hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees for three decades, played a leading role in numerous efforts to bring peace in Somalia by hosting peace talks to reconcile Somalis, and the Kenyan military, as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has sacrificed a lot and helped liberate towns and cities. Kenya feels all these efforts have not been appreciated by Somalia, which in the spirit of good neighbourliness should have given negotiation more time instead of going to court. In March, on the day of the hearing, when both sides were due to present their arguments, Kenya boycotted the court proceedings at the 11th hour. The court ruled that in determining the case, it would use prior submissions and written evidence provided by Kenya. Thus, the Kenyan government’s latest demand to close Dadaab is seen as retaliation against Somalia for insisting on pursuing the case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Nowhere safe to return to

Closing Dadaab by June 2022 as Kenya has insisted to the UNHCR, is not practical and will not allow the dignified return of refugees. Three decades after the total collapse of the state in Somalia, conditions have not changed much, war is still raging, the country is still in turmoil and many parts of Somalia are still unsafe. Much of the south of the country, where most of the refugees in Dadaab come from, remains chronically insecure and is largely under the control of al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the risk of some of the returning youth being recruited into al-Shabaab is real.

A programme of assisted voluntary repatriation has been underway in Dadaab since 2014, after the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed a tripartite agreement together with the UNHCR in 2013. By June 2021, around 85,000 refugees had returned to Somalia under the programme, mainly to major cities in southern Somalia such as Kismayo, Mogadishu and Baidoa. However, the programme has turned out to be complicated; human rights groups have termed it as far from voluntary, saying that return is fuelled by fear and misinformation. 

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed. Most of those who were repatriated returned in 2016 at a time when pressure from the Kenyan government was at its highest, with uncertainty surrounding the future of Dadaab after Kenya disbanded its Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and halted the registration of new refugees.

Many of the repatriated ended up in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia, with access to fewer resources and a more dangerous security situation. Somalia has a large population of 2.9 million IDPs  scattered across hundreds of camps in major towns and cities who have been displaced by conflict, violence and natural disasters. The IDPs are not well catered for. They live in precarious conditions, crowded in slums in temporary or sub-standard housing with very limited or no access to basic services such as education, basic healthcare, clean water and sanitation. Thousands of those who were assisted to return through the voluntary repatriation programme have since returned to Dadaab after they found conditions in Somalia unbearable. They have ended up undocumented in Dadaab after losing their refugee status in Kenya.  

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed.

Camps cannot be a permanent settlement for refugees. Dadaab was opened 30 years ago as a temporary solution for those fleeing the war in Somalia. Unfortunately, the situation in Somalia is not changing. It is time the Kenyan government, in partnership with members of the international community, finds a sustainable, long-term solution for Somali refugees in Kenya, including considering pathways towards integrating the refugees into Kenyan society.  Dadaab could then be shut down and the refugees would be able to lead dignified lives, to work and to enjoy freedom of movement unlike today where their lives are in limbo, living in prison-like conditions inside the camps.

The proposal to allow refugees from the East African Community to remain after the closure of the camps — which will mainly affect the 130,000 South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma —  is a good gesture and a major opportunity for refugees to become self-reliant and contribute to the local economy.

Announcing the scheme, Kenya said that refugees from the EAC who are willing to stay on would be issued with work permits for free. Unfortunately, this option was not made available to refugees from Somalia even though close to 60 per cent of the residents of Dadaab are under the age of 18, have lived in Kenya their entire lives and have little connection with a country their parents escaped from three decades ago.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees. Many have also integrated fully into Kenyan society, intermarried, learnt to speak fluent Swahili and identify more with Kenya than with their country of origin.

The numbers that need to be integrated are not huge. There are around 269,000 Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma. When you subtract the estimated 40,000 Kenyan nationals included in refugee data, the figure comes down to around 230,000 people. This is not a large population that would alter Kenya’s demography in any signific ant way, if indeed this isis the fear in some quarters. If politics were to be left out of the question, integration would be a viable option.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees.

For decades, Kenya has shown immense generosity by hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees, and it is important that the country continues to show this solidarity. Whatever the circumstances and the diplomatic difficulties with its neighbour Somalia, Kenya should respect its legal obligations under international law to provide protection to those seeking sanctuary inside its borders. Refugees should only return to their country when the conditions are conducive, and Somalia is ready to receive them. To forcibly truck people to the border, as Kenya has threatened in the past, is not a solution. If the process of returning refugees to Somalia is not well thought out, a hasty decision will have devastating consequences for their security and well-being.

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The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio

As CARICOM countries call for more profound changes that would empower the Haitian population, Western powers offer plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country.

