“Uhuru Kenyatta’s assumption of the presidency has injected fresh energy into his family’s commercial empire, putting a number of its units on an expansion mode that is expected to consolidate its position as one of the largest business dynasties in Kenya”
Business Daily, Monday, November 11, 2013.
A few days ago, the Dairy Board of Kenya published, then recalled, draft regulations that sought, among other things, to outlaw and criminalize farmer-to-consumer raw milk sales. Essentially farmers would be compelled to sell milk to processors or other intermediaries (cooperatives or businesses) licensed and regulated by the Board. The withdrawal was in response to a huge public blowback, including a trending hashtag #Kenyattamilkbill, mobilising for the reactivation of the boycott against Brookside Dairy products. It was notable that the Dairy Board’s reversal of its draft regulations followed a press release by Brookside Dairies objecting to the regulations citing specifically the levies that the Board proposed on dairy businesses. Tellingly, Brookside’s statement was silent on the question of outlawing farmer to consumer raw milk sales.
This story is about an even more audacious scheme in the Kenyatta empire’s “expansion drive”, the most egregious case of policy and regulatory capture I have encountered…
As a previous column, Crony Capitalism and State Capture: The Kenyatta Family Story observed, Uhuru Kenyatta’s presidency has delivered remarkable returns-on-investment for the family enterprise:
“During Uhuru Kenyatta’s first term the consumer price of milk increased 67 percent (from KSh 36 to KSh 60 per half-litre packet), while producer prices remained unchanged at Sh 35 per litre), effectively increasing processors’ gross margin by 130 percent (from Sh37 to Sh 85 per litre). Given the industry’s 400m litre annual throughput and Kenyatta family’s market share, which stands at 45 percent, the consumer squeeze translates to an increase of the Kenyatta Family’s turnover from KSh 13 billion to KSh 22 billion, and gross margin from KSh 6.7 billion to KSh 15 billion a year.”
Not enough, not by a long shot.
The platform will offer micro and small enterprises an overdraft facility of up to KSh 50,000, and a loan of up to 12 months with a limit of KSh 200,000. The initiative targets five million sign-ups, and two million users in the first year. How it plans to do this is a frightening demonstration of the workings of state capture in the Uhuru Kenyatta era.
Kenya’s annual milk production is estimated at 3.5 billion litres, of which 80 percent is consumed or traded informally. Put another way, only 20 percent, about 600,000 litres, is handled by processors. If these regulations were only to double the processors intake to 50 percent, we are talking of growing Brookside’s turnover and gross margin to KSh100 billion and KSh 67 billion respectively.
But this column is not about the milk, at least not literally – even if the milking metaphor is quite apt. This story is about an even more audacious scheme in the Kenyatta empire’s “expansion drive”, the most egregious case of policy and regulatory capture I have encountered, and I have been round this block a few times. What follows is based on an internal document entitled ‘Restoring Credit Access to Micro and Small Sized Businesses’ shared by whistleblowers in institutions that have been corralled into the scheme by force.
The Huduma Number connection starts with an innocuous statement in a slide presentation titled “How Customers will Qualify” that ends with a bullet point stating that “customers that don’t immediately qualify can opt into a credit access plan”.
The name of the scheme is Wezesha (‘enable’). It is a proposed mobile phone lending platform described as a “collaborative initiative to bridge the access to credit by micro and small enterprises”. It will be managed by five banks, namely NIC Bank, Diamond Trust Bank (DTB), the Kenya Commercial Bank and Cooperative Bank under the leadership of the Kenyatta Family-owned Commercial Bank of Africa. CBA is in the process of acquiring NIC, alongside the smaller microfinance oriented Jamii Bora bank. KCB, Kenya’s largest bank by asset base, and Cooperative Bank, are quasi-public banks, while Diamond Trust Bank is associated with the Aga Khan. The platform will offer micro and small enterprises an overdraft facility of up to KSh 50,000, and a loan of up to 12 months with a limit of KSh 200,000. The initiative targets five million sign-ups, and two million users in the first year. How it plans to do this is a frightening demonstration of the workings of state capture in the Uhuru Kenyatta era.
When it was launched we were threatened that Kenyans who did not register would be denied public services. We are compelled to ask whether this threat, and its prominence in this scheme are related. Are the president’s commercial interests the force behind the Huduma Number?
