It has been a hectic couple of months for the Ministry of Finance and the IMF. Uganda is one of those countries desperately in need of a bailout and November/December saw end-to-end meetings. On the agenda were Uganda’s or President Museveni’s desire to proceed with his legacy projects and the IMF’s objections.
Gone are the days when Uganda was described as the IMF success story, “a virtual textbook of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment program: free markets, a convertible currency, an independent central bank, selling off state-owned companies, tight budget, and downsizing the civil service and the army.” ” ~ Bill Berkeley, Atlantic Monthly
For instance, in 2018 the Central Bank cannot anymore be described as independent as the ongoing Parliamentary investigation in to the sale of four banks under supervision orders shows. The Central Bank belongs to one Justine Bagyenda, former head of Bank Supervision and her unknown handlers. According to leaked bank statements she is a dollar millionaire after 32 years in the civil service.
Gone are the days when Uganda was described as the IMF success story, “a virtual textbook of the International Monetary Fund’s structural adjustment program…For instance, in 2018 the Central Bank cannot anymore be described as independent as the ongoing Parliamentary investigation in to the sale of four banks under supervision orders shows.
Bagyenda is unable to explain to parliament’s Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises (COSASE) why she autonomously and illegally sold a bank under supervision or the basis upon which she discounted bank assets by 93%. She insists she does not remember. Unfortunately, there are no records either because Bagyenda was caught on security cameras one night removing a sack of documents from the bank. Her accomplices (bodyguard, driver and bank security guards) were all remanded in custody but she remains a free woman.
Twenty years after divestment of state enterprises, there has been no report on profits or losses made. Fraud was detected in the sale of the national airline and other assets. The ‘cash budget’ is characterised by massive arrears and supplementary budgets are made throughout the year to overspending ministries. Finally, the civil service has ballooned from 22 ministries (after downsizing) to over 75, plus an additional twenty-nine specialist agencies causing service delivery to suffer.
The IMF and the interests they serve want to do business but also want to interrupt Chinese domination of the territory. They are seizing the moral high ground by accusing China of ‘predatory lending’, ’weaponizing’ capital and holding poor debtor countries to ransom.
20 years after divestment of state enterprises, there has been no report on profits or losses made. Fraud was detected in the sale of the national airline and other assets. The ‘cash budget’ is characterised by massive arrears and supplementary budgets are made throughout the year to overspending ministries. Finally, the civil service has ballooned from 22 ministries (after downsizing) to over 75, plus an additional twenty-nine specialist agencies…
In their letter to the Administration, the senators asked, “As the largest contributor to the IMF, how can the United States use its influence to ensure that bailout terms prevent the continuation of ongoing BRI projects, or the start of new BRI projects?”
All of this is going on over the heads of the Ugandan people who are not included in the planning and will not be involved in oversight of any transactions. They just want public resources to be used honestly and in the most efficient and effective manner possible. With an upward trend in undernourishment, the introduction of new taxes and announcements scaling back universal primary and secondary education programmes, Ugandan docility is becoming a thing of the past. Although 2018 has been plagued by persistent civil unrest, resistance to state brutality led by the People Power movement is growing.
Turning to the specifics of the various competing interests, President Museveni’s agenda includes building the planned oil pipeline and oil refinery. These require major road construction in the oilfields of Buliisa. Problem number one – there are no funds available to construct the roads and they will need to be borrowed.
The IMF and the interests they serve want to do business but also want to interrupt Chinese domination of the territory.
For the refinery, a partnership with an investor should secure 60% of the cost, but that still leaves 40% to be sourced by the government of Uganda. Similarly the only source is another loan. A proposed partnership in the pipeline would provide 85% of the cost. The remaining 15% would have to be borrowed by government.
All of this is against the background of the energy sector. Isimba and Karuma hydro-electric power plants are complete. The generated power can only be evacuated and distributed among consumers with a huge investment in the necessary infrastructure. At this stage there is no time to begin the long process of cultivating a public private partnership and the entire amount – US$ 3.5 billion – to fund transmission and distribution has to be borrowed. Note that Isimba and Karuma were built with non-concessional loans
Sources state that there are lower-interest, longer term concessional loans available from the UK and Europe, however, Uganda’s ability to repay is compromised by its being over its head in semi-concessional debt to China and domestic banks. Hence the need for an IMF bailout.
