For over a decade now, Kenyans have been listening to talk about police reforms. And though it may be true that police now have more fancy crowd control equipment than they did 10 years ago, and more cars, a forensic lab, health care insurance, armed vehicles, and some extra housing, this has yet to translate into better police performance that is noticeable for the average Kenyan. And frankly, there is little reason to be optimistic things will change in the near future.
Ever since its inception by the colonial powers, police in Kenya have functioned as a class institution, where members of the higher classes receive quite different treatment from the lower classes. Rather than serving the interests of the public, police have been serving the interests of those in power, especially when those in power could exercise influence over promotions and removals. For the others, policing in Kenya has since long been characterised by excessive use of force, extra-judicial killings, torture, and corruption.
Police frequently fail to respond professionally to policing situations, whether they involve calls for assistance, criminal investigations, dealing with terrorist threats, managing peaceful protests or even the handling of traffic. As a result, the public lacks confidence and is reluctant to report to the police or otherwise provide them with information.
As with any misconduct, it doesn’t stop at the gates of the institution: members of the police also fall victim to (internal) corruption, nepotism and (sexual) harassment. Nor are all police officers bad – on the contrary, there are many good willing, hardworking officers, who want the system to change, who are desperate to build true professional pride, and who were hoping the reforms would bring the long hoped for changes.
In sum, there is no real incentive for the powers-that-be to build a truly effective, professional, accountable police service.
Also, members of the upper classes are certainly not safe from bad policing. Cases such as the killing of the son of a British aristocrat, Alexander Monsoon, in 2012, the killing of the son of a former MP in 2009, and last April, the killing of the son of a senior police officer spring to mind. Likewise, the upper classes’ safety is hardly guaranteed: though senior members of the political and executive elites usually have substantial security detail (drawn from the police), this provides only some protection, and certainly does not protect against terrorism; a case in point is the death of the President’s nephew during the attack on the Westgate Mall. Make no mistake; without doubt, the lower classes get far worse policing, if any at all, than the middle and upper classes and especially when it comes to the use of force, they find themselves on the receiving end much, much more often than their richer compatriots. But it is not true that policing for the higher classes is without problems.
How did this situation evolve the way it did? First of all, due to systematic underfunding, misallocation of funds and regular inappropriate interference in police operations, the police force has been unable to develop into a service that meets international professional standards. But why did the powers-that-be allow this situation to evolve like this? For this we have to go a bit deeper, looking at how Kenya, with its politics dominated by tribalism and a winner-takes-all mentality, is a country where winning the elections means access to wealth. As such, it is useful for those in power, at whichever level, to have police who are loyal to them, rather than politically neutral servers of the general public.
Moreover, let’s not forget Kenya still is a country with various leaders being accused of various levels of involvement in organised crime and corruption, and with a ‘culture of impunity’ (see Branch 2011; or look at the difficulty the judiciary is having to interpret Chapter VI of the Constitution, let alone getting it implemented in practice). Indeed, reports of political involvement in drug trafficking, ivory poaching and corruption involving senior Government officials and businessmen closely related to the political elite (Gastrow 2011; Kahumbu 2014), make it clear that it may not be that beneficial for the country’s elite to have truly professional police that handle crime effectively: indeed they themselves might be targeted by police investigations. In sum, there is no real incentive for the powers-that-be to build a truly effective, professional, accountable police service.
This says something about the context in which police, and indeed other Government institutions, operate. Police in Kenya, like in most other countries, have a level of discretion to decide how to deal with certain policing situations. Such discretion is often seen as a defining element of police professionalism: within the boundaries set by the law and policies, police officers have a level of freedom to decide how to respond to a given situation, based on the specific nature of that situation. Indeed, where the public trusts the police they are willing to ‘grant’ them operational independence, and discretion, for which the police have to account. Discretion must be balanced by effective accountability, so that afterwards the appropriateness of the police’s actions can be assessed.