First observation: the contentious Huduma Number initiative features prominently in the scheme. The Huduma Number connection starts with an innocuous statement in a slide (the documentation is a powerpoint presentation) titled “How Customers will Qualify” that ends with a bullet point stating that “customers that don’t immediately qualify can opt into a credit access plan (consumer education).” How so, is elaborated in another slide titled “Customer Education At Huduma Universal Service Kiosk” complete with the Huduma Kenya logo. Further along, in another slide titled “Functional Schema” a bullet point: “Distribution: An integrated network of GoK Huduma Centres, Bank Branches and agent locations to ‘onboard’ customers and offer information and advice to capital and business opportunities.”
When Huduma Number was launched we were threatened that Kenyans who did not register would be denied public services. We are compelled to ask whether this threat, and its prominence in this scheme are related. Are the president’s commercial interests the force behind the Huduma Number?
But perhaps the question is already answered in another slide titled “Phase 2 Support for Scalability”: New Huduma ID to be integrated once it is ready. This scheme could be used as a registration incentive.”
The funding partners propose that the GoK establishes a credit risk guarantee fund, that is administered by the Central Bank of Kenya, to provide mezzanine credit risk cover for any credit losses above three percent, up to the prevailing NPL rate.
Also to be leveraged for scaling: “Moratorium from KRA Pin and Tax payment”. This statement requires some thought. What would give a private business scheme the audacity to propose a tax compliance waiver as a tactic to attract customers?
But the crux, is this:
“The funding partners propose that the GoK establishes a credit risk guarantee fund, that is administered by the Central Bank of Kenya, to provide mezzanine credit risk cover for any credit losses above three percent, up to the prevailing NPL rate.”
Some background is necessary. The cost of bank credit is arrived at as follows:
Cost of funds + Target income + Loan loss provision (NPLs)
Cost of funds is the interest the bank pays on deposits. Target income is the bank’s calculated profit margin that will translate into an acceptable return on investment. Loan loss provision is
the income that the bank sets aside to compensate for loans that are not repaid. Banks are required by the regulator to “provide” from their income equivalent to non-performing loans (NPLs).
Based on this costing, the Scheme’s promoters seem to have arrived at the conclusion that the initiative is not commercially viable. They appear to have determined this in the following way: The lending rate is set at nine percent arrived at by setting cost of funds, target income and a target loan loss provision at three percent each. Next, the Scheme factors in the Kenyan banking sector’s actual NPL rate, which was 11.6 percent at the close of 2018. They then calculate that at 9 percent the initiative would have run at loss of 5.6 percent (9 – 3-11.6 = -5.6).
This is how the case for a public credit guarantee scheme is made. In the computation provided, the public credit risk guarantee would cover the difference between banks’ target and the industry NPL. In the documents that we have seen, an example is provided in which the target NPL is set at three percent as above; the industry NPL at 10 percent and the actual NPL of the lending scheme is set at 12 percent. In this case, the public would pay seven percent (10% – 3%) and the banks would absorb five percent, the target income is projected at three percent, and the additional two percent that is over and above the industry NPL of 10 percent.
Let me illustrate. If for argument’s sake, the scheme lent out KSh 100 billion at nine percent, a 12 percent NPL reduces the performing portfolio to KSh 88 billion, which translates to an interest income of KSh 7.92 billion. A 12 percent loan loss provision (KSh 12 billion) changes that to an interest income loss of KSh 4 billion. But above three percent NPL the public credit insurance kicks in and injects KSh 7 billion, making a total revenue of KSh 14.92 billion (less KSh 12 billion loan loss provision) leaving a net revenue of Sh. 2.92 billion. This translates to a loss of KSh 0.8 million, given that the cost of funds is KSh 3 billion.
What are we missing?
This is a very strange way of pricing a product. The conventional way is to do one of two things: (a) cost the product and compare it with the market price; or (b) take the market price and work backwards to see whether you can beat the price. Sometimes, the product may cost more than the completion, then it becomes a question of whether it can be sold at a premium, like for example, an iPhone, or a Ferrari.
Either way, one arrives at a break-even interest rate of 17.6 percent by adding up the cost of funds (three percent), the targeted income (three percent) and industry NPL rate (11.6 percent).
The next question is whether they would get sufficient uptake of the product at say 18-20 percent. The answer is an unequivocal yes.
For mobile money loans, the money is not in the interest rate but in the transaction fees.
