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CAPITAL CRIMES: How Uganda is Still Targeting African Wealth Today

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There are virtually no banks owned by Ugandan Africans left in the country. By KALUNDI SERUMAGA

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CAPITAL CRIMES: How Uganda is Still Targeting African Wealth Today
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What happens when a new idea grows up, and grows old?

There is drama in the Uganda parliament, where a statutory committee is bringing to light several truly amazing revelations regarding over twenty years of the effects of the reforms to Uganda’s banking sector.

Working from a report received from the Auditor-General, the committee, known as the Parliamentary Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises (COSASE), is building a picture of the inside story of how a slew of banks came to be variously taken over, shut down and/or sold off.

Starting with Teefe Trust Bank in 1993, a cluster of institutions fell one after the other: Uganda Commercial Bank (1998/2001), International Credit Bank Ltd (1998), Greenland Bank (1999), Co-operative Bank (1999), National Bank of Commerce (2012), Global Trust Bank (2014).

The committee wants the details on how Bank of Uganda came to the decision to close down any given bank, and then the manner in which such a decision was carried out.

Apart from being unable to demonstrate any kind of procedural rigor, central bank officials have not been able to show the terms of reference for the acts of dissolution; the full audited accounts of the wound-up banks; the location of seized bank title deeds that have never – decades after the closures- been disposed of; the inventory of some of the banks’ assets; and handover reports. In one case, it was discovered that they had allowed an appointed liquidator to dispose of a seized banks assets at a 93% discount, granted them immunity, and fully conceded to the company’s demand that their agreement be governable by UK law only.

The committee wants the details on how Bank of Uganda came to the decision to close down any given bank, and then the manner in which such a decision was carried out.

In the face of this flood of damning testimony, one hard-pressed Central Bank functionary found himself blurting out the assertion that there was “no need for an inventory” when winding up one of the institutions.

But what may be missed in this avalanche of details is the fact that the banks concerned all had one common thread: they were either locally owned, owned by Africans from elsewhere on the continent, or were statutorily established to service locally owned commercial activity.

That, actually, is the real story.

The immediate trigger for all this drama has been the 2016 sudden shut down, sell off and dissolution of Crane Bank, perhaps until then the jewel in the crown of a business empire owned by the flamboyant Sudhir Ruperelia.

That this probe comes now, has led many to speculate that perhaps the committee is working at the behest of the Crane’s erstwhile owners as part of a vendetta against the central bank officials involved in the closure operation. Certainly, Uganda’s media –and in particular, the online community- has suddenly become awash with stories that take a strong interest in the operations of Crane Bank’s eventual buyer, as well as the character and reputation of the various Central Bank high officials.

Whatever the Attorney General’s impetus, his office found itself looking at the entire body of shutdowns undertaken by the central bank, since it was “reset” by the passing of a new Bank of Uganda Act in 1993, to replace the initial 1969 law establishing it.

The audit has become an impromptu review of the entire financial services aspect of Uganda’s now twenty-five year old liberalization policy, which was seen as groundbreaking in some quarters, at the time of its inception.

Various shades of opinion will continue to debate the policy, but twenty years down the line, one outcome is clear: there are virtually no banks owned by Ugandan Africans left in the country. Coincidence? Perhaps.

One effect of this had has been to create the impression that “foreign” banks are more “professionally managed” than the home-grown ones. But if that were really the case, then the West’s great crash of 2008 would simply never have happened. There are enough instances of foreign banks getting caught and being fined in other jurisdictions. In fact some of the foreign banks facing disciplinary action in South Africa and the UK (over cheating on the inter-bank lending rates) are banks that also have representation in Uganda. Why would banks choose to behave well only in Uganda, and then decide to misbehave elsewhere?

One effect of this had has been to create the impression that “foreign” banks are more “professionally managed” than the home-grown ones. But if that were really the case, then the West’s great crash of 2008 would simply never have happened.

There will always be the temptation for some level of “cheating” among banks. After all, it is a business about using money to make a lot more money. This is rarely a saintly pursuit. For example ABSA of South Africa (which used to be Bankcorp, and then was bought by Barclays who then took on the name) was discovered to have received an unexplained payout of about $166 million from the then apartheid government. They are still refusing to pay it back, even after the South Africa Ombudsman said they should.

