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Kenya Beyond Liberal Democracy: The Rationale for an Ethnically-Based Federation

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An increasing number of political theorists are convinced that what is often called “the failure of democracy in Africa” is really “the failure of liberal democracy in Africa”, and that this failure is doomed to be witnessed on the continent until Africans stop trying to implement this foreign model of governance and begin to design their own home-grown models of democracy, which could include ethnically-based federations.

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Kenya Beyond Liberal Democracy: The Rationale for an Ethnically-Based Federation
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Whenever there is a crisis of the magnitude of the current COVID-19 pandemic, people are forced to inspect their most basic assumptions. In Philosophy and Education in Africa, R.J. Njoroge and G.A. Bennaars noted that we get the English noun “crisis: from the Greek noun krisis, denoting separation, decision, or judgment. Among the things that many have often taken for granted, but that are worth inspecting, is the belief that democracy is all about elections, after which the executive, the legislature and the judiciary run the country. This is the liberal democratic framework that deserves a fresh look, alongside the many other things that we can no longer take for granted.

The woes of liberal democracy

For many, “democracy” simply means “liberal democracy” – characterised by individual freedom (which entitles citizens to the liberty and responsibility of charting the course of their lives and conducting their own affairs), equality before the law, the right of everyone to vote (“universal suffrage”), universal education, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and freedom of assembly.

Many of these features have been proclaimed in historical documents, such as the 1776 U.S. Declaration of Independence, which asserted the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which affirmed the principles of civil liberty and of equality before the law, and the 1941 Anglo-American Atlantic Charter, which affirmed the “four freedoms”, namely, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear of physical aggression.

Liberal democracy is the political expression of liberalism – an ideology that emphasises the pre-eminence of the autonomy of the individual over the authority of society. In 1859, John Stuart Mill classically articulated the centrality of the autonomy of the individual in Western liberal thought in his On Liberty, in which he argued that the individual ought to be protected against the tyranny of the majority in the same way as he or she ought to be protected against political despotism. For him, society is only justified to limit the individual’s freedom in instances where his or her actions result in harm to others.

In “The Case against Democracy”, C. Crain notes that proponents of liberal democracy contend that it has several strengths, among which are that countries that subscribe to it very rarely go to war with one another, rarely murder their own populations, nearly always have peaceful transitions of government, and respect human rights more consistently than other systems of government do.

However, since most African states attained political independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s on the back of constitutions that were by and large liberal democratic, they almost immediately faced major challenges in their efforts to put this imported model of governance into practice. Thus there were numerous amendments of constitutions to perpetuate incumbent regimes, often leading to autocratic one-party states, military coups, contested elections, and violent inter-ethnic conflicts.

Furthermore, in a masterly book chapter titled “Western Modernity, African Indigene, and Political Order: Interrogating the Liberal Democratic Orthodoxy” in Electoral Politics in Kenya, the Kenyan political scientist Ludeki Chweya pointed out that the re-introduction of multiparty democracy in several African countries from the early 1990s met with challenges very similar to the ones experienced at the dawn of independence. From the early 1990s, newly elected governments were overthrown either through military coups (Sierra Leone, Burundi and Côte d’Ivoire), or at the hands of armed guerrilla movements (Congo-Brazzaville). Further, adulterated multiparty elections resulted in the retention and legitimisation of the continent’s long-standing authoritarian civilian regimes (Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Kenya). Even where there was a successful change of guard through multiparty elections, new, ostensibly democratic regimes quickly assumed an authoritarian character typical of their predecessors (Zambia and Malawi). A few others remained aloof to these democratisation initiatives (Sudan).

In “The Case against Democracy”, C. Crain notes that proponents of liberal democracy contend that it has several strengths, among which are that countries that subscribe to it very rarely go to war with one another, rarely murder their own populations, nearly always have peaceful transitions of government, and respect human rights more consistently than other systems of government do.

Consequently, an increasing number of African and Africanist political theorists are now convinced that what is often called “the failure of democracy in Africa” is really “the failure of liberal democracy in Africa”, and that this failure is doomed to be witnessed in our continent again and again until we stop trying to implement this foreign model of governance and design our own home-grown models of democracy instead.

For Ludeki Chweya, the development of a stable and enduring democracy in Africa is contingent upon a fusion of elements from two civilisations that make up the continent’s socio-political heritage, namely, the abiding indigenous African forms of democracy and Western liberal democracy, so as to produce a special variant of democracy for the continent.

On the basis of the decentralised political structures in a considerable number of pre-colonial societies in Africa, the Kenyan philosopher Aloo Osotsi Mojola, in a chapter in the edited volume, Law and the Struggle for Democracy in East Africa, prescribes a restructuring of the global system through radical decentralisation that no longer has the “nation-state” at its core.

On his part, the renowned Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, in Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, prescribes a no-party consensual democracy for contemporary African states, averring that many pre-colonial African communities were effectively governed through this form of governance. He is emphatic that while unanimity might be the perfection of consensus, it need not be achieved in every instance. Instead, quite often, it will be enough to ensure that all views are adequately articulated in the course of decision-making in order to secure the goodwill of those whose wishes are not adopted for implementation.

Moreover, in his 2002 conference paper, “Democratic Governance and New Democracy in Africa: Agenda for the Future”, the late South Africa-born scholar, Archie Mafeje, proposed that African scholars abandon the Western debate between liberal democracy and social democracy, and adopt a new approach to democracy instead, entailing three crucial components. First, the sovereignty of the people ought to be recognised as both a basic necessity and a fundamental right. Second, social justice, not simply formal rights, must constitute the foundation of the new democracy. Third, the livelihood of the citizens must not be contingent on ownership of property, but rather on equitable access to productive resources.

