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ANIMAL FARMS: How Uganda Killed its Agricultural Sector

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ANIMAL FARMS: How Uganda Killed its Agricultural Sector
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In addition to loans, both external and internal, plus arrears owed to suppliers (known as domestic arrears), Uganda’s debt burden is being augmented by a steadily increasing stream of court awards against the government. The judgment debt comprises awards and compensation for state-inflicted violence, unlawful occupation of property by the armed forces and others, non-payment for services and using services with the full knowledge that the government is unable to pay for them.

Indications are that in addition to aggressive new taxation policies (e.g. the taxes on digital cash transfers and social media use), the Ugandan government has been dealing with its financially precarious position by withholding payment for goods and services supplied. However, this ends up costing more in the long run when suppliers file suits and are awarded damages with interest.

Judgment debt arrears (not to be confused with domestic debt arrears) go back many years and had reached UGX648 billion (US$170 million) by July 2016. The Treasury releases UGX4 billion a month to be shared out among claimants prioritised according to a formula devised by the Ministry of Justice. Because much of the judgment debt is awarded with interest, the longer government takes to pay, the greater the debt.

At the end of the day, the biggest loser to government corruption and incompetence is the smallholder farmer who is also the largest contributor to Uganda’s hard currency earnings. Smallholder-produced coffee is still Uganda’s leading foreign currency earner. Yet farmers are the most negatively impacted by the government’s failure to provide appropriate agricultural interventions, such as advisory support and post-harvest technologies.

The lawsuits against the state arise from two main sources; criminality and incompetence. The criminality includes multiple unlawful seizures of property from citizens both officially and by officials for their own benefit. Vehicles are also unlawfully impounded by the police. Compensation for the victims of police and army brutality, including torture, robbery, shooting, unlawful detention and malicious prosecution, accounts for 32% of the judgment debt arrears. The debt will grow as land grabs and state violence increase and the perpetrators continue to enjoy the support of “development” partners, such as DfID (UK), Danida (Denmark), Sida (Sweden), Norad (Norway), Ireland, Austria, USAID, IFAD, the Africa Development Bank and the European Investment Bank, among others.

At the end of the day, the biggest loser to government corruption and incompetence is the smallholder farmer who is also the largest contributor to Uganda’s hard currency earnings. Smallholder-produced coffee is still Uganda’s leading foreign currency earner. Yet farmers are the most negatively impacted by the government’s failure to provide appropriate agricultural interventions, such as advisory support and post-harvest technologies.

Some of the awards reflect the times in which we live: land has been appropriated for the settlement of refugees and for use by UN peacekeepers. State crimes have included armed robbery and theft by the armed forces and slave trafficking of women to Iraq by Uganda Veterans Development Ltd, a company set up to help army veterans. There are law suits for breach of contract caused by procurements gone wrong — the Standard Gauge Railway suit was shelved but the eventual settlement will still be a cost to the public.

Authenticity issues

Incompetence has given rise to many cases of breach of contract. The fact that goods and services are still bought on credit can only mean that if procedures are being followed, either Treasury releases of cash are diverted or that government business cannot continue within the IMF–approved resource envelope and accounting officers continue to rely on credit knowing it cannot be repaid.

Much of the judgment debt is for non–payment for goods and services on the grounds of insufficient funds i.e. it comes from domestic arrears. Therefore, existing domestic arrears are potential judgment debts if the suppliers sue. Domestic arrears payable to suppliers stand at UGX1 trillion (US$267 million).

This writer has covered the debt industry elsewhere (also known as “air supply”). Suffice it is to say here, just as the burgeoning salary arrears in the 1990s pointed to the payroll ghost employees industry, so escalating domestic arrears suggest an element of fraud. It has been found in the past that fictitious billings and other claims can be made and are approved for payment by colluding officials who then share the proceeds with the “supplier”. Therefore, domestic arrears need to be verified by an audit.

