Turbulence in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa remains one of the most volatile regions on the continent, plagued by persistent conflicts that threaten its stability and development. The region has experienced decades of unrest, failing to break free from protracted conflicts, violent crimes, communal violence, extremism, political instability, proxy wars and state failures. 

The growing tensions in South Sudan, within Ethiopia, between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the insurgency in Somalia, ongoing conflict in Sudan and civil unrest in other parts of the region underscore the challenges faced by the African Union (AU), which plays a crucial role in conflict resolution and peacekeeping. The AU continues to deploy the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) framework which includes key institutions such as the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Panel of the Wise, to address conflict resolution and prevention through proactive and integrated strategies. However, its efforts are frequently hampered by internal divisions and external influences, lack of political will and inadequate resources, which undermine its ability to implement lasting solutions.

Indeed, civilians continue to bear the brunt of these ongoing regional conflicts and instability. According to a 2024 report by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 20.1 million persons have been displaced, triggering a severe refugee crisis, while countless others face loss of life, family fragmentation, and food insecurity that is exacerbated by the effects of climate change. Women and children continue to bear the brunt of the violence as they resort to desperate measures of survival including sexual commerce and child labour. Poverty is on the rise due to economic instability and insecurity while the failure of regional leaders to prioritise dialogue and seek a resolution to the crises in the region continues to fuel a cycle of instability. Historical injustices and impunity for those that commit mass atrocities continue to spur widespread violations against civilians in the region.

Meanwhile, the growing involvement of global powers, notably the Gulf states, driven by strategic interests in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, further complicates peace efforts. Foreign intervention operating under the guise of humanitarian aid while offering military support to conflicts has further complicated efforts to establish lasting peace and security in the region. Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), China, and the United States, have been instrumental in providing financial and military backing to various regional actors, aligning their actions with their own geopolitical goals, such as securing strategic ports and influencing political dynamics. 

In the ongoing conflict in Sudan, the UAE’s alleged military support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in their prolonged conflict with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) exemplifies this trend. In addition, China and the US are increasingly seeking to secure economic and strategic footholds, with China playing a pivotal role in infrastructural development with its Belt and Road Initiative while US policies, counterterrorism approach and reliance on military intervention, particularly in Somalia, have perpetuated conflict rather than foster resolution.

The conflict landscape in the Horn of Africa 

Sudan

Sudan has been engulfed in a devastating conflict since mid-April 2023, with no resolution in sight as the conflict marked its second anniversary on 15 April 2025. The power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) under the command of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) headed by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly known as “Hemedti”, has claimed 150,000 lives and triggered the world’s largest humanitarian crisis on record, with 30.4 million people in urgent need of aid. Furthermore, over 12.5 million people have been displaced, making it the fastest-growing displacement crisis globally. Half of Sudan’s population faces severe food insecurity, while the country’s health system teeters on the edge of collapse. Civilians continue to endure relentless attacks and human rights abuses, with women and children continuing to face horrific, systematic sexual violence. The war’s impact extends beyond Sudan, straining neighbouring countries like South Sudan, Egypt, Chad, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Libya as they struggle to support refugees with minimal international assistance.

Despite multiple mediation efforts, ceasefire attempts have failed. The US and Saudi-led Jeddah talks collapsed, as did subsequent negotiations in Geneva involving Egypt, the UAE, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. With no resolution in sight, Sudan remains trapped in a cycle of war and instability.

Ethiopia’s Tigray Conflict

Rising tensions in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia threaten to reignite conflict as political divisions deepen. The region’s leadership has fractured into two rival factions, with both sides vying for control of the post-war administration, undermining the transitional process outlined in the Pretoria Agreement, creating unrest in society, and instiling fear. Reports of recent military mobilisation along the federal border signal a looming confrontation, with the potential for further destabilisation and spillover into neighbouring Sudan, exacerbating an already volatile situation.

The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which had dominated Ethiopia’s national politics for over 30 years, lost influence when Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali took power in 2018. This led to a two-year bloody war in Ethiopia that began on 3 November 2020, when forces loyal to the TPLF, including some soldiers from the federal government, seized military bases in Tigray. In response, Prime Minister Abiy sent troops with the support of Eritrean federal forces against the TPLF. According to reports, the conflict claimed 600,000 lives, and more than two million people were displaced from their homes between 2020 and 2022. 

A Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) signed between the Government of Ethiopia and the TPLF in Pretoria, South Africa, on 2 November 2022, under the auspices of the AU was able to silence the guns. While the situation in Ethiopia has improved, the lingering effects of the war continue to be felt. 

The incomplete implementation of the CoHA – including the return of the internally displaced, the withdrawal of non-Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF), and the holding of fresh elections in the Tigray region – has led to internal rivalries among the TPLF leaders and a scramble for resources, sparking fears of fresh conflict.