On his part, the renowned Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, in Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective, prescribes a no-party consensual democracy for contemporary African states, averring that many pre-colonial African communities were effectively governed through this form of governance.

Tatah Mentan’s 2015 book, Decolonizing Democracy from Western Cognitive Imperialism, seems to capture the spirit of the views of the foregoing African theorists.

In line with the foregoing African thinkers, I hold the view that there is no reason for giving liberal democracy a third chance instead of exercising our creativity to come up with alternative models of democracy that take cognisance of our socio-political realities instead of attempting to override them as experiments with liberal democracy have done for almost six decades now. In “Liberal Democracy: An African Critique”, I argued that from an African perspective, the almost hegemonic status of liberal democracy can be challenged on at least five grounds:

  1. Logical inconsistency – liberal democracy advocates for the autonomy of the individual, and yet no individual is born with an awareness of liberal ideals; these can only be taught to the young and old in a social context.
  2. Impracticability – while liberal democracy lays emphasis on the autonomy of the individual, many Africans have a largely communalistic outlook based on their conception of family as extending beyond their immediate household to a broad range of kinship relations that extend all the way to their ethnic groups. Besides, due to the large amounts of money required to effectively compete for elective positions, liberal democracy marginalises the masses to mere voting pawns.
  3. Inconsistency between affirmation and action – Western societies that emphasise the liberal ideals of the dignity of the individual and his/her various freedoms have been some of the greatest violators of those very ideals through the slave trade, colonialism and neocolonialism.
  4. Violation of the right to ethnic identity – the ethnically-blind vision of liberal democracy unjustifiably criminalises the right of the individual to enjoy associating with his/her ethnic group, and even to desire that this loyalty be recognised and respected in the management of public affairs.
  5. The moral imperative to assert the right to cultural emancipation – genuine political independence requires that the cultural orientation of African peoples find expression in their political organisation instead of such organisation being designed to reflect the ideals of their erstwhile colonisers.

Three Grounds for an Ethnically-based Federation for Kenya

According to the advocates of liberal democracy, post-colonial African states ought to minimise, if not entirely get rid of, the multiplicity of ethnic identities and loyalties. In other words, they advocate for ethnically-blind polities, where states focus on the demands of the individuals in them rather than on those of cultural groups.

However, there are at least three reasons why Kenya ought to be re-structured into an ethnically-based federation.

First, freedom of association ought to include the liberty of the individual to associate with people with whom he/she shares a cultural heritage, and this can find considerable room for expression in an ethnically-based federation. Western liberalism strangely fails to see that criminalising the free expression of ethnic loyalty amounts to a violation of the right to free association, and is a case of liberalism itself being illiberal in practice. Furthermore, social scientists attest to the fact that the individual’s views regarding the good life are significantly influenced by his or her social environment whose major feature is often ethnicity.

The 1948 United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights had a distinctly liberal democratic orientation, envisaging rights as strictly belonging to individuals and not to groups. However, due to pressure from non-Western communalistic cultures, current discourse on human rights within the UN framework acknowledges three categories of entitlements, referred to as “generations of rights”, namely (1) civil rights (entailing the well-known personal liberties, such as freedom of movement, association and conscience), (2) economic welfare rights (including entitlements to food, shelter, medical care and employment), and (3) what may be broadly termed “rights of cultural membership”.

Thus the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares that third-generation rights ought to be protected: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”

Second, recognition and protection of the right to ethnic identity through an ethnically-based federation would be an antidote to perpetual cultural, political and economic domination. In unitarist ethnically plural post-colonial African states, ethnic groups that enjoy numerical advantage, or, more importantly, that have managed to hang on to political power, configure the state to reflect and support their own worldviews, and this has a direct impact on access to economic and political influence. For example, in “Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity”, Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo pointed out that just like their colonial predecessors, post-colonial Kenyan regimes have defined the economic potential of the country strictly through agro-ecological zones, thus retaining the colonial fixation with highland agriculture. Central Kenya and the highlands are defined as high potential areas, while the Lake Basin and Ukambani lowlands (Eastern province) are defined as medium potential and the rangelands, which comprise 70 per cent of the country’s land mass, are defined as lowest potential.

Consequently, as John R. Campbell observed in “Ethnic Minorities and Development: A Prospective Look at the Situation of African Pastoralists and Hunter-Gatherers”, a hierarchy has developed based on unequal political power which translates into unequal access to, and control over, land. Campbell went on to note that from colonial times, alien Western capitalism has encroached on land, whether it belongs to agriculturalists, pastoralists or hunter-gatherers; agriculturalists have moved into pastoralist lands, and agriculturalists and pastoralists have taken over hunter-gatherer territories.

For example, in “Kenya: Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Diversity”, Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo pointed out that just like their colonial predecessors, post-colonial Kenyan regimes have defined the economic potential of the country strictly through agro-ecological zones, thus retaining the colonial fixation with highland agriculture.

Except for alien Western capitalist encroachment, numerical strength or weakness has been pivotal to this hierarchical process of socio-political dispossession, as the agriculturalists are more numerous than the pastoralists, and the latter have a demographic advantage over the hunter-gatherers. Consequently, entrenching the right to the recognition and protection of ethnic identity into the country’s constitution would significantly enhance efforts to address these injustices.