Now with the upper hand, the IMF has raised its own concerns the first of which is the sustainability of the public debt.
This is a turnaround from their Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) of 2016 in which they pronounced the economy healthy and debt levels manageable, “Government finances remain on a sound footing, though expenditure composition can be of concern.” That conclusion contradicted the Auditor General’s report in which he warned that interest on loans from domestic banks (much higher and repayable in much shorter periods than loans from International Financial Institutions) was approaching unsustainable levels. In 2016 and 2017 he also outlined significant failures in agricultural projects and health service delivery.
There are lower-interest, longer term concessional loans available from the UK and Europe, however, Uganda’s ability to repay is compromised by its being over its head in semi-concessional debt to China and domestic banks. Hence the need for an IMF bailout.
The IMF’s only caveat in the DSA was that for continued debt sustainability a) project selection and implementation would have to be strengthened b) commencement of oil production would have to commence on schedule in 2020. They are not keen on either the pipeline or the refinery as priorities – their priority is debt servicing.
Oil production has now been pushed back to 2023. Uganda discovered oil before Ghana but Ghana has been producing for years. During that time Uganda has been embroiled in legal battles over the sale of concessions. It is very interesting that in the recently concluded trial in which one Patrick Ho was convicted of bribing President Museveni and his foreign minister Sam Kutesa, correspondence revealed that Patrick Ho understood that after he had paid them, the sale of oil concessions would be reversed in order to sell them to China’s CEFC of which Ho was a representative.
Now the IMF is of the view that commercial debt servicing consumes resources that would otherwise be available for development.
They are also concerned about domestic arrears, payments owed to local suppliers, which continue to climb and reached an unpayable US$267 million in 2018. Suppliers of foodstuffs to the police force formed an association and suspended all supplies until their arrears were cleared.
The third barrier to a new IMF package is the high recurrent cost of public administration. Mushrooming local government entities and specialist agencies hived off from their parent ministries has meant in 2018 that many civil servants have been or are yet to be paid in arrears. Service delivery has been characterised by shortages, the most important of which is drug stock-outs. Belatedly, government has resolved to reduce the number of ministries, departments and agencies although action has yet to be taken.
In the recently concluded trial in which one Patrick Ho was convicted of bribing President Museveni and his foreign minister Sam Kutesa, correspondence revealed that Patrick Ho understood that after he had paid them, the sale of oil concessions would be reversed in order to sell them to China’s CEFC of which Ho was a representative.
Supplementary expenditure will be the toughest nut to crack. Expenditure over budget is in direct relation to the political clout of the overspending entity. Predictably State House and the Ministry of Defence are the biggest culprits. State House has been known to exhaust its annual budget in the first quarter of the year, requiring supplementaries that are carved out of the budgets of less powerful votes.
A study by the Alliance for Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM) in 2016 showed that overexpenditure peaks during election periods, it also showed that State House is a serial offender, indications that the government diverts funds from service delivery to election campaigns and regime preservation.
These are the current barriers to a new IMF programme. It is clear that all of Uganda’s economic problems stem from poor governance, in the words of one source, “The problems are not economic but institutional failures, lack of accountability.”
However, although the IMF’s arguments may sound plausible, it would be a mistake to conclude that their interests are one and the same as those of the Ugandan people. An oil refinery would mean a break from the tradition of exporting raw materials, but it is no accident that no serious effort has been made to refine coffee, cotton or any other more easily accessible local produce despite the eternal presence of ‘development partners’. If anything IMF structural adjustment decimated the young local textile industry making the average Ugandan dependent on imported used clothing. It is therefore highly unlikely that they would support Uganda in refining oil when with a little pressure they can get the raw material more cheaply.
Official talk about corruption is diversionary. Museveni and Kutesa have been hawking public assets for three decades with the knowledge of the development partners. It was accepted while the goose continued to lay golden eggs and service already unsustainable Western debt. It is only because those repayments are threatened by Chinese extortion and the growing indignation of the Ugandan polity that the IMF and partners are putting on their ethical investor disguises.