This is not to suggest that all African Ugandan operators were innocent of any form of malpractice or incompetence. However, the authorities have always had various options at their disposal for dealing with this. The most common is for the regulatory authorities to impose heavy fines, remove errant directors, and in some cases also pump cash into the ailing culprit.

Like the “sin bin” concept in rugby, another equally rough and tumble activity, the object is to accommodate the energy of the game, while allowing it to proceed as safely as is manageable, not to kill off its spirit.

What the Uganda banking authorities can be accused of doing is to have decided to target only one category of player, and then have only one “remedy”: permanently eject them not just from the game, but all future tournaments, and also confiscate their equipment.

This is like a police traffic operation in which only one brand of car gets stopped and examined. Naturally, some offenders will be found. What then happens is that the driver is fined, the car’s number plates are removed, the passengers thrown out, the driver jailed, and the vehicle itself seized.

But this is by no means the focus, or stated interest of the parliamentary committee, but perhaps it should be.

It may offer a different perspective from which to understand what is now going on at the Uganda parliament. Beyond the forensics, what was the intent?

Perhaps the real purpose of the 1990s reforms to the banking system was to bolster the central bank’s capacity to get native capital out of the market and prevent the emergence of an autonomous business class.

If that were to be the case, it would come as no surprise to any student of Uganda’s real history: there is a precedent for this. In fact, it is a very old story.

Perhaps the real purpose of the 1990s reforms to the banking system was to bolster the central bank’s capacity to get native capital out of the market and prevent the emergence of an autonomous business class. If that were to be the case, it would come as no surprise to any student of Uganda’s real history.

In the book: The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, historians Kasozi, Nakanyike, and Sejjengo list a whole body of measures aimed at preventing the emergence of such a class:

“As early as the 1890s the colonial state began excluding Africans from the processing and marketing stages of production- the most lucrative in the colony’s commodity-based economy. Kabaka Mwanga tried to buy a saw-mill but was prevented by the authorities from doing so. In 1909, Governor Bell ordered the destruction of hand-gins, which handled some thirty-five per cent of cotton produced in the colony…. In 1913, Kina Kulya Growers’ Society of Ssingo Farmers was discouraged from marketing its own cotton. The Cotton Rules of 1918 restricted middlemen from operating within five miles of a ginnery, all of which were owned by foreigners. The Buganda Growers’ Association tried to market its own cotton in 1923 but was discouraged by the government. Four years later, Sepiriya Kaddumukasa tried to erect a ginnery on his own land but was refused a licence. In 1920 the Buganda Cotton Company was prevented from ginning and marketing its own cotton. In 1932, when the Uganda Cotton Society tried to obtain high prices by ginning and marketing its own cotton and “eliminating the Indian middleman,’ it was not allowed to do so. In the same year, the Native Marketing Ordinance (Coffee) curtailed the buying activities of African businessmen.”

The purpose of the colonial economy was to privilege British originated commerce over the local indigenous economy. Britain’s Chillington Tool Company alone, for example, all but wiped out indigenous ironworking by the 1940s, by dumping large amounts of cheap, mass-produced hoes on the Uganda market.

in Uganda, Western economic policy faced two obstacles to its aim of preventing–or at least endlessly delaying- the aggregation of African capital.

First was that the politics of the colonial conquest of Buganda meant the British had to concede vast tracts of land to primarily the Anglican African warlords that helped them overthrow the two resisting Kings, Kabalega and Mwanga. What is more, they had to concede laws restricting ownership of such land to black Africans only. Buganda, and Tonga were thus the only two colonial territories in the entire jurisdiction of the British Empire, in which native land claims were legally upheld, after a fashion, in the new order. As Africans entered commerce (or tried to) these land holdings began to come into play as collateral for loans.

The purpose of the colonial economy was to privilege British originated commerce over the local indigenous economy. Britain’s Chillington Tool Company alone, for example, all but wiped out indigenous ironworking by the 1940s, by dumping large amounts of cheap, mass-produced hoes on the Uganda market.

The second was the raft of “nationalist” measures put in place as an expression of the Independence movement. For example, an African Trade and Development Fund (ATDF) had been established in the late colonial period to provide a form of “affirmative action” for all those earlier generations of deliberately disadvantaged Africans. Even without privately-owned African banks, the state had established the Uganda Commercial Bank, envisioned as a cheap reliable lender to commercial African farmers, as well as enabling the co-op movement –battling on from the 1920s- to establish its own bank.