Third, in “Nationhood and Statehood: The Impact of a Conflated Discourse on African Polities and their Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups”, I argued that constitutional protection of ethnic identity would address the need to mitigate the harmful effects of the discourse on the nation-state. From the days of the so-called nationalist struggle for independence, the idea was popularised that Kenyans are “one people”.

However, the formation of the Kenyan state was an act of gross violence, commencing with the formal inauguration of the Imperial British East Africa Company rule in 1888, but more officially with the declaration of the British East African Protectorate on 1st July, 1895. The 1886 Anglo-German agreement delineated the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar from the country’s coastline to ten miles into the interior. In 1895, the Sultan of Zanzibar leased the administration of the strip to the British.

These events set in motion the violent process of placing different ethnic communities with their diverse systems of government within one large and new area of central administration. The territory beyond the ten-mile coastal strip was declared to be “Kenya Colony” in 1920. Thus while the ten-mile coastal strip continued to be referred to as a Protectorate, the rest of the territory was henceforth referred to as the Kenya Colony.

Nevertheless, the British administered the Protectorate and the Colony as a two-in-one unit out of expediency. Is it any wonder then that our people display greater loyalty to their ethnic identities that are centuries old, while giving lip service to the Kenyan identity which, very loosely speaking, is only a century old this year? Consequently, like most post-colonial African polities, Kenya is a multi-national state, not a nation.

While current geopolitics make it impossible for our various peoples to revert to their pre-colonial political formations, we can mitigate their pain considerably by setting up an ethnically-based federation in which ethnic identity is recognised and respected instead of being criminalised, as it has been thus far. Thus, in the place of the nationalist discourse, we need to build a polity in which our various peoples can organise their local spaces in a manner consonant with their worldviews. This point becomes clearer when we recognise the fact that politics is part and parcel of culture, so that a political formation enjoys greater legitimacy when it reflects the cultural milieu of its inhabitants. Regarding this, A.S. Narang, in “Ethnic Conflicts and Minority Rights”, wrote:

People invariably retain an attachment to their own ethnic group and the community in which they were brought up. There is an interdependence between the individual and collective processes of identity formation. Thus individuals expect to recognise themselves in public institutions. They expect some consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, embedded in the social institutions, and celebrated in public events. Otherwise, individuals feel like social strangers, they feel that the society is not their society.

Many people in Kenya, especially in the rural areas, still cherish their indigenous systems of governance. This is perhaps most evident during electioneering seasons, when politicians go around the country receiving politico-spiritual “honours” from elders of various ethnic groups in a bid to enhance their popularity in those communities. It is therefore high time we took the rampant loyalty to indigenous governance models seriously by giving the people space to utilise them at the local level through an ethnically-based federation.

In “What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa?”, the late renowned Nigerian social scientist, Claude Ake, stated:

… ethnicity supposedly epitomizes backwardness and constrains the development of Africa. This presupposition is misleading, however, for it is development rather than the people and their culture which has to be problematized. Development has to begin by taking people and their culture as they are, not as they might be, and proceeding from there to define the problems and strategies for development. Otherwise, the problematic of development becomes a tautology. The people are not and cannot be a problem just by being what they are, even if part of what they are is ethnic consciousness. Our treatment of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness reflects this tendency to problematize the people and their culture, an error that continues to push Africa deeper into confusion…The point of course is not to romanticize the past and be captive to it but to recognize what is on the ground and strive to engineer a more efficient, less traumatic, and less self-destructive social transformation.

Many people in Kenya, especially in the rural areas, still cherish their indigenous systems of governance. This is perhaps most evident during electioneering seasons, when politicians go around the country receiving politico-spiritual “honours” from elders of various ethnic groups in a bid to enhance their popularity in those communities.

Ake went on to warn that the usual easy judgments against ethnic consciousness are a dangerous luxury at a time when long-established states are decomposing under pressure from ethnic and nationalist assertiveness, and when the community of independent states is shrugging off their demise. For him, the enormous implications of this for Africa, where hundreds of ethnic groups are squeezed chaotically and oppressively into approximately 50 states, are easy enough to imagine.

Are there successful cases of ethnically-based federations in Africa? The answer to this question is not straightforward, but the Ethiopian case is worth careful study. While in “The Trouble with Ethiopia’s Ethnic Federalism” Mahmood Mamdani dismisses the Ethiopian experiment on the basis of the ethnically-blind liberal vision of society, Kalundi Serumaga plausibly replies to him in “Speak of Me as I Am: Ethiopia, Native Identities and the National Question in Africa”.

Yet, whether or not there are successful cases of ethnically-based federations is neither here nor there: the hypocritical nationalist discourse in Kenya, in which politicians speak about their commitment to a Kenyan identity while mobilising their followers along ethnic lines, can only be slain by finally acknowledging our ethnic diversity and factoring it into our socio-political engineering. We can achieve this by granting constitutional protection to the right to ethnic identity, and on its basis creating an ethnically-based federation.

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Dr. Reginald M.J. Oduor is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Nairobi. He is the first person with total visual disability to be appointed to a substantive teaching position in a public university in Kenya. He was the founding Editor-in-Chief of the New Series of Thought and Practice: A Journal of the Philosophical Association of Kenya from 2009 to 2015. With Drs. Oriare Nyarwath and Francis E.A. Owakah, he edited OderaOruka in the Twenty-First Century. He is also Co-founder and current Chair of the Society of Professionals with Visual Disabilities (SOPVID). Email: rmjoduor@gmail.com. Blog: http://kenyancrossroads.blogspot.co.ke

Ideas

Whiteness and the Future of Artificial Intelligence

Tracing the digital contours of the settler colony helps us understand how old inequalities will shape a future with artificial intelligence.

