Connect with us


UGANDA: The Kennedy Doctrine – Matching Debt with Greed instead of Need



African anger
Download PDFPrint Article

A lot has changed since 1960. More than ten African countries gained independence in that year alone, and more than ten more were independent by 1966. It was a time of great expectations. The United States has been through eleven presidents since President Eisenhower first formulated a foreign policy for Africa. The one important constant has been Africa’s growing indebtedness and enduring inability to pay the debts.

April 1960, State Department, Washington D.C, USA

On April 7, 1960, a meeting was convened by President Eisenhower’s Under Secretary of State, C. Dillon, to discuss American policy in sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on what they called “assistance” to emerging African nations. What is immediately clear from the memorandum of that conversation is that even then, there was competition to “assist” in the development of Africa.

The American administration had been trying since 1958 to forge links with newly independent African countries as they were born. The difficulty was that all these approaches had to be very subtle so as not to offend the former colonial powers. The British still had trade agreements with former colonies and sought new ones that would secure them continued access to cheap commodities. The French, well, the French had an arrangement whereby they offered their colonies greater autonomy in the form of indigenous legislature in return for military and trade rights.

In line with their new foreign policy, the Americans offered Guinea 150 scholarships. So when Guinea opted for full independence rather than membership in the French communaute, she was ostracised by Europe and the Americans were left with the scholarships and no relations with Guinea. The meeting of April 1960 was convened in part to address this potential source of tension between Europe and America. The meeting’s memorandum is self-explanatory:

‘Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs]Satterthwaite set the scene and outlined the events leading to the present meeting; he said that AF’s [State Department Bureau of African Affairs] problem was epitomised by the situation in Guinea, which illustrates the numerous frustrations involved and the dangers of subordinating United States policy to that of the former mother country [….]

‘The Secretary of Treasury had urged that the United States seek maximum effort from the European countries to assist their former dependencies. If the European countries did not supply their needs or if the African territories were unwilling to accept aid from the former metropoles [former colonial powers], and if additional aid were needed, Mr Dillon felt all agencies in NSC [National Security Council] were agreed that the US should fill the gap[….]

‘Mr Dillon…. urged the NSC, in its concentration on language, not to overlook the great political importance of the African area and the vital challenge from the Soviet bloc countries.”

It was only after President Kennedy signed the National Security Action No. 16 in 1961 that the National Security Council policy was altered “to provide flexibility (emphasis added) for the United States to supplement Western European support for newly-independent areas whenever such actions is (SIC) in the United States’ interest.” From that point on, officials were no longer required to tiptoe around British and European officials before intervening on the African continent.

Back in 1960, the ways and means of securing access to Africa’s natural resources were still being explored. It appears from the April 7 discussion that one approach was to tie Africa to the USA by means of indebtedness.

Dillon had raised a problem in another area though: The perceived threat from the Soviet bloc. In 1960, as they do today, the Chinese presented a threat to American interests in Africa. Sekou Touré, the president of Guinea, had turned to the Eastern Bloc for development cooperation. Then as now, the Chinese gained the upper hand over the West by imposing no conditionalities on cooperation.

Satterthwaite had noted this in his opening remarks:

“[Satterthwaite] stressed the need to simplify our aid procedures, and noted the extreme difficulty in obtaining African countrie’ concurrence to ICA [International Cooperation Administration] umbrella agreements when ‘the Chinese ask for no privileges for their people’. This was one reason for the long delays in trying to carry out our modest offer of 150 scholarships to Guinea.’

 “Assistance”, a code word for access to cheap commodities

The main item on the agenda was not really assistance; it was, and still is, commodities.

“Mr Dillon mentioned that ICA had set up a special group to work out a coordinated programme for Africa, including the question of stationing ICA officers in consular posts in Africa. He indicated his readiness to agree after the problem had been thought out.

Mr Dillon mentioned Recommendation 7 in Mr. Satterthwaite’s memorandum of March 30, ‘Means of assuring friendly single community [commodity] countries a ready market for their exports at reasonable and stable prices’. While not minimizing the difficulties, he thought we should look into this to see what could be done; he mentioned coffee as an example.”

By 1973, Richard Nixon’s Administration was ready to spell it out. A memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) dated July 19, 1973 reads thus:

“There is insufficient awareness in the United States of the importance to us of Africa’s natural resources. Africa has significant quantities of the world’s reserves of phosphate rock, copper, cobalt, and other minerals. Africa’s iron ore reserves are twice those of the United States and two-thirds those of the USSR. Libya and Nigeria are among the top oil producing countries of the world. Algeria produces great quantities of natural gas. Access to these resources is important to the United States and to other friendly powers. With the spread of industrialization, these resources will become increasingly critical.