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The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio
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On Wednesday 7 July 2021, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated in his home. His wife was injured in the attack. That the president’s assassins were able to access his home posing as agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States (DEA) brought to the fore the intricate relationship between drugs, money laundering and mercenary activities in Haiti. Two days later, the government of Haiti reported that the attack had been carried out by a team of assailants, 26 of whom were Colombian. This information that ex-soldiers from Colombia were involved brought to the spotlight the ways in which Haiti society has been enmeshed in the world of the international mercenary market and instability since the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Lavalas movement in 2004.

When the French Newspaper Le Monde recently stated that Haiti was one of the four drug hubs of the Caribbean region, the paper neglected to add the reality that as a drug hub, Haiti had become an important base for US imperial activities, including imperial money laundering, intelligence, and criminal networks. No institution in Haiti can escape this web and Haitian society is currently reeling from this ecosystem of exploitation, repression, and manipulation. Under President Donald Trump, the US heightened its opposition to the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. The mercenary market in Florida became interwoven with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the financial institutions that profited from crime syndicates that thrive on anti-communist and anti-Cuba ideas.

But even as Haitian society is reeling from intensified destabilization, the so-called Core Group (comprising of the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union, the United States, France, Spain, Canada, Germany, and Brazil) offers plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, CARICOM countries are calling for more profound changes that would empower the population while mobilizing international resources to neutralize the social power of the money launderers and oligarchs in Haitian society.

Haiti since the Duvaliers

For the past thirty-five years, the people of Haiti have yearned for a new mode of politics to transcend the dictatorship of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc). The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination. Since that revolution, France and the US have cooperated to punish Haiti for daring to resist white supremacy. An onerous payment of reparations to France was compounded by US military occupation after 1915.

Under President Woodrow Wilson, the racist ideals of the US imperial interests were reinforced in Haiti in a nineteen-year military occupation that was promoted by American business interests in the country. Genocidal violence from the Dominican Republic in 1937 strengthened the bonds between militarism and extreme violence in the society. Martial law, forced labour, racism and extreme repression were cemented in the society. Duvalierism in the form of the medical doctor François Duvalier mobilized a variant of Negritude in the 50s to cement a regime of thuggery, aligned with the Cold War goals of the United States in the Caribbean. The record of the Duvalier regime was reprehensible in every form, but this kind of government received military and intelligence assistance from the United States in a region where the Cuban revolution offered an alternative. Francois Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who continued the tradition of rule by violence (the notorious Tonton Macoute) until this system was overthrown by popular uprisings in 1986.

The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination.

On 16 December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the presidency by a landslide in what were widely reported to be the first free elections in Haiti’s history. Legislative elections in January 1991 gave Aristide supporters a plurality in Haiti’s parliament. The Lavalas movement of the Aristide leadership was the first major antidote to the historical culture of repression and violence. The United States and France opposed this new opening of popular expression such that military intervention, supported by external forces in North America and the Organization of American States, brought militarists and drug dealers under General Joseph Raoul Cédras to the forefront of the society. The working peoples of Haiti were crushed by an alliance of local militarists, external military peacekeepers and drug dealers. The noted Haitian writer, Edwidge Danticat, has written extensively on the consequences of repeated military interventions, genocide and occupation in the society while the population sought avenues to escape these repressive orders. After the removal of the Aristide government in 2004, it was the expressed plan of the local elites and the external forces that the majority of the Haitian population should be excluded from genuine forms of participatory democracy, including elections.

Repression, imperial NGOs and humanitarian domination

The devastating earthquake of January 2010 further deepened the tragic socio-economic situation in Haiti. An estimated 230,000 Haitians lost their lives, 300,000 were injured, and more than 1.5 million were displaced as a result of collapsed buildings and infrastructure. External military interventions by the United Nations, humanitarian workers and international foundations joined in the corruption to strengthen the anti-democratic forces in Haitian society. The Clinton Foundation of the United States was complicit in imposing the disastrous presidency of Michel Martelly on Haitian society after the earthquake. The book by Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster, provides a gripping account of the corruption in Haiti. So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

In 2015, Jovenel Moïse was elected president in a very flawed process, but was only able to take office in 2017. From the moment he entered the presidency, his administration became immersed in the anti-people traditions that had kept the ruling elites together with the more than 10,000 international NGOs that excluded Haitians from participating in the projects for their own recovery. President Moïse carved out political space in Haiti with the support of armed groups who were deployed as death squads with the mission of terrorizing popular spaces and repressing supporters of the Haitian social movement. In a society where the head of state did not have a monopoly over armed gangs, kidnappings, murder (including the killing of schoolchildren) and assassinations got out of control. Under Moïse, Haiti had become an imbroglio where the government and allied gangs organized a series of massacres in poor neighbourhoods known to host anti-government organizing, killing dozens at a time.