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Whiteness and the Future of Artificial Intelligence
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For much of the nineteenth century, Sundays in an open field at the gates of New Orleans saw a spectacular congregation of human activity. Picture a hot, humid, swampy Louisiana summer day, the Spanish moss dripping from the trees, and the bass drum pulse reverberating as you approach a mass gathering at the fringe of the United States’s most Caribbean city.

You’d see New Orleaneans of all stripes, dressed in everything from the latest Parisian fashions to simple rags, standing around in circles, watching the most talented musicians, dancers, actors, and diviners of their city on full display.

If you could have angled your head to see inside the circle, you would be privileged to witness the diversity of humanity coming together. People from across Africa and the Americas co-mingling, sharing their culture, celebrating the arrival of the one day they can express their home and ancestral cultures in public.

Unaware that their communing would one day birth a novel culture, which would in turn branch out to influence cultures in the rest of the world, there must have been an urgent feeling to the gatherings, fleeting if not quite ephemeral, but temporary enough to make them feel dreamlike, religious even. As soon as that feverish dream of a day would break, they would be returning to unpaid labor, toiling in fields or answering to the whims of their white masters. Because they were not, in the society in which they lived, human.

In 2018, after returning to the US from living in Brazil, I visited New Orleans for the first time. While there, I picked up a book on the history of Congo Square, and in the following months I couldn’t help from periodically daydreaming about the historical Sunday gatherings in that city. I drew parallels to the basement house party or the rented community center of my childhood in Milwaukee, where immigrants would dance the night away, speak in their own language, eat their own food, even worship in their own cosmos.

They were also there at the nightclub that I frequented as a student in Madrid, filled with young men who may have risked their lives crossing deserts and seas to arrive in Europe, and who now danced in the center of circles to Youssou N’Dour. Or they were in the hidden away bars and nightclubs of New York and San Francisco, where migrants of a variety of classes and national origins brushed up against each other, catching up on the latest sounds from their various home lands. They were also in online spaces, in which young people across the world found a foothold for expression, with various permutations of digital soul music pulsing on the parallel circuits of a global capitalism still guided by the logic of white supremacy.

Connecting a historical moment like Congo Square to my own experiences helped to challenge lingering colonial logics embedded within my imaginings of America’s past. It particularly helped to destroy an invisible line that tends to be drawn between those whose ancestors arrived on these shores from Africa in bondage hundreds of years ago, and those who arrived more recently for other purposes. It forced me to recognize that African migration to the Americas (or elsewhere) can and should be thought of as a continuum, and the humanity of those who migrate, forced or by choice, is unbroken across space and time.

Last summer, I sat in a parking lot in King City, California, a small town surrounded by mountains and endless fields of fruit and vegetables, listening to a local Spanish language radio broadcast. On it, alongside various Mexican regional musics, they had public service announcements about COVID-19 and ads for English language classes. King City sits in the heart of one of the centers of industrial agriculture in the United States.

The manual labor performed in this region is done by workers from Mexico and Central America, some undocumented, but all descended from people who occupied and moved around these lands freely for thousands of years. Largely invisible in nearby wealthy urban enclaves, they are an integral labor force that save for a periodic scapegoating, demonization, and dehumanization in the media, isn’t normally seen as part of the nation—let alone having their hopes, joys, or individual expressions considered in mainstream discourse.

So I sat there, listening to the bright horn choruses and upbeat snare drum rolls, and imagined that these local radio broadcasts served to provide a sense of community and humanity to their audiences, not unlike those of the Sunday gatherings in New Orleans two hundred years ago. Humanity denied, humanity reclaimed, the contours of citizenship and their interplay with labor are perpetually dancing at the edges of the settler colony.

Contemporaneous to the gatherings at Congo Square, the American settler colony was in an expansive phase moving west across the North American continent. Around the same time, European powers were doling out territories for themselves in Africa, and across the world they accomplished these “civilizing missions” by pushing the existing inhabitants off of the land, killing or imprisoning them, or attempting to wipe out their way of life. The privileges of white settlers in these extensions of Europe were fortified by the legal structures of the colonial state. In the United States, laws like the Homestead Act and the Second Amendment to the Constitution turned white frontier families into state-sponsored militias, their structural advantage scrawled across the physical landscape of the continent.

In the wake of the guns and military campaigns (sometimes manned by colonised peoples themselves), urban professionals of the colonial metropoles followed with their pens, phonographs, and cameras and became the documentarians of the folk culture of the marginals, misfits, Native Americans and Africans at the frontier (as well in the working class neighborhoods of cities). These state agents and entrepreneurs would chronicle the transition from an Atlantic society based on slave labor to capitalism. The legends they constructed would become the foundation for an imperialist ideology that continues to this day.

Starting around the mid-1800s, the US witnessed the rise in popularity of the blackface minstrel show. Through the medium of vaudeville, and with Congo Square as one of the direct source materials, the minstrel show denigrated people of African descent (or anyone deemed other at the time), mocking the expressions of humanity that they managed, while simultaneously integrating them into the identity of the nation. This form of entertainment would produce America’s first pop stars who would in turn become global ambassadors for the new American society that was emerging.