Back in 1960, the ways and means of securing access to Africa’s natural resources were still being explored. It appears from the April 7 discussion that one approach was to tie Africa to the USA by means of indebtedness. A number of memoranda of the period mention the Development Loan Fund (DLF). This American state-owned bank was not at that time as active as the administration wished and was often ruefully discussed as a potential engine for acquiring leverage in Africa.

A feasibility study by the World Bank might have shown that two parallel projects were not required, but only if the objective of borrowing and lending is development. If, on the other hand, the objective is merely to deepen indebtedness, the $10 million loan makes perfect sense.

Tanzania (then Tanganyika) presented an opportunity. A highway was being built in that country with local resources. At the April meeting, it was suggested, in the absence of a request from Tanganyika (none was referred to) and without evidence of a feasibility study or any other pre-loan procedures having taken place, that Tanganyika should meet only local costs from their own resources and borrow the rest from the American Development Loan Fund:

For example, it had been found that Tanganyika was covering both foreign and local currency costs of a highway. It was believed that the DLF could handle foreign currency costs on the two sections of the highway and that Tanganyika could cover local currency expenses on both sections.”

Later on,

“Mr Dillon agreed with Recommendation 10 of Mr Satterthwaite’s paper, that we should encourage the African countries to become members of the IMF, IBRD, and IDA.”

February 2017, Ministry of Finance, Kampala, Uganda

The memorandum of April 7, 1960, came to mind recently when Uganda was reported in the local media as having accepted an unnecessary loan from the World Bank. It was for the purpose of assisting with the development of a One Stop Shop as a vehicle for promoting foreign direct and other investment. Because potential investors have often cited complicated procedures for setting up a business as a barrier to investment, the Uganda Investment Authority came up with the idea of a web-based centre where an investor could carry out all the procedures online and under one roof, so to speak. They called it a One Stop Centre.

A sum of Ush1.6 billion (US$457,142), which was on hand, was reportedly set aside for the purpose and the Uganda Investment Authority commissioned a foreign expert to do the work. As it neared completion, (the Secretary to the Treasury is quoted as having said the work was 80% done), a World Bank loan materialised for the development of a One Stop Shop under a separate project run by the Ministry of Finance: The Competitiveness Enterprise Development Project (CEDP) slated to run from 2013 to 2019 had US$100 million (Ush359.9 billion) allocated to it, with the One Stop Shop component costing $10 million (Ush36 billion).

According to media reports, which the World Bank declined to confirm or deny when contacted, when the time came to account for the loan, the Ministry of Finance sought to present the Investment Authority’s project as evidence of their having implemented the One Stop Shop. This meant transferring the original facility, the UIA’s One Stop Centre project to the Ministry of Finance. By all accounts, the ensuing scenes were not pretty. The head of state is said to have stepped in, rejected the new project and insisted that the UIA Centre go ahead to completion using local resources.

Any casual observer of Ugandan public affairs will have formed the impression that the amounts of public funds lost through corruption and procurement fraud have grown in frequency and magnitude since 1992.

A feasibility study by the World Bank might have shown that two parallel projects were not required, but it would only have influenced their decision if the objective of borrowing and lending is development. If, on the other hand, the objective is merely to deepen indebtedness, the US$10 million loan makes perfect sense.

The World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Uganda

A look at the overall World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2011 – 2015 throws some light on the seeming absurdity of the CEDP/Uganda Investment Authority saga. Its overall objective (similar to the earlier CAS in the area of service delivery) was “to create an enabling environment for private sector-led growth by improving the business environment, strengthening physical infrastructure and human capital and raising the functioning of public sector institutions and their capacity for service delivery.”

The CEDP was evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank in 2016. As with so many economic recovery and development projects in Uganda, the project was found to have been hampered by poor governance. The Completion Learning Report (CLR) states,”…the major challenge lay in the area of governance, with the extent of progress in reducing patronage and corruption being unclear.”

Measures were put in place to mitigate this known risk and protect the investment in the form of regular reviews of government progress in addressing governance issues. However, to quote the report, “the CLR does not provide any information on how regularly these reviews were undertaken and what impact they had on mitigating risks to the Bank’s programme.”