What has happened, however, is that the police in Kenya have had limited operational independence, and there was limited if any, effective, external oversight. The lack of oversight made it even easier to deploy the police for personal gain, and also to block investigations and operations that became a threat, and at the same time it gave the police space to serve their own interests, as when they collect bribes and intimidate and harass members of the public. Though it is too simple to say that the police are merely a puppet for those in power – and ultimately the President – it must be recognized they operate within the boundaries set by them. An effective accountability structure that includes independent oversight would greatly diminish the ‘playing field’ of both the rulers they serve as well as their own, and as such is not in the interest of either. The police have been given by and large a free hand, as long as they do not interfere with businesses that should be left unpoliced and instead ‘deal with’ crime and other security threats; that free hand has, however, extended beyond control, hence the extortions, killings, and tortures.
The police have been given by and large a free hand, as long as they do not interfere with businesses that should be left unpoliced and instead ‘deal with’ crime and other security threats; that free hand has, however, extended beyond control, hence the extortions, killings, and tortures.
It should be noted that this context is facilitated by a sometimes rather permissive attitude of the general public towards police misconduct, and mixed messages about what it is they want from the police. For example, with regards to killings by the police, all too often the comments from the general public are not only permissive, but sometimes even literally calling on the police to kill more. Civil society could, and should, play a role in opening up, and guiding the public debate about the type of police we want for Kenya today. Yet, to date, such a debate has yet to materialize.
Over the years, this situation led to ever-louder calls, by civil society and other stakeholders, for police reforms. For some 15 years now, there have been several reform efforts. A first comprehensive police reform effort was undertaken in 2003-4 after the NARC Government came to power on an agenda of change and anti-corruption. An ambitious police reform document (Strategic Plan 2004-2008) was developed, largely focusing on improving salaries and allowances and enhancing budget allocation to address infrastructural, operational and administrative concerns, but failed to propose substantial reforms that would have resulted in more accountable, more fair and effective policing. Calls for police reforms gained strength after the 2007/08 post-election violence. Domestic actors and representatives of the international community convinced the two principals, Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga, to sign the ‘National Peace Accord’, of which ‘Agenda item 4’ addresses ‘Long term issues and solutions’, including ‘Constitutional, legal and institutional reform’. It is under this agenda item that police reform was addressed. As the National Task Force on Police Reform later noted: “the inclusion of Police Reform under ‘Agenda Four’ stemmed from a strong feeling that the level of post-election violence and destruction would have been minimized had the Police responded in a professional non-partisan manner” (p.1).
In line with the Peace Accord, the coalition-Government established the ‘Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence’ (also known as the CIPEV Commission, or Waki Commission, named after its Chair, Justice Philip Waki). ‘Waki’ revealed that, not only had the police been unable to prevent the violence or protect members of the public against it, they also actively contributed to the violence, with estimates that one third of the people who were killed died at the hands of members of the police. The two Principals agreed to implement certain recommendations from ‘Waki’, including the establishment of an Independent Police Service Commission and an Independent Police Conduct Authority, as well as the establishment of the National Task Force on Police Reforms in May 2009, (known as the ‘Ransley Commission’ after its Chair, Retired Justice Philip Ransley). ‘Ransley’ was tasked to evaluate the current police, and make recommendations for improvement. In total, ‘Ransley’ made over 200 recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, conditions of service, provision of welfare benefits and greater security for officers, enhance accountability and create attitude and culture change. It called for establishing an effective complaints system, a Police Council and a Police Service Commission. After Ransley, the Government set up the Police Reform Implementation Committee (PRIC) to prepare implementation of the recommendations.