Prior to that, Kasozi tells us:

“The banking system was controlled by British- and India- based banks…. They did not lend to many Africans, although they operated on an accumulation of African peasant savings, which was lent to foreign businessmen to further exploit national resources. In 1949 [anti-colonial leader] Musaazi called for the use of peasant [savings] to create an agricultural bank. It was not until later that such a bank, the Uganda Credit and Savings bank, was floated. By that time Africans had been left so far behind in business expertise that they could not compete with Indo-Pakistanis and Europeans. Africans could not participate in the lucrative wholesale trade because the colonial government issued wholesale licenses only to traders with permanent buildings of stone and concrete: very few Africans had such buildings.”

The Uganda Credit and Savings bank is what became the Uganda Commercial Bank. At its peak, it operated well over half of all bank branches in the country and held 50% of all commercial bank deposits. The South African Standard Bank would be the one to buy it in the great 1990s sell-off now being picked apart in parliament. Standard went on to buy Grindlays Bank, which had been part-nationalised in the 1960s, and merged it with its new concern.

The evidence from parliament suggests that some looting and asset-stripping has taken place. Even if that were true, I do not think it would have been the real goal. The assertion bears repeating: the purpose was to drive native African capital out of the banking sector and to do so in such a way that it would find it hard to regroup and try and make another entry.

The story goes further back still: a less-formally recorded narrative exists of how it was common practice under colonial education, to deny opportunities for advancement to pupils coming from the more well-off families, often associated with the aristocracy. The method was to shunt them into courses aimed at closing off their possible qualification to tertiary education. At the same time, such opportunities were left open to African pupils of other backgrounds.

A few such children of the better-off therefore gained their higher education at the own parents’ expense where affordable, after leaving the formal colonial system, and studying abroad.

The purpose added to the earlier one of preventing or delaying the aggregation of native capital for as long as possible. The idea seemed to be to prevent also the possibility of the owners of any such aggregated capital gaining personal access to new knowledge and skills.

This also explains the Western (read British) hostility to the post-Amin Uganda National Liberation Front (UNLF) coalition government whose economic protectionist policies were aimed at boosting local manufacturing capacity. The open British support to the military junta that overthrew the coalition government in May 1980, and the Milton Obote regime it helped back into power, brought that aspiration to an end.

The more recent, two-decade legislative siege of original African land holdings that prevents them from using their holdings to raise capital, is an additional measure towards this goal.

The World Bank was certainly most enthusiastic about the new Bank of Uganda legislation. On the 14th May 1993, the very same day the Act passed into law, a team from the World Bank landed at Entebbe airport and were driven straight into a meeting with the then bank governor. There have been World Bank associated technocrats based in the Bank of Uganda building ever since.

Although owned by a Ugandan citizen, it cannot be said that this was the reason Crane Bank was also closed. Evidence used by Bank of Uganda to shut it down suggests it was more of a conduit for money laundering, leaving a large hole in the new banking system, and threatening its stability. The World Bank would not have liked this. Besides, the bank’s own attitude towards domestic capitalists was far from friendly.

The former Crane Bank headquarters building was on Kampala’s high street, next to a parking lot that was created for it over twenty years ago. That space used to be occupied by a set of modest African-owned shops, one of which was known as Kayondo Shoemakers. The abovementioned ATDF bought the building in the early 1960s, and leased it out for long-term purchase to Kayondo and three others who became the first black Africans to own businesses on Kampala’s main street, and the “last man standing”, just about, of local manufacturers, by the late eighties.

They would occupy it for thirty-five years, religiously paying in their mortgage instalments to the Fund. That is until 1997, when the ATDF was targeted for divestiture as part of the Ugandan government’s implementation of IMF/World Bank –directed privatisations, which were carried out with all the proverbial passion of the neophyte. Meera investments, a sister company to Crane Bank, put in a bid for it, and the matter eventually ended up in the High Court.

In May 2000, within less than an hour of winning that High Court case, Crane Bank’s owners had the shops demolished.

The very emptiness, right next to a fallen example of the neo-liberal banking adventure, bears witness to a history the folly of denying to others what you cannot hold on to yourself.

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Kalundi Serumaga is a social and political commentator based in Kampala.

Politics

Who Won Kenya’s “Nominations”?

Being nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine grass-roots legitimacy but it is hard not to suspect that some of the losers in the nominations process might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn.

