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The Unwinnable War: How the Myth of an ‘Institutional’ Solution Has Hobbled the Fight Against Graft and Wasted Time and Resources

The political vernacular of corruption has lost its lustre, especially with the millennial generation, who today perceive corruption not as the abuse of public office for private gain but the abuse itself lays in the existence of the public office.

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The Unwinnable War: How the Myth of an ‘Institutional’ Solution Has Hobbled the Fight Against Graft and Wasted Time and Resources
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What is clear is that in Kenya’s case, the public policy reform/technocratic approach to fighting corruption has become utterly irrelevant in the current political context. The Presidential ‘Summit’ on Governance and Corruption in November 2016 as former anti-graft Czar John Githongo opined was the final nail in the coffin of the ‘technical fix’ to corruption when President Uhuru Kenyatta expressed his helplessness, ripped into his anti-corruption officials and their approach, and basically reduced the event to a public relations exercise. Kenyans have done all the anti-corruption benchmarking, created all the anti-graft institutions, committees, working groups, task forces, units; drafted all the frameworks and policy papers; taken all the advice possible from multilaterals, bilaterals, NGOs, the private sector and others including churches; enacted all the laws and their subsidiaries; held all the conferences, summits, workshops and get-togethers possible. Fundamentally, what started in 1956 with a series of legal and institutional reforms aimed at improving governance and fighting corruption was a phase that ended with Presidential Summit on Governance and Corruption in November 2016. But the history of corruption didn’t begin here.

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In 1888, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEACo) claimed Kenya as one of its territories. That arrangement continued until 1895 when the territory reverted to the British as the East African Protectorate encompassing areas deemed “waste and unoccupied” that did not have a settled form of government. In the early 1900s, Europeans began to stream into the country at the invitation of the colonial government and were allocated the most fertile land upcountry in areas where for generations Africans had farmed, grazed animals, and practised their customs freely. The consequence was that the indigenous people were driven to low-density areas unsuitable for agriculture with low rainfall, poor soil, and absence of pasture. Those who didn’t find a place to settle became squatters in white farms or worked as labourers for Asian merchants. The expropriation of African land by Europeans was done fraudulently and represented one of the first acts of land grabbing and looting by the colonial regime in Kenya. They just grabbed African farms without much effort to hide their activities. Until then, the African lands were secured by the Protectorate.

Regulations of 1897 forbade any alienation of land regularly used by Africans unless the colonial administration was satisfied the land was no longer regularly used and that Africans would not be adversely affected. That changed with the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1902 which gave the government jurisdiction over all lands subject to the right of occupation by Africans. From that time, African ownership of land was not recognized; only occupation and use of it were permitted.

The Unwinnable War: How the Myth of an 'Institutional' Solution Has Hobbled the Fight Against Graft and Wasted Time and Resources

Dawa ya Ufisadi

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In 1915, another Crown Land Ordinance was passed giving whites 999- year leases. It also transferred all lands formerly occupied by Africans to the control of the governor, and barred European landowners from employing non-white managers or supervisors to be in-charge of their holdings. The Ordinance also created African reserves to be located away from white settlements. As the whites entrenched themselves, more land laws were passed to govern different parts of the country making the Land Law in Kenya one of the most complicated land systems in the world. After World War II, the British government heightened the process of settling former servicemen by grabbing more land. Overall, 1% of the white population occupied 16,500 square miles of land.

At that time, crown or public land comprised 76.97% of Kenya. It included everything from forests to lakes and rivers. However, 70% of it was in the dry Northern Frontier Province, inhabited mainly by Somali ethnic groups. Of the total land area, only 1.9% was put to agricultural use at the time and almost all of it by white settlers. Thus, while each of the majority Africans occupied one or two acres on average, whites were sitting on 160 acres each per person.