It is arguable that for Parliament to regularise illegitimate debt – debt incurred with the knowledge that funds for repayment are unlikely to be found – with supplementary budgets is unconstitutional as it defeats the whole purpose of the budget process. Meanwhile, amounts awarded against the government in new judgments continue to escalate. This is partly due to the increase in land-grabbing cases for which compensation is high. The Ministry of Justice states: “UGX249bn in FY 2012/13 to over UGX.865bn at the end of FY 2015/16. The contingent liability of Government against uncompleted civil matters (ongoing cases) is estimated at UGX.4.2 Trillion.”

According to a manual record seen, the total provision for claims for the period 2011–2013 was US$9,168,111,441. These are US dollar expenses incurred by suppliers. (Note that since the first draft of this article in April this year, the shilling has fallen against the dollar from 1:3,696 to 1:3,819, increasing the dollar debt by UGX1,127,677,707,243 in just four months.) It is unclear if these figures include the US$10 billion judgment of the International Court of Justice awarded against Uganda for the unlawful invasion and subsequent looting and pillaging of Eastern Congo by the Ugandan army. The ICJ debt is greater than the US$8 billion owed on loans.

The Treasury has made some changes in 2018. For example, rather than the Ministry of Justice being responsible for the payment of awards, the responsibility has been decentralised so that the ministry, department or agency (MDA) committing the offense must cover it from its own budget. That means the MDA must estimate the likelihood of such eventualities and manage staff and finances in a manner that reduces the likelihood of successful claims against it.

Additionally, legal reform has made arbitration compulsory. This means that claimants must now attempt to reach an agreement with the government before filing a suit. The process can take years. While this makes sense for contractual breaches, it may not sit well with victims of, say, unlawful eviction, land theft, trafficking and police brutality who may need quicker relief and want their day in court. Close to half of the awards arising in the years 2011–2013 were against the police and army. Fourteen per cent are land-related.

The state could go further and pin accountability on individual employees. Offending officials and support staff could be made to contribute to awards from their pensions and gratuities.

Mismanagement of the agricultural sector

What we learn from scrutinising judgment debt and domestic arrears is that debt generally must not be considered in isolation from the need for competence in public administration. Poor planning, abdication of responsibility to foreign entities and the lack of accountability are behind the need to borrow even for day-to-day government business. They drive soaring judgment debt and staggering levels of domestic arrears. The management of the agricultural sector, the backbone of the economy, serves as a good example.

Not unlike the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) debacle that cost the government a loan of US$54 million and co-financing from the International Fund for Agricultural Development and other donors of US$52 million, a Ministry of Agriculture milk programme ended in tears for some, massive financial loss to the state, and swirling suspicions about corruption.

Under the milk scheme, the farmers of Fort Portal, Bundibugyo (80% of the local population) and nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo were allocated two cooling plants by the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Industries. One was located in Ntoroko, a good one and a half to two hours of off-road driving from the milk producers of Fort Portal and Bundibugyo.

Not unlike the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) debacle that cost the government a loan of US$54 million and co-financing from the International Fund for Agricultural Development and other donors of US$52 million, a Ministry of Agriculture milk programme ended in tears for some, massive financial loss to the state, and swirling suspicions about corruption.

It may have been that the objective was to provide a source of income for this new district, but when visited by Uganda Radio Network reporters in 2008, the Ntoroko chiller, pasteuriser, packaging machine and generator seemed never to have been used and were covered in dust, cobwebs and rust. Some farmers interviewed were unaware that there was such a thing as a milk processing plant in Ntoroko. The consensus among producers was that the plant was too far. Milk was normally transported in small quantities by bicycle or ordinary pick-up trucks to Karugutu Trading Centre on the Fort Portal-Bundibugyo highway where it was sold.

The district agricultural officer of Ntoroko denied claims regarding the inappropriate location giving the reason for the plant’s falling to disuse as the “laziness” of the farmers who were unwilling to travel to Ntoroko.

Two suppliers of milk processing equipment, Capital Venture International Ltd and Charm Uganda Ltd, eventually sued the government for expenses they incurred in storing and securing 34 coolers for a protracted period while the equipment remained idle. The record shows claims of US$405,448 and US$383,273, respectively. UGX 2,366,163,000 in total were provided for the claims. The farmers, meanwhile, were still being left stuck with extra unsold milk for lack of buyers with cooling facilities. (Buyers will not buy milk they cannot sell immediately or preserve).

