The Kenyan Tax Revolt as Constitutional Awakening

As the dust seemingly settles from the demographic whirlwind of the Kenyan tax revolt, the scramble to understand the new context as a pathway to prosperity following a recognition of the shifting political needs and perspectives of the country’s youthful population continues.

Various groups are trying to work out their stand on how to effectively engage the youthful Generation Z (Gen Z) in their agitation for a countrywide democratic correction. 

Religious leaders, civil society, the private sector, media, academics and other traditional or formal avenues of engagement are all looking to find their footing in the complexity that has emerged and grown beyond the initial tax revolt.

This follows the #RejectFinanceBill2024 movement that forced President William Ruto to decline to sign the proposed tax legislation. The law was sent back to parliament for formal withdrawal by legislators led by Majority Leader Kimani Ichung’wah and the Finance and Planning Committee Chair Kimani Kuria as the first step of conceding its unpopularity.

Currently, tax laws seem to have abandoned the omnibus approach to annual revision and are being handled separately to avoid stoking public ire any further while also allowing for a keener scrutiny of proposals.

The protests also resulted in the full dissolution of the cabinet, a first under the 2010 Constitution but the second in Kenya’s history; President Mwai Kibaki dissolved his cabinet after losing the 2005 referendum.

A New “Youthpolitik”

Kenyans are still in awe at the persistence of the youth in staying true to the issues of concern, their organisational innovativeness in using social media to build a broad constituency that has rendered tribalism irrelevant, and in the way they have stood up to critique traditionally powerful institutions such as the church.

Surprisingly, they continue to receive the support of their elders – mainly their parents – who are encouraging them to fight for their rights despite worrying about the risks involved such as the unexplained abductions and disappearances.

On the other hand, the attacks directed at the country’s leadership, exemplified by the storming of institutional symbols of power such as the parliament and the regular online or telephone harassment targeting parliamentarians held responsible for voting in the law, remain perplexing to the political establishment. This is because they have been caught off guard by how societal frustrations boiled over to embolden a new “youthpolitik”. The Kenyan political elite are accustomed to a pliant electorate whose emotions are easily manipulated for political ends and hence the Gen Z awakening is giving them sleepless nights.

Having now come out of hiding (they for a time kept a low profile following the protests), many legislators remain on edge and are acutely aware of possible reprisals given how some of their colleagues have been accosted, their offices razed to the ground, their businesses vandalised, or residences and vehicles destroyed. This level of public anger and discontent with the current administration has shocked officialdom.

Calls to reject the tax law have now turned into a #RutoMustGo slogan on X (formerly Twitter) spaces; one such space brought together a record 1.2 million people who for seven straight hours coarsely vented their frustrations against the government and its leadership.

Unfortunately, the deaths resulting from the high-handed police response against angry crowds that stormed parliament is a dark cloud hanging over the aftermath of the protests while the church has lost the opportunity to be a moderating influence because of its past associations with politicians.

Public fury has also been channelled towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, while recent revelations of business dealings with the Indian Adani Group related to the leasing of the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), the construction of transmission lines and substations, healthcare industry integration, and the modernisation of tax technology platforms have only stoked the anger. 

Kenyans increasingly view these developments as a constant infringement of Kenya’s sovereignty thanks to government misadventures that have failed to properly gauge the negative effects on local service delivery. A simmering public anger has therefore continued for months after the protests. 

Meanwhile, despite all attempts to conceal it, the dissonance between the president and his deputy has glaringly played out in the public eye, culminating in an impeachment drama that has ended in the courts.

The dissonance between the president and his deputy has glaringly played out in the public eye, culminating in an impeachment drama that has ended in the courts.

Understanding the current context requires reference to Kenya’s history of tensions that accompany the democratic reversals and transitions that take place every ten to fifteen years when a demographic cohort joins the country’s productive sphere. As each generation comes of age and enters the labour force, it is politically initiated by encountering the burden of historical schisms – as observed between 1982 and 1992, between 1992 and 2002, between 2005 and 2017, and between 2010 and 2024 (at the passage of the 2010 Constitution) – characterised by manifest political violence.

In the preface to Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections, Professor Karuti Kanyinga and Duncan Okello explain this by observing that the country’s democratisation project can be described as offering mixed results on five counts that sustain the country’s political tensions.

First, illiberal tendencies pervade democratic institutions and procedures, with the holding of regular elections serving as a totem for multiparty competition but not leading to the full realisation of constitutional rights or freedoms thereby resulting in the present discontent. Constitutionalism, therefore, continues to be undermined by pervasive tribal mobilisation, conflicts, and rising institutional impunity in governance, creating societal fissures and tensions between the Kenyan political class and the citizenry.

Secondly, political parties have a deficit in internal democracy and are characterised by poor quality rules, unstructured decision making, woeful accountability, personalised rule, and emasculated party structures that do not institutionalise democracy and which, also, in the current instance, stifle youth involvement in governance.

Thirdly, a liberal media environment has been compromised by biased ownership, unprofessional conduct, and content moderation on traditionalist grounds. However, new telecommunication technologies have weakened state or elite controls, allowing unfettered access to information and permitting intense, unregulated citizen dialogue.

Fourth, while institutionally the new constitution may have set up the structure for a more responsive security system, the culture of policing has not improved. The excesses of the police have become more brazen with every new wave of civil disobedience.

Lastly, the unsettled question of women in leadership and their requisite representation still hangs on the national consciousness like an albatross. 