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Who won Kenya’s “nominations”, the tense and often unpredictable political process through which parties select which candidates they want to represent them in the general election scheduled for 9 August? That may sound like a silly question. Social media is full of photographs of smiling candidate clutching their certificates of nomination—surely we need to look no further for the winners?

But maybe we do. Beyond the individual candidates in the contests for nominations, there are other winners. One may be obvious: it seems the general feeling is that Deputy President William Ruto came out better from the nominations than did his principal rival in the presidential race, former opposition leader Raila Odinga—about which more below. However, for some, coming out on top in the nominations may prove a poisoned chalice. Where nominations are seen to have been illegitimate, candidates are likely to find that losing rivals who stand as independents may be locally popular and may gain sympathy votes, making it harder for party candidates to win the general election. This means that there are often some less obvious winners and losers.

One reason for this is that nominations shape how voters think about the parties and who they want to give their vote to, come the general election. Research that we conducted in 2017, including a nationally representative survey of public opinion on these issues, found that citizens who felt that their party’s nomination process had not been legitimate were less likely to say that they would vote in the general election. In other words, disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out. In 2017, this appeared to disadvantage Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), whose nomination process was generally seen to have been more problematic—although whether this is because they were, or rather because this is how they were depicted by the media, is hard to say.

In the context of a tight election in 2022, popular perceptions of how the nominations were managed may therefore be as significant for who “wins” and “loses” as the question of which individuals secured the party ticket.

Why do parties dread nominations?

The major parties dreaded the nominations process—dreaded it so much, in fact, that despite all their bold words early on about democracy and the popular choice (and despite investments in digital technology and polling staff), most of the parties tried pretty hard to avoid primary elections as a way of deciding on their candidates. In some cases that avoidance was complete: the Jubilee party gave direct nominations to all those who will stand in its name. Other parties held some primaries—Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA) seems to have managed most—but in many cases they turned to other methods.

That is because of a complicated thing about parties and elections in Kenya. It is widely assumed—and a recent opinion poll commissioned by South Consulting confirms this—that when it comes to 9 August most voters will decide how to cast their ballot on the basis of individual candidates and not which party they are standing for. Political parties in Kenya are often ephemeral, and people readily move from one to another. But that does not mean that political parties are irrelevant. They are symbolic markers with emotive associations – sometimes to particular ideas, sometimes to a particular regional base. ODM, for example, has been linked both with a commitment to constitutional reform and with the Luo community, most notably in Nyanza. So the local politician who wants to be a member of a county assembly will be relying mostly on their personal influence and popularity—but they know that if they get a nomination for a party which has that kind of emotive association, it will smoothen their path.

Disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out.

This means that multiple candidates vie for each possible nomination slot. In the past, that competition has always been expensive, as rival aspirants wooed voters with gifts. It occasionally turned violent, and often involved cheating. Primary elections in 2013 and 2017 were messy and chaotic, and were not certain to result in the selection of the candidate most likely to win the general election. From the point of view of the presidential candidates, there are real risks to the primary elections their parties or coalitions oversee: the reputational damage due to chaos and the awareness that local support might be lost if a disgruntled aspirant turns against the party.

This helps to explain why in 2022 many parties made use of direct nominations—variously dressed up as the operation of consensus or the result of mysterious “opinion polls” to identify the strongest candidate. What that really meant was an intensive process of promise-making and/or pressure to persuade some candidates to stand down. Where that did not work, and primaries still took place, the promise-making and bullying came afterwards—to stop disappointed aspirants from turning against the party and standing as independents. The consequence of all that top-down management was that the nominations saw much less open violence than in previous years.

So who won, and who lost, at the national level?

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates. That brings us to the big national winners and losers of the process. Odinga—and his ODM party—have come out rather bruised. They have been accused of nepotism, bribery and of ignoring local wishes. This is a particularly dangerous accusation for Odinga, as it plays into popular concerns that, following his “handshake” with President Kenyatta and his adoption as the candidate of the “establishment”, he is a “project” of wealthy and powerful individuals who wish to retain power through the backdoor after Kenyatta stands down having served two-terms in office. In the face of well-publicised claims that Odinga would be a “remote controlled president” doing the bidding of the Kenyatta family and their allies, the impression that the nominations were stage-managed from on high in an undemocratic process was the last thing Azimio needed.