Against this backdrop, the rift between Ethiopia and Eritrea has deepened, despite the troops of both countries fighting alongside each other in Tigray. The relationship has unravelled following Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy’s bid to regain access to the Red Sea via the Somaliland Red Sea access deal; Ethiopia lost access when Eritrea gained independence in 1993. 

As the delay in the implementation of major clauses in the Pretoria Agreement continues to brew frustration in the Tigray region, the exclusion of key conflict actors in the Pretoria Agreement, in particular Eritrea, has seen a major deterioration of relations, with Eritrea aligning itself with the TPLF chairperson, a sign of lingering hostilities. 

South Sudan

Political violence and instability have continued to plague South Sudan. The power struggle between President Salva Kiir and the first Vice-President Riek Machar fuelled the civil war from 2013 to 2018, culminating in the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS, 2015) and the subsequent Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS, 2018). Despite the peace deals, the country continues to grapple with the dilemma of either hastily navigating transitional processes as the power-sharing government remains fragile, risking economic collapse and renewed conflict/intercommunal violence, or extending the transition, further entrenching leaders who have failed to deliver lasting peace. The AU has fallen short of its commitment to support a key national process on which peaceful coexistence, unity, and collective responsibility in South Sudan depend.

The country continues to face a worsening humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the drastic effects of climate change, economic instability and spillover from the civil war in neighbouring Sudan. Political tension and violence have significantly escalated since the beginning of 2025, jeopardising South Sudan’s peace process and political transition. The recent hostilities in Upper Nile, near the border with Ethiopia (particularly Nasir and Ulang Counties), Bahr El-Ghazal, Western Equatoria and Central Equatoria, and the placing under house arrest of Vice-President Machar may lead the country to the brink of renewed conflict. The escalating conflict between various political and ethnic groups follows recent cabinet reshuffles and the arrest of senior officials in February. 

In response to the tension, the African Union Mission in South Sudan (AUMISS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC) urged all parties to de-escalate and restore calm. However, their call has gone unheeded as tensions continue to escalate that may ultimately spiral into large-scale conflict.

National elections have also been postponed twice, with the government citing delays in carrying out what it argues are key prerequisites for elections, to wit, a national census, drafting of a permanent constitution and the registration of political parties, among others.

The reckless power struggle and the rapidly deteriorating security situation could lead to a full-scale civil war reminiscent of the civil war of 2013–2018. The impeded implementation of the 2018 peace deal and the stalled Tumaini Peace Initiative, which seeks to bring holdout opposition groups into government, could worsen the crisis in the country, preventing it from moving forward with the full implementation of the 2018 peace agreement. 

Somalia’s struggle with insurgency

Somalia continues to grapple with persistent challenges, including but not limited to political instability and the presence of the Al-Shabaab, and other insurgencies that compound the current challenges. The presence of the peace missions in the country and the transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and now the new AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) – the third AU mission – has proven that there is need for robust intervention to resolve long-standing issues. AUSSOM inherits many of its predecessor’s challenges – particularly funding, logistics and the uncertainty surrounding an immediate transition according to United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2719 – that have far-reaching implications on national and regional security.

For nearly two decades, Somalia has struggled to establish a robust central government capable of combating Al-Shabaab, an Islamist insurgent group that has capitalised on the feebleness of Somalia’s central government since its reconstitution in 2006. Despite AU efforts through previous missions to contain Al-Shabaab, the group remains a significant threat to peace and security in Somalia.

The country’s federal system is unravelling following President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s push for controversial constitutional changes, triggering resistance from regional states exacerbated by clan-based politics and the lack of inclusive governance. Disputes between Mogadishu and Jubaland have recently deteriorated following the re-election of President Ahmed “Madobe” for a third term, leading to recent clashes that have undermined state-building efforts and created a security vacuum for extremist groups to consolidate power and influence the region. Meanwhile, the recent standoff between Somalia and Somaliland is particularly contentious, with Somaliland asserting its sovereignty claims after signing a memorandum of understanding with Ethiopia to grant naval access to its coast, a move Somalia’s federal government has condemned as an act of aggression. 

Lack of consensus between the government and the Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) – particularly Burundi – threatens the effectiveness of AUSSOM’s peace and stabilisation process, undermining the earlier expectation that the Somali National Security Forces would take over the security responsibilities. 

African-led interventions in the Horn of Africa

The principle of “African solutions to African problems” is proving to be much like pounding sand, despite the avowed commitment to self-reliance, unity, and the ability of African nations to address their own challenges without over-reliance on external actors. Indeed, following recent developments in the Horn of Africa, external actors have overshadowed African institutions as they step in to mediate the crises, indicating a growing reliance on external forces to address major crises. The ongoing conflict in Sudan involving mediation efforts by the US, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, as well as Türkiye’s significant role in mediating the Somalia-Ethiopia standoff, raises questions about the effectiveness of African-led interventions in fulfilling their mandates as key players in African crisis diplomacy.