Part of that is to rehabilitate President Museveni’s image if not his character. In December 2018, the month in which the IMF talks were concluded and during which concrete evidence was presented in a New York court proving Museveni and Kutesa had received bribes from Patrick Ho, and during which COSASE revealed the Central Bank to be as corrupt as other public institutions, Ugandans were stunned to wake up to the news that the head of Transparency International had travelled to Uganda and given Museveni an award for ‘fighting corruption’.
Museveni and Kutesa have been hawking public assets for three decades with the full knowledge of development partners. It was acceptable behaviour while the goose continued to lay golden eggs, servicing already unsustainable Western debt. It is only because those repayments are threatened by Chinese extortion and the growing indignation of the Ugandan polity that the IMF and partners are putting on their ethical investor glasses.
At the event, he announced yet another anti-corruption initiative to be unveiled on 10 December. Suspended BRI infrastructure projects and a renewed anti-corruption drive are elements of Kenya’s new SAP programme smuggled in earlier this year.
In 1994, Linda de Hoyos wrote, “In exchange for his handing Uganda back to such entities as Windsor Holdings, Museveni has been given the franchise as the marcher lord for East Africa. While the “social sector” is starved of funds, Museveni has poured millions into the military, his only political base of support.”
It seems although damaged, Museveni is still useful to the West.
Support The Elephant.
The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.
Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.
Cherry-Picking of Judges Is a Great Affront to Judicial Independence
Uhuru Kenyatta’s refusal to fulfil his constitutional duty to appoint and gazette JSC-nominated judges is a tyranny against the judiciary.
The 2010 constitution placed an onerous responsibility on the judiciary. That responsibility is to check that the exercise of public power is done in a manner that is compliant with the constitution. The constitution brought everyone, including the president – in both his capacities as the head of state and head of national executive – under the law. Hence, the judiciary has the final word when called upon to determine whether anything done or said to be done by anyone in the exercise of public power is constitutional.
To ensure that judges and magistrates can perform this task, the 2010 constitution created a strong architecture to secure judicial independence. In a nutshell, judicial independence simply means creating the necessary guardrails to ensure that judges and magistrates are and feel fully protected to make the right decision without fear of reprisal and that the judiciary has the facilities it needs to create an enabling environment to facilitate judges and magistrates’ abilities to undertake that core mandate. Ordinarily, the critical aspects of judicial independence include decisional, operational/administrative as well as financial independence.
Operational independence safeguards the ability of the judiciary to run its affairs without interference from other arms of government or from anyone else. Financial independence on the other hand ensures that the judiciary is well funded and fully in control of its funds so that its core duty (decision-making) is not frustrated by either lack of funds or the possibility of a carrot–and-stick approach where the executive dangles funding to extract the decisions it wants. In this regard, the constitution creates a judiciary fund and places it under the administration of the judiciary. Unfortunately, the national government and the treasury have continued to frustrate the full operationalisation of the judiciary fund.
Centrality of an individual judge’s independence
Importantly, the foundational rationale for judicial independence and its different facets is securing the decision maker’s (judge and magistrate) individual independence. This is commonly referred to as decisional independence. In the end, the judiciary exists for only one reason: to adjudicate disputes. In this regard, the person who is charged with decision making is the one who is the primary beneficiary of judicial independence. Of course, ultimately, everyone benefits from an independent judiciary.
Still, the constitution has specific and high expectation of the decision-maker, including that he or she makes decisions based only on an objective analysis of the law and the facts. The decision maker must not be mesmerised or cowed by power. He or she should never be beholden to power – in the present or the future. Simply put, under the constitution, a decision maker should never have to think about personal consequences that he or she may suffer for making a decision one way or another as long as that decision is based on an honest analysis of the law and the facts. Put a bit differently, the decision maker should never have to make (or even think of calibrating) his or her decision to please those in or with power – either within the judiciary or outside it – with the expectation that it will help him or her to obtain professional favours, promotion or to avoid reprisals.
And this is why Uhuru Kenyatta’s cherry-picking of who should or should not be appointed judge is the greatest threat to judicial independence in Kenya.
But first a quick word on what the constitution says about the process of selecting, appointing and disciplining judges.
Selection and disciplining of judges
Before 2010, the president played a controlling role in the selection of judges. This meant that the surest way to become and remain a judge was by being in the good books of the president and his handlers. The result was that the judiciary was largely an appendage of the executive – and could hardly restrain the abuse of public power by the president or other ruling elites. The 2010 constitutional provisions on the judiciary were deliberately designed to eliminate or highly diminish this vice.