The legal mechanisms for enclosure in the world of ideas mirrored those of physical territory. As communication technology rapidly advanced, the mechanical copyright emerged to protect property in the cultural realm. This mechanism ensured a structural advantage for those with the resources to extract and define the value of the culture of those at the margins. The owners of patents and copyrights did more than just document their changing world, they also ossified racial categories and ushered racism along from the biological realm into the cultural one. This was the foundation on which the global entertainment industries of today were built.

After the very slow and wrought process of abolishing Atlantic slavery, and the violent consolidation of the colonial territories, by the turn of the twentieth century debates about citizenship and civil rights would arise to mask the battlefield over humanity. As Native Americans were cordoned off to reservations, Africans in the Americas would be folded into the nation as Black (Negro, Colored, etc). And as the western literary genre moved from the written word to the screen, and the minstrel show moved from live theater, to radio and phonograph, to film and television, the twin legacies of the fascination with and denigration of a dehumanized other would leave their mark on each.

White capitalist copyright owners would position themselves as the authoritative gatekeepers on the pure folk cultures of the inferior races, or white performers, on stage with their actual faces, would insert themselves as the individual genius responsible for the synthesis of a unique cultural innovation, the social relations behind the slick final product forever obscured. While various cultural rebellions have arisen throughout the years to counter these processes of dehumanization, the tools of extraction inherited from the nineteenth century have proven to be more than effective in upholding the logic of empire and racial capitalism.

In parallel to this cultural push and pull, a political debate would arise amongst Black Americans over how to (or whether to) integrate into the settler colonial society. Visions of a return to Africa would wax and wane, while an anti-colonial politics was violently repressed. Ultimately, the call to own property as a way to secure one’s rightful place within the nation, the ghosts of 40 acres and a mule, would ring out loud over the decades. This echo has found new life in today’s discourse around race, resulting in an ascendant black nationalist purism, particularly online. This trend is unfortunate. While there is certainly agency within the beauty and virtuosity that has come into the world as a result of the cultural resilience of African descended peoples in the Americas, it doesn’t mean that it is the result of some intrinsic quality unique to one racial group or national historical context.

In fact, it could be argued that the African retentions that remain in the Americas survived because the dominant systems either tolerated them or weren’t able to read them as such. In other words: Black American cultures have arisen as a result of both black resilience and white supremacy. Still, America’s Blackness is one of the most important cultural expressions of resilience and resistance in modern society. To put an enclosure around it only reinforces the settler colonial mentality, leaving the aims of universal humanism incomplete. Even those Africans at Congo Square, who helped start this whole thing in the first place, would likely remain outside of the gates.

Just over an hour drive from that King City parking lot where I was listening to the radio in Spanish, and on the western edge of the continental territory colonised by the United States, sits the headquarters of the world’s most valuable companies: Google, Facebook, Tesla, Apple—the heart of the global information economy. Even though the bubble of the California Gold Rush has long since burst (a process that seems to repeat itself every few decades), it has turned into a region with one of the largest concentrations of wealth in the world. If mass media was born amongst the colonization project of Euro-American imperialism, the dehumanization of non-European peoples, and the consolidation of racial capitalism, then today’s information economy is also built upon that same infrastructure.

On the wild frontiers of the early internet, online communities emerged that would freely exchange infinitely replicable digital material. In what many thought was a new reality of a post-scarce digitally permanent world, the reign of the regime of copyright briefly found itself in crisis. Music was the most fertile ground from which to declare one’s liberation, but it wasn’t the only one.

And while interaction with the old guard of racial capitalism allowed a tradition of gatekeeping and cultural appropriation inherited from vaudeville to continue, what had emerged within the confines of the virtual world—torrent libraries, file sharing sites, personal blogs, forums and chat rooms—collectively could be thought of as a sort of digital Congo Square. The response from the United States Department of Homeland Security, alongside other policing efforts, was to raid the safe houses of free exchange and try and put an end to it all through intimidation.

Before the average uploader became familiar with the DMCA takedown, some big companies looked at the anarchistic landscape and lured the loosely organized scattering of digital cultural producers onto their free platforms. Soundcloud, Youtube, Instagram, Twitter, etc all provided sleek design, convenience, and a veneer of protection from the harshest crackdowns by the state.

Yet, these platforms were not immune to the demands of capital or its watchdogs. Perhaps, they never were meant to be. Investors eventually wanted returns, and the landed copyright elite needed their cut too, and whether planned or not, all the platforms would eventually make concessions that favored the biggest property owners over the public. These concessions would eventually evolve into the phenomenon now popularly known as surveillance capitalism.

Eventually, the ideological struggles of our time would also move on to the individualized “feeds” and “timelines” of the Silicon Valley platforms. No longer reserved for the stage of fights between or within nations, political speech is tailored, tracked, and manipulated in the interest of generating more interaction with minimal regard to the real world consequences. We may constantly measure ourselves against how we think other people might see us online, but when you strip us back down to our most human needs and desires, the questions that concern much of the population of this planet are fairly simple: What is the right of any individual human to exist wherever they are on Earth? And, under what conditions do they have a right to do so?

So today, across the world, young people leave rural communities to work in the fields, mines, and factories that fuel the supply chains of multinational corporations with the slightest hope that integration into the global economy will provide a better future for them and their families. Masses from the urban margins take to the streets with the belief that by facing state violence head on they might bring about a more just reality for their communities.

And, when members of both groups feel like they have no alternative but to hit the unmarked highways of the world’s most dangerous migration routes and seek a better future elsewhere, they are doing so with the idea that the same world that can beam images and sounds via satellite to a mobile phone in their pocket must be able to recognize a humanity denied as a result of neocolonial economic, environmental, and military policy.

