Connect with us

Politics

UGANDA: The Kennedy Doctrine – Matching Debt with Greed instead of Need

Published

on

African anger
Download PDFPrint Article

A lot has changed since 1960. More than ten African countries gained independence in that year alone, and more than ten more were independent by 1966. It was a time of great expectations. The United States has been through eleven presidents since President Eisenhower first formulated a foreign policy for Africa. The one important constant has been Africa’s growing indebtedness and enduring inability to pay the debts.

April 1960, State Department, Washington D.C, USA

On April 7, 1960, a meeting was convened by President Eisenhower’s Under Secretary of State, C. Dillon, to discuss American policy in sub-Saharan Africa, with a focus on what they called “assistance” to emerging African nations. What is immediately clear from the memorandum of that conversation is that even then, there was competition to “assist” in the development of Africa.

The American administration had been trying since 1958 to forge links with newly independent African countries as they were born. The difficulty was that all these approaches had to be very subtle so as not to offend the former colonial powers. The British still had trade agreements with former colonies and sought new ones that would secure them continued access to cheap commodities. The French, well, the French had an arrangement whereby they offered their colonies greater autonomy in the form of indigenous legislature in return for military and trade rights.

In line with their new foreign policy, the Americans offered Guinea 150 scholarships. So when Guinea opted for full independence rather than membership in the French communaute, she was ostracised by Europe and the Americans were left with the scholarships and no relations with Guinea. The meeting of April 1960 was convened in part to address this potential source of tension between Europe and America. The meeting’s memorandum is self-explanatory:

‘Assistant Secretary [of State for African Affairs]Satterthwaite set the scene and outlined the events leading to the present meeting; he said that AF’s [State Department Bureau of African Affairs] problem was epitomised by the situation in Guinea, which illustrates the numerous frustrations involved and the dangers of subordinating United States policy to that of the former mother country [….]

‘The Secretary of Treasury had urged that the United States seek maximum effort from the European countries to assist their former dependencies. If the European countries did not supply their needs or if the African territories were unwilling to accept aid from the former metropoles [former colonial powers], and if additional aid were needed, Mr Dillon felt all agencies in NSC [National Security Council] were agreed that the US should fill the gap[….]

‘Mr Dillon…. urged the NSC, in its concentration on language, not to overlook the great political importance of the African area and the vital challenge from the Soviet bloc countries.”

It was only after President Kennedy signed the National Security Action No. 16 in 1961 that the National Security Council policy was altered “to provide flexibility (emphasis added) for the United States to supplement Western European support for newly-independent areas whenever such actions is (SIC) in the United States’ interest.” From that point on, officials were no longer required to tiptoe around British and European officials before intervening on the African continent.

Back in 1960, the ways and means of securing access to Africa’s natural resources were still being explored. It appears from the April 7 discussion that one approach was to tie Africa to the USA by means of indebtedness.

Dillon had raised a problem in another area though: The perceived threat from the Soviet bloc. In 1960, as they do today, the Chinese presented a threat to American interests in Africa. Sekou Touré, the president of Guinea, had turned to the Eastern Bloc for development cooperation. Then as now, the Chinese gained the upper hand over the West by imposing no conditionalities on cooperation.

Satterthwaite had noted this in his opening remarks:

“[Satterthwaite] stressed the need to simplify our aid procedures, and noted the extreme difficulty in obtaining African countrie’ concurrence to ICA [International Cooperation Administration] umbrella agreements when ‘the Chinese ask for no privileges for their people’. This was one reason for the long delays in trying to carry out our modest offer of 150 scholarships to Guinea.’

 “Assistance”, a code word for access to cheap commodities

The main item on the agenda was not really assistance; it was, and still is, commodities.

“Mr Dillon mentioned that ICA had set up a special group to work out a coordinated programme for Africa, including the question of stationing ICA officers in consular posts in Africa. He indicated his readiness to agree after the problem had been thought out.

Mr Dillon mentioned Recommendation 7 in Mr. Satterthwaite’s memorandum of March 30, ‘Means of assuring friendly single community [commodity] countries a ready market for their exports at reasonable and stable prices’. While not minimizing the difficulties, he thought we should look into this to see what could be done; he mentioned coffee as an example.”

By 1973, Richard Nixon’s Administration was ready to spell it out. A memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) dated July 19, 1973 reads thus:

“There is insufficient awareness in the United States of the importance to us of Africa’s natural resources. Africa has significant quantities of the world’s reserves of phosphate rock, copper, cobalt, and other minerals. Africa’s iron ore reserves are twice those of the United States and two-thirds those of the USSR. Libya and Nigeria are among the top oil producing countries of the world. Algeria produces great quantities of natural gas. Access to these resources is important to the United States and to other friendly powers. With the spread of industrialization, these resources will become increasingly critical.

Back in 1960, the ways and means of securing access to Africa’s natural resources were still being explored. It appears from the April 7 discussion that one approach was to tie Africa to the USA by means of indebtedness. A number of memoranda of the period mention the Development Loan Fund (DLF). This American state-owned bank was not at that time as active as the administration wished and was often ruefully discussed as a potential engine for acquiring leverage in Africa.

A feasibility study by the World Bank might have shown that two parallel projects were not required, but only if the objective of borrowing and lending is development. If, on the other hand, the objective is merely to deepen indebtedness, the $10 million loan makes perfect sense.

