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On 16 September 2025, thirteen years after 21-year-old Agnes Wanjiku Wanjiru was assaulted, strangled, stabbed and her body dumped in a septic tank in Nanyuki, Kenya (allegedly) by British soldiers stationed at the British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) base in Nanyuki, the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi issued a warrant of arrest for British national Robert James Purkiss for the murder of Wanjiru. Kenya’s Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) sought the arrest warrant to facilitate extradition proceedings for Purkiss who returned to the United Kingdom (UK) soon after the murder of Wanjiru. Purkiss was arrested by UK authorities in Wiltshire, UK, on 6 November 2025.
The arrest has reignited the six-decade-long debate about the asymmetrical nature of the successive defence agreements between Kenya and the United Kingdom, the first of which was concluded in June 1964, just six months after Kenya’s independence from the UK. The current pact – Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Defence Co-operation (2021 Agreement) – was signed on 27 July 2021 to replace the Defence Co-operation Agreement signed in 2015 and that expired on 6 October 2021. The Agreement was laid before the UK parliament until 17 January 2022 and ostensibly subsequently ratified by the UK, while Kenya’s National Assembly debated and approved the ratification on 12 April 2023.
Kenya-UK military cooperation has for decades been plagued by controversy. In the sixty years that BATUK has operated in Kenya, its main training base – located on hundreds of acres in Nanyuki, Laikipia County – has been implicated in multiple nefarious activities and abuses against local civilians and their property. BATUK has been implicated in multiple deaths and injuries caused to civilians, including children, and to livestock as a result of direct confrontation with its soldiers or resulting from unexploded and uncleared ordnance. BATUK’s activities have also caused environmental damage over the years, the most recent being in March 2021 when, for five straight days, about 12,000 acres of Lolldaiga Hills Conservancy were ravaged by a fire resulting from reckless deployment of explosives by BATUK soldiers, causing extensive damage to the environment, biodiversity and the ecological system. In August 2025, the UK government reportedly agreed to an out-of-court compensation of approximately £3.9 million (about £505 for each of the 7,723 landowners), a measly amount considering the extent of the damage.
BATUK soldiers have also over the years been severally implicated in a long line of grave sexual violence against the local population, including rape, gang rapes and sexual assault (see TJRC Report, vol. IIA, pp. 750–752) and murder, as well as discriminatory practices regarding labour and employment. Prominently, in March/April 2012 in Nanyuki, Kenya, Agnes Wanjiku Wanjiru was assaulted, strangled, stabbed and dumped in a septic tank while still alive (allegedly) by BATUK soldiers; her corpse was discovered two months later. BATUK and the UK government have been accused of subsequently covering up the murder, including by frustrating investigations and efforts to bring the perpetrators to justice. An inquest conducted by a Kenyan magistrate opined in November 2019 that Wanjiru was murdered by British soldiers attached to BATUK. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) recommended further investigations which were conducted by the Directorate of Criminal Prosecutions. After reviewing the investigation file, the DPP sought an arrest warrant in September 2025 against one Robert James Purkiss (a former BATUK soldier) to facilitate extradition proceedings, which warrant was issued by the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi on 16 September 2025.
The 2021 Agreement: a missed opportunity
The 2021 Agreement was, therefore, expected to provide guarantees of non-recurrence of abuses by BATUK soldiers, particularly considering that no UK soldier has ever been held criminally responsible for any of the above crimes, and compensation by the UK government for injuries caused to civilians has been sporadic, grossly inadequate and involved BATUK not admitting legal responsibility. The Agreement, however, falls short of expectations in several respects.
First, as a general matter, Article 6(1) of the Agreement subjects the visiting UK forces to the laws of Kenya. However, pursuant to Article 6(2)–(4) of the Agreement, the UK retains jurisdiction over offences against property/security of the visiting forces or of members of the visiting forces, and offences arising in the course of official duty. Kenya may request this primary right to exercise jurisdiction to be waived, and the UK “may give sympathetic consideration” to such request. Additionally, Kenya’s Attorney General may certify that Kenya ought to exercise jurisdiction in the public interest or in the interest of the administration of justice, and request the UK to waive its primary jurisdiction, or request the Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee (which comprises senior military and civil service officials from both states) to direct the UK to waive primary jurisdiction.