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In 1935, Archdeacon Eric Burns, a British member of the Kenya Legislative Council (LegCo), complained that chiefs were forcing widows exempted from taxes into paying them a bribe so that the widows could retain their exemptions; and that animals sold in distress for non-payment of tax were undervalued and purchased by the chiefs and their henchmen. The evil of corruption and bribery got worse when colonialists enacted the Chief’s Act in 1937 giving the officials a wider latitude of powers, including maintaining law and order, collecting taxes to help sustain the luxurious lifestyles of whites, overseeing agricultural activities in their areas, and mediating disputes. To meet their financial needs, chiefs habitually confiscated livestock from tax defaulters to swell their herds, and accumulated land that really belonged to other people.” It was routine for chiefs to raid a village and demand surrender of personal property under threats of arrest. They collected hut and poll taxes and retained part of the money. The more levy they collected the more money went into the Exchequer and into their pockets. During colonial times, chiefs commanded respect and trepidation from locals in equal measures. Chiefs exerted themselves to please the authorities, often taking actions that turned out to be abuse of peoples’ rights. They sometimes beat and tortured innocent villagers to demonstrate their commitment to duty and loyalty to their masters. As the government’s “eyes” on the ground, chiefs frequently held barazas to explain colonial plans and policies, and were spokespeople and translators for white administration officials.

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The biggest known case of public corruption in Colonial Kenya involved the construction of the Mbotela and Ofafa housing estates on the east part of Nairobi in the 1950s. According to Joe Khamisi in his seminal work Kenya: Looters and Grabbers: 54 Years of Corruption and Plunder by the Elite, the project was intended to ease accommodation problems created by mass movements of people from the rural areas in search of jobs in the city, as well as the return of African soldiers from World War II. Thirteen thousand bed spaces per year were scheduled to be built over a period of five years at a cost of GBP.2 million (KES.273 million), which was to come as a grant from the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC). In those years, construction work was dominated by big European and Asian owned firms though many small “one-job-at-a-time operations” also existed. Those nondescript companies were prepared to take any job even though they didn’t have proper equipment and relied on cheap unskilled labor. Soon after tendering for the housing project was done and contracts awarded, news went around alleging corrupt practices in the selection process. The Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was called in to investigate. When news reached London, the British government appointed Sir Alan Rose a well-known lawyer to head a three-man commission with a brief to “examine accusations of corruption and malpractices in every aspect of the affairs of the Nairobi City Council.

A long list of contraventions of building specifications was provided, including “shallow excavation of footings, under-strength concreting in floors and lintels, substandard joinery, the use of cheaper, weaker materials throughout, and generally poor standards of workmanship” – all of which had apparently been approved by council officers in exchange for kickbacks. One of several officials implicated in the debacle was the city engineer Harold Whipp. Before the council made the decision to sack him, Whipp committed suicide and his body was found on a railway line. The Commission also unearthed several other cases of misconduct in the council including some in the fire brigade and the city market. The Mayor, Israel Somen, and his deputy, Dobbs Johnson, were cited for corrupt practices. The two survived the scandal and Somen was, after independence, appointed by Tel Aviv as the Israel ambassador to Kenya. The Rose Commission concluded that bribery and corruption were “by no means uncommon” among city office holders at ‘all levels and in all departments’; that the scale of cash inducements involved to secure services or preference from the council was often significant; and that such behavior was accepted as the norm and widely tolerated. So, it wasn’t just African home guards and chiefs who engaged in bribery and extortion in colonial Kenya.

Europeans were as guilty of corruption and malpractice in colonial Nairobi as anyone else, and Africans at the bottom of the colonial racial hierarchy were most often its victim. To stymie the growing trend of corruption in government, the LegCo (Legislative Council) enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 65) in 1956, setting out jail terms for any public servant who solicited, accepted or obtained money unlawfully in exchange for service. It also provided for forfeiture of awards of gifts offered in a corrupt manner.” It was the Roe vs.Wade legislation as pertaining to fighting corruption in Kenya.

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On 12 December 1963, the Union Jack was lowered for the last time on Kenya soil, Kenya obtained ‘independence’ from the British. Under its first president, Jomo Kenyatta promulgated its first constitution which laid bare the hopes, dreams and promises of the Kenyan people. The government promised every part of the country will be controlled by the indigenous people of the area. Too, it promised it would eradicate poverty, disease and ignorance and also fight corruption.

