“Uhuru Kenyatta’s assumption of the presidency has injected fresh energy into his family’s commercial empire, putting a number of its units on an expansion mode that is expected to consolidate its position as one of the largest business dynasties in Kenya”
Business Daily, Monday, November 11, 2013.
A few days ago, the Dairy Board of Kenya published, then recalled, draft regulations that sought, among other things, to outlaw and criminalize farmer-to-consumer raw milk sales. Essentially farmers would be compelled to sell milk to processors or other intermediaries (cooperatives or businesses) licensed and regulated by the Board. The withdrawal was in response to a huge public blowback, including a trending hashtag #Kenyattamilkbill, mobilising for the reactivation of the boycott against Brookside Dairy products. It was notable that the Dairy Board’s reversal of its draft regulations followed a press release by Brookside Dairies objecting to the regulations citing specifically the levies that the Board proposed on dairy businesses. Tellingly, Brookside’s statement was silent on the question of outlawing farmer to consumer raw milk sales.
This story is about an even more audacious scheme in the Kenyatta empire’s “expansion drive”, the most egregious case of policy and regulatory capture I have encountered…
As a previous column, Crony Capitalism and State Capture: The Kenyatta Family Story observed, Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency has delivered remarkable returns-on-investment for the family enterprise:
“During Uhuru Kenyatta’s first term the consumer price of milk increased 67 percent (from KSh 36 to KSh 60 per half-litre packet), while producer prices remained unchanged at Sh 35 per litre), effectively increasing processors’ gross margin by 130 percent (from Sh37 to Sh 85 per litre). Given the industry’s 400m litre annual throughput and Kenyatta family’s market share, which stands at 45 percent, the consumer squeeze translates to an increase of the Kenyatta Family’s turnover from KSh 13 billion to KSh 22 billion, and gross margin from KSh 6.7 billion to KSh 15 billion a year.”
Not enough, not by a long shot.
The platform will offer micro and small enterprises an overdraft facility of up to KSh 50,000, and a loan of up to 12 months with a limit of KSh 200,000. The initiative targets five million sign-ups, and two million users in the first year. How it plans to do this is a frightening demonstration of the workings of state capture in the Uhuru Kenyatta era.
Kenya’s annual milk production is estimated at 3.5 billion litres, of which 80 percent is consumed or traded informally. Put another way, only 20 percent, about 600,000 litres, is handled by processors. If these regulations were only to double the processors intake to 50 percent, we are talking of growing Brookside’s turnover and gross margin to KSh100 billion and KSh 67 billion respectively.
But this column is not about the milk, at least not literally – even if the milking metaphor is quite apt. This story is about an even more audacious scheme in the Kenyatta empire’s “expansion drive”, the most egregious case of policy and regulatory capture I have encountered, and I have been round this block a few times. What follows is based on an internal document entitled ‘Restoring Credit Access to Micro and Small Sized Businesses’ shared by whistleblowers in institutions that have been corralled into the scheme by force.
The Huduma Number connection starts with an innocuous statement in a slide presentation titled “How Customers will Qualify” that ends with a bullet point stating that “customers that don’t immediately qualify can opt into a credit access plan”.
The name of the scheme is Wezesha (‘enable’). It is a proposed mobile phone lending platform described as a “collaborative initiative to bridge the access to credit by micro and small enterprises”. It will be managed by five banks, namely NIC Bank, Diamond Trust Bank (DTB), the Kenya Commercial Bank and Cooperative Bank under the leadership of the Kenyatta Family-owned Commercial Bank of Africa. CBA is in the process of acquiring NIC, alongside the smaller microfinance oriented Jamii Bora bank. KCB, Kenya’s largest bank by asset base, and Cooperative Bank, are quasi-public banks, while Diamond Trust Bank is associated with the Aga Khan. The platform will offer micro and small enterprises an overdraft facility of up to KSh 50,000, and a loan of up to 12 months with a limit of KSh 200,000. The initiative targets five million sign-ups, and two million users in the first year. How it plans to do this is a frightening demonstration of the workings of state capture in the Uhuru Kenyatta era.
When it was launched we were threatened that Kenyans who did not register would be denied public services. We are compelled to ask whether this threat, and its prominence in this scheme are related. Are the president’s commercial interests the force behind the Huduma Number?