The project evaluation ratings should therefore come as no surprise:

  • Progress in Focus Area IV: Improve Good Governance and Value for Money is rated: Moderately Unsatisfactory.
  • Objective 11: Increased transparency and efficiency of public financial management and public procurement at national and local level: Partially Achieved.
  • Objective 12: Strengthened public sector management and accountability at national and local level: Mostly Achieved.

One might want to argue with the ratings for project objectives 11 and 12. No framework for assessing improvement in these areas was provided, and on close examination, the ratings look to be pure fiction.

Any casual observer of Ugandan public affairs will have formed the impression that losses of public funds through corruption and procurement fraud have grown in frequency and magnitude since 1992. There is ample evidence in the latest report from the Office of the Auditor General (2015/2016) that it is still a major problem.

African countries have two options: to continue to implement development strategies that began in the early 1960s and before, and which have yet to meet the basic needs of their citizens, such as electricity and piped water in all homes by halting the haemorrhage of funds through the servicing of non-performing loans.

The Auditor General lists serious audit concerns that have been recurring in the area of financial management and procurement since at least 1992 when the Economic and Financial Management Programme (EFMP) was launched, at great expense, to increase transparency, efficiency and accountability in the public sector. Irregularities included payroll fraud, pension payments unsupported by documentation, procurement irregularities, lack of accountability in the use of public funds, and so on.

EFMP was followed by the equally costly EFMP Phase II that revisited the same objectives. After that capacity building programmes, again with financial management components, have been carried out in the agriculture and health sectors, while local government capacity building has also been funded by loans. In spite of all the above, public financial management, procurement capacity and quality of service delivery have deteriorated while the number of local authorities has grown from 27 to over 200.

In the last financial year, a number of local authorities were unable to utilise a combined total of Ush94.78 billion (US$26.4 million) in Capacity Building Infrastructure Development funds transferred to them from the central government owing to a lack of expertise in procuring specialised equipment and services for surveying, engineering and environmental works. US$26 million is 17 per cent of the Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development Programme’s capacity-building loan of $150 million. It is clear that the country is choking on loans while thirsting for basic services.

Elsewhere in the CLR, the World Bank itself notes that eight out of the twelve objectives of their Country Assistance Strategy were either only partially achieved or not achieved at all. The overall Development Outcome of the strategy is rated as “Moderately Unsatisfactory.” Curiously, the Bank’s performance is rated “Fair”, with only four out of twelve development objectives met. When is a project considered a failure?

The Bank’s overall assessment is more credible in its conclusion that “weak compliance with safeguards affected project implementation and the delivery of results. A reason cited is “weak oversight on the part of the Bank.

The way forward

The US State Department’s agreed objective in 1960, which was to encourage African countries to borrow from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the Tanganyika example, in which a loan was agreed even without it being requested or given any formal appraisal, taken together with very poor implementation of the World Bank’s Assistance Strategy for Uganda, point to the conclusion that the objective of giving massive, unsustainable and poorly monitored loans and “normalising” project failure is to perpetuate a relationship of indebtedness and not necessarily to promote development.

Alternatively Governments could go on lowering expectations and shift their focus from the reduction of poverty to the reduction of only absolute poverty. They could continue to endorse modest development goals, such as carrying 20 litres of water over a distance of 200 metres rather than a distance of 400 metres twice a day.

African countries have two options: to continue to implement development strategies that began in the early 1960s and before, and which have yet to meet the basic needs of their citizens, such as electricity and piped water in all homes by halting the haemorrhage of funds through the servicing of non-performing loans.

Alternatively Governments could go on lowering expectations and shift their focus from the reduction of poverty to the reduction of only absolute poverty. They could continue to endorse modest development goals, such as carrying 20 litres of water over a distance of 200 metres rather than a distance of 400 metres twice a day.

All outstanding public loans need to be audited. Those that are found to have been nugatory expenditure (regardless of the lenders’ own self-ratings) should be repudiated. This includes any which were wasted by leaders who are themselves enabled by World Bank negligence in the design, planning and oversight of their projects.

Uganda’s progress is often contrasted with Malaysia’s owing to similar colonial histories and deriving much of their incomes from the export of raw materials during that time and on in to the 1970s. Like Uganda Malaysia has offered incentives for local and foreign direct investment such as tax holidays and duty free imports of raw materials and capital equipment. Malaysia managed to implement a national development plan focused on import substitution without coercion while Uganda turns initiatives such as these in to discouraging financial scandals. The Auditor-General’s last report questioned a tax holiday granted to a hotelier to which, he said, there was no end in sight. The government has been covering the investor’s tax obligations for the past five years. Last year the country failed to collect royalties on gold exported from her new refinery, the loss was between USD 1.9 million and 9.7 million.