So, why would these banks price the loans to SMEs, the riskiest segment of the market, at 9 percent (about the same as Treasury Bill rate), which for all intents and purpose is the risk-free rate?
For mobile money loans, the money is not in the interest income charged on loans but in the transaction fees. In fact, most products do not charge interest at all. The pricing structure varies widely. To get the actual cost of the loans, we need to calculate a standardized rate known as the Annual Percentage Rate (APR). The APR is obtained by adding up all the cost of the loan and converting them to the equivalent annual interest rate, for example a three month, KSh 10,000 loan with a 5% fee and interest of 2.5% per month costs 1250 (Sh. 500 fee plus Sh. 750 interest) which annualizes to KSh 5000 (Sh. 1250 x 4), which is an APR of 50%. KCB charges a 2.5 percent transaction fee and interest rate of 1.16 percent a month for loans ranging from one to six months which works out to APR of 19% to 44% for the six and one month loans respectively. In general, the shorter the term, the more expensive. CBA charges a 7.5 percent fee for a one-month Mshwari loan. This is an APR of 90 percent. The recently launched Fuliza overdraft tariff range from 5/- a day for amounts below KSh 500 to KSh 30 per day for amounts above KSh. 2500. A Sh.10,000 Fuliza overdraft at KSh 30 per day translates to an APR of 110 percent.
When fees are factored in, the case for public credit insurance collapses like a house of cards.
Let’s go back to the monetary illustration. Assume the scheme achieves its borrowing target of two million customers. Our portfolio of KSh100 billion works out to an average individual loan of KSh. 20,000. Further, assume they churn the funds six times a year, that is, each of the customer borrows and repays a loan every two months on average. A five percent transaction fee translates to an income of KSh12 billion a year, and a total income of KSh19.92 billion — well above the 18 percent required for the scheme to meet its profit target.
So what is going on here? First, Wezesha is simply a scheme to fleece the public. In today’s financial lingo, the Scheme is fully “de-risked”…par for the course in “public-private partnership” (PPP) business, where the profits are privatized, but the losses are socialized (i.e. borne by the public). The second, is to see Wezesha as a strategy to finance undercutting the competition by pricing below cost at entry, with the intention of charging monopoly prices once the competition is driven out of business.
The nine percent interest is a bait. Its purpose is to make the case for the proposed government credit insurance scheme by purporting to offer SMEs affordable credit.
So what is going on here? There are two ways to look at it. First, Wezesha is simply a scheme to fleece the public. In today’s financial lingo, the Scheme is fully “de-risked.” This is par for the course in “public-private partnership” (PPP) ventures, where the profits are privatized, but the losses are socialized (i.e. borne by the public).
The second, is to see Wezesha as a strategy to finance undercutting the competition by pricing below cost at entry, with the intention of charging monopoly prices once the competition is driven out of business. In competition economics, we call this predatory pricing. It is illegal under competition law. In this case, the public insurance serves both as a financial cushion as well as insurance from regulatory scrutiny.
The CBA already controls consumer credit data on account of its Safaricom partnership. This Scheme is designed to make the CBA the gatekeeper for the entire banking and financial services to micro-and small-enterprises.
As students of economics and finance know from the concept of information asymmetry, the most important asset in credit markets is information about customers’ creditworthiness. On the strategy for “scaling up” the documents refer to “integration to other financial institutions and service providers.” The intention is clear. First, use the government machinery and public money to drive customer acquisition. The CBA already controls consumer credit data on account of its Safaricom partnership. This Scheme is designed to make the CBA the gatekeeper for the entire banking and financial services to micro-and small enterprises, and I quote: “CBA Digital shall play a lead arranger role to develop and operate the credit risk management model for the full credit lifecycle.”
Even if there was an economic rationale for a credit insurance scheme of this kind, no government in its right mind would confer such a market advantage to some players. It is instructive that, in what looks like a case of the tail wagging the dog, KCB the crown jewel of public banks has been brought into the scheme. We should not be surprised if down the road, it turns out to be an acquisition target.
Uhuru Kenyatta’s sole accomplishment after extricating himself from the ICC may turn out to be framing the corruption issue exclusively as plunder of the budget, perhaps even deliberately giving his associates leeway in that theatre—recall “mnataka nifanye nini” (what do you want me to do)— as he provides cover for the Family to do the more serious boardroom stuff. Plunder of the budget ends once the thieves leave office. Wholesale enclosure of large chunks of the economy will keep the dynasty in the black long after he has left office.