First observation: the contentious Huduma Number initiative features prominently in the scheme. The Huduma Number connection starts with an innocuous statement in a slide (the documentation is a powerpoint presentation) titled “How Customers will Qualify” that ends with a bullet point stating that “customers that don’t immediately qualify can opt into a credit access plan (consumer education).” How so, is elaborated in another slide titled “Customer Education At Huduma Universal Service Kiosk” complete with the Huduma Kenya logo. Further along, in another slide titled “Functional Schema” a bullet point: “Distribution: An integrated network of GoK Huduma Centres, Bank Branches and agent locations to ‘onboard’ customers and offer information and advice to capital and business opportunities.”
When Huduma Number was launched we were threatened that Kenyans who did not register would be denied public services. We are compelled to ask whether this threat, and its prominence in this scheme are related. Are the president’s commercial interests the force behind the Huduma Number?
But perhaps the question is already answered in another slide titled “Phase 2 Support for Scalability”: New Huduma ID to be integrated once it is ready. This scheme could be used as a registration incentive.”
The funding partners propose that the GoK establishes a credit risk guarantee fund, that is administered by the Central Bank of Kenya, to provide mezzanine credit risk cover for any credit losses above three percent, up to the prevailing NPL rate.
Also to be leveraged for scaling: “Moratorium from KRA Pin and Tax payment”. This statement requires some thought. What would give a private business scheme the audacity to propose a tax compliance waiver as a tactic to attract customers?
But the crux, is this:
“The funding partners propose that the GoK establishes a credit risk guarantee fund, that is administered by the Central Bank of Kenya, to provide mezzanine credit risk cover for any credit losses above three percent, up to the prevailing NPL rate.”
Some background is necessary. The cost of bank credit is arrived at as follows:
Cost of funds + Target income + Loan loss provision (NPLs)
Cost of funds is the interest the bank pays on deposits. Target income is the bank’s calculated profit margin that will translate into an acceptable return on investment. Loan loss provision is
the income that the bank sets aside to compensate for loans that are not repaid. Banks are required by the regulator to “provide” from their income equivalent to non-performing loans (NPLs).
Based on this costing, the Scheme’s promoters seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the initiative is not commercially viable. They appear to have determined this in the following way: The lending rate is set at nine percent arrived at by setting cost of funds, target income and a target loan loss provision at three percent each. Next, the Scheme factors in the Kenyan banking sector’s actual NPL rate, which was 11.6 percent at the close of 2018. They then calculate that at 9 percent the initiative would have run at loss of 5.6 percent (9 – 3-11.6 = -5.6).
This is how the case for a public credit guarantee scheme is made. In the computation provided, the public credit risk guarantee would cover the difference between banks’ target and the industry NPL. In the documents that we have seen, an example is provided in which the target NPL is set at three percent as above; the industry NPL at 10 percent and the actual NPL of the lending scheme is set at 12 percent. In this case, the public would pay seven percent (10% – 3%) and the banks would absorb five percent, the target income is projected at three percent, and the additional two percent that is over and above the industry NPL of 10 percent.
Let me illustrate. If for argument’s sake, the scheme lent out KSh 100 billion at nine percent, a 12 percent NPL reduces the performing portfolio to KSh 88 billion, which translates to an interest income of KSh 7.92 billion. A 12 percent loan loss provision (KSh 12 billion) changes that to an interest income loss of KSh 4 billion. But above three percent NPL the public credit insurance kicks in and injects KSh 7 billion, making a total revenue of KSh 14.92 billion (less KSh 12 billion loan loss provision) leaving a net revenue of Sh. 2.92 billion. This translates to a loss of KSh 0.8 million, given that the cost of funds is KSh 3 billion.
What are we missing?
This is a very strange way of pricing a product. The conventional way is to do one of two things: (a) cost the product and compare it with the market price; or (b) take the market price and work backwards to see whether you can beat the price. Sometimes, the product may cost more than the completion, then it becomes a question of whether it can be sold at a premium, like for example, an iPhone, or a Ferrari.
Either way, one arrives at a break-even interest rate of 17.6 percent by adding up the cost of funds (three percent), the targeted income (three percent) and industry NPL rate (11.6 percent).
The next question is whether they would get sufficient uptake of the product at say 18-20 percent. The answer is an unequivocal yes.
For mobile money loans, the money is not in the interest rate but in the transaction fees.
So, why would these banks price the loans to SMEs, the riskiest segment of the market, at 9 percent (about the same as Treasury Bill rate), which for all intents and purpose is the risk-free rate?