It was left to the Catholic Church to intervene in Masaka. The Catholic Diocesan Development Organisation (Maddo) established a milk collection centre at Kirimya on the outskirts of Masaka town, one of six such centres planned. In 2014, the government of the Netherlands supported the Uganda Crane Creameries Cooperative Union (in Ankole and Kigezi) by providing half the cost of cooling equipment so that farmers providing the other half could test milk quality in laboratories and chill and otherwise manage their product without being beholden to processing plants that underpaid them. In 2016 a foreign investor installed a milk processing plant worth US$13 million in Kiruhura, Western region.

Corruption was proved in the case of the government intervention. The government’s activities in milk production have yet to be comprehensively probed. In their report on NAADS, the World Bank suggested it was a potentially workable scheme derailed by interference from the President. He allegedly transformed an advisory service into a farm inputs give-away scheme (Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) report on NAADS, March 22, 2011). The main beneficiaries turned out to be the elite and not the poor farmers it was intended to assist (“elite capture”). After the project, the evaluation team found only “negligible” improvements in farming operations and gave it an overall “moderately unsatisfactory” rating.

Despite the shortage of cash for development, give-aways continue. President Museveni’s latest in the agricultural sector is to one Dr. Ahmed Eltigani Al Mansourie, an Emirati who is about to demonstrate how a single heifer can produce 50 high-yield milk calves. He has been given 27 square miles of Ugandan territory for free on which this feat is to be performed. Post-demonstration, it is unclear to whom the livestock and the land will belong. In the State of the Nation address of 2018, the youth were invited to approach “us” for grain milling equipment. It is pledges such as these that undermine financial planning and give rise to debt.

Another intervention in the agricultural sector was the provision of rice hulling facilities. The supplier, Charm Uganda, sued for non-payment. In addition to the balance on the price, the firm was awarded UGX50 million in damages – money that could have gone towards improving the lives of farmers.

It does not augur well for the economy that the Ministry of Agriculture is a major serial offender. It has been sued for non-payment for construction of various infrastructure, such as a fish landing site, livestock markets and valley tanks.

The scale of non-payment of suppliers means either the budget is not fully funded and the government cannot function without credit or sharp practice, or that funds provided are diverted from their approved purpose. Or both.

The competence or otherwise of World Bank project designers and planners is also at issue here; critical errors were made in restructuring the agricultural sector. While planning to retrench the government’s agricultural support staff, the Bank planned to retrain them to deliver extension services privately. Although critical to the project’s success, the training did not take place as planned. The project also resulted in shortages of experienced extension staff.

The competence or otherwise of World Bank project designers and planners is also at issue here; critical errors were made in restructuring the agricultural sector.

Robbing smallholder farmers is a continuing tradition

The sale of the Dairy Corporation and other state enterprises continued the tradition of exploitation of smallholder farmers. It began when the colonial administration had a statutory monopoly on buying export commodities. A percentage of cotton and coffee sales was retained by the colonial administration. Farmers also paid export taxes levied on cotton and coffee, poll tax and other taxes. Farmers’ withheld earnings were purportedly insurance or enforced savings. They were supposed to be shared out among farmers during the years when the international price for the commodities fell.

In reality, the money was used to run the colonial administration, to build infrastructure and to bail Britain out before, during and after the Second World War. Britain held deposits of commodity assistance (also called price stabilisation) funds belonging to the colonies of as much as £1,200 million in 1957. They would have earned interest on those sums. (John Stonehouse MP, Commonwealth and Empire Resources debate, House of Commons, 1957).

So abundant were cotton and coffee revenues that the government was able to borrow against them to build the Nalubaale Dam and to service the loan. In 1955 the Uganda Coffee Price Assistance Fund stood at £15 million and the Cotton Price Assistance Fund at £20 million (the dam cost less than 15 million). Withdrawals of the funds for development required individual colonies to submit project proposals to the Colonial Office.