However, that arrangement lasted for less than a year as Kenyatta abolished the region-based independence constitution in 1964 and introduced a unitary system of government which gave the presidency executive powers. Corruption took centre stage. An estimated 25,000 people were settled in the month of January 1964 alone. The pace in which the process was implemented implied there was no intention to vet and accord deserving cases their rights, but rather persons had already been predetermined or identified by the authorities.” The bottom line was: corruption was at play. One of the first things Kenyatta did after becoming Prime Minister, was to order a Rolls Royce car from the London’s Motor Show, for his use without any state budgetary provisions or (even) personal intent to pay. In doing so, Kenyatta became the first Kenyan official to violate procurement procedures which required that the Central Tender Board (CTB) call for multiple quotations from suppliers. It was a colonial process which did not change until the 1970s. Kenyatta also ignored the advice of Finance Minister James Gichuru who told him Kenya was short of capital and therefore bankrupt and could not afford the expensive vehicle.

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Having heard the complaints of senior officials in his administration about their inability to do private business because of government restrictions, Kenyatta 1 regime decided to do something. In 1971, Kenyatta appointed a body called the “Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission” to recommend reforms in the public service on a system established by the colonial government. Known as the Ndegwa Commission, after its Chairman Duncan Ndegwa, the Commission recommended sweeping changes in moral and professional conduct of civil servants. It suggested increases in civil service salaries; the appointment of an ombudsman to oversee integrity in government; and slashing the number of parastatals. Furthermore, it permitted civil servants to engage in private businesses.

The Ndegwa report broke the colonial rule which was observed up to around 1970 that public workers should not engage in businesses. In the meantime, civil servants began immediately to engage in businesses. Soon, the civil service was submerged in corruption from top to bottom. Officers demanded bribes and sold tips and confidential government information to the highest bidders. Service delivery was impacted as many civil servants were often away tending to their private businesses. The Ndegwa allowed people to use their public offices to loot public resources with very little or no accountability.

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When Moi came to power many Kenyans hoped corruption would end. Because Kenya’s second president was a staunch Christian; and as a man with a strong rural upbringing, he was less entangled in the twisted urban lifestyles of intrigues, corruption, and conspiracy. He demonstrated that commitment by lashing at corruption and those involved in it wherever he went in the country, even as his family and cronies were amassing wealth. At one time, he showed up in Parliament to personally lead a debate on a legislation intended to deal with the menace. In 1982, Moi formed a working committee to draft a national code of conduct to deal with various issues including inequitable distribution of resources, misappropriation of public funds, and corruption. In announcing its formation, he accused some of his officials of greed and selfishness and promised tough action. He said his government would no longer tolerate graft and those caught would be punished severely. The working committee, chaired by a prominent businessman, B. M. Gecaga, submitted its report in October 1983, but that was the last time anyone heard of it. The whole charade appeared to be a public relations stint to hoodwink Kenyans into believing he was serious about corruption. It was a show of empty bravado.

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In 1993, the Government established the Police Anti-Corruption Squad in the police force to spearhead the fight against corruption in the Criminal Investigation Department. It was abandoned in 1995. The Prevention of Corruption Act (Cap 65) was amended in 1997 and would lead to the creation of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority (KACA), the first government anti-corruption organ established by law to fight corruption. The first Director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority, John Harun Mwau, was appointed in December, 1997. KACA was disbanded in the year 2000 after it was declared unconstitutional by the High Court. This decision was on the basis, among others, that the powers of KACA to prosecute went against Section 26 of the then Constitution which had then preserved powers of prosecution on the Attorney General. After the disbandment of KACA, the Anti-Corruption Police Unit was formed as an administrative organ to continue the fight against corruption.

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In July 1998, Parliament appointed a Select Committee on anti-corruption under the Chairmanship of MP Musikari Kombo and gave it the mandate to study and investigate the causes, nature, extent and impact of corruption in Kenya; identify the key perpetrators and beneficiaries of corruption; recommend immediate and effective measures to be taken against such individuals involved in corruption, recover public property corruptly appropriated by them; and enact a Bill to provide stiff penalties for corruption related offences. The motion led to the enactment of the Anti Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill (2000) which established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) with responsibilities to investigate corrupt cases and institute civil proceedings for recovery of corruptly obtained assets; and the formation of the Kenya anti-corruption advisory board to be responsible for appointing commissioners, and advise the commission on the performance of its functions. Nothing came out of those efforts until Moi handed over the government to Kibaki in December 2002.