For mobile money loans, the money is not in the interest income charged on loans but in the transaction fees. In fact, most products do not charge interest at all. The pricing structure varies widely. To get the actual cost of the loans, we need to calculate a standardized rate known as the Annual Percentage Rate (APR). The APR is obtained by adding up all the cost of the loan and converting them to the equivalent annual interest rate, for example a three month, KSh 10,000 loan with a 5% fee and interest of 2.5% per month costs 1250 (Sh. 500 fee plus Sh. 750 interest) which annualizes to KSh 5000 (Sh. 1250 x 4), which is an APR of 50%. KCB charges a 2.5 percent transaction fee and interest rate of 1.16 percent a month for loans ranging from one to six months which works out to APR of 19% to 44% for the six and one month loans respectively. In general, the shorter the term, the more expensive. CBA charges a 7.5 percent fee for a one-month Mshwari loan. This is an APR of 90 percent. The recently launched Fuliza overdraft tariff range from 5/- a day for amounts below KSh 500 to KSh 30 per day for amounts above KSh. 2500. A Sh.10,000 Fuliza overdraft at KSh 30 per day translates to an APR of 110 percent.
When fees are factored in, the case for public credit insurance collapses like a house of cards.
Let’s go back to the monetary illustration. Assume the scheme achieves its borrowing target of two million customers. Our portfolio of KSh100 billion works out to an average individual loan of KSh. 20,000. Further, assume they churn the funds six times a year, that is, each of the customer borrows and repays a loan every two months on average. A five percent transaction fee translates to an income of KSh12 billion a year, and a total income of KSh19.92 billion — well above the 18 percent required for the scheme to meet its profit target.
So what is going on here? First, Wezesha is simply a scheme to fleece the public. In today’s financial lingo, the Scheme is fully “de-risked”…par for the course in “public-private partnership” (PPP) business, where the profits are privatized, but the losses are socialized (i.e. borne by the public). The second, is to see Wezesha as a strategy to finance undercutting the competition by pricing below cost at entry, with the intention of charging monopoly prices once the competition is driven out of business.
The nine percent interest is a bait. Its purpose is to make the case for the proposed government credit insurance scheme by purporting to offer SMEs affordable credit.
So what is going on here? There are two ways to look at it. First, Wezesha is simply a scheme to fleece the public. In today’s financial lingo, the Scheme is fully “de-risked.” This is par for the course in “public-private partnership” (PPP) ventures, where the profits are privatized, but the losses are socialized (i.e. borne by the public).
The second, is to see Wezesha as a strategy to finance undercutting the competition by pricing below cost at entry, with the intention of charging monopoly prices once the competition is driven out of business. In competition economics, we call this predatory pricing. It is illegal under competition law. In this case, the public insurance serves both as a financial cushion as well as insurance from regulatory scrutiny.
The CBA already controls consumer credit data on account of its Safaricom partnership. This Scheme is designed to make the CBA the gatekeeper for the entire banking and financial services to micro-and small-enterprises.
As students of economics and finance know from the concept of information asymmetry, the most important asset in credit markets is information about customers’ creditworthiness. On the strategy for “scaling up” the documents refer to “integration to other financial institutions and service providers.” The intention is clear. First, use the government machinery and public money to drive customer acquisition. The CBA already controls consumer credit data on account of its Safaricom partnership. This Scheme is designed to make the CBA the gatekeeper for the entire banking and financial services to micro-and small enterprises, and I quote: “CBA Digital shall play a lead arranger role to develop and operate the credit risk management model for the full credit lifecycle.”
Even if there was an economic rationale for a credit insurance scheme of this kind, no government in its right mind would confer such a market advantage to some players. It is instructive that, in what looks like a case of the tail wagging the dog, KCB the crown jewel of public banks has been brought into the scheme. We should not be surprised if down the road, it turns out to be an acquisition target.
Uhuru Kenyatta’s sole accomplishment after extricating himself from the ICC may turn out to be framing the corruption issue exclusively as plunder of the budget, perhaps even deliberately giving his associates leeway in that theatre—recall “mnataka nifanye nini” (what do you want me to do)— as he provides cover for the Family to do the more serious boardroom stuff. Plunder of the budget ends once the thieves leave office. Wholesale enclosure of large chunks of the economy will keep the dynasty in the black long after he has left office.
Welcome to the Kenyatta Republic Inc.