Smallholders continued to subsidise the government even after independence as the government maintained the monopoly on buying and exporting commodities. The revenues continued to be the major source of government finance. The monopoly was only abolished in the 1991 when production was no longer profitable and was being abandoned by farmers. The goose that laid the golden egg was finally dying. Below is a snapshot of the difference skimmed off farmers’ earnings.

Data source: Mukherjee. R, Uganda, an Historical Accident?: Class, Nation, State Formation, 1985
Data source: Mukherjee. R, Uganda, an Historical Accident?: Class, Nation, State Formation, 1985

Parastatals paid for with some of the farmers’ compulsory savings (shown in the above chart) have been sold by the state, leaving the sector with inadequate post-harvest facilities. The promised greater efficiency and broader service delivery have not materialised. The outcome of the privatisation of the Uganda Electricity Board, which resulted in higher subsidies being paid to the sector than before, puts paid to any lingering illusions about the benefits of divestiture under the structural adjustment programme.

Meanwhile, the latest available World Bank statistics show that undernourishment in Uganda is on an upward trend, having increased by 13 percentage points between 2006 and 2015. In the Kenya, Tanzania and Rwanda, where there is significant undernourishment, at least the percentage is slowly going down.

At the same time, Uganda’s farming population is now being encouraged to move to as yet non-existent urban areas. “The main growth will come by expanding the middle stratum of commercial farmers from the current 10% to 65% […] and reducing the smallholders from 85% to 25% by 2040.” (Uganda National Coffee Strategy 2040 Plan for 2015/16)

President Yoweri Museveni has been clear on his attitude towards smallholders: “One of the characteristics of backwardness is to have more people in agriculture than in services.” He also asked heads of urban areas to promote and support industrialisation […] for wealth creation. […] establishment of factories will be facilitated by development of infrastructure.”

President Yoweri Museveni has been clear on his attitude towards smallholders: “One of the characteristics of backwardness is to have more people in agriculture than in services.” He also asked heads of urban areas to promote and support industrialisation […] for wealth creation. […] establishment of factories will be facilitated by development of infrastructure.”

The plan is to consolidate smallholdings to large, modern, commercial and most likely foreign-owned GMO farms because, to use the latest catch-phrase, what the economy needs is “farmers” not “diggers”. Could it be that the government has finally given up on the 80% of Ugandans who live in rural areas?

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Mary Serumaga is a Ugandan essayist, graduated in Law from King's College, London, and attained an Msc in Intelligent Management Systems from the Southbank. Her work in civil service reform in East Africa lead to an interest in the nature of public service in Africa and the political influences under which it is delivered.

Politics

Who Won Kenya’s “Nominations”?

Being nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine grass-roots legitimacy but it is hard not to suspect that some of the losers in the nominations process might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn.

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Who Won Kenya’s “Nominations”?
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Who won Kenya’s “nominations”, the tense and often unpredictable political process through which parties select which candidates they want to represent them in the general election scheduled for 9 August? That may sound like a silly question. Social media is full of photographs of smiling candidate clutching their certificates of nomination—surely we need to look no further for the winners?

But maybe we do. Beyond the individual candidates in the contests for nominations, there are other winners. One may be obvious: it seems the general feeling is that Deputy President William Ruto came out better from the nominations than did his principal rival in the presidential race, former opposition leader Raila Odinga—about which more below. However, for some, coming out on top in the nominations may prove a poisoned chalice. Where nominations are seen to have been illegitimate, candidates are likely to find that losing rivals who stand as independents may be locally popular and may gain sympathy votes, making it harder for party candidates to win the general election. This means that there are often some less obvious winners and losers.

One reason for this is that nominations shape how voters think about the parties and who they want to give their vote to, come the general election. Research that we conducted in 2017, including a nationally representative survey of public opinion on these issues, found that citizens who felt that their party’s nomination process had not been legitimate were less likely to say that they would vote in the general election. In other words, disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out. In 2017, this appeared to disadvantage Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), whose nomination process was generally seen to have been more problematic—although whether this is because they were, or rather because this is how they were depicted by the media, is hard to say.