Like in the post-Reconstruction era in the US, many of the proposed solutions to the injustices that have emerged in the digital age have concentrated on finding technological fixes to restore (old) systems of fair(er) compensation for the output (input) of online denizens. However, rather than provide solutions to the structural inequalities inherent to capitalism, technological fixes such as blockchain capitalism, cash app mutual aid, personalized sponsorship accounts, and other enclosure-oriented solutions ultimately retrofit the infrastructures of exploitation against the claims of universal humanism. While there certainly is value in building community online, especially as a form of resistance or resilience, the question remains: What forms of online participation emerge from the claims to humanity of the marginalsmisfitsNative Americans and Africans at the frontier?

And in our resistance, we should also never forget that the reality of surveillance capitalism is that one person’s individual wealth, clout, or social relevance is insignificant in comparison to the aggregate picture of all the behaviors of the world’s population.

By the time the platforms had a monopoly on audiences, they no longer needed the cultural products they claimed to be supporting to have any exchange value at all (with human moderation becoming fertile ground for corruption or payola). While influencers try to squeeze out a few pennies from sponsors or trickle down monetization schemes based on clout they’ve managed to accumulate in their online and real world social networks, the runways of the digital future are paved with the promise of returns from the proprietary algorithms built on data hoarded from the behavior of the masses.

As it stands, a few companies, concentrated in specific geographic locations, fortified by an accumulated wealth never seen before, defended by the largest military force ever to exist, swallow and secure all the information we give them: our behaviors, our desires, all of our humanistic acts and expressions, and employ small armies to sort, categorize, process and program, with the end goal of creating an “artificial intelligence” that can ultimately stake a claim to humanity too.

However, unlike the popular science fiction fantasy in which the future battles for humanity will happen between robots and humans, as big tech plans an exit from a planet in crisis, our future struggles are more likely to look like the age old one of humans who can harvest the fruits of their enclosures versus those of us who can’t. So, if blackness is the foundational currency on which the capitalist information economy is built, what will whiteness mean to a cyborg.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site once a week.

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Combatting the Desert Locust Menace

In January 2020 Kenya experienced the worst locust invasion in 70 years. So intense were the infestations that they posed a serious risk of food insecurity to the country and the region.

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Combatting the Desert Locust Menace
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Locusts are small creatures measuring approximately 0.5 to 3 inches long and weighing 0.07 ounces that belong to the grasshopper family. The average lifecycle of a locust is three to six months. In normal circumstances they are solitary but can change their behaviour and become gregarious under certain conditions. During the dry season, they tend to swarm together in the scant patches of vegetation. The swarming causes serotonin to release into their central nervous system, promoting rapid movement, giving them appetite for a more varied diet leading to their rapid spread.

The onset of rains brings with it an increase in lush vegetation, favouring the rapid increase of the insects and triggering their gregarious phase during which the desert locust can be devastating, consuming its weight in food in a day. In each square kilometre of a swarm there can be as many as 40 million individuals capable of destroying in day enough food to feed more than 35,000 people.

Towards the end of 2019, the East African region experienced an invasion of desert locusts of a scale not witnessed in the region in decades. The desert locusts descended on farmland in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia in their hundreds of millions.

According to scientists, two cyclones in 2018 — Cyclone Mekunu in May and Cyclone Luban in October — caused massive rainfall in the Arabian Desert, a factor that facilitated the breeding of desert locusts. The rains were enough to create ephemeral lakes in the desert, a favourable breeding ground for desert locusts. It is believed that this phenomenon is likely to have enabled the formation of three generations of locust deserts, increasing the number of the swarming locusts 8,000-fold.

As is the nature of the desert locust, the swarms began to migrate and by the summer of 2019 they were crossing the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden into the Eastern Africa countries of Ethiopia and Somalia. The desert locusts continued to breed for several months, with the autumn rains experienced in the East Africa region — capped by cyclonic storm Pawan, experienced in December of 2019 and responsible for rainfall in Somalia — triggering another reproductive cycle of the desert locusts.

The swarms of locusts continued to grow and arrived in Kenya towards the end of December 2019, rapidly moving through the northern and central parts of the country. By the end of January 2020, Kenya was experiencing the worst locust invasion in 70 years. So intense were the infestations — which moved through the neighbouring countries of Eritrea and Djibouti, finding their way to northern Tanzania and northeast Uganda in mid-February — that they posed a serious risk of food insecurity in the region.

The impact of the locust invasion was severe and continues to be felt to this day. In as much as Kenya has made significant steps in combating desert locusts infestations, new infestations continue swarming into the country and farmers in the north and in some parts of central Kenya continue to grapple with the huge losses caused by the invasions.

According to reports by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), about 20.2 million people in the Eastern Africa region faced acute food insecurity in 2020 alone, a condition that was worsened by the desert locust infestations and the Covid-19 pandemic. Further, according to the FAO, desert locusts have the potential to affect 20 per cent of the earth’s land and put into jeopardy the livelihoods of a tenth of the world’s population.

As explained at the beginning of this article, the desert locust has the potential to destroy in one day food that can feed over 35,000 people, threatening a country with food insecurity. But while this might be the immediate impact of a desert locust invasion, infestations have other long short- and long-term effects.

It is said that a healthy nation is a productive nation. However, locust invasions have the potential to nullify this statement in less than a week of their landing in a region. The recent and ongoing wave of locust infestations has driven families and vulnerable groups into poverty and hunger, a situation that has been worsened by the Covid-19 pandemic.