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The Second Sex: Women’s Liberation and Media in Post-Independence Tanzania
Fatma Alloo (of the Tanzania Media Women’s Association) on how women used the media and cultural spaces to organize and challenge gender norms.
Fatma Alloo’s activism grew in the decades following Tanzania’s independence in 1961, when she worked as a journalist under Julius Nyerere, or Mwalimu, the first president of Tanzania; co-founded the feminist advocacy group Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA) in 1987; and co-founded the vibrant Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) in 1997. Here, she unpacks how women used the media and cultural spaces for social mobilization and shifting patriarchal norms, particularly in periods where they were marginalized from state power. In the “Reclaiming Africa’s Early Post-Independence History” series, and the Post-Colonialisms Today project more broadly, we’re learning from African activists and policy makers from the early post-independence era, to understand how their experience of a unique period of economic, societal, cultural, and regional transformation can aid us in the present day, when questions of decolonization and liberation are more pressing than ever.
Heba M. Khalil: You have lived through so many changes in so many different political systems, from the Sultanate, colonialism, the Nyerere years; you’ve seen the dawning of liberalism and neoliberalism.
Fatma Alloo: As you say, I’ve been through a lot of “-isms” in Tanzania. The other day I was reflecting that although I grew up under colonialism in Zanzibar, as a child I was not aware that it was colonialism, I was not aware there was a Sultanate. We used to run and wave to the Sultan because he was the only one with a shiny, red car and we used to love that car, a red Rolls Royce. But as I reflect now, I realized that these were the years Mwalimu was struggling for independence in Tanganyika.
Then, of course, as you grow, life takes you on a journey, and I ended up at the University of Dar es Salaam in the 1970s, where the Dar es Salaam debates were taking place. Tanzania hosted liberation movements, and that is where socialism, communism, Marxism, Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism, and feminism were being debated, and that’s where my consciousness grew, because I was in the midst of it. As the progressive, international community at the university was ideologically fired up by Mwalimu’s socialism, I began to understand that even my feminism had come from the West. Nobody had taught me that women lived feminism on the continent. This realization came when, as a student, I participated in an adult literacy program launched by Mwalimu. As students, we were sent to a rural and urban factory to teach literacy, but I emerged from those communities having been taught instead!
Heba M. Khalil: What do you think the role of women was in Tanzania in particular, but also on the continent, in defining the parameters, the choices and the imagination of post-independence Africa?
Fatma Alloo: Women had always been part and parcel of the independence movement in Africa. In Southern Africa and Tanzania they stood side-by-side with the men to fight, so they were very much part of it. The unique thing about Tanzania was that Mwalimu established a party called the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which had five wings with women being one of them. The others were youth, peasants, and workers, so as to mobilize society as a whole.
Post-independence is another story, one that very often has been narrated by men in power. There was a struggle for the visibility of women. I remember the debates in South Africa, where the African National Congress was arguing about the women’s wing wanting to discuss power relations. And there was resistance to this, the party leaders would argue first let’s just get independence, let’s not waste our time, women’s liberation will come later. It was a very bitter struggle, and of course after independence, women lost out quite a bit.
Heba M. Khalil: Why were post-independence power structures and ideologies defeated and replaced at some point by new ideologies of liberalism and, eventually, neoliberalism?
Fatma Alloo: The western media portrays Mwalimu as a failure. He has not failed, from my point of view. The whole issue of national unity is important. Tanzania has been a relatively peaceful country. Why? It did not happen by accident, it had to do with Mwalimu’s policies—he realized he had to deal with profound divisions, and he understood the role of education. Administratively, the nation had been inherited after decades of divide and rule policies. It was divided on racial and religious bases, as Tanzania is half Christian and half Muslim. We could have had a civil war, like in Lebanon, or a tribal-oriented conflict, like in Kenya or Libya. Mwalimu really understood this from the very beginning. I remember when we started TAMWA, when the women came together, we had no idea who belonged to what tribe. He was that successful.
We had free medicine, free education, but of course, all that went away with neoliberalism. My generation remembers this, and I think we have to make sure that the younger generation knows the history of the country, knows the literature that emerged from the continent. In my opinion, of all the contributions of Mwalimu, the most important was the peace and unity—amani, in Kiswahili.