Welcome to the Kenyatta Republic Inc.
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Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy, Justice, Reparations and the Black Soul
Only the Haitian people can decide their own future. The dictatorship imposed by former president Jovenel Moïse and its imperialist enablers need to go – and make space for a people’s transition government.
Haiti is once again going through a profound crisis. Central to this is the struggle against the dictatorship imposed by former president Jovenel Moïse. Since last year Mr. Moise, after decreeing the dismissal of Parliament, has been ruling through decrees, permanently violating Haiti’s constitution. He has refused to leave power after his mandate ended on February 7, 2021, claiming that it ends on February 7 of next year, without any legal basis.
This disregard of the constitution is taking place despite multiple statements by the country’s main judicial bodies, such as the CSPJ (Superior Council of Judicial Power) and the Association of Haitian Lawyers. Numerous religious groups and numerous institutions that are representative of society have also spoken. At this time, there is a strike by the judiciary, which leaves the country without any public body of political power.
At the same time, this institutional crisis is framed in the insecurity that affects practically all sectors of Haitian society. An insecurity expressed through savage repressions of popular mobilizations by the PNH (Haitian National Police), which at the service of the executive power. They have attacked journalists and committed various massacres in poor neighborhoods. Throughout the country, there have been assassinations and arbitrary arrests of opponents.
Most recently, a judge of the High Court was detained under the pretext of promoting an alleged plot against the security of the State and to assassinate the president leading to the illegal and arbitrary revocation of three judges of this Court. This last period has also seen the creation of hundreds of armed groups that spread terror over the entire country and that respond to power, transforming kidnapping into a fairly prosperous industry for these criminals.
The 13 years of military occupation by United Nations troops through MINUSTAH and the operations of prolongation of guardianship through MINUJUSTH and BINUH have aggravated the Haitian crisis. They supported retrograde and undemocratic sectors who, along with gangsters, committed serious crimes against the Haitian people and their fundamental rights.
For this, the people of Haiti deserve a process of justice and reparations. They have paid dearly for the intervention of MINUSTAH: 30 THOUSAND DEAD from cholera transmitted by the soldiers, thousands of women raped, who now raise orphaned children. Nothing has changed in 13 years, more social inequality, poverty, more difficulties for the people. The absence of democracy stays the same.
The poor’s living conditions have worsened dramatically as a result of more than 30 years of neoliberal policies imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), a severe exchange rate crisis, the freezing of the minimum wage, and inflation above 20% during the last three years.
It should be emphasized that, despite this dramatic situation, the Haitian people remain firm and are constantly mobilizing to prevent the consolidation of a dictatorship by demanding the immediate leave of office by former President Jovenel Moïse.
Taking into account the importance of this struggle and that this dictatorial regime still has the support of imperialist governments such as the United States of America, Canada, France, and international organizations such as the UN, the OAS, and the EU, the IPA calls its members to contribute their full and active solidarity to the struggle of the Haitian people, and to sign this Petition that demands the end of the dictatorship as well as respect for the sovereignty and self-determination of the Haitian people, the establishment of a transition government led by Haitians to launch a process of authentic national reconstruction.
In addition to expressing our solidarity with the Haitian people’s resistance, we call for our organisations to demonstrate in front of the embassies of the imperialist countries and before the United Nations. Only the Haitian people can decide their future. Down with Moise and yes to a people’s transition government, until a constituent is democratically elected.
Deconstructing the Whiteness of Christ
While many African Christians can only imagine a white Jesus, others have actively promoted a vision of a brown or black Jesus, both in art and in ideology.
When images of a white preacher and actor going around Kenya playing Jesus turned up on social media in July 2019, people were rightly stunned by the white supremacist undertone of the images. They suggested that Africans were prone to seeing Jesus as white, promoting the white saviour narrative in the process. While it is true that the idea of a white Jesus has been prevalent in African Christianity even without a white actor, and many African Christians and churches still entertain images of Jesus as white because of the missionary legacy, many others have actively promoted a vision of Jesus as brown or black both in art an in ideology.