Moïse and the extension of repression in Haiti

Moïse remained president with the connivance of diplomats and foundations from Canada, France and the United States. These countries and their leaders ignored the reality that the Haitian elections of 2017 were so deeply flawed and violent that almost 80 per cent of Haitian voters did not, or could not, vote. Moïse, with the support of one section of the Haitian power brokers, avoided having any more elections, and so parliament became inoperative in January 2020, when the terms of most legislators expired. When mayors’ terms expired in July 2020, Moïse personally appointed their replacements. This accumulation of power by the president deepened the divisions within the capitalist classes in Haiti. Long-simmering tensions between the mulatto and black capitalists were exacerbated under Moïse who mobilized his own faction on the fact that he was seeking to empower and enrich the black majority. Thugs and armed gangs were integrated into the drug hub and money laundering architecture that came to dominate Haiti after 2004.

After the Trump administration intensified its opposition to the Venezuelan government, the political and commercial leadership in Haiti became suborned to the international mercenary and drug systems that were being mobilized in conjunction with the military intelligence elements in Florida and Colombia. President Jovenel Moïse’s term, fed by spectacular and intense struggles between factions of the looters, was scheduled to come to a legal end in February 2021. Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

Since the removal of Aristide and the marginalization of the Lavalas forces from the political arena in Haiti, the US has been more focused on strengthening the linkages between the Haitian drug lords and the money launderers in Colombia, Florida, Dominican Republic, and Venezuelan exiles. It was therefore not surprising that the mercenary industry, with its linkages to financial forces in Florida, has been implicated in the assassination of President Moïse. The Core Group of Canada, France and the US has not once sought to deploy the resources of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to penetrate the interconnections between politicians in Haiti and the international money laundering and mercenary market.

Working for democratic transition in Haiti

The usual handlers of Haitian repression created the Core Group within one month of Moïse’s assassination. Canada, France and the United States had historically been implicated in the mismanaging of Haiti along with the United Nations. Now, the three countries have mobilized the OAS (with its checkered history), Brazil and the European Union to add their weight to a new transition that will continue to exclude the majority of the people of Haiti. It has been clear that under the current system of destabilization and violence, social peace will be necessary before elections can take place in Haiti.

Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

The continuous infighting among the Haitian ruling elements after the assassination was temporarily resolved at the end of July when Ariel Henry was confirmed by the US and France as Prime Minister. Henry had been designated as prime minister by Moïse days before his assassination. The popular groups in Haiti that had opposed Moïse considered the confirmation of Ariel Henry as a slap in the face because they had been demonstrating for the past four years for a more robust change to the political landscape. These organizations mobilized in what they called the Commission, (a gathering of civil society groups and political parties with more than 150 members), and had been holding marathon meetings to publicly work out what kind of transitional government they would want to see. According to the New York Times, rather than a consensus, the Core Group of international actors imposed a “unilateral proposal” on the people of Haiti.

Haiti is a member of CARICOM. The Caribbean community has proposed a longer transition period overseen by CARICOM for the return of Haiti to democracy. With the experience of the UN in Haiti, the Caribbean community has, through its representative on the UN Security Council, proposed the mobilization of the peacekeeping resources and capabilities of the UN to be deployed to CARICOM in order to organize a credible transition to democracy in Haiti. The nature and manner of the assassination of President Moïse has made more urgent the need for genuine reconstruction and support for democratic transition in Haiti.

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How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya

Despite the hostile rhetoric and threats of closure, the presence of refugees in the camps in northern-eastern Kenyan has benefited the host communities.

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How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya
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In the 1960s, Kenya had a progressive refugee policy that allowed refugees to settle anywhere in the country and to access education. This approach created in Kenya a cadre of skilled and professional refugees. However, the policy changed in the 1990s due to an overwhelming influx of refugees and asylum seekers escaping conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Kenya switched to an encampment policy for refugees, who were mainly confined to camps.

Although there are refugees living in urban and peri-urban areas elsewhere in the country, for over two decades, northern Kenya has hosted a disproportionate number of the refugees living in Kenya. The region has been home to one of the world’s largest refugee camps, with generations of lineage having an impact on the economic, social, cultural, and ecological situation of the region because of the support provided by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in education, health and security services.