The AU and other regional organisations like IGAD and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have been ineffective in mediating conflicts and advancing peace initiatives in the region due to overlapping mandates, resource constraints, competing interests, and challenges in coordination under the principle of subsidiarity. The situation in Sudan exemplifies this failure; the AU and IGAD both adopted a roadmap for the Resolution of Conflict in Sudan. These multiple peace processes have undermined the possibility of resolving the conflict. As the AU has allowed the regional mechanisms to take the lead in situations occurring in their regions, it has fallen short of assuming a central role in streamlining these processes. A more inclusive, well-resourced and reformed approach is necessary for the AU and other African-led interventions to intervene more decisively and effectively in the region.

The Pretoria Agreement, a landmark achievement in promoting “African solutions to African problems”, reflects a commendable commitment to AU autonomy in the peace process. However, the AU seems to have taken a back seat in ensuring the full execution of the agreement. According to a report of Africans for the Horn of Africa, the implementation of the agreement had significant gaps that have contributed to the relapse into hostilities, among them lack of transparency by the AU Monitoring Verification and Compliance Mechanism (AU-MVCM), lack of an accountability mechanism, and the exclusion of women from the peace talks.

In Sudan, the AU has deployed a proliferation of peace processes in its efforts to end the war. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) repeatedly condemned the violence, urging a ceasefire and inclusive dialogue. In May 2023, the AU Commission developed a conflict resolution roadmap and established a core group of the expanded mechanism to coordinate global pressure on Sudanese factions. Subsequent efforts included the January 2024 High-Level Panel on Sudan and the June 2024 PSC Ad hoc Presidential Committee led by Uganda’s President Yoweri Museveni to facilitate direct talks. Despite these interventions, meaningful engagement with Sudanese stakeholders remains elusive, and the fighting continues unabated.

Unlike its predecessors, AMISOM and ATMIS, the new mission in Somalia, AUSSOM, is an AU-led peace support operation with UN financing that began its operations in January 2025 with a mandate running through the end of 2028. The new mission aims to establish a stable government, bolster the Somali Security Forces and combat the extremist group Al-Shabaab.

The AU and IGAD have made a long-standing appeal for the South Sudan government to fully implement the 2018 Revitalised Agreement that has faced delays with the unending transition since the country’s independence.

Challenges of African-led interventions in the Horn of Africa

Efforts for regional peace and security continue to face substantial neighbouring-state interventions arising from conflict, limiting the effectiveness of interventions aimed at achieving sustainable peace and stability in the Horn of Africa as the countries struggle to find lasting peace. In the ongoing conflict in Sudan, neighbouring states have indirectly fuelled Sudan’s crisis by providing platforms for belligerents to engage in shuttle diplomacy, undermining peace efforts and deepening political tensions. Hemedti’s diplomatic tours across Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda have allowed him to rebrand himself as a regional statesman, despite the RSF’s documented war crimes and recent US sanctions. Kenya’s President William Ruto, who positions himself as a mediator in Sudan, has been slammed for his close ties with the RSF, an outright violation of international charters, including those of the UN, AU, and IGAD. Ruto’s initiative to host the RSF to form a “parallel government” not only contradicts his supposed neutrality but also derails accountability and shifts focus away from the suffering of Sudanese civilians. By legitimising these engagements, African nations fracture peace efforts, allowing competing interests to entrench instability.

The complexity of Peace Support Operations has been a key challenge, with over-reliance on external actors, unclear mandates, and coordination gaps between various stakeholders. Despite the African Union’s long-standing peace mission in Somalia, the Al-Shabaab insurgency persists, largely due to the absence of robust state institutions and a complex political landscape that hampers state-building efforts. Donor fatigue and insufficient logistical support exacerbate the situation, as resource constraints lead to delayed payments for peacekeepers. 

Indeed, while financing may not be the only challenge, a lack of consensus among TCCs and international partners, driven by conflicting interests, results in operational inefficiencies. A recent example can be seen in the dynamics between Ethiopia and Somalia. Recently, Ethiopia’s troop deployment was rejected by Somalia due to the former’s Red Sea deal with Somaliland. However, a breakthrough was achieved in December 2024 when Türkiye facilitated an agreement that eased tensions, allowing Ethiopian troops to be deployed in AUSSOM. However, Burundi, a long-standing contributor to AU missions in Somalia, is withdrawing its troops following a disagreement with the host government over the number of troops, which has seen the AU taking a less prominent role in influencing decisions over peace support missions.