The power to select judges was given to the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), a body representative of many interest groups, the president key among them. Constitutionally, the president directly appoints three of the 11 JSC members: the attorney general and two members representing the public. But with his usual ingenuity at subverting the constitution, Uhuru Kenyatta has added to this list a fourth – by telling the Public Service Commission (PSC) who should be its appointee. Regardless, while there are always endless wars to control the JSC especially by the executive, the many interests represented complicate a full takeover of the JSC by the executive or any other interests. And that is partly what the constitution intended to achieve. The law – which the court has clarified numerous times – is that once the JSC has nominated persons to be judges, the president’s role is purely ceremonial, and one that he performs in his capacity as head of state. He must formally appoint and gazette the appointment of the judges. No ifs, no buts.
This is why Uhuru Kenyatta’s cherry-picking of who should or should not be appointed judge is the greatest threat to judicial independence in Kenya.
In fact, the law further clarifies that not even the JSC can reconsider its recommendation once it has selected its nominees. There is a good reason for this unbendable procedure – it helps to insulate the process from manipulation especially once the JSC has publicly disclosed its judge-nominees. Still, the constitution preserves for the president, the JSC and citizens the option of pursuing a rogue nominee by providing the realistic possibility for the initiation of a disciplinary and removal process of a judge even after appointment if there are legitimate grounds for such action.
In this regard, the JSC also has the responsibility to discipline judges by considering every complaint made against a judge to determine whether there are grounds to start proceedings for removal. It is to be noted that the president has more substantive powers in relation to the removal of judges. This is because if the JSC determines that there are grounds for the removal of a judge, the president’s hand is mostly unrestrained with regards to whom he appoints to sit on the tribunal to consider whether a judge should be removed. Unfortunately, there is an emerging trend that indicates that Uhuru undertakes this task in a biased manner by subjectively selecting tribunal members who will “save” the judges he likes.
The injustice of cherry-picking
Now, back to the injustices of Uhuru’s cherry-picking of judges for appointment.
The injustice is horrific for both the appointed judges and those who are not appointed, especially those of the Court of Appeal. Under the 2010 constitution, you do not become a superior court judge by chance.. For High Court judges nominated to the Court of Appeal, this is earned through hard work, countless sleepless nights spent writing ground-breaking judgments and backbreaking days sitting in court (likely on poor quality furniture) graciously listening to litigants complain about their disputes all day, and then doing administrative work to help the judiciary keep going. All this while maintaining personal conduct that keeps one away from trouble – mostly of the moral kind. Magistrates or other judicial staff who move up the ranks to be nominated judges endure the same.
The injustice is horrific for both the appointed judges and those who are not appointed, especially those of the Court of Appeal
If ever there was a list of thankless jobs, those of judges and magistrate would rank high on the list. It is therefore completely unacceptable that a faceless presidential advisor – probably sitting in a poorly lit room with depressing décor and a constantly failing wifi connection, and who likely has never met a judge – can just tell the president, “Let’s add so and so to the list of judges without ’integrity’. And by the way, from the last list, let’s remove judge A and add judge Z”. Utterly unfeeling and reckless. Worse, the judge is left to explain to the world what his/her integrity issues are when he or she knows nothing about them.
Cherry-picking also creates a fundamental perception problem. Kenya’s Supreme Court has confirmed that perception independence is a critical element of independence. For litigants appearing before the judges who were appointed in cases involving the president or the executive, it will be hard to shake-off the stubborn but obviously unfair thought that the judge earned the appointment in order to be the executive’s gatekeeper. That is what minds do; they conjure up possibilities of endless, and at times, conspiracy-inspired thoughts. Similarly, those who appear before a judge who was left out will likely believe that the judge – who decides a case impartially but against the executive – is driven by the animus of non-appointment. And you can trust the president’s people to publicly say as much and even create a hashtag for it. Yet such perceptions (of a judge who is thought to favour or be anti-executive) are relevant because justice is both about substance and perception.
And that is the psychological tyranny of Uhuru’s unconstitutional action – for both the judges that have been appointed and to those who have not. It is, indeed, a tyranny against the judiciary and, in a smaller way, against all of us. Perhaps just as Uhuru intended it to be.