This provision, therefore, has a particular disenfranchising effect in the Kenyan context. Most of the injuries to persons and damage to property over the years have been caused by visiting UK soldiers “during the course of official duty”. The UK has never prosecuted any of its soldiers for these offences, and compensation, if any, has been sporadic, grossly inadequate and involved the UK not admitting legal responsibility. As such, this provision simply enables and perpetuates the impunity of visiting UK soldiers for all manner of injury and damage caused in Kenya as long as these are classified as occurring “during the course of official duty”, a rather broad and ambiguous classification that could possibly mean anything and everything that BATUK considers to be official duty.
Second, Article 6(5) of the Agreement recognises Kenya’s primary jurisdiction over offences not arising in the course of official duty and lists these as: sexual offences; torture; inhumane or degrading treatment of persons; transnational organised crimes; slavery; offences against Kenya’s security; robbery; and attempting, aiding and abetting the commission of the aforementioned offences.
Of particular concern, however, and given the controversial history of BATUK, is that the offence of murder was not included in this list. The only close reference in the Agreement is with respect to death resulting from an act committed in the course of official duty [article 6(7)], which is in any case within the primary jurisdiction of the UK unless it gives “sympathetic consideration to” Kenya’s request for the waiver of such jurisdiction. Notably, many previous deaths of civilians resulting from BATUK’s activities, including from reckless and negligent acts such as leaving explosives and unexploded ordinances lying around, have been classified as resulting from an act committed in the course of duty and would, therefore, be outside Kenya’s jurisdiction.
Consequently, the Departmental Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations of Kenya’s National Assembly recommended in March 2023 that Article 6(5) be amended to include murder in the list of offences over which Kenya has primary jurisdiction. Kenya’s parliament approved the ratification with this reservation in April 2023. However, as this so-called reservation was effectively a proposed “amendment” to the Agreement, the consent of both parties in accordance with their internal treaty ratification processes was required for the amendment to also become effective (Article 26 of the Agreement). It is unclear whether the UK subsequently ever consented to Kenya’s proposed amendment. The prevailing position, it appears, is that since the UK parliament had earlier approved ratification of the Agreement without any amendments or reservations, the Agreement then entered into force following the Kenyan parliament’s approval in April 2023, but in its original form without the proposed amendment to include murder in the list of offences over which Kenya has primary jurisdiction.
Environmental protection
Third, Article 8 of the Agreement provides in general terms that the parties “shall ensure protection, preservation and restoration of the environment” in the training areas, establishments and installations in accordance with Kenyan law and international law, including by avoiding “acts that negatively impact on the human health and safety, property, flora and fauna”. Kenyan authorities are obligated to conduct regular inspection of training areas to ensure compliance, and are entitled to verify the compliance measures put in place by the visiting forces.
Notably, however, the Agreement does not provide any clarity on the specific share of legal responsibility to be borne by Kenya and the UK with respect to any environmental damage caused by the visiting forces. This is a particularly vital aspect considering the environmental damage that BATUK has been accused of over the years, and the lack of accountability for the damage.
Civil claims and liabilities
Fourth, Article 11 of the Agreement recognises Kenya’s jurisdiction over civil claims and liabilities.
Notably, however, Kenya and the UK have expressly waived any claims arising out of official duty that Kenya or the UK may have against each other for injury to armed forces personnel and damage/loss of armed forces property. Effectively, therefore, neither Kenya nor the UK will be entitled to compensation for any injury to armed forces personnel including death and damage to armed forces property that may result from the activities of visiting UK forces.
Third party claims and liabilities are, however, unaffected by the above waiver. Kenya has jurisdiction over these claims, and both parties have an obligation to cooperate in investigations of such claims, and where the liability of UK forces is established, the UK is obligated to pay “prompt and adequate compensation”. Article 23 further emphasises the obligation of visiting forces to pay compensation where their liability has been established for death, injury, loss/damage to persons/property of local communities including arising from sexual exploitation. The issue of third-party claims is, nonetheless, made ambiguous by other provisions of the Agreement.