Mandera and Marsabit counties, both of which boarder with Ethiopia, Wajir County which borders with both Ethiopia and Somalia and, Garissa County which borders with Somalia, have hosted refugees and migrants displaced from their countries of origin for various reasons. In 2018, the town of Moyale, which is on the Ethiopian boarder in Marsabit County, temporarily hosted over 10,000 Ethiopians escaping military operations in Ethiopia’s Moyale District.    

Elwak town in Wajir County occasionally hosts pastoralist communities from Somalia who cross into Kenya seeking pasture for their livestock. While the movement of refugees into Marsabit and Wajir counties has been of a temporary nature, Garissa County has hosted refugees for decades.

Located 70 kilometres from the border with Somalia, the Dadaab refugee complex was established in the 1990s and has three main camps: Dagahaley, Ifo, and Hagadera. Due to an increase in refugee numbers around 2011, the Kambioos refugee camp in Fafi sub-county was established to host new arrivals from Somalia and to ease pressure on the overcrowded Hagadera refugee camp. The Kambioos camp was closed in 2019 as the refugee population fell.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), the Dadaab refugee complex currently hosts over 226, 689 refugees, 98 per cent of whom are from Somalia. In 2015, the refugee population in the Dadaab refugee complex was over 300,000, larger than that of the host community. In 2012, the camp held over 400,000 refugees leading to overstretched and insufficient resources for the growing population.

Under international refugee and human rights law, the government has the sole responsibility of hosting and caring for refugees. However, there is little information regarding the investments made by the Kenyan government in the refugee sector in the north-eastern region over time. Moreover, the government’s investment in the sector is debatable since there was no proper legal framework to guide refugee operations in the early 1990s. It was only in 2006 that the government enacted the Refugee Act that formally set up the Refugee Affairs Secretariat mandated to guide and manage the refugee process in Kenya.

While the Refugee Act of 2006 places the management of refugee affairs in the hands of the national government, devolved county governments play a significant role in refugee operations. With the 2010 constitution, the devolution of social functions such as health and education has extended into refugee-hosting regions and into refugee camps. While devolution in this new and more inclusive system of governance has benefited the previously highly marginalised north-eastern region through a fairer distribution of economic and political resources, there is however little literature on how the refugees benefit directly from the county government resource allocations.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds: Mandera County alone received US$88 million in the 2015/2016 financial year, the highest allocation of funds after Nairobi and Turkana, leading to developmental improvements.

However, it can be argued that the allocation of funds from the national government to the northern frontier counties by the Kenya Commission on Revenue Allocation—which is always based on the Revenue Allocation table that prioritizes population, poverty index, land area, basic equal share and fiscal responsibility—may not have been taking the refugee population into account. According to the 2019 census, the population of Dadaab sub-county is 185,252, a figure that is well below the actual refugee population. The increase in population in the north-eastern region that is due to an increase in the refugee population calls for an increase in the allocation of devolved funds.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds.

Dadaab refugee camp has been in the news for the wrong reasons. Security agencies blame the refugees for the increased Al Shabaab activity in Kenya, and even though these claims are disputed, the government has made moves to close down the camp. In 2016, plans to close Dadaab were blocked by the High Court which declared the proposed closure unconstitutional. In 2021, Kenya was at it again when Ministry of Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’I tweeted that he had given the UNHCR 14 days to draw up a plan for the closure of the camp. The UNHCR and the government issued a joint statement agreeing to close the camp in June 2022.

The security rhetoric is not new. There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms. During the 554th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Forum held in November 2015, it was concluded that the humanitarian character of the Dadaab refugee camp had been compromised. The AU statements, which may have been drafted by Kenya, claimed that the attacks on Westgate Mall and Garissa University were planned and launched from within the refugee camps. These security incidents are an indication of the challenges Kenya has been facing in managing security. For example, between 2010 and 2011, there were several IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) incidents targeting police vehicles in and around Dadaab where a dozen officers were injured or killed. In October 2012, two people working for the medical charity Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in Dadaab. Local television network NTV has described the camp as “a womb of terror” and “a home for al-Shabaab operations”.

There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms.

Security restrictions and violent incidents have created a challenging operational environment for NGOs, leading to the relocation of several non-local NGO staff as well as contributing to a shrinking humanitarian space. Some teachers and health workers from outside the region have refused to return to the area following terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab, leaving behind large gaps in the health, education, and nutrition sectors.

However, despite the challenging situation, the refugee camps have also brought many benefits, not only to Kenya as a country but also to the county governments and the local host communities.

Education

According to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) half the refugee population in the IGAD member states are children of school-going age, between 4 and 18 years.