COVID-19 Vaccine Safety and Compensation: The Case of Sputnik V
All vaccines come with medical risks and Kenyans are taking these risks for their protection and that of the wider community. They deserve compensation should they suffer for doing so.
How effective is Kenya’s system for regulating new medicines and compensating citizens who suffer side-effects from taking them? Since March 2021, Kenya has been using the AstraZeneca vaccine supplied through COVAX to inoculate its frontline workers and the older population. This is available to the public free of charge, according to a priority list drafted by the Ministry of Health (MOH). The Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB) also approved the importation of the Sputnik V vaccine from Russia, which was initially available through private health facilities only at a cost of KSh8,000 per jab, before the MOH banned it altogether. However, there were reports in the media that the vaccine continued to be administered secretary even after the ban.
Although side effects are rare, we know that all vaccines come with certain medical risks. Kenyans taking vaccines run these risks not just for their own protection, but also for that of the wider community. The state has a responsibility to protect citizens by carefully controlling the distribution of vaccines and by ensuring that adequate and accessible compensation is available where risks materialise. These duties are enshrined in the constitution which guarantees the right to health (Article 43) and the rights of consumers (Article 46).
A system of quality control before the deployment and use of medicines is set out in the Pharmacy and Poisons Act the Standards Act, the Food, Drugs and Chemical Substances Act and the Consumer Protection Act. However, the controversy over Sputnik V in Kenya has cast doubt on the coherence and effectiveness of this patchwork system. Moreover, none of these Acts provides for comprehensive compensation after deployment and use of vaccines.
Vaccine approval and quality control
Subject to medical trials and in line with its mandate to protect global health, WHO has recommended specific COVID-19 vaccines to states. Generally, WHO recommendations are used as a form of quality control by domestic regulators who view them as a guarantee of safety and effectiveness. However, some countries rely exclusively on their domestic regulators, ignoring WHO recommendations. For instance, the UK approved and administered the Pfizer vaccine before it had received WHO approval.
The COVAX allocation system fails to take into account the fact that access to vaccines within countries depends on cost and income.
By contrast, many African states have relied wholly on the WHO Global Advisory Committee on Vaccine Safety given their weak national drug regulators and the limited capacity of the Africa Centre for Disease Control (CDC). The Africa CDC itself deems vaccines safe for use by member states on the basis of WHO recommendations. Kenya has a three-tier approval system: PPB, Kenya Bureau of Standards and WHO. The PPB relies on the guidelines for emergency and compassionate use authorisation of health products and technologies. The guidelines are modelled on the WHO guidelines on regulatory preparedness for provision of marketing authorization of human pandemic Influenza vaccines in non-vaccine producing countries. However, prior to approval by PPB, pharmaceuticals must also comply with Kenya Bureau of Standards’ Pre-Export Verification of Conformity standards .
Vaccine indemnities and compensation
To minimise liability and incentivise research and development, companies require states to indemnify them for harm caused by vaccines as a condition of supply. In other words, it is the government, and not manufacturers, who must compensate them or their families where required. Failure to put such schemes in place has undermined COVID-19 vaccine procurement negotiations in some countries such as Argentina. Indemnities can be either “no-fault” or “fault”-based’.
No-fault compensation means that victims are not required to prove negligence in the manufacture or distribution of vaccines. This saves on the often huge legal costs associated with tort litigation. Such schemes have had a contested history and are more likely to be available in the Global North. By contrast citizens of countries in the Global South must rely on the general law, covering areas such as product liability, contract liability and consumer protection. These are usually fault-based, and require claimants to show that the vaccine maker or distributor fell below widely accepted best practice. Acquiring the evidence to prove this and finding experts in the sector willing to testify against the manufacturer can be very difficult.
By default, Kenya operates a fault-based system, with some exceptions. Admittedly, citizens have sometimes been successful in their claims, as in 2017 when the Busia County Government was ordered by the High Court to compensate victims of malaria vaccines. The High Court held that county medics were guilty of professional negligence, first by not assessing the children before administering the vaccines, and second by allowing unqualified medics to carry out the vaccination.
The problem is that the manufacturer has not published sufficient trial data on the vaccine’s efficacy.
