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I have been following the Adani Group’s electricity deal with the Kenya government involving the Kenya Electricity Transmission Company, Ketraco, and it reminds me of the story of a similar deal with a Turkish firm, Karpowerships, in South Africa back in 2020.
In October this year, after four years of steady campaigning, lobbying, court cases and street protests, a South African government minister declared the Karpowership deal “dead in the water.”
The story of the Karpowership deal spans over four years, from June 2020 to October 2024, and has seen multiple twists and turns during that time.
Looking back at the successful campaign against the Karpowership arrangement in South Africa, I believe Kenya’s anti-Adani Group campaign can draw valuable lessons with regard to the Ketraco issue.
While the contexts may differ, the core challenges in both cases revolve around transparency. To put the South African power crisis in context, one needs to understand that the country had been struggling with persistent power shortages, mainly due to the deteriorating infrastructure of Eskom, the state-owned power utility, which operates a fleet of ageing coal plants. The matter of scheduled power cuts – what South Africans refer to as load shedding – has been a major issue, leading to economic disruptions and public dissatisfaction.
In what was seen by some at the time as a bid to alleviate South Africa’s problem, a controversial deal was proposed by a Turkish company, Karpowership. Powerships are floating power plants that use gas as fuel to generate electricity, which is then fed into the electricity grid. Karpowership has a track record of providing ship-based electricity generation to various other countries. In Africa, these countries include Ghana, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Senegal and Sierra Leone.
For many South Africans, one of the red flags around the Karpowerships deal was that it would last for 20 years. As a result, the deal soon faced significant public backlash, with accusations of corruption and mismanagement.
The main allegations included irregularities in the procurement process. Critics, including environmental activists and opposition political parties like the Democratic Alliance (DA), claimed that the procurement process was not transparent and was rushed to benefit Karpowership. Others raised concerns that the deal would lock South Africa into expensive, long-term, 20-year contracts with the high costs passed on to consumers.
Alongside these concerns there emerged conflict of interest allegations. Investigative journalists and civil society organisations suggested that politically connected individuals may have unduly influenced the deal. The involvement of figures within the government and potentially corrupt interests came under scrutiny. There were allegations that officials in key positions may have facilitated the deal in exchange for kickbacks or other benefits.
One of the leading civil society organisations campaigning against the Karpowership deal has been the Organisation Undoing Tax Abuse (Outa). It argued that the Karpowership deal on the table would mean that South Africa was tied to the agreement for 20 years and that this was untenable.
In a press release, Outa said, “Karpowership buys gas to generate electricity in US dollars, and the dollar-rand exchange rate fluctuates. So South Africa will be tied financially to whatever the rate is.
“If the agreement falls through, Karpowership can simply pack up and leave, leaving South Africa with no infrastructure to generate electricity though we would have spent a lot of money by then.”
The activists lobbied public opinion and worked through the courts and were unwittingly assisted by a degree of infighting or disagreement over the deal between different South African government departments.
In the end it was a combination of environmental concerns, fears of corruption, and licensing issues that stalled the Karpowerships deal.
South Africa’s Department of Forestry, Fisheries and Environment (DFFE) initially refused to grant Karpowership the necessary environmental licences, citing the potential harm to marine ecosystems and air quality. Some environmental activists suggested that these environmental concerns were overlooked in favour of vested interests.
With regard to the cost and long-term burden of the deal, economists and energy experts argued that the cost of generating power using LNG would be significantly higher than other sources, especially renewables. Environmental watchdogs like Greenpeace Africa voiced opposition, arguing that the government was not prioritising renewable energy solutions and that the Karpowership deal was financially and environmentally unsound.
The long-term financial burden on South Africa, especially for a 20-year contract, led to suspicions that the deal favoured corporate interests over the national interest. The deal’s future became uncertain after legal challenges, public protests, and environmental concerns led to delays. Additionally, investigations into possible irregularities slowed down its implementation. While the Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE) wanted everything done yesterday and as smoothly as possible, the DFFE felt duty-bound to ensure that all the i’s were dotted and all the t’s were crossed.
As all this was going on, it emerged that in order to satisfy South Africa’s Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment rules with regard to investment, an Independent Power Producer (IPP) company called Karpowership SA had been formed. This company was owned 51 per cent by the Turkish energy company Karadeniz Holdings and 49 per cent by the South African company, Powergroup SA.
The initial Karpowership proposal for South Africa came in June 2020 at a time when South Africa was grappling with an energy crisis.
As a result of the power crisis, the government had earlier begun exploring various emergency power solutions to alleviate the rolling blackouts caused by ageing coal plants and delayed renewable energy projects.