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Kibaki’s victory in the 2002 general elections came as a big sigh of relief that four decades of KANU’s misrule had come to an end. Kenyans dreamed of a new beginning away from corruption, misadministration, and human injustices. Kibaki vowed to deal firmly with corruption which Moi had failed to clamp down. Kibaki said that corruption would cease to be a way of life in Kenya. Soon after being sworn-in, Kibaki moved to create institutions to deal with the challenge. He established the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) and appointed John Githongo as PS in his office to deal with matters of ethics in the public sector. Within a few months, he got Parliament to enact the public officer ethics legislation to compel all public servants to declare their wealth. The legislation tightened protocols to discourage favoritism, nepotism and administrative malpractices in government. From all initial indications, Kenyans were convinced Kibaki was the man to steer the country away from rampant sleaze which had dominated the two previous administrations. KACC was born out of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) and the Public Officers Ethics Act of 2003 which became fully operational on 2 May 2003. The Act also established the Kenya Anti- Corruption Advisory Board (KACAB), a body which recommends to Parliament persons to be appointed as director and assistant directors, and advises the commission on the exercise of its powers and performance of its functions. However, while the anti-corruption push, led from the front by President Mwai Kibaki, started with a bang it faltered within eight months. Through a series of circulars, directives, committees, commissions and endless meetings, the fight against corruption was bureaucratised, effectively reduced to an annual laundry list by the anti-corruption authority of what they mostly hadn’t achieved, and the odd court appearance by suspects wearing broad smiles and expensive suits.

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In August 2010, a new constitution was promulgated in Kenya, which made far-reaching changes on governance, leadership, integrity in the anti-corruption regime. Article 79 of the Constitution required Parliament to enact legislation to establish an independent body to ensure compliance with and enforcement of Chapter Six of the Constitution. Pursuant to this Article, Parliament enacted the Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission Act, No. 22 of 2011 which came into effect on 5th September 2011. The Act amended the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (ACECA) by repealing the provisions establishing Kenya Anti Corruption Commission and its Advisory Board, while retaining all other provisions relating to corruption offences and economic crimes, their investigation and prosecution.

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After billions of dollars have been spent in the war on graft, today, corruption is undergoing a moral and political paralysis. Largely due to the politicization of corruption by the Kenyan political class in their battles for 2022, and more fundamentally because the standard post-colonial logic that “all would be fine” if it were not for the corruption of some persons and their ability to mobilise their own ethnic groups in pursuit of the public purse has been falsified. The political vernacular of corruption has lost its luster, especially with the millennial generation, who today perceive corruption not as the abuse of public office for private gain but the abuse itself lays in the existence of the public office. Indeed, the very idea and roots of the Kenyan state is that of “corruption” and of the continuous abuse of its citizens.

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The author is an analyst based in Nairobi, Kenya.

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Revealed: Majority of US Voters Support Patent Waiver on COVID-19 Vaccines

Shock poll reveals majority support for Joe Biden to suspend TRIPS and support global vaccination.

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Photo: Hakan Nural on Unsplash
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A new poll finds that 60% of US voters want President Joe Biden to endorse the motion by more than 100 lower- and middle-income countries to temporarily waive patent protections on Covid-19 vaccines at the World Trade Organization. Only 28% disagreed.

The survey, carried out by Data for Progress and the Progressive International, shows a super majority of 72% registered Democrats want Biden to temporarily waive patent barriers to speed vaccine roll out and reduce costs for developing nations. Even registered Republicans support the action by margin of 50% in favor to 36% opposed.

The new polling shows that “there is a popular mandate from the US American people to put human life and economic recovery ahead of corporate profits and a broken intellectual property system,” said David Adler, the general coordinator of the Progressive International. Burcu Kilic, research director of the access to medicines program at Public Citizen and member of Progressive International’s Council, called on Biden to “listen to Americans who put him in power” and “do the right thing.”

Revealed: Majority of US Voters Support Patent Waiver on COVID-19 VaccinesDue to WTO intellectual property rules, countries are barred from producing the current leading approved vaccines, including US-produced Moderna, Pfizer and Johnson & Johnson. In October of 2020, South Africa and India presented the WTO with a proposal to temporarily waive these rules for the duration of the pandemic so that vaccines can be manufactured across different countries, increasing their availability, reducing their cost and ensuring that they are delivered to everyone on earth as quickly as possible.