Because Mwalimu was so successful, the West, especially Scandinavian countries, made him their darling. As you know, Scandinavian countries had not colonized Africa much, so people also trusted them and accepted their development aid. Very sadly, it did eat away at the success of Mwalimu with his people, and eventually made us dependent on that development aid, which continues to date. Without development aid we don’t seem to be able to move on anything. We have stopped relying on ourselves.
Heba M. Khalil: What was your experience of organizing during the rapid growth of the mass media sector in Tanzania?
Fatma Alloo: I was very active, first as a journalist in the 1980s and early 1990s, and it was extremely different. We were very influenced by Mwalimu’s ideology and ready to play our role to change the world. Mwalimu had refused to introduce television because, he argued at that time, we did not have our own images to portray, to empower our younger generations. He said if we introduce television the images shown will be of the West and the imperialist ideology will continue. In Zanzibar, however, we already had the oldest television on the continent, and it was in color. When Abeid Karume attained power in Zanzibar in 1964, after a bloody overthrow of the sultanate in power, the first thing he did was to introduce not only television, but community media, so every village in Zanzibar already had these images. But television didn’t come to Tanganyika until 1992 (Mwalimu stepped down in 1986), when it was introduced by a local businessman who established his own station. Until then the state had controlled the media, so history began to change as businesses were allowed to establish media.
I remember I was then in TAMWA and we had to encourage a lot of production of plays and other visuals, for which there was no market before. The radio had been powerful; when the peasants went to the countryside, they would take the radio and listen as they ploughed the land. So, the radio was the main tool that was used to mobilize society during Mwalimu’s era.
The press gave women journalists little chance to cover issues of importance to women. We were given health or children to cover as our issues. Before, Tanzania had one English paper, one Kiswahili, Uhuru, and one party paper. By 1986, there were 21 newspapers, and it became easier for us to really influence the press, and TAMWA began talking about issues like sexual harassment at work. But it was a double-edged sword, because the television stations recruited pretty girls to do the news reading, and the girls also wanted to be seen on television as it was a novelty. So, while we were expanding the conversation on the portrayal of women, here was television, where women were used as sex objects. The struggle continues, a luta continua.
Heba M. Khalil: How are movements trying to achieve change on the continent, particularly youth movements or younger generations, by utilizing media and cultural spaces?
Fatma Alloo: The youth need to develop tools of empowerment at an educational level and at an organizational level. Africa is a young continent, and our hope is the youth. Many youth are very active at a cultural level, they may not be in universities but at a cultural level they are extremely visible, in music, dance, and street theater.
At the moment, you see the pan-African dream has sort of lost the luster it had during independence. Even if you look at the literature of that time, it was a collective dream for Africa to unite—Bob Marley had a song “Africa Unite,” we used to dance to it and we used to really identify with it, and the literature—Franz Fanon, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, Sembène Ousmane, Miriam Ba, Nawal al Saadawi—and also the films that came out. In fact, Egypt was the first country to produce amazing films; when we established the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF), in our first year we showed a film from Egypt, The Destiny by Youssef Chahine.
Zanzibar International Film Festival was born because we asked the question, “If we in Africa do not tell our stories, who will?” We ask that question particularly to train and stimulate the production of films on the continent, including in Kiswahili, because while West Africa has many films, East Africa lags behind. The festival has been in existence for 21 years. This part of the world has more than 120 million people who speak Kiswahili, so the market is there. We also encourage a lot of young producers and we encourage putting a camera in children’s hands, because from my own experience, children get so excited when they can create their own images. Twenty-one years later, these children are now adults, and they are the directors and the producers in this region. So, one has to play a role in impacting change and liberating consciousness on our vibrant and rich continent.
This article is part of the series “Reclaiming Africa’s Early Post-Independence History” from Post-Colonialisms Today (PCT), a research and advocacy project of activist-intellectuals on the continent working to recapture progressive thought and policies from post-independence Africa to address contemporary development challenges. Sign up for updates here.
The State of Judicial Independence in Kenya: A Persistent Concern
Judicial independence is Kenya’s last buffer line, stopping the country from degenerating into absolute tyranny. Judicial independence is a collective national good. It will be protected as such. So long as we may have an independent Judiciary, the great interests of the people will be safe.
On Thursday 22 July 2021, Justice Aggrey Muchelule and Justice Said Juma Chitembwe were subjects of arbitrary search, intimidation, and interrogation by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) on the basis of unfounded allegations of corruption.