Tanzania (then Tanganyika) presented an opportunity. A highway was being built in that country with local resources. At the April meeting, it was suggested, in the absence of a request from Tanganyika (none was referred to) and without evidence of a feasibility study or any other pre-loan procedures having taken place, that Tanganyika should meet only local costs from their own resources and borrow the rest from the American Development Loan Fund:

For example, it had been found that Tanganyika was covering both foreign and local currency costs of a highway. It was believed that the DLF could handle foreign currency costs on the two sections of the highway and that Tanganyika could cover local currency expenses on both sections.”

Later on,

“Mr Dillon agreed with Recommendation 10 of Mr Satterthwaite’s paper, that we should encourage the African countries to become members of the IMF, IBRD, and IDA.”

February 2017, Ministry of Finance, Kampala, Uganda

The memorandum of April 7, 1960, came to mind recently when Uganda was reported in the local media as having accepted an unnecessary loan from the World Bank. It was for the purpose of assisting with the development of a One Stop Shop as a vehicle for promoting foreign direct and other investment. Because potential investors have often cited complicated procedures for setting up a business as a barrier to investment, the Uganda Investment Authority came up with the idea of a web-based centre where an investor could carry out all the procedures online and under one roof, so to speak. They called it a One Stop Centre.

A sum of Ush1.6 billion (US$457,142), which was on hand, was reportedly set aside for the purpose and the Uganda Investment Authority commissioned a foreign expert to do the work. As it neared completion, (the Secretary to the Treasury is quoted as having said the work was 80% done), a World Bank loan materialised for the development of a One Stop Shop under a separate project run by the Ministry of Finance: The Competitiveness Enterprise Development Project (CEDP) slated to run from 2013 to 2019 had US$100 million (Ush359.9 billion) allocated to it, with the One Stop Shop component costing $10 million (Ush36 billion).

According to media reports, which the World Bank declined to confirm or deny when contacted, when the time came to account for the loan, the Ministry of Finance sought to present the Investment Authority’s project as evidence of their having implemented the One Stop Shop. This meant transferring the original facility, the UIA’s One Stop Centre project to the Ministry of Finance. By all accounts, the ensuing scenes were not pretty. The head of state is said to have stepped in, rejected the new project and insisted that the UIA Centre go ahead to completion using local resources.

Any casual observer of Ugandan public affairs will have formed the impression that the amounts of public funds lost through corruption and procurement fraud have grown in frequency and magnitude since 1992.

A feasibility study by the World Bank might have shown that two parallel projects were not required, but it would only have influenced their decision if the objective of borrowing and lending is development. If, on the other hand, the objective is merely to deepen indebtedness, the US$10 million loan makes perfect sense.

The World Bank Country Assistance Strategy for Uganda

A look at the overall World Bank Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2011 – 2015 throws some light on the seeming absurdity of the CEDP/Uganda Investment Authority saga. Its overall objective (similar to the earlier CAS in the area of service delivery) was “to create an enabling environment for private sector-led growth by improving the business environment, strengthening physical infrastructure and human capital and raising the functioning of public sector institutions and their capacity for service delivery.”

The CEDP was evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank in 2016. As with so many economic recovery and development projects in Uganda, the project was found to have been hampered by poor governance. The Completion Learning Report (CLR) states,”…the major challenge lay in the area of governance, with the extent of progress in reducing patronage and corruption being unclear.”

Measures were put in place to mitigate this known risk and protect the investment in the form of regular reviews of government progress in addressing governance issues. However, to quote the report, “the CLR does not provide any information on how regularly these reviews were undertaken and what impact they had on mitigating risks to the Bank’s programme.”

The project evaluation ratings should therefore come as no surprise:

  • Progress in Focus Area IV: Improve Good Governance and Value for Money is rated: Moderately Unsatisfactory.
  • Objective 11: Increased transparency and efficiency of public financial management and public procurement at national and local level: Partially Achieved.
  • Objective 12: Strengthened public sector management and accountability at national and local level: Mostly Achieved.

One might want to argue with the ratings for project objectives 11 and 12. No framework for assessing improvement in these areas was provided, and on close examination, the ratings look to be pure fiction.

Any casual observer of Ugandan public affairs will have formed the impression that losses of public funds through corruption and procurement fraud have grown in frequency and magnitude since 1992. There is ample evidence in the latest report from the Office of the Auditor General (2015/2016) that it is still a major problem.

African countries have two options: to continue to implement development strategies that began in the early 1960s and before, and which have yet to meet the basic needs of their citizens, such as electricity and piped water in all homes by halting the haemorrhage of funds through the servicing of non-performing loans.

The Auditor General lists serious audit concerns that have been recurring in the area of financial management and procurement since at least 1992 when the Economic and Financial Management Programme (EFMP) was launched, at great expense, to increase transparency, efficiency and accountability in the public sector. Irregularities included payroll fraud, pension payments unsupported by documentation, procurement irregularities, lack of accountability in the use of public funds, and so on.

EFMP was followed by the equally costly EFMP Phase II that revisited the same objectives. After that capacity building programmes, again with financial management components, have been carried out in the agriculture and health sectors, while local government capacity building has also been funded by loans. In spite of all the above, public financial management, procurement capacity and quality of service delivery have deteriorated while the number of local authorities has grown from 27 to over 200.