Desert locusts have the potential to affect 20 per cent of the earth’s land and put into jeopardy the livelihoods of a tenth of the world’s population.

Desert locust infestations are not only a threat to crops but they also threaten the survival of livestock. The FAO reported that in Ethiopia alone, an early assessment of the impact of the wave of locust invasions showed that more than 5,000 square miles of pastureland and 800 square miles of cropland were destroyed. The infestation also caused the loss of over 350,000 metric tonnes of dry grains and cereal, resulting in over one million people experiencing hunger and needing food aid.

A nation that is not food secure is a nation that is not secure at all. Hunger and poverty contribute to increased crime in a country, driving people to engage in all manner of vice in an effort to survive.

Food insecurity is also a leading cause of increased government borrowing in a bid to alleviate the suffering of the population. The borrowing, which is meant to cushion the nation from the effects of the invasion and other resultant challenges, leads to a ballooning national debt and a high cost of living. Locust invasions also seriously affect a country’s export earnings which has a direct effect on previously planned expenditures. Locust infestations also tend to derail the development agenda of a country as it is forced to put scheduled plans on hold in order to deal with the invasion.

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How then can a country deal with locust infestations to guarantee its food security and avert the challenges associated with such invasions? Biological methods of pest control are safest, both for the environment and for humans. However, biological methods of desert locust control may not be effective, especially in cases where swarms are involved.

The most commonly used biological method of pest control is the use of a predator to eliminate the pest. However, the challenge with this method is that it cannot be effective in controlling large swarms of locusts as they can easily fly away from their predators. Another challenge is that locusts barely stay put for more than a day or two since they are constantly looking for food and therefore cannot be easily contained and controlled.

A nation that is not food secure is a nation that is not secure at all.

The other option of locust control would be to use of nets to capture swarms. However, this method of control can only be effective on a small scale since large swarms of locusts can fly above and past the nets.

Scaring the swarms away is yet another method of locust control. However, it can only be implemented in small areas since scaring the pests away only drives them to the next available vegetation for them to devour.

Consequently, the most effective method of controlling  large swarms of desert locusts is to spray organophosphate chemicals in small, concentrated volumes using aerial sprayers, vehicle-mounted sprayers, or from knapsack or handheld sprayers in smaller areas.

However, spraying chemicals to control locusts also has adverse effects on nature and on living organisms. For instance, while the use of the Metarhizium biopesticide was found to be 70 to 90 per cent effective in the control of locusts, with no measurable impact on non-target organisms, this is not the case with other chemical formulations that wipe out both the target and non-target organisms, immensely impacting the ecological balance.

During the recent wave of locust invasions experienced in Kenya and the larger East African region, the FAO has collaborated with the local and national governments to mitigate the spread of these swarms to other areas by spraying pesticides both on the ground (to kill any eggs or nymphs) and aerially in areas where it is safe to do so. Research is ongoing to develop formulations that have the least impact on non-target organisms.

Notably, the FAO is working closely with 51 Degrees Ltd. to bring the desert locust situation under control using a hotline system integrated with tracking software, trained scouts, and aircraft. The EarthRanger system captures and transmits locust sightings and movements, making it easier to control the warms. Initially developed to track poaching, the method has been yielding positive results in locust control in Kenya.

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Planning by governments is essential in ensuring that a country is not caught off-guard by infestations in the future. Having mitigation measures in place to reduce the impact of locust infestations on a country’s economy is crucial.

Locusts are an important part of the grassland ecosystem as they stimulate nutrient cycling and play a crucial role in food chains. As such, governments should think of balanced ways to control these insects while at the same time maintaining the much-needed balance in the ecosystem. Controlling the locusts ensures that a country enjoys food security and also averts other challenges brought on by locust invasions.

While biological control may prove hard to implement, especially where large swarms of locusts are involved, the government can come up with other safe control mechanisms that do not affect the environment and ecological balance. For instance, finding a way of preventing swarms of locusts from landing on crops as they migrate can be a good way to ensure that a country’s food security is safeguarded.

Planning by governments is essential in ensuring that a country is not caught off-guard by infestations in the future.

Additionally, investing in research to better understand the biology of locusts, their breeding habits and migratory patterns, and applying the ecological niche modeling approach to predict the breeding sites of locusts can be very useful in controlling these insects. Institutions such as the International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) in Kenya have been at the forefront in researching better ways to combat locust infestations using this approach.

The model proposes the use of historical datasets of the breeding patterns of desert locusts in the Middle East and in the Sahel region to predict the probability of locusts breeding in the East African region. This type of research identifies the desert locust breeding hotspots and better prepares a country to combat the menace. Through such an approach, the government can come up with a cost-effective, site-specific, and targeted management of crawling hoppers before they become gregarious adults, thus minimising the risk of an outbreak.

This article is part of The Elephant Food Edition Series done in collaboration with Route to Food Initiative (RTFI). Views expressed in the article are not necessarily those of the RTFI.

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Kenya: Will Recognising Ethnic Identities Lead To Positive Outcomes?

Countries that adopt ethnic recognition go on to experience less violence, more economic vitality, and more democratic politics.

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KenyKenya: Will Recognising Ethnic Identities Lead To Positive Outcomes?a Should Take Note: Recognising Ethnic Identities Can Lead To Positive Outcomes
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Kenyans are preparing to amend the country’s 2010 constitution, with a referendum tentatively scheduled for June 2021. The amendments focus on ensuring shared prosperity, managing ethnic diversity, and avoiding divisive elections.