The key objective of the current reform project, as laid down by the Police Reforms Implementation Committee in 2011, is to enhance police professionalism and accountability; its ultimate goal ‘is to transform the police force into an effective, efficient and trusted police service’. The reforms have been codified in the 2010 Constitution and subsequent laws, most notably the National Police Service Act (c.11a), National Police Service Commission Act (c.30) and Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act (c.35), all of 2011. The Constitution gives an outline of the accountability infrastructure for the police. Overall command over the two Police Services, i.e. the Administration Police Service and the Kenya Police Service, is with the Inspector General who has security of tenure for four years, and is given independence of command. The Constitution prohibits the Cabinet Secretary, or anybody else, from interfering in police operations, investigations or employment and deployment matters. This also means that the Provincial Administration, or its equivalent, can no longer direct the police, which is a huge break with the past. Secondly, the Cabinet Secretary can give policy guidance only and this has to be in writing. Thirdly, the Constitution establishes the National Police Service Commission (the Commission, or NPSC) as responsible for recruitment and appointment and confirmation of promotions and transfers and gives the Commission the authority to observe due process, exercise disciplinary control and remove persons holding or acting in offices within the NPS. Even though the NPSC is a hybrid of both police and non-police (the IG and the two Deputy IGs are members, and the Commission includes two retired police officers, one from each branch of the Police Service; only the other four members are non-police), its independence is guaranteed under the Constitution. Fourthly, the Constitution places all national security organs under civilian authority and instructs the police to behave according to well-defined values of integrity and to reach out to the communities.
Yet, trouble loomed from the start. Normally, when a Bill has been adopted in Parliament, and is assented to by the President, it is sent to the Government’s Printer for printing and publication. As the key hurdle is parliamentary approval, followed by the President’s assent, printing should be a technicality only. Not so this time. Though the IPOA and the NPSC Acts were released fairly quickly, the NPS Act was only published one year later, in July 2012. Also, setting up the relevant institutions, most notably IPOA and the NPSC, was faced with delays. The IPOA Board was only appointed in June 2012 and the NPSC Commissioners were appointed in October 2012, more than a year after the Act was adopted in Parliament.
Tellingly, to date, there have been three amendments to the NPS Act, as well as one to the NPSC Act which strengthened the role of the executive, most notably the Cabinet-Secretary for Internal Security and Coordination of National Government, while weakening the NPSC.
In such a context, it should come as no surprise that implementation of the Acts, in letter but even more so in spirit, is wanting. For example, the Service Standing Orders should have been amended in order to comply with the new legislation and made public within one year after commencement of the Act. Not so. Releasing the Standing Orders would allow for a level of transparency that is apparently not in the interest of those in charge (whether de jure or de facto). Also, as can be seen by the many police shootings resulting in death, it is clear the police have not been instructed according to the new legislation. This is particularly clear when looking at IPOA, the official State body tasked with investigating deaths and serious injuries caused by police officers. Police have always been reluctant to notify the Authority of deaths and serious injuries that resulted from their actions, despite a statutory requirement to do so, and over the years the willingness has steadily declined. In the last 6 months of 2016, the police only notified the Authority in three instances. As IPOA wrote in its last Performance Report: ‘It is noted the number of deaths reported by the National Police Service is not reflective of the number of deaths as a result of police actions that were received through other channels. This implies a non-compliance by NPS.’ (p.21). IPOA has claimed the police fail to cooperate with the Authority, as was clear when IPOA inspectors were even detained by an Officer Commanding Police Division last year. Also, despite IPOA having conducted numerous investigations and inspections, and reviewed major police operations (for example, Operation Usalama Watch and also the Mpeketoni terrorist attacks), its impact on actual police performance remains modest as long as the police refuse to implement its recommendations.
The Commission hit the ground running, recruiting 7,000 new police recruits just weeks after it was established, and starting the recruitment of the new IG along with two deputies in late 2012, completing the make up of the Commission. However it was met with a hostile reception, from early 2013 onwards. Numerous were the headlines that the NPSC Chair, Johnston Kavuludi, was stepping on the mandate of then IG David Kimaiyo, and there were repeated calls to curtail, and even abolish the Commission. It was in this context that amendments started circulating shortly after the Commission took up office, which fed into the belief the executive had never been committed to implementing the legislation as it stood.