In the last financial year, a number of local authorities were unable to utilise a combined total of Ush94.78 billion (US$26.4 million) in Capacity Building Infrastructure Development funds transferred to them from the central government owing to a lack of expertise in procuring specialised equipment and services for surveying, engineering and environmental works. US$26 million is 17 per cent of the Uganda Support to Municipal Infrastructure Development Programme’s capacity-building loan of $150 million. It is clear that the country is choking on loans while thirsting for basic services.

Elsewhere in the CLR, the World Bank itself notes that eight out of the twelve objectives of their Country Assistance Strategy were either only partially achieved or not achieved at all. The overall Development Outcome of the strategy is rated as “Moderately Unsatisfactory.” Curiously, the Bank’s performance is rated “Fair”, with only four out of twelve development objectives met. When is a project considered a failure?

The Bank’s overall assessment is more credible in its conclusion that “weak compliance with safeguards affected project implementation and the delivery of results. A reason cited is “weak oversight on the part of the Bank.

The way forward

The US State Department’s agreed objective in 1960, which was to encourage African countries to borrow from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and the Tanganyika example, in which a loan was agreed even without it being requested or given any formal appraisal, taken together with very poor implementation of the World Bank’s Assistance Strategy for Uganda, point to the conclusion that the objective of giving massive, unsustainable and poorly monitored loans and “normalising” project failure is to perpetuate a relationship of indebtedness and not necessarily to promote development.

Alternatively Governments could go on lowering expectations and shift their focus from the reduction of poverty to the reduction of only absolute poverty. They could continue to endorse modest development goals, such as carrying 20 litres of water over a distance of 200 metres rather than a distance of 400 metres twice a day.

African countries have two options: to continue to implement development strategies that began in the early 1960s and before, and which have yet to meet the basic needs of their citizens, such as electricity and piped water in all homes by halting the haemorrhage of funds through the servicing of non-performing loans.

Alternatively Governments could go on lowering expectations and shift their focus from the reduction of poverty to the reduction of only absolute poverty. They could continue to endorse modest development goals, such as carrying 20 litres of water over a distance of 200 metres rather than a distance of 400 metres twice a day.

All outstanding public loans need to be audited. Those that are found to have been nugatory expenditure (regardless of the lenders’ own self-ratings) should be repudiated. This includes any which were wasted by leaders who are themselves enabled by World Bank negligence in the design, planning and oversight of their projects.

Uganda’s progress is often contrasted with Malaysia’s owing to similar colonial histories and deriving much of their incomes from the export of raw materials during that time and on in to the 1970s. Like Uganda Malaysia has offered incentives for local and foreign direct investment such as tax holidays and duty free imports of raw materials and capital equipment. Malaysia managed to implement a national development plan focused on import substitution without coercion while Uganda turns initiatives such as these in to discouraging financial scandals. The Auditor-General’s last report questioned a tax holiday granted to a hotelier to which, he said, there was no end in sight. The government has been covering the investor’s tax obligations for the past five years. Last year the country failed to collect royalties on gold exported from her new refinery, the loss was between USD 1.9 million and 9.7 million.

Uganda is more usefully compared and contrasted with other countries with similar histories of endemic corruption and incompetence. In developing strategies for self-sufficiency we would do better to take as our model two countries that managed to increase their food yields, health care coverage and school enrolment without World Bank loans: Sankara’s Burkina Faso and Castro’s Cuba.

 

Support The Elephant.

The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.

Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.

By

Mary Serumaga is a Ugandan essayist, graduated in Law from King's College, London, and attained an Msc in Intelligent Management Systems from the Southbank. Her work in civil service reform in East Africa lead to an interest in the nature of public service in Africa and the political influences under which it is delivered.

Politics

Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya

Somali refugees in Kenya should not be held hostage by political disagreements between Mogadishu and Nairobi but must continue to enjoy Kenya’s protection as provided for under international law.

Published

on

Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya
Download PDFPrint Article

For several years now, Kenya has been demanding that the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, close the expansive Dadaab refugee complex in north-eastern Kenya, citing “national security threats”. Kenya has argued, without providing sufficient proof, that Dadaab, currently home to a population of 218,000 registered refugees who are mostly from Somalia, provides a “safe haven” and a recruitment ground for al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia that constantly carries out attacks inside Kenya. Threats to shut down have escalated each time the group has carried out attacks inside Kenya, such as following the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015.

However, unlike previous calls, the latest call to close Dadaab that came in March 2021, was not triggered by any major security lapse but, rather, was politically motivated. It came at a time of strained relations between Kenya and Somalia. Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County in north-western Kenya, is mostly home to South Sudanese refugees but also hosts a significant number of Somali refugees. Kakuma has not been included in previous calls for closure but now finds itself targeted for political expediency—to show that the process of closing the camps is above board and targets all refugees in Kenya and not only those from Somalia.

That the call is politically motivated can be deduced from the agreement reached between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government last April where alternative arrangements are foreseen that will enable refugees from the East African Community (EAC) to stay. This means that the South Sudanese will be able to remain while the Somali must leave.