In mid-February 2020, the South African Energy Ministry had announced that it needed to procure 2000 MW of generation capacity from a range of energy technologies through the Risk Mitigation Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (RMIPPPP).
When in March 2020 COVID-19 hit, President Cyril Ramaphosa declared the situation a national disaster using South Africa’s Disaster Management Act (DMA). South Africa’s legislative measures to deal with emergency situations and disasters fall under sections 30 and 30A of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA).
According to an April 2020 article published by Nicole Kruger, then a candidate attorney at Warburton Attorneys, Section 30A provides for a person to be issued with a directive permitting them to carry out a listed or specified activity without obtaining an environmental authorisation in order to prevent or contain an emergency situation or the effects of the emergency situation.
By May 2020, as increased pressure came to bear on the healthcare system as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) announced it was backing the Energy Minister’s call for the procurement of generation capacity.
A month later, in June, Karpowership made a proposal to the South African government in which it undertook to supply its powerships – which were to be anchored off a number of South African ports – to provide electricity directly to the grid. They intended to use Karpowership SA’s floating gas-fired power plants, which would supply electricity for a 20-year period.
When in October 2020 the South African government, through the DMRE, finally launched the RMIPPPP, the then opposition Democratic Alliance (DA, which is now a major partner in South Africa’s Government of National Unity) together with some non-governmental organisations demanded investigations into the deal. They claimed the deal was marred by corruption and sought to challenge the legality and transparency of the RMIPPPP bidding process. By 2023, the Karpowership project was facing hurdles, including legal and environmental reviews, but discussions about it continued as part of South Africa’s ongoing energy debates.
In March the following year, the DMRE announced that Karpowership SA had been awarded three out of the eight preferred bidder contracts, with plans to deploy powerships at the ports of Richards Bay, Saldanha Bay, and Ngqura. The contracts would supply a combined 1,220 MW, around 61 per cent of the RMIPPPP’s total. Another three preferred bidders were added later.
By the time April 2021 rolled around, Karpowership had applied to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) for three generation licences for Coega, Saldanha Bay and Richards Bay, with 31 August 2022 as the commissioning date. The applications were revised and resubmitted in May 2021.
Things were now beginning to move quickly. By May it was time for the Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and the DFFE began reviewing Karpowership’s applications for environmental authorizations.
In the meantime, public opposition began to grow as it became evident that Karpowership would require significant exemptions from environmental laws. In June 2021, Karpowerships experienced their first rejection from the government when the DFFE declined to give environmental approvals; environment Minister Barbara Creecy rejected Karpowership’s environmental applications, citing insufficient consultation and risks to marine biodiversity. As was to be expected, Karpowership appealed the decision, arguing that its powerships would meet South Africa’s urgent energy needs.
Meanwhile, environmental and legal concerns about the deal were coming to the fore. Environmental organisations, such as the Green Connection and other civil society groups, raised concerns about the environmental impact of the gas-fired ships. They argued that the project could harm marine life and increase carbon emissions, undermining South Africa’s climate goals.
Legal challenges were filed against the project, particularly focusing on its long-term financial and environmental viability. One of those challenging the deal was Outa. In August 2021, Outa made a formal submission to NERSA objecting to the Karpowership licences. In a press release at the time, they said, “Our submission is straightforward and sets out why NERSA ought not entertain the application(s) in the first place as many factors and processes are still pending and not yet finalised.”
At the same time the media was running reports on the bidding process and the 20-year contract and the last six months of 2021 were a time of public backlash and investigations into the matter. The media were reporting that the 20-year contract could cost the country billions and this sparked further opposition to the deal. NERSA also faced criticism from politicians and the public for being seen to have “hastily” approved the project.
The deal’s legal and regulatory battles rolled into 2022 as Karpowership continued to face multiple legal challenges and delays in receiving approvals from NERSA and the DFFE. During this time, concerns around gas supply contracts, potential costs, and legal implications stalled further progress.
There were also international concerns, or to be more precise, questions about what the deal would signal about South Africa’s commitment to reducing its carbon footprint. South Africa has signed international commitments on climate change and because the Karpowership deal involved fossil fuel-based power generation, eyebrows were raised.
In the interim, the regular power cuts – or load shedding – became a permanent feature of South African life. In 2022, South Africa reported 2,400 hours of power cuts in the country. Things got worse in 2023 when almost 6,950 hours of load shedding occurred in the country and Eskom was forced to implement stage six load shedding to prevent the collapse of the national power grid.
By April 2023, the Karpowership deal looked like it was in real trouble as pressure from environmental groups mounted and the public outcry against the environmental and financial risks grew louder.
However, within the government there was strong support for the deal. While the government’s overall energy strategy has all along been a mix of renewables and other sources, there was support from elements within Ramaphosa’s administration for this emergency procurement due to the urgency of addressing Eskom’s failures.