Uganda is more usefully compared and contrasted with other countries with similar histories of endemic corruption and incompetence. In developing strategies for self-sufficiency we would do better to take as our model two countries that managed to increase their food yields, health care coverage and school enrolment without World Bank loans: Sankara’s Burkina Faso and Castro’s Cuba.


Support The Elephant.

The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.

Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.


Mary Serumaga is a Ugandan essayist, graduated in Law from King's College, London, and attained an Msc in Intelligent Management Systems from the Southbank. Her work in civil service reform in East Africa lead to an interest in the nature of public service in Africa and the political influences under which it is delivered.


Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.



Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning
Download PDFPrint Article

The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

Continue Reading


Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.



Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement
Download PDFPrint Article

“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

Continue Reading


The Murang’a Factor in the Upcoming Presidential Elections

The Murang’a people are really yet to decide who they are going to vote for as a president. If they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves. Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Can Jimi Wanjigi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction?



The Murang’a Factor in the Upcoming Presidential Elections
Download PDFPrint Article

In the last quarter of 2021, I visited Murang’a County twice: In September, we were in Kandiri in Kigumo constituency. We had gone for a church fundraiser and were hosted by the Anglican Church of Kenya’s (ACK), Kahariro parish, Murang’a South diocese. A month later, I was back, this time to Ihi-gaini deep in Kangema constituency for a burial.

The church function attracted politicians: it had to; they know how to sniff such occasions and if not officially invited, they gate-crash them. Church functions, just like funerals, are perfect platforms for politicians to exhibit their presumed piousness, generosity and their closeness to the respective clergy and the bereaved family.

Well, the other reason they were there, is because they had been invited by the Church leadership. During the electioneering period, the Church is not shy to exploit the politicians’ ambitions: they “blackmail” them for money, because they can mobilise ready audiences for the competing politicians. The politicians on the other hand, are very ready to part with cash. This quid pro quo arrangement is usually an unstated agreement between the Church leadership and the politicians.

The church, which was being fund raised for, being in Kigumo constituency, the area MP Ruth Wangari Mwaniki, promptly showed up. Likewise, the area Member of the County Assembly (MCA) and of course several aspirants for the MP and MCA seats, also showed up.

Church and secular politics often sit cheek by jowl and so, on this day, local politics was the order of the day. I couldn’t have speculated on which side of the political divide Murang’a people were, until the young man Zack Kinuthia Chief Administrative Secretary (CAS) for Sports, Culture and Heritage, took to the rostrum to speak.

A local boy and an Uhuru Kenyatta loyalist, he completely avoided mentioning his name and his “development track record” in central Kenya. Kinuthia has a habit of over-extolling President Uhuru’s virtues whenever and wherever he mounts any platform. By the time he was done speaking, I quickly deduced he was angling to unseat Wangari. I wasn’t wrong; five months later in February 2022, Kinuthia resigned his CAS position to vie for Kigumo on a Party of the National Unity (PNU) ticket.

He spoke briefly, feigned some meeting that was awaiting him elsewhere and left hurriedly, but not before giving his KSh50,000 donation. Apparently, I later learnt that he had been forewarned, ahead of time, that the people were not in a mood to listen to his panegyrics on President Uhuru, Jubilee Party, or anything associated to the two. Kinuthia couldn’t dare run on President Uhuru’s Jubilee Party. His patron-boss’s party is not wanted in Murang’a.

I spent the whole day in Kandiri, talking to people, young and old, men and women and by the time I was leaving, I was certain about one thing; The Murang’a folks didn’t want anything to do with President Uhuru. What I wasn’t sure of is, where their political sympathies lay.

I returned to Murang’a the following month, in the expansive Kangema – it is still huge – even after Mathioya was hived off from the larger Kangema constituency. Funerals provide a good barometer that captures peoples’ political sentiments and even though this burial was not attended by politicians – a few senior government officials were present though; political talk was very much on the peoples’ lips.

What I gathered from the crowd was that President Uhuru had destroyed their livelihood, remember many of the Nairobi city trading, hawking, big downtown real estate and restaurants are run and owned largely by Murang’a people. The famous Nyamakima trading area of downtown Nairobi has been run by Murang’a Kikuyus.

In 2018, their goods were confiscated and declared contrabrand by the government. Many of their businesses went under, this, despite the merchants not only, whole heartedly throwing their support to President Uhuru’s controversial re-election, but contributing handsomely to the presidential kitty. They couldn’t believe what was happening to them: “We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him.”