Security threat

Accusing refugees of being a security threat and Dadaab the operational base from which the al-Shabaab launches its attacks inside Kenya is not based on any evidence. Or if there is any concrete evidence, the Kenyan government has not provided it.

Some observers accuse Kenyan leaders of scapegoating refugees even though it is the Kenyan government that has failed to come up with an effective and workable national security system. The government has also over the years failed to win over and build trust with its Muslim communities. Its counterterrorism campaign has been abusive, indiscriminately targeting and persecuting the Muslim population. Al-Shabab has used the anti-Muslim sentiment to whip up support inside Kenya.

Moreover, if indeed Dadaab is the problem, it is Kenya as the host nation, and not the UNHCR, that oversees security in the three camps that make up the Dadaab complex. The camps fall fully under the jurisdiction and laws of Kenya and, therefore, if the camps are insecure, it is because the Kenyan security apparatus has failed in its mission to securitise them.

The terrorist threat that Kenya faces is not a refugee problem — it is homegrown. Attacks inside Kenya have been carried out by Kenyan nationals, who make up the largest foreign group among al-Shabaab fighters. The Mpeketoni attacks of 2014 in Lamu County and the Dusit D2 attack of 2019 are a testament to the involvement of Kenyan nationals. In the Mpeketoni massacre, al-Shabaab exploited local politics and grievances to deploy both Somali and Kenyan fighters, the latter being recruited primarily from coastal communities. The terrorist cell that conducted the assault on Dusit D2 comprised Kenyan nationals recruited from across Kenya.

Jubaland and the maritime border dispute 

This latest demand by the Kenyan government to close Dadaab by June 2022 is politically motivated. Strained relations between Kenya and Somalia over the years have significantly deteriorated in the past year.

Mogadishu cut diplomatic ties with Nairobi in December 2020, accusing Kenya of interfering in Somalia’s internal affairs. The contention is over Kenya’s unwavering support for the Federal Member State of Jubaland — one of Somalia’s five semi-autonomous states — and its leader Ahmed “Madobe” Mohamed Islam. The Jubaland leadership is at loggerheads with the centre in Mogadishu, in particular over the control of the Gedo region of Somalia.

Kenya has supported Jubaland in this dispute, allegedly hosting Jubaland militias inside its territory in Mandera County that which have been carrying out attacks on federal government of Somalia troop positions in the Gedo town of Beled Hawa on the Kenya-Somalia border. Dozens of people including many civilians have been killed in clashes between Jubaland-backed forces and the federal government troops.

Relations between the two countries have been worsened by the bitter maritime boundary dispute that has played out at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The latest call to close Dadaab is believed to have been largely triggered by the case at the Hague-based court, whose judgement was delivered on 12 October.  The court ruled largely in favour of Somalia, awarding it most of the disputed territory. In a statement, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta said, “At the outset, Kenya wishes to indicate that it rejects in totality and does not recognize the findings in the decision.” The dispute stems from a disagreement over the trajectory to be taken in the delimitation of the two countries’ maritime border in the Indian Ocean. Somalia filed the case at the Hague in 2014.  However, Kenya has from the beginning preferred and actively pushed for the matter to be settled out of court, either through bilateral negotiations with Somalia or through third-party mediation such as the African Union.

Kenya views Somalia as an ungrateful neighbour given all the support it has received in the many years the country has been in turmoil. Kenya has hosted hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees for three decades, played a leading role in numerous efforts to bring peace in Somalia by hosting peace talks to reconcile Somalis, and the Kenyan military, as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has sacrificed a lot and helped liberate towns and cities. Kenya feels all these efforts have not been appreciated by Somalia, which in the spirit of good neighbourliness should have given negotiation more time instead of going to court. In March, on the day of the hearing, when both sides were due to present their arguments, Kenya boycotted the court proceedings at the 11th hour. The court ruled that in determining the case, it would use prior submissions and written evidence provided by Kenya. Thus, the Kenyan government’s latest demand to close Dadaab is seen as retaliation against Somalia for insisting on pursuing the case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Nowhere safe to return to

Closing Dadaab by June 2022 as Kenya has insisted to the UNHCR, is not practical and will not allow the dignified return of refugees. Three decades after the total collapse of the state in Somalia, conditions have not changed much, war is still raging, the country is still in turmoil and many parts of Somalia are still unsafe. Much of the south of the country, where most of the refugees in Dadaab come from, remains chronically insecure and is largely under the control of al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the risk of some of the returning youth being recruited into al-Shabaab is real.

A programme of assisted voluntary repatriation has been underway in Dadaab since 2014, after the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed a tripartite agreement together with the UNHCR in 2013. By June 2021, around 85,000 refugees had returned to Somalia under the programme, mainly to major cities in southern Somalia such as Kismayo, Mogadishu and Baidoa. However, the programme has turned out to be complicated; human rights groups have termed it as far from voluntary, saying that return is fuelled by fear and misinformation. 

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed. Most of those who were repatriated returned in 2016 at a time when pressure from the Kenyan government was at its highest, with uncertainty surrounding the future of Dadaab after Kenya disbanded its Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and halted the registration of new refugees.