They were first proposed in the Building Bridges Initiative report, which came about after the country’s election stalemate of 2017.

After two rejected polls, increasing tensions and pockets of violence, opposition leader Raila Odinga and presidential victor Uhuru Kenyatta shook hands in March 2018 and agreed to work together under what they termed the Building Bridges Initiative.

Its report has a section on “Ethnic Antagonism and Competition which highlights the need to “find ways of managing … diversity” and preventing “ethnic conflicts in Kenya.”

The report holds that the ethnicised winner-takes-all nature of Kenyan politics has been at the root of the country’s election instability. But debate over its proposals, which are now included in the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, continues.

Much of the debate is around ethnic representation in government, equitable sharing of resources among Kenya’s diverse ethnic communities, and the role of the current political elite in future governance structures.

In our book, Diversity, Violence, and Recognition: How Recognizing Ethnic Identity Promotes Peace, we investigate some of the same issues debated in Kenya today.

We focus on contexts around the world that, like Kenya, are ethnically diverse and have experienced violent conflict on so-called ethnic lines. This means the religious, tribal, caste, racial, or other descent-based characteristics along which politics and society have been structured.

We examine the strategies that different countries have chosen to manage such conflict. In particular we study how and why leaders choose to recognise or avoid reference to ethnic identities in government institutions and the effects of this choice on peace.

Our findings were surprisingly clear: countries that adopt ethnic recognition go on to experience less violence, more economic vitality, and more democratic politics. But these effects depend on which ethnic group is in power.

Recognising ethnicity

We studied constitutions and peace agreements from 57 countries around the world from Afghanistan to Ethiopia, Burundi to the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland). The countries we studied experienced violent conflict between 1990 and 2012. We searched each document to determine whether or not they named different ethnic groups as part of the body politic.

We found that globally, 43% of post-conflict constitutions and peace agreements named ethnic groups. Sometimes this ethnic recognition comes with group differentiated rights like representation quotas or autonomy arrangements. But in other cases it is largely symbolic.

In Kenya’s case, the 2010 constitution mentions “ethnic diversity” but it does not name specific ethnic groups. The same is true of the Building Bridges Initiative proposals and the constitution amendment bill.

We also found that there was a pattern that distinguished the contexts where ethnic recognition was adopted: the leader was typically from the largest ethnic group. When leaders from the largest ethnic group were in power, ethnic recognition was adopted 60% of the time. However, in contexts of minority ethnic rule, ethnic recognition was adopted only 24% of the time.

Ethnic recognition is less common in Africa than in other regions. Still, there are notable instances of recognition on the continent like Burundi and Ethiopia.

Why it matters

We used statistical analysis to compare trends in countries with and without ethnic recognition. On average, countries that explicitly recognise different ethnic groups in their constitutions or peace agreements go on to experience less violence, more economic vitality, and greater democracy than countries that did not.

We believe that this is because ethnic recognition, and policies connected to it, help to manage mistrust between groups.

Recognition allows groups to know how they are doing compared to others through metrics like group-based statistics. This brings issues pertaining to inequality or exclusion out of the sphere of rumour and speculation. In addition, group-based rights such as representation quotas dampen fears that one group will dominate state institutions.

While recognition leads to a number of positive societal effects, we found that these effects depend on the ethnic group in power. The beneficial effects of recognition have been most powerful for countries where the leader is from the largest ethnic group. In contexts of minority ethnic rule, leaders have to balance the rights that recognition offers with countermeasures to prevent larger ethnic groups from winning power.

Take for example, Burundi. It’s last three presidents have been from the majority Hutu ethnic group. Some may worry that formally recognising ethnic identities could entrench mobilisation along ethnic lines. But political dynamics in Burundi illustrate the opposite.

For example, it named ethnic groups in the Arusha Peace Accords of 2000. The accords are widely attributed with having brought the country out of its 1993–2005 civil war.

It also named ethnic groups in its 2005 constitution. The constitution established ethnically based quotas for parliament, political parties, the military, and other state institutions. As a result, inter-ethnic conflict has become increasingly less relevant politically.

This has not been the case in neighbouring Rwanda, which is led by an ethnic minority leader. Rwanda’s post-genocide constitution seeks to “eradicate ethnic identity”. But deep inter-ethnic mistrust persists. This is despite laws that restrict references to ethnic identity except when commemorating genocide victims.

Integrating ethnicity

Ethnic recognition policies can appear in different sectors from the executive, legislative or judiciary, civil service and the security sector, to education and language. It can be the basis for different types of national strategies to build social cohesion.

For example, Burundi’s approach since the enactment of its 2005 constitution has been to use ethnic quotas to balance and integrate groups within state institutions. This has promoted cooperative intergroup contact, which has helped to reduce inter-ethnic mistrust.

Since its 1995 constitution Ethiopia has also taken an ‘ethnic recognition’ approach to governance. However, its ethno-federal regime has put more emphasis on granting regional autonomy rights, including a right to secession.

It is conceivable that an autonomy-based strategy could offer assurances that promote national unity, but the current dynamics in Ethiopia suggest a high degree of volatility.

Many wish for a foolproof recipe for managing diversity in conflict-affected contexts. There isn’t one. But Kenyans are not alone in debating best strategies. Our book offers accounts of other countries’ experimentation and reminds us that constitutional moments are high stakes and that institutional choices matter.The Conversation

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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