Images of a brown or black Jesus is as old as Christianity in Africa, especially finding a prominent place in Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which has been in existence for over sixteen hundred years. Eyob Derillo, a librarian at the British Library, recently brought up a steady diet of these images on Twitter. The image of Jesus as black has also been popularised through the artistic project known as Vie de Jesus Mafa (Life of Jesus Mafa) that was conducted in Cameroon.
The most radical expression of Jesus as a black person was however put forth by a young Kongolese woman called Kimpa Vita, who lived in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. Through the missionary work of the Portuguese, Kimpa Vita, who was a nganga or medicine woman, became a Christian. She taught that Jesus and his apostles were black and were in fact born in São Salvador, which was the capital of the Kongo at the time. Not only was Jesus transposed from Palestine to São Salvador, Jerusalem, which is a holy site for Christians, was also transposed to São Salvador, so that São Salvador became a holy site. Kimpa Vita was accused of preaching heresy by Portuguese missionaries and burnt at the stake in 1706.
It was not until the 20th century that another movement similar to Vita’s emerged in the Kongo. This younger movement was led by Simon Kimbangu, a preacher who went about healing and raising the dead, portraying himself as an emissary of Jesus. His followers sometimes see him as the Holy Spirit who was to come after Jesus, as prophesied in John 14:16. Just as Kimpa Vita saw São Salvador as the new Jerusalem, Kimbangu’s village of Nkamba became, and still is known as, the new Jerusalem. His followers still flock there for pilgrimage. Kimbangu was accused of threatening Belgian colonial rule and thrown in jail, where he died. Some have complained that Kimbangu seems to have eclipsed Jesus in the imagination of his followers for he is said to have been resurrected from the dead, like Jesus.
Kimbangu’s status among his followers is however similar to that of some of the leaders of what has been described as African Independent Churches or African Initiated Churches (AICs). These churches include the Zionist churches of Southern Africa, among which is the amaNazaretha of Isaiah Shembe. Shembe’s followers see him as a divine figure, similar to Jesus, and rather than going to Jerusalem for pilgrimage, his followers go to the holy city of Ekuphakameni in South Africa. The Cameroonian theologian, Fabien Eboussi Boulaga, in his Christianity Without Fetish, see leaders like Kimbangu and Shembe as doing for their people in our own time what Jesus did for his people in their own time—providing means of healing and deliverance in contexts of grinding oppression. Thus, rather than replacing Jesus, as they are often accused of doing, they are making Jesus relevant to their people. For many Christians in Africa, therefore, Jesus is already brown or black. Other Christians still need to catch up with this development if we are to avoid painful spectacles like the one that took place Kenya.
In Magufuli’s Shadow: The Stark Choices Facing Tanzania’s New President
One immediate concern is what steps Hassan will take on the pandemic, and whether she will change direction.
The sudden death of Tanzania’s President John Pombe Magufuli has thrown the East African nation into a period of political uncertainty.
Vice-president, Samia Suluhu Hassan, has been sworn in as his successor, making her Tanzania’s first woman president.
The transition is all the more challenging given the major rupture – both political and economic – caused by Magufuli’s presidency. Magufuli, who won a second term in October 2020, dramatically centralised power and pursued an interventionist economic policy agenda. He courted controversy on a number of fronts, most recently, by claiming that Tanzania – contrary to mounting evidence – was Covid-free.
Hassan has called for unity and counselled that now is not the time to look at what has passed but rather to look at what is to come.
Despite the 61-year-old leader’s forward-looking stance, questions remain about how Magufuli’s legacy will shape her time in office.
The authoritarian turn
Magufuli oversaw the marginalisation of opposition parties and a decline in civil liberties. His first term was defined by heightened intimidation and violence against opposition leaders, including disappearances and physical attacks.
Thanks to five years of repression, the October 2020 general elections saw the opposition all but wiped out of elected office. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi now controls all local government councils. It also holds 97% of directly elected legislative seats, up from 73% in 2015.
But Magufuli’s authoritarian tendencies were not unprecedented in Tanzania. For instance, the rule of his predecessor Jakaya Kikwete was also marred by human rights abuses as well civil society and media repression. Kikwete also cancelled Zanzibar’s 2015 election due to a likely opposition victory.
It remains to be seen whether Hassan will adopt a more liberal approach, loosening restrictions on opposition parties, the media and civil society. Even if she does, the damage will take time to repair. Opposition parties, for instance, may well struggle to regain their strength. Among other setbacks, they have lost almost all local elected representatives – a core element of their organisational infrastructure built up painstakingly over decades.