Many of the repatriated ended up in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia, with access to fewer resources and a more dangerous security situation. Somalia has a large population of 2.9 million IDPs  scattered across hundreds of camps in major towns and cities who have been displaced by conflict, violence and natural disasters. The IDPs are not well catered for. They live in precarious conditions, crowded in slums in temporary or sub-standard housing with very limited or no access to basic services such as education, basic healthcare, clean water and sanitation. Thousands of those who were assisted to return through the voluntary repatriation programme have since returned to Dadaab after they found conditions in Somalia unbearable. They have ended up undocumented in Dadaab after losing their refugee status in Kenya.  

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed.

Camps cannot be a permanent settlement for refugees. Dadaab was opened 30 years ago as a temporary solution for those fleeing the war in Somalia. Unfortunately, the situation in Somalia is not changing. It is time the Kenyan government, in partnership with members of the international community, finds a sustainable, long-term solution for Somali refugees in Kenya, including considering pathways towards integrating the refugees into Kenyan society.  Dadaab could then be shut down and the refugees would be able to lead dignified lives, to work and to enjoy freedom of movement unlike today where their lives are in limbo, living in prison-like conditions inside the camps.

The proposal to allow refugees from the East African Community to remain after the closure of the camps — which will mainly affect the 130,000 South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma —  is a good gesture and a major opportunity for refugees to become self-reliant and contribute to the local economy.

Announcing the scheme, Kenya said that refugees from the EAC who are willing to stay on would be issued with work permits for free. Unfortunately, this option was not made available to refugees from Somalia even though close to 60 per cent of the residents of Dadaab are under the age of 18, have lived in Kenya their entire lives and have little connection with a country their parents escaped from three decades ago.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees. Many have also integrated fully into Kenyan society, intermarried, learnt to speak fluent Swahili and identify more with Kenya than with their country of origin.

The numbers that need to be integrated are not huge. There are around 269,000 Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma. When you subtract the estimated 40,000 Kenyan nationals included in refugee data, the figure comes down to around 230,000 people. This is not a large population that would alter Kenya’s demography in any signific ant way, if indeed this isis the fear in some quarters. If politics were to be left out of the question, integration would be a viable option.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees.

For decades, Kenya has shown immense generosity by hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees, and it is important that the country continues to show this solidarity. Whatever the circumstances and the diplomatic difficulties with its neighbour Somalia, Kenya should respect its legal obligations under international law to provide protection to those seeking sanctuary inside its borders. Refugees should only return to their country when the conditions are conducive, and Somalia is ready to receive them. To forcibly truck people to the border, as Kenya has threatened in the past, is not a solution. If the process of returning refugees to Somalia is not well thought out, a hasty decision will have devastating consequences for their security and well-being.

Continue Reading

Politics

The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio

As CARICOM countries call for more profound changes that would empower the Haitian population, Western powers offer plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country.

Published

on

The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio
Download PDFPrint Article

On Wednesday 7 July 2021, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated in his home. His wife was injured in the attack. That the president’s assassins were able to access his home posing as agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States (DEA) brought to the fore the intricate relationship between drugs, money laundering and mercenary activities in Haiti. Two days later, the government of Haiti reported that the attack had been carried out by a team of assailants, 26 of whom were Colombian. This information that ex-soldiers from Colombia were involved brought to the spotlight the ways in which Haiti society has been enmeshed in the world of the international mercenary market and instability since the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Lavalas movement in 2004.

When the French Newspaper Le Monde recently stated that Haiti was one of the four drug hubs of the Caribbean region, the paper neglected to add the reality that as a drug hub, Haiti had become an important base for US imperial activities, including imperial money laundering, intelligence, and criminal networks. No institution in Haiti can escape this web and Haitian society is currently reeling from this ecosystem of exploitation, repression, and manipulation. Under President Donald Trump, the US heightened its opposition to the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. The mercenary market in Florida became interwoven with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the financial institutions that profited from crime syndicates that thrive on anti-communist and anti-Cuba ideas.

But even as Haitian society is reeling from intensified destabilization, the so-called Core Group (comprising of the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union, the United States, France, Spain, Canada, Germany, and Brazil) offers plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, CARICOM countries are calling for more profound changes that would empower the population while mobilizing international resources to neutralize the social power of the money launderers and oligarchs in Haitian society.

Haiti since the Duvaliers

For the past thirty-five years, the people of Haiti have yearned for a new mode of politics to transcend the dictatorship of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc). The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination. Since that revolution, France and the US have cooperated to punish Haiti for daring to resist white supremacy. An onerous payment of reparations to France was compounded by US military occupation after 1915.

Under President Woodrow Wilson, the racist ideals of the US imperial interests were reinforced in Haiti in a nineteen-year military occupation that was promoted by American business interests in the country. Genocidal violence from the Dominican Republic in 1937 strengthened the bonds between militarism and extreme violence in the society. Martial law, forced labour, racism and extreme repression were cemented in the society. Duvalierism in the form of the medical doctor François Duvalier mobilized a variant of Negritude in the 50s to cement a regime of thuggery, aligned with the Cold War goals of the United States in the Caribbean. The record of the Duvalier regime was reprehensible in every form, but this kind of government received military and intelligence assistance from the United States in a region where the Cuban revolution offered an alternative. Francois Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who continued the tradition of rule by violence (the notorious Tonton Macoute) until this system was overthrown by popular uprisings in 1986.