To begin with, Article 22 of the Agreement on protection of information is likely to frustrate efforts at establishing liability for third-party claims. Specifically, the provision prohibits disclosure to third parties of “classified information or material” relating to the Agreement without prior written consent of the party from which the information/material originates. As previous incidents/cases involving visiting UK forces in Kenya have proven, it is very unlikely that the UK will consent to the release of information/material to third parties, especially when such information/material relates to incidents/cases involving UK soldiers. The UK could simply classify information relevant to incidents/cases involving UK soldiers as confidential, and the third parties would then be unable to access it.
Moreover, despite the fact that Article 11 of the Agreement recognises the primacy of host state jurisdiction over “civil claims and liabilities arising from activities in its territory”, Article 24 of the Agreement empowers the Inter-Governmental Liaison Committee (which comprises senior military and civil service officials from both States) to consider, recommend and oversee the resolution of third party civil claims. The Agreement is, therefore, either vague and ambiguous as regards host state jurisdiction over third party civil claims, or seeks to oust the primary jurisdiction of the host state and its administrative and judicial organs over third-party claims, in favour of the Committee.
Investigation procedures for accidents
The Agreement is vague on investigation procedures for accidents.
Article 11 imposes a general obligation to cooperate in carrying out investigations on third-party claims, but does not prescribe a specific investigative procedure.
Article 19 of the Agreement on investigation procedures for accidents/incidents does not provide much clarity in terms of the specific procedure, other than indicating that such investigation “shall be the responsibility of the authorities of the Party in whose territory the accident or incident under investigation occurred”. This provision is certainly ambiguous and poorly drafted and will likely hamper accountability efforts.
The provision can be read to mean that Kenya (in the case of visiting UK forces on its territory) alone bears the responsibility of investigating all accidents/incidents resulting from the activities of visiting UK forces. On the one hand, this is in line with the principle of sovereignty as Kenya retains primary responsibility over all its territory. On the other hand, this interpretation would appear to absolve the UK of any concrete investigative obligations beyond mere cooperation with Kenya’s investigations. The provision provides in non-mandatory terms that the visiting forces (the UK in this case) may also conduct further investigations, but this does not translate to a mandatory obligation.
Considering the decades of accusations levelled against BATUK and the UK government concerning their apathetic and opaque approach to investigation (if at all) of accidents/incidents arising from the activities of their forces in Kenya, this does not augur well for accountability efforts. Had the parties been keener on accountability, the Agreement would have imposed firmer investigative obligations upon both the host state and the visiting forces, beyond mere “cooperation” and “observer” entitlement for the visiting forces.
To conclude, while “defence co-operation” between Kenya and the UK is unlikely to terminate anytime soon, and while it is unlikely that any agreements governing such “co-operation” between states with vast differences in economic circumstances and military capacity would be entirely balanced, fair and reflective of an equal relationship between the parties, a self-respecting sovereign state has an obligation to its people to ensure that its dealings with other states do not (unnecessarily) expose its nationals to harm. It is quite telling that despite the well-documented harms caused to Kenyan civilians for decades by the activities of the UK military in Kenya, the UK government’s position on the 2021 Agreement as expressed by its then Defence Secretary in an Explanatory Memorandum to parliament is that it “considers that the Agreement has no implications for the UK’s domestic or international human rights obligations”. The UK government’s defiant and unbothered attitude has been and continues to be enabled by the Kenyan government’s failure or inability to assert its responsibilities to its people.
It appears then that the only difference between the current Agreement and previous ones is that it expands bilateral cooperation beyond the traditional “exchange of students in military institutions, training support and cooperation in the defence industry” to include cooperation in “security and defence policy, peacetime military activities, environmental protection, military sports, military medicine, research and development, military exercises, staff talks, technical meetings, and teaching and training personnel”. As regards accountability, the 2021 Agreement seems to give UK soldiers in Kenya a free pass like all previous agreements, or at least retains the very same legal bottlenecks that have frustrated accountability for six decades and enabled impunity by British soldiers in Kenya.