In the context of a tight election in 2022, popular perceptions of how the nominations were managed may therefore be as significant for who “wins” and “loses” as the question of which individuals secured the party ticket.

Why do parties dread nominations?

The major parties dreaded the nominations process—dreaded it so much, in fact, that despite all their bold words early on about democracy and the popular choice (and despite investments in digital technology and polling staff), most of the parties tried pretty hard to avoid primary elections as a way of deciding on their candidates. In some cases that avoidance was complete: the Jubilee party gave direct nominations to all those who will stand in its name. Other parties held some primaries—Ruto’s United Democratic Alliance (UDA) seems to have managed most—but in many cases they turned to other methods.

That is because of a complicated thing about parties and elections in Kenya. It is widely assumed—and a recent opinion poll commissioned by South Consulting confirms this—that when it comes to 9 August most voters will decide how to cast their ballot on the basis of individual candidates and not which party they are standing for. Political parties in Kenya are often ephemeral, and people readily move from one to another. But that does not mean that political parties are irrelevant. They are symbolic markers with emotive associations – sometimes to particular ideas, sometimes to a particular regional base. ODM, for example, has been linked both with a commitment to constitutional reform and with the Luo community, most notably in Nyanza. So the local politician who wants to be a member of a county assembly will be relying mostly on their personal influence and popularity—but they know that if they get a nomination for a party which has that kind of emotive association, it will smoothen their path.

Disputed and controversial nomination processes can encourage voters to stay away from the general election, making it harder for leaders to get their vote out.

This means that multiple candidates vie for each possible nomination slot. In the past, that competition has always been expensive, as rival aspirants wooed voters with gifts. It occasionally turned violent, and often involved cheating. Primary elections in 2013 and 2017 were messy and chaotic, and were not certain to result in the selection of the candidate most likely to win the general election. From the point of view of the presidential candidates, there are real risks to the primary elections their parties or coalitions oversee: the reputational damage due to chaos and the awareness that local support might be lost if a disgruntled aspirant turns against the party.

This helps to explain why in 2022 many parties made use of direct nominations—variously dressed up as the operation of consensus or the result of mysterious “opinion polls” to identify the strongest candidate. What that really meant was an intensive process of promise-making and/or pressure to persuade some candidates to stand down. Where that did not work, and primaries still took place, the promise-making and bullying came afterwards—to stop disappointed aspirants from turning against the party and standing as independents. The consequence of all that top-down management was that the nominations saw much less open violence than in previous years.

So who won, and who lost, at the national level?

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates. That brings us to the big national winners and losers of the process. Odinga—and his ODM party—have come out rather bruised. They have been accused of nepotism, bribery and of ignoring local wishes. This is a particularly dangerous accusation for Odinga, as it plays into popular concerns that, following his “handshake” with President Kenyatta and his adoption as the candidate of the “establishment”, he is a “project” of wealthy and powerful individuals who wish to retain power through the backdoor after Kenyatta stands down having served two-terms in office. In the face of well-publicised claims that Odinga would be a “remote controlled president” doing the bidding of the Kenyatta family and their allies, the impression that the nominations were stage-managed from on high in an undemocratic process was the last thing Azimio needed.

Moreover, perhaps because Odinga seems to have been less active than his rival in personally intervening to mollify aggrieved local politicians, the ODM nominations process seems to have left more of a mess. That was compounded by complications in the Azimio la Umoja/One Kenya Alliance Coalition Party (we’ll call it Azimio from now on, for convenience). Where Azimio “zoned”—that is, agreed on a single candidate from all its constituent parties—disappointed aspirants complained. Where it did not zone, and agreed to let each party nominate its own candidate for governor, MP and so on, then smaller parties in the coalition complained that they would face unfair competition come the general election. That is why the leaders of some of these smaller groups such as Machakos Governor Alfred Mutua made dramatic (or theatrical, depending on your view) announcements of their decision to leave Azimio and support Ruto.

Despite all the back-room deal-making, top-down political management was not especially successful in soothing the feelings of those who did not come out holding certificates.