The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination.

On 16 December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the presidency by a landslide in what were widely reported to be the first free elections in Haiti’s history. Legislative elections in January 1991 gave Aristide supporters a plurality in Haiti’s parliament. The Lavalas movement of the Aristide leadership was the first major antidote to the historical culture of repression and violence. The United States and France opposed this new opening of popular expression such that military intervention, supported by external forces in North America and the Organization of American States, brought militarists and drug dealers under General Joseph Raoul Cédras to the forefront of the society. The working peoples of Haiti were crushed by an alliance of local militarists, external military peacekeepers and drug dealers. The noted Haitian writer, Edwidge Danticat, has written extensively on the consequences of repeated military interventions, genocide and occupation in the society while the population sought avenues to escape these repressive orders. After the removal of the Aristide government in 2004, it was the expressed plan of the local elites and the external forces that the majority of the Haitian population should be excluded from genuine forms of participatory democracy, including elections.

Repression, imperial NGOs and humanitarian domination

The devastating earthquake of January 2010 further deepened the tragic socio-economic situation in Haiti. An estimated 230,000 Haitians lost their lives, 300,000 were injured, and more than 1.5 million were displaced as a result of collapsed buildings and infrastructure. External military interventions by the United Nations, humanitarian workers and international foundations joined in the corruption to strengthen the anti-democratic forces in Haitian society. The Clinton Foundation of the United States was complicit in imposing the disastrous presidency of Michel Martelly on Haitian society after the earthquake. The book by Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster, provides a gripping account of the corruption in Haiti. So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

In 2015, Jovenel Moïse was elected president in a very flawed process, but was only able to take office in 2017. From the moment he entered the presidency, his administration became immersed in the anti-people traditions that had kept the ruling elites together with the more than 10,000 international NGOs that excluded Haitians from participating in the projects for their own recovery. President Moïse carved out political space in Haiti with the support of armed groups who were deployed as death squads with the mission of terrorizing popular spaces and repressing supporters of the Haitian social movement. In a society where the head of state did not have a monopoly over armed gangs, kidnappings, murder (including the killing of schoolchildren) and assassinations got out of control. Under Moïse, Haiti had become an imbroglio where the government and allied gangs organized a series of massacres in poor neighbourhoods known to host anti-government organizing, killing dozens at a time.

Moïse and the extension of repression in Haiti

Moïse remained president with the connivance of diplomats and foundations from Canada, France and the United States. These countries and their leaders ignored the reality that the Haitian elections of 2017 were so deeply flawed and violent that almost 80 per cent of Haitian voters did not, or could not, vote. Moïse, with the support of one section of the Haitian power brokers, avoided having any more elections, and so parliament became inoperative in January 2020, when the terms of most legislators expired. When mayors’ terms expired in July 2020, Moïse personally appointed their replacements. This accumulation of power by the president deepened the divisions within the capitalist classes in Haiti. Long-simmering tensions between the mulatto and black capitalists were exacerbated under Moïse who mobilized his own faction on the fact that he was seeking to empower and enrich the black majority. Thugs and armed gangs were integrated into the drug hub and money laundering architecture that came to dominate Haiti after 2004.

After the Trump administration intensified its opposition to the Venezuelan government, the political and commercial leadership in Haiti became suborned to the international mercenary and drug systems that were being mobilized in conjunction with the military intelligence elements in Florida and Colombia. President Jovenel Moïse’s term, fed by spectacular and intense struggles between factions of the looters, was scheduled to come to a legal end in February 2021. Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

Since the removal of Aristide and the marginalization of the Lavalas forces from the political arena in Haiti, the US has been more focused on strengthening the linkages between the Haitian drug lords and the money launderers in Colombia, Florida, Dominican Republic, and Venezuelan exiles. It was therefore not surprising that the mercenary industry, with its linkages to financial forces in Florida, has been implicated in the assassination of President Moïse. The Core Group of Canada, France and the US has not once sought to deploy the resources of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to penetrate the interconnections between politicians in Haiti and the international money laundering and mercenary market.

Working for democratic transition in Haiti

The usual handlers of Haitian repression created the Core Group within one month of Moïse’s assassination. Canada, France and the United States had historically been implicated in the mismanaging of Haiti along with the United Nations. Now, the three countries have mobilized the OAS (with its checkered history), Brazil and the European Union to add their weight to a new transition that will continue to exclude the majority of the people of Haiti. It has been clear that under the current system of destabilization and violence, social peace will be necessary before elections can take place in Haiti.

Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

The continuous infighting among the Haitian ruling elements after the assassination was temporarily resolved at the end of July when Ariel Henry was confirmed by the US and France as Prime Minister. Henry had been designated as prime minister by Moïse days before his assassination. The popular groups in Haiti that had opposed Moïse considered the confirmation of Ariel Henry as a slap in the face because they had been demonstrating for the past four years for a more robust change to the political landscape. These organizations mobilized in what they called the Commission, (a gathering of civil society groups and political parties with more than 150 members), and had been holding marathon meetings to publicly work out what kind of transitional government they would want to see. According to the New York Times, rather than a consensus, the Core Group of international actors imposed a “unilateral proposal” on the people of Haiti.