Tellingly, to date, there have been three amendments to the NPS Act, as well as one to the NPSC Act which strengthened the role of the executive, most notably the Cabinet-Secretary for Internal Security and Coordination of National Government, while weakening the NPSC. Though there has been repeated talk of amending the IPOA Act, this has to date been held off.
The Commission, meant to insulate the police from (political) interference by ensuring human resource management would be fair and merit-based, has received major criticism. It has conducted 5 major recruitment exercises, including one in 2014 that was marred with allegations of corruption and interference to the extent that IPOA went to court to get the exercise cancelled, much to the chagrin of the Commission, the police and wider executive, as well as the candidates affected (some of whom were said to have paid huge sums to acquire a spot while others had resigned from their jobs thinking they had gotten into the police). The 2015, 2016 and 2017 exercises went ahead – despite more allegations of malpractices (see for example the critical report by KNCHR).
Yet, probably the main activity for which the Commission is known to the public is the vetting process, which disclosed a lot of information about the inner workings of the police. As per the NPS Act, all members of the NPS are to be vetted on suitability and competence, by the Commission. The vetting, which started mid 2013, has been slow, and today the Commission has only vetted just over 3,000 officers. More worryingly, very few have actually been removed from the Service following the vetting, leading to many people questioning the value of the costly process. Indeed, there are many allegations, some of them substantiated, that the Commission does not comply with its own regulations, thus feeding into the belief the Commission is not fully independent and fails to prevent interference, raising questions about its own value.
All in all, despite the setting up of various institutions meant to hold the police to account, shield them from undue interference, and prevent misconduct or correct it where it does occur, police performance has barely changed. There are still numerous reports of crime committed by police officers, most notably corruption, extortion, bribery, excessive use of force and torture. Some have even argued that extra-judicial killings are on the rise, and there is a continuing failure of the police to respond professionally to policing situations, as the handling of various demonstrations in the past 12 months have shown all too well. The case of the Mavoko 3, where police were involved in the torture and brutal killing of lawyer Willie Kimani, his client, Josphat Mwenda, and their driver, Joseph Muiruri, is a particularly gruesome case in point.
All in all, despite the setting up of various institutions meant to hold the police to account, shield them from undue interference, and prevent misconduct or correct it where it does occur, police performance has barely changed.
Indeed, even though the government did spend additional resources, for example on cars, police housing, and insurance, this has yet to translate into better police performance and public confidence continues to be low. And despite the setting up of various oversight structures, a culture of non-compliance with the law has developed over the recent years and as a result, the (impact of the) enhanced accountability requirements have remained small, because the root causes of the current policing situation have been left, mostly, unaddressed.
In the current context, with few incentives to reform and just too many benefits to keeping things as they are, as well as limited political commitment to reform, both Cabinet-Secretary and the police leadership are likely to pick only those cherries from the reform package that are useful, and don’t rock the boat too much.
This should not come as a surprise, and unfortunately, all things staying equal, there is no reason to believe this will change in the near future. The current situation simply serves all involved all too well.
Branch, Daniel, 2011. Kenya, between hope and despair, 1963–2011. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, Republic of Kenya. 2008. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence. Nairobi: Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV Commission).
Gastrow, Peter, Sept 2011. Termites at work. Transnational organized crime and state erosion in Kenya. New York: International Peace Institute.
Kahumbu, Paula, 2014. The war on poaching cannot be won in the field unless we take on highlevel corruption. The Guardian, 5 May 2014 [online].
National Task Force on Police Reforms, Republic of Kenya, October 2009. Report of the National Task Force on Police Reforms. Nairobi: National Task Force on Police Reforms.
Anneke Osse (2016) Police reform in Kenya: a process of ‘meddling through’, published in Policing and Society, 26(8), pp. 907-924.