So Ruto looks like a nomination winner. But his success comes with a big price tag. His interventions to placate disgruntled aspirants involved more than soothing words. A new government will have lots of goodies to distribute to supporters—positions in the civil service and parastatals, diplomatic roles, not to mention business opportunities of many kinds. But the bag of goodies is not bottomless, and it seems likely that a lot of promises have been made. Ruto’s undoubted talents as an organizer and deal-maker have been useful to him through the nominations—but those deals may prove expensive for him, and for Kenya, if he wins the presidential poll.

Money, politics, and the cost of campaigns

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword. In the short term, many of them will have saved considerable money: depending on exactly when the deal was done, they will have been spared some days of campaign expenses—no need to fuel cars, buy airtime for bloggers, pay for t-shirts and posters, and hand out cash. But that will be a brief respite. The disappointed rivals who have gone independent will make the campaigns harder for them—and likely more expensive. The belief that they were favoured by the party machinery may mean that voter expectations are higher when it comes to handouts and donations on the campaign trail. And the fact they were nominated rather than selected by party members may undermine their grass-roots legitimacy.

Others may experience a similar delayed effect. Among the short-term losers of the nominations will have been some of the “goons” who have played a prominent physical role in previous nominations: their muscular services were largely not required (although there were exceptions). The printers of posters and t-shirts will similarly have seen a disappointing nominations period (although surely they will have received enough early orders to keep them happy, especially where uncertainty over the nomination was very prolonged). The providers of billboard advertising may have seen a little less demand than they had hoped for, although they too seem to have done quite well from selling space to aspirants who—willingly or not—did not make it to the primaries. But where the general election will be fiercely contested, entrepreneurs will likely make up any lost ground as the campaigns get going. In these cases, competition has been postponed, not avoided.

Those in less competitive wards, constituencies or counties—the kind in which one party tends to dominate in the general election—are unlikely to be able to make up for lost time. These “one-party” areas may be in shorter supply in 2022 than in the past, due to the way that the control of specific leaders and alliances over the country’s former provinces has fragmented, but there will still be some races in which it is obvious who will win, and so the campaigns will be less heated.

Those who “won” by being directly nominated to their desired positions may also come to see this process as something of a double-edged sword.

More definite losers are the parties themselves. In some ways, we could say they did well as institutions, because they were spared the embarrassment of violent primaries. But the settling of many nominations without primaries meant not collecting nomination fees from aspirants in some cases, and refunding them in others. That will have cost parties a chunk of money, which they won’t get back. That may not affect the campaigns much—the money for campaigns flows in opaque and complex ways that may not touch the parties themselves. But it will affect the finances of the parties as organizations, which are often more than a little fragile.

Are the losers actually the biggest winners?

Some losers, however, are really big winners. Think about those candidates who would not have won competitive primaries but were strong enough to be able to credibly complain that they had been hard done by due to the decision to select a rival in a direct process. In many cases, these individuals were able to extract considerable concessions in return for the promise not to contest as independents, and so disrupt their coalition’s best laid plans. This means that many of the losers—who may well have been defeated anyway—walked away with the promise of a post-election reward without the expense and bother of having to campaign up until the polls.

It is hard not to suspect that some of them might feel a little bit relieved at this out-turn. In fact, some of them may have been aiming at this all along. For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome. Instead of spending the next three months in an exhausting round of funerals, fund-raisers and rallies, constantly worrying about whether they have enough fifty (or larger) shilling notes to hand out and avoiding answering their phones, they can sit back and wait for their parastatal appointment, ambassadorship, or business opportunity.

For those with limited resources and uncertain prospects at the ballot, the opportunity to stand down in favour of another candidate may have been pretty welcome.

For these individuals, the biggest worry now is not their popularity or campaign, but simply the risk that their coalition might not win the presidential election, rendering the promises they have received worthless. Those whose wishes come true will be considerably more fortunate—and financially better off—than their colleagues who made it through the nominations but fall at the final hurdle of the general election.

Separating the winners of the nominations process from the losers may therefore be harder than it seems.

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Politics

Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.

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The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

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Politics

Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.

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Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement
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“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

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