The arrest, coming in the wake of constant and relentless attacks on the judiciary by the Executive and politicians, left a very sour taste in the mouths of many, bearing in mind that nothing was found to implicate the judges upon searching their respective chambers. Let it be clear that NOBODY is above the law (nemo est supra legis)! Not even the President of the Republic, let alone the judges.
However, there are reasons why there are arguments for special procedures when arresting or dealing with criminal allegations against a sitting judge: the need to preserve the sanctity of the office and the need to manage perceptions with regard to the judicial office. The Supreme Court of India in the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat AIR 1991 SC 2176, (1991) 4 SCC 406 recognized the fact that whereas judges were not above the law, certain guidelines had to be in place to guide the conduct of arrest “in view of the paramount necessity of preserving the independence of judiciary and at the same time ensuring that infractions of law are properly investigated”. The concept of judicial independence, it must be recalled, recognizes not only realities but also perceptions that attach to the judicial office.
Chief Justice Howland in the Canadian Supreme Court case of R v. Valente  2 SCR 673 stated as follows with regards to perception as an ingredient of judicial independence: “it is most important that the judiciary be independent and be so perceived by the public. The judges must not have cause to fear that they will be prejudiced by their decisions or that the public would reasonably apprehend this to be the case.’ There is therefore the need to guard and jealously so, the image of the judiciary such as to manage how the judiciary is perceived by the public.
The unsubstantiated claims of corruption, and knee jerk searches without an iota of evidence does not bode well for the perception of the judiciary as a whole, and specifically, for the individual judges involved whose reputations are dragged through the mud, and needlessly so. There are germane reasons why the arrest of a judge should not be a trivial matter. The deference and respect to a judicial office informs the caution exercised in the conduct of arresting a judge. The judicial office fuses with the person of the holder and therefore it becomes necessary to err on the side of caution.
Indeed, Courts elsewhere have endeavoured to engage cautiously in this exercise of delicate funambulism. The Supreme Court of India in the case of K. Veeraswami v Union of India and others, 1991 SCR (3) 189 found that a sitting judge can only be undertaken with permission from the Chief Justice or if it is the Chief Justice who is sought to be prosecuted, from the President.
Equally, the Court of Appeal of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the case of Hon. Justice Hyeladzira Ajiya Nganjiwa V. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2017) LPELR-43391(CA) held that a sitting judge cannot be prosecuted for offences that would have otherwise been a ground for removal from office.
It is important to note that the grounds for the removal of any judge from office are captured in article 168 of the Constitution of Kenya and they include a breach of the code of conduct and gross misconduct or misbehaviour.
Noteworthy it is to remark that the High Court of Kenya, in laying a principle of constitutional law in the case of Philomena Mbete Mwilu v Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others; Stanley Muluvi Kiima (Interested Party); International Commission of Jurists Kenya Chapter (Amicus Curiae)  eKLR ably stated that, “While the DCI is not precluded from investigating criminal misconduct of judges, there is a specific constitutional and legal framework for dealing with misconduct and/or removal of judges.
Consequently, cases of misconduct with a criminal element committed in the course of official judicial functions, or which are so inextricably connected with the office or status of a judge, shall be referred to the JSC in the first instance.” The cumulative conclusion was that the gang-ho recklessness meted on Justices Muchelule and Chitembwe by an increasingly overzealous Department of Criminal Investigations (DCI) was an affront to judicial independence in its functional sense and also in terms of perception. It was a careless move.
If there is any evidence linking any of the judges to any conduct unbecoming, then out of constitutional edict and commonsensical pragmatism, the first point of call should be the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). The Office of the Chief Justice must also be subject of focus during this unfortunate debacle.
The statement emanating from that office in the aftermath of the unfortunate events of 22nd July 2021, was at best timid and disjointed. The statement did not appear to reinforce the constitutional principle that judges cannot be arrested over matters that really ought to be addressed by the Judicial Service Commission. The office of the Chief Justice should have done better.
In summary, let it be proclaimed boldly that judicial independence is too precious a public good that it will be protected at all costs. Let it be lucid that incessant interference with judicial independence will not be tolerated from any quarters.
Judicial independence is Kenya’s last buffer line, stopping the country from degenerating into absolute tyranny. Judicial independence is a collective national good. It will be protected as such! And in the words of John Rutledge, a scholar, jurist and the second Chief Justice of the United States of America; “So long as we may have an independent Judiciary, the great interests of the people will be safe.”