A Legacy of Broken Promises

The Kenyan tax revolt was an upheaval combining the generation that politically came of age during the 2005 referendum, the Millennials, and the younger Gen Z cohort that was born in or after 1997. The legacy of broken promises that they have inherited, the suppression of their aspirations, and their festering grievances have directly powered the societal backlash against political and religious leaders. Considered a coddled demographic, the litany of broken promises of prosperity (Mafanikio) and the shock at the high taxes as they enter salaried employment or their meagre earnings as “Hustlers” in the gig economy have galvanised the Gen-Z revolt.

The legacy of broken promises that they have inherited, the suppression of their aspirations, and their festering grievances have directly powered the societal backlash against political and religious leaders.

The energies now exhibited can be compared to those harnessed during the 2005 referendum period when those born between 1980 and 1990 hit the labour market in search of jobs and opportunities only to be disappointed by the betrayal that came in the wake of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) fallout.

At that time, the generational anger was channelled into the Orange versus Banana referendum politics whose reverberations would be felt in the crisis of the 2007/08 Post-Election Violence (PEV). The same cannot be said of the recent leaderless revolt.

The Zillenial Alliance

While some of the youthful Millennial leaders of that time have come into political positions as principal secretaries, governors, parliamentarians, or the controversial Chief Administrative Secretaries (CAS) through elections, appointments, and nominations, they have not been able to establish the structures that galvanise a critical mass to jumpstart transformation. 

Consequently, they are too locked into the culture of short-term political battles with their elders to fulfil their generational mission. Their lack of transformative progression has stifled the upward mobility of the Gen Z cohort that took to the streets, uniting those with a Free Primary Education (FPE) and those from the International General Certificate of Secondary Education (IGCSE) ranks. 

They are too locked into the culture of short-term political battles with their elders to fulfil their generational mission

The massive occupation of the streets by their younger siblings created an opportunity for a generational “Zillenial” alliance between Millennials and Gen Z to strategically push back against Boomers and the so-called Generation X.

Analysts are reaching out for comparisons from all popular revolutions across history but, considering the cultural element in this moment (the reincarnation of Unbwogable in Anguka Nayo geared towards purging the system), one can begin to see how the demands for a democratic correction share similarities with the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

The pathway to development (Maendeleo) – freedom from poverty by tackling disease, hunger, and ignorance – has been presented to previous generations in many forms but the promises have remained unfulfilled. Be it attaining national values (Maadili), establishing federalism (Majimbo), institutionalising governance principles (Muongozo), concluding constitutional reforms (Mabadiliko), championing political change (Mageuzi), continuing the class struggle (Mapambano) or fomenting countrywide revolution (Mapinduzi) with protests (Maandamano) as the most effective tool over the course of time, none of these appeal to Zillennials any more.

So, like the young Chinese who sought to destroy the “Four Olds” – old ideas, old culture, old customs, and old habits – the Gen Z, in particular, hand in hand with kindred spirited Millennials see all these as old slogans for broken promises and are consequently revisiting all historic visions through pursuing the constitutional promise.

The fluid organisation and technological advances in mobilisation have lent the Kenyan youth a democratic bent that presents an opportunity to make “Three Corrections” (Marekebisho) in their pursuit of a transformative awakening.

The first correction of ideas is that the social contract is not an abstract promise as captured in historical sloganeering. Rather, it is solidly encapsulated in the Constitution of Kenya 2010 that must be fundamentally respected. Greater responsibility for the country’s public finances can only be established by pursuing fair taxation that ensures participation, accountability, non-discrimination, empowerment, and legitimacy in law to guarantee constitutionally enshrined rights.

Second is a correction of the political culture that requires systemic gradualism and patience for the next electoral cycle to bring changes. Gen Z have taken a stand against such generational passivity that is infused with tribal connotations or considerations. Herein lies their suspicion of bureaucratic commissions, select committees, advisory councils, or boards whose hierarchy, continuity, or expertise have been poisoned by corruption and nepotism.

These entities are viewed as spaces that need to correct their tokenistic institutional customs and practices which, as seen in the case of the Finance Bill debate, broke the camel’s back with their insufficient responses to concerns, thereby derailing the momentum for immediate impact on the daily life of Kenyans.

Third is the correcting of habits or behaviours in leadership displayed by politicos and religious leaders. Abhorrent displays of wealth, lavish living, or derogatory and disdainful talk by elected leaders have angered the youth and the society at large.

Sins of the Pulpit

Meanwhile, the church is viewed as complicit in the crimes of politicians by accepting gifts and alms from them at every opportunity. While this segment may have bought time with its initial support to the youth, their offers to help navigate the current turmoil continue to be viewed with suspicion.

The hardness of hearing by the men and women of the cloth is a result of their continued insistence on their divine mandate to shepherd the flock while, on the other hand, their congregants are demanding repentance and solidarity in pursuing good governance.

The clergy’s continued framing of the youth as “troubled” or “restless” as they try to comprehend “their madness” or “anger” is creating a great chasm between them and the youth.

The clergy’s continued framing of the youth as “troubled” or “restless” as they try to comprehend “their madness” or “anger” is creating a great chasm between them and the youth. The church is likely to suffer more distancing from its congregants who will not forget the sins of the pulpit as their political fervour is sustained over the next three years into the 2027 election cycle.

Walking back from the precipice requires a “winning hearts and minds” strategy. Effectively addressing public anxieties, seeking support for proposals, and addressing grievances to the satisfaction of protesters may prevent a return to authoritarianism as witnessed by the reemergence of abductions as a security measure.

For Zillennials, establishing a strategic commitment to action in the spirit of Marekebisho will help them achieve the “Three Corrections” that will institute new rules on engaging governance issues by dispelling obsolete decision making and retaining a democratic resolve to repair the country’s injured republican essence and prevent a constant siege mentality.