Many African-led peace-support operations depend heavily on funding and logistical support from international partners such as the UN, the European Union, and individual donor countries. While this support is crucial, it creates vulnerabilities, as funding cuts or delays can disrupt operations and limit their effectiveness, undermining the principle of “African solutions for African problems”, not to mention vested interests. Additionally, the unclear mandate and exit strategy of ATMIS further complicate the situation, leaving the new mission AUSSOM, without well-defined goals and undermining its effectiveness.

The ongoing power struggles among military factions in Sudan and South Sudan have severely undermined democratic transition and peace processes, leading to persistent instability that adversely affects civilians. Despite the proliferation of both international and African-led peace initiatives advocating for ceasefires and collaborative efforts, these calls have largely been ignored. Efforts to facilitate dialogue between conflicting parties have repeatedly faltered, exacerbated by the competing interests of foreign powers drawn by Sudan’s geostrategic significance, which further complicates the pursuit of lasting peace and deepens the conflict. International actors such as the US, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland have been the drivers of these conflict resolution negotiations, with no single inclusive and legitimate AU-led process to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

The slow implementation of peace agreements in South Sudan and Ethiopia has intensified political tensions and violence. In South Sudan the ongoing power struggle between President Kiir and Vice-President Machar, has obstructed the execution of the 2018 peace agreement. Both factions prioritise political dominance over the peace process, fostering mistrust and delaying necessary reforms. In addition, the AU has also abandoned its commitment to facilitating justice for Africans. The delay in the formation of the Hybrid Court in South Sudan undermines the organisation’s principle and its commitment to African-led solutions in pursuing accountability for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes.

This fragmented security environment has exacerbated ethnic and intercommunal violence, undermining national stability. In Ethiopia, persistent ethnic and political tensions, particularly between the federal government and Tigray leaders, further complicate the full realisation of peace agreements. The failure to address unresolved issues in a timely manner has led to renewed violence and ongoing instability in both nations.

Strengthening African-led interventions in the Horn of Africa

While African-led interventions in the Horn of Africa face significant challenges, they also hold immense potential for fostering peace and stability. The African-led intervention needs a rethought and reimagined approach that emphasises African ownership in conflict prevention and resolution. The approach should foster the inclusion of civilian voices in peace negotiations and mediation to prioritise the localisation of efforts and interventions that are tailored to the specific cultural, economic, social, and political dynamics of a region and that address the root causes of the conflict and promote sustainable development.

The AU has often found itself in a position of intervening after conflicts have already escalated, demonstrating a reactive approach to alarming levels, focusing on crisis management rather than prevention. To achieve their full potential, African-led interventions must prioritise a proactive approach by prioritising conflict prevention through robust early warning systems, proactive diplomacy, and regular monitoring mechanisms to prevent the resurgence of armed conflicts and cycles of violence. This may include strengthening governance and building institutional capacity to deliver services, enforce the rule of law, and foster inclusive political systems. 

Secondly, African member states have proven their inability to support their own initiatives including peace operations. The AU does not have an independent source of income and faces untimely and irregular contributions from member states, leaving the organisation dependent on external partners. The AU still relies on the European Union for almost half of its annual budget. This year, the EU has deepened its ties with the AU and has committed €20 million towards achieving sustainable development, inclusive growth, and resilience in Africa, while also strengthening ties between the two regions. In Somalia, funding for peace operations has heavily relied on donor countries; the EU has paid for troops’ stipends in past missions, while the UN has provided logistical support packages to the missions. Funding has been inadequate and unsustainable, a challenge that the new mission, AUSSOM, is experiencing. Therefore, it is crucial for the AU to secure sustainable funding through resource mobilisation from member states, international partners, and innovative financing mechanisms. This is essential to ensure long-term, impactful interventions that contribute to a more stable and prosperous region.

Thirdly, it is crucial for the AU and other regional bodies, including the RECs, to adopt integrated and holistic conflict management strategies that prioritise partnerships, thereby minimising duplication of efforts and enhancing the effectiveness of peace-building initiatives. While the AU provides continental coordination and oversight, there should be properly defined roles while promoting cooperation, compatibility and clarity in the application of the principle of subsidiarity to enable trust and ensure effectiveness rather than competition.

Finally, the AU must prioritise inclusivity, grassroots engagement, and responsiveness to the needs of African citizens to reshape the image of being a “foreign entity”. Fostering inclusive dialogue that addresses the root causes of conflict and aligns peace initiatives with the active participation of civilians, particularly women and youth, can mitigate divisive ethnic and regional politics, ultimately contributing to a more stable and peaceful region. Incorporating community-driven solutions into conflict resolution strategies can significantly enhance the legitimacy of the AU’s peacebuilding efforts.