In the absence of the waiver, the current manufacturing and distribution rates are unlikely to stem the pandemic’s momentum, especially as new variants, which are more infectious and seem to evade the acquired immunity from prior infection or from the current vaccines, continue to emerge. The US under President Trump joined other richer nations to block them.

The shock poll reveals a level of public support for intellectual property waivers that will likely add to growing congressional pressure on Biden to join those pushing to save lives through a global vaccination drive. Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky is working on a letter to the president to which Schakowsky says more than 60 lawmakers have added their signature, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi.

Senator Bernie Sanders, Chair of the Senate Budget Committee, responded to the poll saying the US should be “leading the global effort to end the coronavirus pandemic.” According to Sanders, “a temporary WTO waiver, which would enable the transfer of vaccine technologies to poorer countries, is a good way to do that.”

Responding to the new poll, Representative Ilhan Omar called on Biden to “support a waiver to boost the production of vaccines, treatment and tests worldwide,” arguing that it was “not just an issue of basic morality, but of public health.”

Adler argues, “US Americans know rigged rules to prop up big pharma’s profits are not in their interest. The longer the virus has to spread, the more it can mutate and become vaccine-resistant. Covid-19 anywhere is a threat to public health and economic wellbeing everywhere. If intellectual property restrictions are not lifted, the pandemic will go on for longer, killing more people and damaging more livelihoods.”

The threat to the Global South from vaccine apartheid is a “death sentence for millions around the world—and it is because giant pharmaceutical corporations would rather maximize profit than provide vaccines to people who need it,” according to Omar.

Sanders agrees, saying “the bottom line is, the faster we help vaccinate the global population, the safer we will all be. That should be our number one priority, not maximizing the profits of pharmaceutical companies and their shareholders.”

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Erosion of Civil and Political Rights in Africa: Ibrahim Index (IIAG) 2020 Report

The IIAG report concludes that 2020 was a terrible year for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa where political freedoms have deteriorated over the last decade, with citizens having less freedom to assemble in 2019 than they did in 2010.

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Erosion of Civil and Political Rights in Africa: Ibrahim Index (IIAG) 2020 Report
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Is there a link between democratic liberties and human rights on one hand, and good governance and economic progress on the other? Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall, a thirty-year orthodoxy has argued that the former are indispensable to the latter. However, a report by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation raises questions about this.

2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)According to the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), political freedoms across the African continent have continued to deteriorate over the last decade, with citizens having less freedom to assemble in 2019 than they did in 2010, and the trend has accelerated since 2015. On the other hand, countries’ scores in the Human Development and Foundations for Economic Opportunity categories have improved, with the biggest strides being made in infrastructure and health.

And although African countries made progress in overall governance during the last decade, the rate of improvement has slowed down over the last five years which explains the below average score in 2019.

Does this mean that the Chinese model of development—which views human and political rights as a barrier to economic progress—is supplanting the Western model, which proposes that they should go hand-in-hand on the continent?

Andrea Ngombet, a human rights activist and former presidential candidate in the Republic of Congo, says that there is more to it than that.

“To be completely honest, the combination of Chinese money, Western companies’ corruption and African autocrats’ lust for power are the causes of the retreat of democracy. All of them have no interest in a democratic Africa with tax to pay, protected workers and protected environment,” he said.

When asked why democracy is in retreat in African countries, Ngombet explained, “China [reinforces] African autocrats with cheap loans which they use for clientelism and populist projects. As the loans are without any democratic conditions, it allows the autocrats to resist the civil society pressure for democracy and accountability.”

Ngombet also explains that, “When looking at the quality of economic growth, it comes with bad loans over authoritarian regimes and those loans finance unprogressive infrastructure.”

The IIAG report shows that Gambia—the most improved of the 54 African countries—experienced the most changes after 2016 when Yahya Jammeh’s repressive 22-year-reign ended, although the current regime still faces challenges in enforcing environmental policies and in the areas of quality of education, law enforcement and compliance with international health regulations.