We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him

Last week, I attended a Murang’a County caucus group that was meeting somewhere in Gatundu, in Kiambu County. One of the clearest messages that I got from this group is that the GEMA vote in the August 9, 2022, presidential elections is certainly anti-Uhuru Kenyatta and not necessarily pro-William Ruto.

“The Murang’a people are really yet to decide, (if they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves) on who they are going to vote for as a president. And that’s why you see Uhuru is craftily courting us with all manner of promises, seductions and prophetic messages.” Two weeks ago, President Uhuru was in Murang’a attending an African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPCA) church function in Kandara constituency.

At the church, the president yet again threatened to “tell you what’s in my heart and what I believe and why so.” These prophecy-laced threats by the President, to the GEMA nation, in which he has been threatening to show them the sign, have become the butt of crude jokes among Kikuyus.

Corollary, President Uhuru once again has plucked Polycarp Igathe away from his corporate perch as Equity Bank’s Chief Commercial Officer back to Nairobi’s tumultuous governor seat politics. The first time the bespectacled Igathe was thrown into the deep end of the Nairobi murky politics was in 2017, as Mike Sonko’s deputy governor. After six months, he threw in the towel, lamenting that Sonko couldn’t let him even breathe.

Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people

“Igathe is from Wanjerere in Kigumo, Murang’a, but grew up in Ol Kalou, Nyandarua County,” one of the Mzees told me. “He’s not interested in politics; much less know how it’s played. I’ve spent time with him and confided in me as much. Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people. President Uhuru wants to use Igathe to control Nairobi. The sad thing is that Igathe doesn’t have the guts to tell Uhuru the brutal fact: I’m really not interested in all these shenanigans, leave me alone. The president is hoping, once again, to hopefully placate the Murang’a people, by pretending to front Igathe. I foresee another terrible disaster ultimately befalling both Igathe and Uhuru.”

Be that as it may, what I got away with from this caucus, after an entire day’s deliberations, is that its keeping it presidential choice close to its chest. My attempts to goad some of the men and women present were fruitless.

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest. Kiambu has produced two presidents from the same family, Nyeri one, President Mwai Kibaki, who died on April 22. The closest Murang’a came to giving the country a president was during Ken Matiba’s time in the 1990s. “But Matiba had suffered a debilitating stroke that incapacitated him,” said one of the mzees. “It was tragic, but there was nothing we could do.”

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest

It is interesting to note that Jimi Wanjigi, the Safina party presidential flagbearer is from Murang’a County. His family hails from Wahundura, in Mathioya constituency. Him and Mwangi wa Iria, the Murang’a County governor are the other two Murang’a prominent persons who have tossed themselves into the presidential race. Wa Iria’s bid which was announced at the beginning of 2022, seems to have stagnated, while Jimi’s seems to be gathering storm.

Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Jimi’s campaign team has crafted a two-pronged strategy that it hopes will endear Kenyans to his presidency. One, a generational, paradigm shift, especially among the youth, targeting mostly post-secondary, tertiary college and university students.

“We believe this group of voters who are basically between the ages of 18–27 years and who comprise more than 65 per cent of total registered voters are the key to turning this election,” said one of his presidential campaign team members. “It matters most how you craft the political message to capture their attention.” So, branding his key message as itwika, it is meant to orchestrate a break from past electoral behaviour that is pegged on traditional ethnic voting patterns.

The other plunk of Jimi’s campaign theme is economic emancipation, quite pointedly as it talks directly to the GEMA nation, especially the Murang’a Kikuyus, who are reputed for their business acumen and entrepreneurial skills. “What Kikuyus cherish most,” said the team member “is someone who will create an enabling business environment and leave the Kikuyus to do their thing. You know, Kikuyus live off business, if you interfere with it, that’s the end of your friendship, it doesn’t matter who you are.”

Can Jimi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction? As all the presidential candidates gear-up this week on who they will eventually pick as their running mates, the GEMA community once more shifts the spotlight on itself, as the most sought-after vote basket.

Both Raila Odinga and William Ruto coalitions – Azimio la Umoja-One Kenya and Kenya Kwanza Alliance – must seek to impress and woe Mt Kenya region by appointing a running mate from one of its ranks. If not, the coalitions fear losing the vote-rich area either to each other, or perhaps to a third party. Murang’a County, may as well, become the conundrum, with which the August 9, presidential race may yet to be unravelled and decided.

Continue Reading