Haiti is a member of CARICOM. The Caribbean community has proposed a longer transition period overseen by CARICOM for the return of Haiti to democracy. With the experience of the UN in Haiti, the Caribbean community has, through its representative on the UN Security Council, proposed the mobilization of the peacekeeping resources and capabilities of the UN to be deployed to CARICOM in order to organize a credible transition to democracy in Haiti. The nature and manner of the assassination of President Moïse has made more urgent the need for genuine reconstruction and support for democratic transition in Haiti.

Continue Reading

Politics

How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya

Despite the hostile rhetoric and threats of closure, the presence of refugees in the camps in northern-eastern Kenyan has benefited the host communities.

Published

on

How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya
Download PDFPrint Article

In the 1960s, Kenya had a progressive refugee policy that allowed refugees to settle anywhere in the country and to access education. This approach created in Kenya a cadre of skilled and professional refugees. However, the policy changed in the 1990s due to an overwhelming influx of refugees and asylum seekers escaping conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Kenya switched to an encampment policy for refugees, who were mainly confined to camps.

Although there are refugees living in urban and peri-urban areas elsewhere in the country, for over two decades, northern Kenya has hosted a disproportionate number of the refugees living in Kenya. The region has been home to one of the world’s largest refugee camps, with generations of lineage having an impact on the economic, social, cultural, and ecological situation of the region because of the support provided by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in education, health and security services.

Mandera and Marsabit counties, both of which boarder with Ethiopia, Wajir County which borders with both Ethiopia and Somalia and, Garissa County which borders with Somalia, have hosted refugees and migrants displaced from their countries of origin for various reasons. In 2018, the town of Moyale, which is on the Ethiopian boarder in Marsabit County, temporarily hosted over 10,000 Ethiopians escaping military operations in Ethiopia’s Moyale District.    

Elwak town in Wajir County occasionally hosts pastoralist communities from Somalia who cross into Kenya seeking pasture for their livestock. While the movement of refugees into Marsabit and Wajir counties has been of a temporary nature, Garissa County has hosted refugees for decades.

Located 70 kilometres from the border with Somalia, the Dadaab refugee complex was established in the 1990s and has three main camps: Dagahaley, Ifo, and Hagadera. Due to an increase in refugee numbers around 2011, the Kambioos refugee camp in Fafi sub-county was established to host new arrivals from Somalia and to ease pressure on the overcrowded Hagadera refugee camp. The Kambioos camp was closed in 2019 as the refugee population fell.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), the Dadaab refugee complex currently hosts over 226, 689 refugees, 98 per cent of whom are from Somalia. In 2015, the refugee population in the Dadaab refugee complex was over 300,000, larger than that of the host community. In 2012, the camp held over 400,000 refugees leading to overstretched and insufficient resources for the growing population.

Under international refugee and human rights law, the government has the sole responsibility of hosting and caring for refugees. However, there is little information regarding the investments made by the Kenyan government in the refugee sector in the north-eastern region over time. Moreover, the government’s investment in the sector is debatable since there was no proper legal framework to guide refugee operations in the early 1990s. It was only in 2006 that the government enacted the Refugee Act that formally set up the Refugee Affairs Secretariat mandated to guide and manage the refugee process in Kenya.

While the Refugee Act of 2006 places the management of refugee affairs in the hands of the national government, devolved county governments play a significant role in refugee operations. With the 2010 constitution, the devolution of social functions such as health and education has extended into refugee-hosting regions and into refugee camps. While devolution in this new and more inclusive system of governance has benefited the previously highly marginalised north-eastern region through a fairer distribution of economic and political resources, there is however little literature on how the refugees benefit directly from the county government resource allocations.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds: Mandera County alone received US$88 million in the 2015/2016 financial year, the highest allocation of funds after Nairobi and Turkana, leading to developmental improvements.

However, it can be argued that the allocation of funds from the national government to the northern frontier counties by the Kenya Commission on Revenue Allocation—which is always based on the Revenue Allocation table that prioritizes population, poverty index, land area, basic equal share and fiscal responsibility—may not have been taking the refugee population into account. According to the 2019 census, the population of Dadaab sub-county is 185,252, a figure that is well below the actual refugee population. The increase in population in the north-eastern region that is due to an increase in the refugee population calls for an increase in the allocation of devolved funds.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds.

Dadaab refugee camp has been in the news for the wrong reasons. Security agencies blame the refugees for the increased Al Shabaab activity in Kenya, and even though these claims are disputed, the government has made moves to close down the camp. In 2016, plans to close Dadaab were blocked by the High Court which declared the proposed closure unconstitutional. In 2021, Kenya was at it again when Ministry of Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’I tweeted that he had given the UNHCR 14 days to draw up a plan for the closure of the camp. The UNHCR and the government issued a joint statement agreeing to close the camp in June 2022.

The security rhetoric is not new. There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms. During the 554th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Forum held in November 2015, it was concluded that the humanitarian character of the Dadaab refugee camp had been compromised. The AU statements, which may have been drafted by Kenya, claimed that the attacks on Westgate Mall and Garissa University were planned and launched from within the refugee camps. These security incidents are an indication of the challenges Kenya has been facing in managing security. For example, between 2010 and 2011, there were several IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) incidents targeting police vehicles in and around Dadaab where a dozen officers were injured or killed. In October 2012, two people working for the medical charity Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in Dadaab. Local television network NTV has described the camp as “a womb of terror” and “a home for al-Shabaab operations”.