One loud and powerful supporter was the DMRE under the leadership of Minister Gwede Mantashe. They supported the Karpowership bid as part of the government’s broader strategy to rapidly stabilise the energy grid. Mantashe and his department argued that the powerships would provide a much-needed boost to the grid within months, using liquefied natural gas (LNG) as fuel, and they presented it as a temporary but vital solution. In July 2023, Mantashe publicly expressed his frustration at the delays and urged the country to move forward with the Karpowership deal as part of solving the energy crisis.
Meanwhile opponents of the deal were not giving up; if anything, the more the government talked up the deal the more those opposed to it dug in their heels.
August 2023 saw renewed protests and political pressure erupt, with environmental groups organising nationwide demonstrations against the deal. These protests gained significant traction, pressuring the government to reconsider. In parallel, political pressure mounted as opposition parties questioned the legitimacy of the deal in parliament.
By September 2023, despite Minister Mantashe’s pushing, legal challenges continued to plague the project. The Green Connection, a South African environmental lobby group, managed to score a legal victory, halting the project on the grounds of insufficient environmental assessments and lack of transparency. This win in the courts forced NERSA and the DFFE to again delay approvals, with concerns about the adequacy of Karpowership’s impact assessments persisting.
As global environmental standards become more stringent, international organisations expressed concern about South Africa’s adherence to its climate goals. By October 2023, the Karpowership deal faced further delays due to international pressure, as well as slow progress in securing the necessary gas supply contracts.
In February 2024, the deal received its final blow from the courts when the High Court ruled against the government’s handling of the Karpowership deal, declaring that key environmental processes had been bypassed. As a result, the court blocked any further approvals without a thorough independent environmental review, thus significantly weakening Karpowership’s position.
Despite the government not appearing ready to give up the deal, the writing was on the wall. The Karpowership deal looked like it was being effectively sidelined as new renewable energy projects and storage initiatives gained momentum and by July 2024 the government found itself being forced to explore alternative renewable energy solutions to resolve the energy crisis.
The issue was finally spelt out by South Africa’s Energy and Electricity Minister Kgosientsho Ramokgopa in October this year, when he said the deal would not proceed any further and was, as far as he was concerned, “dead in the water”.
Ramokgopa, who was appointed Electricity Minister at the height of the load shedding in March 2023, had the Energy docket added to his portfolio in July this year after the South African general election. He blamed the death of the deal on regulatory hurdles, environmental concerns and the overwhelming public and legal opposition, thus giving environmental advocates and others opposed to the deal reason to celebrate. Some believe that South Africa will now seriously consider more sustainable solutions to its energy crisis.
From where I sit, the campaign against the Karpowership project offers several key insights into how environmental advocacy can influence large infrastructure projects such as the Ketraco one in Kenya.
In theory, it is entirely possible to scupper this controversial Ketraco deal between the government and the Adani Group through legal challenges and the raising of environmental concerns.
Public awareness and media campaigns were an important part of South Africa’s successful campaign against the Karpowerships and could work in Kenya too. Already various groups are using social media and other platforms – including the mainstream media – to build awareness about the perceived harms of the project.
Some of the lessons that can be learnt from the campaign against Karpowerships in South Africa include highlighting the importance of rigorous environmental assessments and the active monitoring of large infrastructure projects. South Africans found, for instance, that legal challenges based on flawed EIAs could be powerful tools to block or alter unsustainable projects.
In Kenya we should seriously consider broad-based collaborations between lawyers, scientists, and NGOs as such collaborations can help strengthen arguments and increase chances of success. We need to more fully appreciate that the point of public participation in such campaigns is that when people are made aware of the local and environmental impacts of projects, they can in theory apply significant pressure on decision-makers.
The framing of the arguments against such projects is crucial. The campaigns in South Africa demonstrated the importance of not just opposing a project but also offering clear and viable alternatives.
Most important of all, and this goes for all sorts of other deals that the government is entering into, is economic transparency and accountability. In South Africa, the critics of Karpowership raised concerns about the long-term economic burden it would place on South Africa due to expensive long-term contracts. They questioned the transparency of the deal and argued that it was not in the public’s financial interest.
In Kenya, the anti-Adani campaign is already pushing for transparency regarding the financial details of the Ketraco deal. They should continue questioning whether the deal is truly beneficial for Kenya in the long run, or if it is locking the country into financially risky arrangements. Highlighting hidden costs or long-term financial burdens can shift public opinion and drive opposition.
There is also a need to collaborate with broader movements. A united front can amplify the campaign’s reach and power, making it harder for the government or corporations to ignore.