In Garissa, the education sector is one of the areas that has benefited from the hosting of refugees in the county because the host community has access to schools in the refugee camps. Windle Trust, an organisation that offers scholarships to students in secondary schools and in vocational training institutes, has been offering scholarships to both the refugees and the host communities. In July 2021, over 70 students benefited from a project run by International Labour Organisations (ILO) in partnership with Garissa county governments, the East African Institute of Welding (EAIW) and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) to give industrial welding skills to refugees and host communities.

However, despite the measures taken by the Kenyan government to enrol refugees in Kenyan schools, there is a notable gap that widens as students go through the different levels of education. Statistics show that of the school-going refugee population, only a third get access to secondary education of which a sixth get to join tertiary institutions. This is well below the government’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 target that seeks to ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education. This also reflects the situation of the host community’s education uptake. Other investments in the education sector that have targeted the host communities include recruitment and deployment of early childhood education teachers to schools in the host community by UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Non-governmental/intergovernmental support 

The presence of refugees has led to NGOs setting up and running projects in the camps. According to Garissa County’s Integrated Development Plan, there are over 70 non-governmental organisations present, with the majority operating around the Dadaab refugee complex and within the host communities. The UNHCR estimates that it will require about US$149.6 million to run its operations in Dadaab Camp this year. However, as of May 2021, only US$45.6 million—31 per cent of the total amount required—had been received.

The decrease in humanitarian funding has had an impact on the livelihoods of refugees and host communities in north-eastern Kenya.  According to the World Bank, 73 per cent of the population of Garissa County live below the poverty line. In the absence of social safety nets, locals have benefited from the humanitarian operations in and around the camp. The UNHCR reports that about 40,000 Kenyan nationals within a 50km radius of the Dadaab refugee camp ended up enrolling as refugees in order to access food and other basic services in the camps.

In 2014, the UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million worth of community assets since 2011. The presence of refugees has also increased remittances from the diaspora, and there are over 50 remittance outlets operating in the Dadaab camp, increasing economic opportunities and improving services. Using 2010 as the reference year, researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

The UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million of community assets since 2011 since 2011.

To reduce overdependence on aid and humanitarian funding in running refugee operations, the County Government of Garissa developed a Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISEDP) in 2019 that provided ways of integrating refugees into the socio-economic life of the community to enhance their self-reliance. The European Union announced a Euro 5 million funding programme to support the socio-economic development plan, thus opening up opportunities for development initiatives including income generating activities such as the flourishing businesses at Hagadera market. The recent announcement of the planned closure of the camp has put these plans at risk.

A voice

The host community is increasingly involved in issues that affect both the locals living around the Dadaab refugee complex and the refugees themselves, with the voice of the community gaining prominence in decision-making regarding the county budget and sometimes even regarding NGO operations. NGOs periodically conduct needs assessments in and around the camp to guide the budgeting and planning process for subsequent years and the host community is always consulted.

Interest in governance issues has also increased. For example, between 2010 and 2015 the host community successfully lobbied for increased employment opportunities for locals in the UNHCR operations. With experience in the humanitarian field, some from within the host communities have secured positions as expatriates in international organizations across the globe, adding to increased international remittances to Garissa County.

Health

Research reveals that, compared to other pastoralist areas, health services for host communities have improved because of the presence of aid agencies in Dadaab. Hospitals managed by Médicins Sans Frontières and the International Red Cross in Dagahaley and Hagadera respectively are said to be offering better services than the sub-county hospital in Dadaab town. The two hospitals are Ministry of Health-approved vaccination centres in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite the massive investments made in the health sector by humanitarian organisations in and around Dadaab, both UNICEF and the World Health Organisation have identified the camp as an entry point for infectious diseases like polio and measles into Kenya. There was a confirmed case of WPV1 (wild poliovirus) in a 4-month-old girl from the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2013. This is a clear indication of the health risks associated with the situation.

Researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

Other problems associated with the presence of the camps include encroachment of the refugee population on local land, leading to crime and hostility between the two communities. These conflicts are aggravated by the scramble for the little arable land available in this semi-arid region that makes it difficult to grow food and rear farm animals, leading to food shortages.

While it is important to acknowledge that progress has been made in integrating refugees into the north-eastern region, and that some development has taken place in the region, more needs to be done to realise the full potential of the region and its communities.  Kenya’s security sector should ensure that proper measures are put in place to enhance security right from the border entry point in order to weed out criminals who take advantage of Kenya’s acceptance of refugees. The country should not expel those who have crossed borders in search of refuge but should tap fully into the benefits that come with hosting refugees.

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