This article was initially published at THE PLATFORM For Law, Justice and Society Magazine
Land Title and Evictions in the Supreme Court of Kenya
Violent evictions of families from their homes are not exceptional events. They go to the heart of Kenya’s political economy and its long history of valorising the rights of those who hold private title.
The Supreme Court of Kenya published its judgment in William Musembi v The Moi Educational Centre Co. Ltd. on the 16th July 2021. The case arose after fourteen families — the residents of two informal settlements, City Cotton and Upendo village in Nairobi — petitioned the High court following their evictions in 2013. They had lived on the land since 1968 when it was public land. The first respondent claimed that they had legitimately acquired title to the land by letters of allotment and that the land was therefore private land. According to Amnesty Kenya, the evictions began in the early morning, without warning. Groups of young men burst into homes. Four hundred homes were demolished and personal possessions were destroyed. Crowbars and sledgehammers were used. The police were present. They fired live ammunition and used teargas canisters during the operation.
In the High Court, Judge Mumbi Ngugi held that the petitioners’ rights to dignity, security, and adequate housing had been infringed. There had been a violation of the rights of children and elderly persons under the constitution. She awarded damages. At the Court of Appeal this judgment was partially set aside. While accepting that there had indeed been violations of the rights to dignity and security, the Court of Appeal nonetheless set aside the order of damages arguing that “there was no material before the court on the basis of which the orders for compensation were made” and that, because it was unable to work out how the damages had been quantified, “the only relief that should have commended itself to the trial Court was a declaration that the forced eviction and demolition of their houses without a Court order is a violation of their right to human dignity and security.” Following this, the petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court.
Importance of the Supreme Court judgment
The importance of this case is, as Gautum Bhatia has written, that it raised the question whether “the right to accessible and adequate housing could be applied inter se between private parties”. It can thus be distinguished from the same Supreme Court’s Mitu-Bell Welfare Society v The Kenya Airports Authority, which ruled on evictions from public land.
Amongst several issues for determination, the petitioners in the present case asked the court to reach a determination of the question whether the letter of allotment held by the first respondent, the Moi Educational Centre, was issued lawfully or legally. Because that question had not been conclusively determined at the High Court or at the Court of Appeal, the petitioners sought “a declaration that the acquisition of the suit property was illegal and unlawful.”
The Supreme Court declined to do this. Arguing that in the High Court Judge Mumbi Ngugi had been right in holding that the question of the propriety of the first respondent’s title was a matter for the National Land Commission and that it is the Land and Environment Court that properly has jurisdiction over this question, the Supreme Court held in William Musembi that “the title of the first respondent remains unimpeached”. Instead, it held, the only question it ought to determine was whether, in evicting the petitioners, the respondents violated the petitioners’ rights to human dignity and security, as well as the rights to housing and health.
It is on the basis of the “unimpeached” title of the first respondent that the court goes on to make its landmark finding. For determination by the court was the question whether the first respondent, being a private party, could nonetheless be responsible for the violation of constitutional rights. Recognising that “the mandate to ensure the realization and protection of social and economic rights does not extend to the first respondent” because it is a private entity which is not under any obligation to ensure the progressive or immediate realisation of those rights, the court found that private parties do nonetheless have a “negative obligation to ensure that it does not violate the rights of the petitioners.”
For Bhatia, the judgment’s significance lies partly in its finding that “a negative obligation not to interfere with socio-economic rights (such as the right to housing), …applies to both public and private parties” although he argues persuasively that “the distinction between negative and positive obligations is doing a lot of work” and that the concrete practice of evictions significantly blurs the boundary between public and private actors. He rightly notes that “evictions invariably involve concert of action between State forces and private landowners, with the latter relying upon the former (either directly, or through forbearance) to accomplish physically removing people from land.”
Public and private
If the distinction between negative and positive obligations is somewhat artificial, I also want to suggest that Kenya’s history of land grabbing shows that so too is the distinction between the state and private landowners. More than just state forces doing the bidding of private landowners, wielding batons and using bullets to break into homes in the early morning, in Kenya the state/private distinction is a mirage. In William Musembi, the court does not elaborate on the important history of letters of allotment in Kenya and the process by which they enabled public land to morph into private land. Instead, it affirms the first respondent’s title – and proceeds to make an important ruling on the obligations of private actors. However, the history of land grabbing and the murky past of letters of allotment is a critical one to keep at the front of our minds.