Source: 2020 Ibrahim’s Index

Source: 2020 Ibrahim’s Index

 

 

The study, whose goal was to help further the conversation on governance in the continent and assess current and emerging trends, analysed 237 variables from 40 different sources. It revealed that African countries are performing the worst in the Participation, Rights & Inclusion category (with an overall average score of 46.2 in 2019). This decline is caused by a deteriorating security situation and an increasingly “precarious environment for human rights and civic participation”.

Source: 2020 Ibrahim’s Index

Source: 2020 Ibrahim’s Index

Nearly half the countries on the continent had less freedom to associate and assemble and a shrinking space for political pluralism and civil society at the close of the 2010s than they had at the beginning of the decade. This was the continuation of a diminution of civil liberties in the second half of the 2000s following improvements in the first half of that decade.

In particular, compared to the country’s scores in 2010, Kenya’s scores for freedom of association and assembly as well as media freedom fell by over 20 per cent from 2015 while the indicators for transparency and accountability, as well as anti-corruption mechanisms also fell during the same period.

However, the Ibrahim report does indicate that the indicators for digital access, energy access, infrastructure and human resources in the education sector have shown a marked improvement under the current Kenyan regime. This is despite a huge debt burden and numerous unresolved corruption cases.

Increased restrictions have been placed on the establishment and operations of civil society and non-governmental organisations which have also experienced higher cases of repression and persecution in most African countries. Political parties have experienced reduced access to state-owned media and public financing for their campaigns which has curtailed their operations.

Democratic elections, the only indicator that had shown a steady improvement since 2010, took a downward spiral in 2015. Election results in countries such as Uganda, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Central Africa Republic, Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Congo have been consistently disputed as the integrity of the electoral process and the independent functioning of election-monitoring bodies have been compromised.

“You can not have democratic elections in the absence of strong institutions such as Independent judiciary, a parliament that is not completely corrupted, independent press, civil societies to monitor and people to engage citizens ahead of elections and inform them by helping them understand democracy rest on their shoulders, governance rests on their shoulder, and not the person that they’ll vote in for,” Tutu Alicante, executive director at EG Justice in  Equatorial Guinea explains.

“It is us that [create] democracy. It is us that [create] governance and all the security, rule of law and human development and not the person [who] as soon as elected will focus on their pockets and family.”

Countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Chad, DRC, Rwanda and Cameroon that have scored dismally in the participation, rights and inclusion category, have all been under the rule of African leaders who have clung on to power.

These findings resonate with those of the 2020 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index which placed Chad, Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of Congo at the bottom of the rankings in democracy in Africa, measured by electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties.

It may be encouraging for citizens of Djibouti, Somalia and Eswatini that although their countries are among those with the least scores in terms of participation, they have registered improvements over the decade.

“Full democratic participation is essential for the development in our society. In Africa if we are thinking about Ubuntu as a basic principle of our society, then clearly democracy is needed in a way in which we all participate in order for us as a society to rise up,” Tutu adds.

Egypt has performed exceedingly well in the score for infrastructure (80/100), and health development indicators (all above 60/100) yet, surprisingly, the country is the third least performing country in Africa, after Burundi and Eritrea—with a score of 7.9/100—when it comes to participation as a principal of good governance.

Egypt has been under dictatorship since the Arab Spring overthrew Hosni Mubarak in 2011. The government has authorised the blocking of close to 500 websites belonging to news outlets, blogs and human rights organisations, and in 2017 blocked the use of internet tools such as VPNs.

Other countries that have experienced drastic internet shutdowns, legal digital restrictions and surveillance include Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Morocco, Benin, Rwanda, Morocco, DRC and Uganda. This often happens during electioneering periods or citizen protests despite “freedom of expression being a fundamental human right enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the cornerstone of democracy”, according to UNESCO, an organisation to which most of these countries belong.

Countries that have managed to transition from dictatorships or civil wars, such as Sierra Leone, Gambia, Togo, Angola and Sudan manifest increasing improvement in their citizens’ access to the fundamental civil rights.

African governments are slowly becoming more inclusive and equal in the provision of public services and the creation of socioeconomic opportunities.

Kenya and Somalia have seen the most improvements under the Gender indicator. Although Kenya has faced difficulties in passing the two-thirds gender rule (leading former Chief Justice Maraga to direct that the president dissolve parliament), it has made impressive strides in providing social-economic opportunities for women and in the representation of women in the executive even though gender equality in civil rights has declined substantially.