Moreover, perhaps because Odinga seems to have been less active than his rival in personally intervening to mollify aggrieved local politicians, the ODM nominations process seems to have left more of a mess. That was compounded by complications in the Azimio la Umoja/One Kenya Alliance Coalition Party (we’ll call it Azimio from now on, for convenience). Where Azimio “zoned”—that is, agreed on a single candidate from all its constituent parties—disappointed aspirants complained. Where it did not zone, and agreed to let each party nominate its own candidate for governor, MP and so on, then smaller parties in the coalition complained that they would face unfair competition come the general election. That is why the leaders of some of these smaller groups such as Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua made dramatic (or theatrical, depending on your view) announcements of their decision to leave Azimio and support Ruto.

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates.

So Ruto looks like a nomination winner. But his success comes with a big price tag. His interventions to placate disgruntled aspirants involved more than soothing words. A new government will have lots of goodies to distribute to supporters—positions in the civil service and parastatals, diplomatic roles, not to mention business opportunities of many kinds. But the bag of goodies is not bottomless, and it seems likely that a lot of promises have been made. Ruto’s undoubted talents as an organizer and deal-maker have been useful to him through the nominations—but those deals may prove expensive for him, and for Kenya, if he wins the presidential poll.

Money, politics, and the cost of campaigns

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword. In the short term, many of them will have saved considerable money: depending on exactly when the deal was done, they will have been spared some days of campaign expenses—no need to fuel cars, buy airtime for bloggers, pay for t-shirts and posters, and hand out cash. But that will be a brief respite. The disappointed rivals who have gone independent will make the campaigns harder for them—and likely more expensive. The belief that they were favoured by the party machinery may mean that voter expectations are higher when it comes to handouts and donations on the campaign trail. And the fact they were nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine their grass-roots legitimacy.

Others may experience a similar delayed effect. Among the short-term losers of the nominations will have been some of the “goons” who have played a prominent physical role in previous nominations: their muscular services were largely not required (although there were exceptions). The printers of posters and t-shirts will similarly have seen a disappointing nominations period (although surely they will have received enough early orders to keep them happy, especially where uncertainty over the nomination was very prolonged). The providers of billboard advertising may have seen a little less demand than they had hoped for, although they too seem to have done quite well from selling space to aspirants who—willingly or not—did not make it to the primaries. But where the general election will be fiercely contested, entrepreneurs will likely make up any lost ground as the campaigns get going. In these cases, competition has been postponed, not avoided.

Those in less competitive wards, constituencies or counties—the kind in which one party tends to dominate in the general election—are unlikely to be able to make up for lost time. These “one-party” areas may be in shorter supply in 2022 than in the past, due to the way that the control of specific leaders and alliances over the country’s former provinces has fragmented, but there will still be some races in which it is obvious who will win, and so the campaigns will be less heated.

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword.

More definite losers are the parties themselves. In some ways, we could say they did well as institutions, because they were spared the embarrassment of violent primaries. But the settling of many nominations without primaries meant not collecting nomination fees from aspirants in some cases, and refunding them in others. That will have cost parties a chunk of money, which they won’t get back. That may not affect the campaigns much—the money for campaigns flows in opaque and complex ways that may not touch the parties themselves. But it will affect the finances of the parties as organizations, which are often more than a little fragile.

Are the losers actually the biggest winners?

Some losers, however, are really big winners. Think about those candidates who would not have won competitive primaries but were strong enough to be able to credibly complain that they had been hard done by due to the decision to select a rival in a direct process. In many cases, these individuals were able to extract considerable concessions in return for the promise not to contest as independents, and so disrupt their coalition’s best laid plans. This means that many of the losers—who may well have been defeated anyway—walked away with the promise of a post-election reward without the expense and bother of having to campaign up until the polls.

It is hard not to suspect that some of them might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn. In fact, some of them may have been aiming at this all along. For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome. Instead of spending the next three months in an exhausting round of funerals, fund-raisers and rallies, constantly worrying about whether they have enough fifty (or larger) shilling notes to hand out and avoiding answering their phones, they can sit back and wait for their parastatal appointment, ambassadorship, or business opportunity.

For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome.

For these individuals, the biggest worry now is not their popularity or campaign, but simply the risk that their coalition might not win the presidential election, rendering the promises they have received worthless. Those whose wishes come true will be considerably more fortunate—and financially better off—than their colleagues who made it through the nominations but fall at the final hurdle of the general election.

Separating the winners of the nominations process from the losers may therefore be harder than it seems.

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Politics

Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.

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The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

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Politics

Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.

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“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

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