For determination by the court was the question whether the first respondent, being a private party, could nonetheless be responsible for the violation of constitutional rights.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/ Irregular Allocation of Public Land established in 2003 set out in forensic detail the illegal and irregular land awards made over the years using the mechanism of the letter of allotment. Awards of land were made to the families of Presidents Kenyatta and Moi, numerous former ministers, members of parliament and civil servants, as well as to individuals in the military and the judiciary. The report sets out how out of proximity to the state, private property owners were created. Public land – land set aside for the building of public health clinics or schools for example – mysteriously turned into private land on which malls, private residences, and diplomatic headquarters appeared. No doubt some individuals acquired perfectly legitimate letters of allotment. But from the 1970s onwards, a thriving market in improper letters of allotment developed. They came to be treated as tradable land documents. Widely but mistakenly used as land titles (with the collusion of lawyers), they changed hands quickly in sales of grabbed land. This was done in order to get the benefit of the principle that an innocent third party for value without notice takes good title. The full extent of this practice is unknown: the Ndung’u Commission warned that its report provided only a snapshot of the illegal/irregular land allocations that had taken place over the years.
I have written elsewhere that land grabbing is sedimented in Kenya’s political economy such that we can describe it as a “grabbed state”. The “normal” economy is founded on accumulation by dispossession. It is not possible to understand Kenya’s political economy without an understanding of how the normal and the supposedly abnormal are pervasively linked. Far from land grabbing being an aberrant phenomenon that can be sharply distinguished from normal business practice, the illegal and irregular appropriation of land structures Kenya’s economy.
Widely but mistakenly used as land titles (with the collusion of lawyers), they changed hands quickly in sales of grabbed land.
There is no operative distinction between the public and the private in Kenya. This makes the judgment in the present case even more consequential: given the history of these murky conversions in title, the judgment’s finding that negative constitutional obligations can attach to private actors is likely to cover a great many potential eviction scenarios. Indeed, I would argue that given the history of land described above, the court should have gone further. Grounding its reasoning in Kenya’s history of land grabbing and the dispossession and discrimination that resulted, it could have held that positive socio-economic obligations (such as providing alternative accommodation) should extend to private parties. Or it might have held that given the extent of land grabbing — which is a matter of public record — the state should not agree to enforce a court order for eviction until it is satisfied that alternative accommodation has been provided.
Entrenching private property
Welcoming the Supreme Court’s judgment, Bhatia has noted that it “continues the welcome trend of judicial scepticism towards entrenched property rights.” The court demonstrated this scepticism by extending negative constitutional obligations to private actors. However, to do so, the Supreme Court moved to confirm the respondent’s title. That title it described as “unimpeached”. The court used this as the basis for setting out the first respondent’s obligations as a private owner. The extension of constitutional obligations to private actors is to be welcomed. But it is important to recognise also that by refusing jurisdiction to question the first respondent’s title – and ruling that this is a matter for another forum – the Supreme Court effectively sanctioned the enclosure of what the appellants claimed was unalienated public land and potentially legitimated the grabbing of public land.
The court does not elaborate on the important history of letters of allotment in Kenya and the process by which they enabled public land to morph into private land.
Instead, the Supreme Court might have used Art. 23 which provides for the authority of courts to uphold and enforce the Bill of Rights, to try to fashion a remedy. It could have expressly referred the question of the integrity of the first respondent’s title to the National Land Commission rather than state as unequivocally as it did that it is unimpeached. At the very least, given the importance of a letter of allotment and the question of title in the case, the court should have rehearsed Kenya’s history of land grabbing and corruption as revealed by the Ndung’u report so as to give it judicial notice and provide a starting point for the wider task of challenging ill-gotten titles by those who might seek to do so.
Reinstating Judge Mumbi Ngugi judgment in the High Court and in particular her finding that damages should be paid to those evicted, the Supreme Court ordered the first respondents, the Moi Educational Centre, to pay fourteen families KSh150,000 (just over 1000 euros) each in damages. The government will also pay each family KSh100,000. In return, unless the National Land Commission or the Land and Environment Court are asked to rule on the propriety of the first respondent’s title and find against them, the Moi Educational Centre now hold unimpeached title to very valuable land in Nairobi. That is quite a windfall.
Violent evictions of families from their homes are not episodic and exceptional events. They go to the heart of Kenya’s political economy and its long history of valorising the rights of those who hold private title, however acquired. How far can the courts be relied upon to undo accumulation by dispossession?
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