In contrast, women in South Africa, Ghana and Equatorial Guinea are enjoying less protection against gender violence.

Is it a question of striking a delicate balance between good overall governance and maintaining the economic growth and security of a country? Or might too much freedom lead to coups and mutiny?

The EUI Democracy report ranked Mali and Burkina Faso—both of which do not have full control over their territories and experience rampant insecurity precipitated by jihadist insurgents—as the worst performing countries in West Africa in terms of democracy. They were downgraded from “hybrid regime” to “authoritarian regime”. The report concludes that overall it was a terrible year for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 31 countries were downgraded, eight stagnated and only five improved their scores.

It is an interesting phenomenon that, despite low scores in civil and political rights, the best scores are to be found in the Foundations for Economic Opportunity and Human Development categories with 20 countries having improved their governance score in these two areas, albeit at a slowed rate in the last five years. The biggest strides have been made in the Infrastructure and Health indicators, complemented by improvements in Environmental Sustainability.

More often than not, infrastructure and health projects are marred by allegations of corruption and lack of transparency. Yet, a correlation model run by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation shows that there is a strong and positive correlation between the overall governance score and specific indicators such as rule of law and justice, inclusion and equality, anti-corruption, transparency and accountability and business environment. Even though statisticians agree that “correlation does not imply causation”, this model indicates that countries with higher scores in those indicators also have higher overall governance scores.

Yuen Ang argues that “the idea that economic growth needs good governance and good governance needs economic growth takes us to a perennial chicken-and-egg debate” whereas Meles Zenawi has claimed “There is no direct relationship between economic growth and democracy historically or theoretically. Democracy is a good thing in and of itself irrespective of its impact on economic growth and my view is that in Africa most of our countries are extremely diverse that maybe the only option of keeping relationships within nations sane. Democracy may be the only viable option of keeping these diverse nations together, we need to democratise but not in order to grow, we need to democratise in order to survive as a united same nation.”

The 2020 IIAG report paints a picture of a continent that had long embarked on the road to decline in rights, civil society space and participation before it was hit by COVID-19. Even though Africa accounts for 3.5 per cent of the global reported COVID-19 deaths, the pandemic is now threatening hard-won gains in areas such as foundations for economic opportunity and human development.

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The Music of the Nyayo Era

Perhaps, we argue, that if we listen to the popular music of his twenty four year rule can we observe the fingerprint and maybe get a glimpse of the Man and his legacy.

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The Music of the Moi Years
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This week marks the first anniversary since the death of the second president of Kenya, Daniel Torotich Arap Moi. Indeed, much has been written and said about Daniel arap Moi, and his death uncorked a litany of previously hidden details and insights into the Shakespearian drama he presided over while in office.

But how do we evaluate the legacy of Moi’s agency during his time in office?

Is it through the memoirs that will and have been written, the popular slogans that were created by his regime and sang by his supporters or is it the “official” narrative peddled by the state? Or is it, perhaps, the pain his detractors and critics faced or the scars of the victims who suffered his heavy hand?

Popular music reflects the culture of our day. Through it, we can observe the blueprint of an age in the lyrics and sound of that time.

Perhaps, we argue, that if we listen to the popular music of Moi’s twenty four year rule can we observe the fingerprint and maybe get a glimpse of the Man and his legacy.

The following is a chronological account of the sounds and hits that defined the twenty four year rule of Daniel Torotich Arap Moi.

1978: The Kenya scene is just coming off of Daudi Kabaka’s African Twist. But we must start with that style Msichana wa Elimu, a song that advises about marriage. Daudi Kabaka was born in 1939 and died in 2001, was a popular Kenyan vocalist, known by his fans as the undisputed King of twist. Jomo Kenyatta died on August 27th of 1978 and President Daniel Torotich took over as the second president of Kenya.

 

1979: Nico Mbarga has taken over Africa with Sweet Mother. Locally Slim Ali and The Hodi Boys Band are all the rave, playing in hotel lounges and clubs across the Middle East and North Africa and ended up in Kenya Slim Ali is from Mombasa. Here, President Moi is still loved and respected by many people. He enjoys popular support from the people. A pull-out from the Nation describes him as a humble and accessible president.