Centralising power in the party
Another key pillar to Magufuli’s legacy is the centralisation of power within the Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
In the early years under founding president Julius Nyerere, Tanzania’s ruling party was dominated by the president and a hierarchy of appointed state and party officials. But, following economic liberalisation in the 1980s and Nyerere’s retirement from politics, the party became steeped in factional rivalries. These were spurred by new political alliances and an emerging private sector business elite.
This factionalism reached its height under Kikwete amid accusations of widespread corruption. Magufuli’s nomination as party presidential candidate only occurred because the rivalry among these factions left him as the unexpected compromise candidate.
Once in office, though, Magufuli quickly signalled he would be nobody’s puppet. He used his position as ruling party chairman to create a “new” Chama Cha Mapinduzi. This involved breaking with party heavyweights, including Kikwete, suppressing factional organising, and consolidating his own support base.
Magufuli’s new base was a cohort of freshly appointed party officials as well as civil servants and cabinet ministers. His loyalists likened these changes to a revival of Nyerere’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi. But, in our view, the comparison is misleading.
Like Magufuli before her, Hassan will be taking office – and party leadership – without her own political base. She will also have to contend with revived factional manoeuvring as sidelined groups try to regain an upper hand.
Hassan could align with a loyal Magufuli faction, which includes influential figures within the party. But, early indications suggest she intends to follow the advice of “party elders”, notably Kikwete. The former president reportedly attended the party’s most recent central committee meeting on Hassan’s invitation.
Aligning herself with Kikwete will likely lead to the reemergence of the internal factional rivalries that characterised the former president’s tenure.
Implications for economic policy
If president Hassan does continue to take a political steer from Kikwete, one likely outcome is that there will be a change in economic policy. In particular, a return to growth that’s led by a more business-friendly approach to the private sector.
Calls are already being made for such a course of action..
A careful reassessment of the Magufuli era is needed to guide future policymaking.
Magufuli used his control over the ruling party to pursue an ambitious policy agenda. This was also linked to his political project of centralising power.
Although this trend actually began under Kikwete, Magufuli accelelrated a move towards more state-led investment. Under his leadership, both state-owned and, increasingly, military-owned enterprises were offered strategic contracts.
Many state enterprises remained cash-starved, relied on government financial support, and registered losses.
Alongside state investment, the president also sought to discipline private sector actors. Some observers suggest that this led to more productive investment, notably by domestic investors. But others point to renewed crony capitalist ties.
Magufuli’s most high profile corporate battle was against Canadian-owned Barrick Gold and its former subsidiary, Acacia Mining. From the two, he demanded USD$190 billion in tax arrears and a renegotiation of operating terms.
Many saw this resource-nationalist approach as an inspiration and a model for African countries seeking to take greater control of their mineral wealth. But in the end – partly due to externally imposed legal and economic constraints – Magufuli walked back on some of his demands. Instead he opted for cooperation rather than confrontation.
He negotiated a joint venture in which Barrick took a majority stake of 84% and Tanzania the remaining 16%. Key elements of the nationalistic mining legislation passed in 2017 were also reversed.
On the plus side gold overtook tourism as Tanzania’s biggest foreign-exchange earner. In addition, some small-scale miners saw their livelihoods improve. Results were more mixed elsewhere, especially for Tanzanite miners in the country’s north.
Ultimately, Magufuli leaves behind a mixed economic legacy. It combines misdirected authoritarian decision-making with positive efforts to pursue an active industrial policy. Reining in unproductive domestic investors and renegotiating adverse contracts with foreign investors were part of this agenda.
There is a risk, given this complex mix, that Tanzania’s policymakers may learn the wrong lessons from his presidency, leading back to the flawed model existing before.
The pandemic and beyond
One immediate concern is what steps Hassan will take on the pandemic, and whether she will change direction.
Whatever she does, the health emergency and associated economic crisis will likely define her presidency. It could indeed define the economic trajectory of the African region in years to come.
Both Kikwete and Magufuli ruled through an economic boom period. Commodity prices were high and access to international finance was fairly easy. This gave them latitude to choose between various development approaches.
If Tanzania reverts to the status quo of the Kikwete years, the risk is a reemergence of rent-seeking but without the same highly favourable economic growth conditions. Indeed, as external conditions worsen, Hassan may find her options far more limited.
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