There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms.

Security restrictions and violent incidents have created a challenging operational environment for NGOs, leading to the relocation of several non-local NGO staff as well as contributing to a shrinking humanitarian space. Some teachers and health workers from outside the region have refused to return to the area following terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab, leaving behind large gaps in the health, education, and nutrition sectors.

However, despite the challenging situation, the refugee camps have also brought many benefits, not only to Kenya as a country but also to the county governments and the local host communities.

Education

According to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) half the refugee population in the IGAD member states are children of school-going age, between 4 and 18 years.

In Garissa, the education sector is one of the areas that has benefited from the hosting of refugees in the county because the host community has access to schools in the refugee camps. Windle Trust, an organisation that offers scholarships to students in secondary schools and in vocational training institutes, has been offering scholarships to both the refugees and the host communities. In July 2021, over 70 students benefited from a project run by International Labour Organisations (ILO) in partnership with Garissa county governments, the East African Institute of Welding (EAIW) and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) to give industrial welding skills to refugees and host communities.

However, despite the measures taken by the Kenyan government to enrol refugees in Kenyan schools, there is a notable gap that widens as students go through the different levels of education. Statistics show that of the school-going refugee population, only a third get access to secondary education of which a sixth get to join tertiary institutions. This is well below the government’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 target that seeks to ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education. This also reflects the situation of the host community’s education uptake. Other investments in the education sector that have targeted the host communities include recruitment and deployment of early childhood education teachers to schools in the host community by UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Non-governmental/intergovernmental support 

The presence of refugees has led to NGOs setting up and running projects in the camps. According to Garissa County’s Integrated Development Plan, there are over 70 non-governmental organisations present, with the majority operating around the Dadaab refugee complex and within the host communities. The UNHCR estimates that it will require about US$149.6 million to run its operations in Dadaab Camp this year. However, as of May 2021, only US$45.6 million—31 per cent of the total amount required—had been received.

The decrease in humanitarian funding has had an impact on the livelihoods of refugees and host communities in north-eastern Kenya.  According to the World Bank, 73 per cent of the population of Garissa County live below the poverty line. In the absence of social safety nets, locals have benefited from the humanitarian operations in and around the camp. The UNHCR reports that about 40,000 Kenyan nationals within a 50km radius of the Dadaab refugee camp ended up enrolling as refugees in order to access food and other basic services in the camps.

In 2014, the UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million worth of community assets since 2011. The presence of refugees has also increased remittances from the diaspora, and there are over 50 remittance outlets operating in the Dadaab camp, increasing economic opportunities and improving services. Using 2010 as the reference year, researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

The UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million of community assets since 2011 since 2011.

To reduce overdependence on aid and humanitarian funding in running refugee operations, the County Government of Garissa developed a Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISEDP) in 2019 that provided ways of integrating refugees into the socio-economic life of the community to enhance their self-reliance. The European Union announced a Euro 5 million funding programme to support the socio-economic development plan, thus opening up opportunities for development initiatives including income generating activities such as the flourishing businesses at Hagadera market. The recent announcement of the planned closure of the camp has put these plans at risk.

A voice

The host community is increasingly involved in issues that affect both the locals living around the Dadaab refugee complex and the refugees themselves, with the voice of the community gaining prominence in decision-making regarding the county budget and sometimes even regarding NGO operations. NGOs periodically conduct needs assessments in and around the camp to guide the budgeting and planning process for subsequent years and the host community is always consulted.

Interest in governance issues has also increased. For example, between 2010 and 2015 the host community successfully lobbied for increased employment opportunities for locals in the UNHCR operations. With experience in the humanitarian field, some from within the host communities have secured positions as expatriates in international organizations across the globe, adding to increased international remittances to Garissa County.

Health

Research reveals that, compared to other pastoralist areas, health services for host communities have improved because of the presence of aid agencies in Dadaab. Hospitals managed by Médicins Sans Frontières and the International Red Cross in Dagahaley and Hagadera respectively are said to be offering better services than the sub-county hospital in Dadaab town. The two hospitals are Ministry of Health-approved vaccination centres in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite the massive investments made in the health sector by humanitarian organisations in and around Dadaab, both UNICEF and the World Health Organisation have identified the camp as an entry point for infectious diseases like polio and measles into Kenya. There was a confirmed case of WPV1 (wild poliovirus) in a 4-month-old girl from the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2013. This is a clear indication of the health risks associated with the situation.

Researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

Other problems associated with the presence of the camps include encroachment of the refugee population on local land, leading to crime and hostility between the two communities. These conflicts are aggravated by the scramble for the little arable land available in this semi-arid region that makes it difficult to grow food and rear farm animals, leading to food shortages.

While it is important to acknowledge that progress has been made in integrating refugees into the north-eastern region, and that some development has taken place in the region, more needs to be done to realise the full potential of the region and its communities.  Kenya’s security sector should ensure that proper measures are put in place to enhance security right from the border entry point in order to weed out criminals who take advantage of Kenya’s acceptance of refugees. The country should not expel those who have crossed borders in search of refuge but should tap fully into the benefits that come with hosting refugees.

Continue Reading

Trending