1980: Fadhili Williams re-releases Malaika. The song was first recorded by a Tanzanian musician Adam Salim in 1945. Fadhili was born in Taita Taveta in 1938 and died in 2001.

1981:  Maroon Commandos and Habel Kifoto produce Charonyi Ni Wasi.

1982: The August 1st coup, a failed attempt to overthrow President Daniel Arap Moi’s government so musicians are under pressure to release unity and praise songs. The biggest hits come from Jambo Bwana by Them Mushrooms which was featured in Cheetah, a Disney film that had the phrase Hakuna Matata which became very popular when Disney released The Lion King later.

1983: Safari Sounds Band releases are recorded That’s Certified Gold. Among the biggest hits were Mama lea mtoto wangu.

1984: Moi has banned Congolese music. But he changes his mind after the release of Mbilia Bel – Nakei Naïrobi (“El Alambre”).

1985:  By now the Nairobi live scene has suffered because of the effects of  the 1982 coup and Moi’s informal censorship. The dark days of the Nyayo era at a crescendo. Detention without trial of many political prisoners and others flee the country at risk of facing the heavy hand of the regime. Still, a rebirth happens in the music scene led by Sal Davis and The Establishment The music isn’t politically conscious however.

1986:  The many detentions of the Nyayo era has also killed the vernacular live scene. State operatives at the time saw these spaces as points of political mobilisation, but Joseph Kamaru leads a little uprising popularising Kikuyu vernacular hits.

1987:  D.O Misiani and Orch come to the scene. And Shirati Band releases some seditious tracks among them Safari Ya Musoma.

1988:  Mombasa Roots Band arrived on the scene with Disco Chakacha – originally released in 1986.

1989: Ten years after it was founded Muungano Choir finally created a pop smash hit Safari Ya Bamba. The following year they released Missa Luba recorded in Germany after the Berlin wall came down, ending the cold war era and the triumphant of liberal democracy.

1990: Les Wanyika released an earthshaking album. One of the biggest hits was Sina Makosa

1991: Albert Gacheru makes his way through Kikuyu Pop music. His biggest hit Mariru – Kikuyu Mugithi Songs

1992: JB Maina releases Mwanake. And Japheth Kassanga, Mary Wambui, Helen Akoth and Mary Atieno are redefining gospel music with the shows Joy Bringers and Sing and Shine.

1993:  Diversification happens in Kenya’s music industry. Many acts like Sheila Tett, Musically Speaking – later Zanaziki and a boy band called 5 Alive change the music scene. Among the many tracks released by Zanaziki is a popular hit. Also, Okatch Biggy and not to forget Princess Julie who create the soundtrack to the Moi government response to HIV in Kenya Dunia Mbaya.

Mid-90s: Urban Music is now bigger than was ever expected. Another boy band Swahili Nation Mpenzi makes their way into the music scene. The opening up of Kenya’s democratic space after the repeal of section 2a in 1991, the import of American culture and growth of local media outlets drastically shifted Kenya’s music scene.

Ted Josiah brings out a  guy called Hardstone – Uhiki who is loved by the growing young urban population.

Jimmi Gathu and others organise for a musician called Eric Wainaina to do the first version of a new national anthem dubbed Kenya Only

Shadez O Black are challenging Hardstone for the artiste of the year award with this smash hit: Serengeti Groove.

Still in the mid 90s there’s a cultural earthquake that changed the music scene in Kenya. Kalamashaka’s hit –Tafsiri Hii. A culmination of  poor governance by the Nyayo era, the structural adjustment programs of the 80’s and 90’s and new young urban generation raised by a staple of America’s hip hop culture and Nairobi’s budding urban culture produces a socially and politically conscious movement of artists who go by the moniker Ukoo fulani.

Eric Wainaina later drops Nchi ya Kitu kidogo. The song that Moi’s government truly hated.

2000s: The music scene expands dramatically and is ungovernable A growing sign that the years of Moi were coming to an end and that he could not hold on any longer to power. Ogopa Deejays arrive in the music scene. The biggest song of those first two years, the soundtrack to the Exit if Moi. All the way from Okok Primary school Gidigidi Majimaji – Unbwogable. This song was used as a slogan by the coalition government that removed Moi from power.

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