In recognition of these difficulties, and in order to ensure rapid vaccine development during a global pandemic, WHO and COVAX have committed to a one-year no-fault indemnity for AstraZeneca vaccines distributed in Kenya. This will allow victims to be compensated without litigation up to a maximum of US $40,000 (approx. KSh4 million). To secure compensation, the claimant has to fill an application form and submit it to the scheme’s administrator together with the relevant evidentiary documentation. According to COVAX, the scheme will end once the allocated resources have been exhausted. The scheme also runs toll-free telephone lines to provide assistance to applicants, although the ministries of health in the eligible countries are also mandated to help claimants file applications.
Beneficiaries of the no-fault COVAX compensation scheme are barred from pursuing compensation claims in court. However, it is anticipated that some victims of the COVAX vaccines may be unwilling to pursue the COVAX scheme. At the same time, since the KSh4 million award under COVAX is lower than some reliefs awarded by courts in Kenya, some claimants may avoid the restrictive COVAX compensation scheme and opt to go to court. Because such claimants may instead sue the manufacturer, COVAX requires countries to indemnify manufacturers against such lawsuits before receiving its vaccines.
Sputnik V is different. Neither the WHO-based regulatory controls before use, nor the COVAX vaccine compensation scheme after use applies. Sputnik has not been approved by WHO or the Africa CDC. The PPB approved its importation in spite of the negative recommendation of Africa CDC, and in the face of opposition from the Kenya Medical Association. The rejection of Sputnik in countries like Kenya is partly due to the reluctance of Russia’s Gamaleya Institute to apply for WHO approval, partly because the manufacturer has not published sufficient trial data on the vaccine’s efficacy, and partly due to broader mistrust of the intentions of the Russian state. This may be changing as Africa CDC Regulatory Taskforce and European Medicines Agency are now reviewing the vaccine for approval while 50 countries across the globe have either approved its use- or are using it already. In Africa, Ghana Djibouti, Congo and Angola have approved the use of Sputnik V with Russia promising to donate 300 million doses to the African Union. Such approvals have been hailed for providing an alternative supply chain and reducing overreliance on the West.
As regards compensation, Russia has indicated that it will provide a partial indemnity for all doses supplied. However, no clear framework has been set out on how this system will work. There has therefore been no further detail on the size of awards, and whether they will be no-fault or fault-based. This lack of legal specifics has added to the reluctance of countries around the world to adopt the vaccine.
As matters stand, therefore, the Kenyan government would not be able to indemnify private clinics importing and administering Sputnik V. The absence of a statutory framework on vaccine compensation by the state makes this possibility even less likely. Nor would compensation be available from the Gamaleya Institute. The only route then would be through affected citizens taking cases based on consumer protection legislation and tort law in the Kenyan courts. As we have noted, this is complex and costly. Claims might be possible in Russia, but these problems would be exacerbated by language barriers and differences between the legal systems, as well as the ambiguity of the Russian compensation promises.
The private sector can complement state vaccination efforts, but this must be done in a way that guarantees accessibility and safety of citizens.
Although the importers obtained a KSh200 million insurance deal with AAR as a precondition for PPB authorisation, the amount per claimant was restricted to KSh1 million, which is well below the WHO rates and the average tort rates ordered by Kenyan courts. As an alternative to claiming against the manufacturers and distributors, injured patients might sue the Kenyan government. Such a claim would allege state negligence and dereliction of statutory and constitutional duties for allowing the use of a vaccine that has not been approved by global regulators such as WHO, thus exposing its citizens to foreseeable risks. This would be particularly attractive to litigants given the difficulties in recovering from the Russian authorities and the risk that Kenyan commercial importers would not be able to meet all possible compensation claims. Ironically, the use of the Sputnik V vaccine in private facilities still exposes the government to lawsuits even if it didn’t facilitate the vaccine’s importation and distribution.
What the government needs to do
The acquisition of vaccines has been undermined by the self-interested “nationalism” of states in the Global North. Only after buying up the greater part of available vaccines have they been willing to offer donations to the rest of the world. These highly publicised commitments fall far short of what is required in the Global South. Kenya’s first task must be to intensify its diplomatic efforts to increase supply through bilateral engagement with vaccine manufacturing states and in multilateral fora like the World Trade Organization, acting in alliance with other African states. Such steps are only likely to bear fruit in the medium term, however. In the short term, it is certainly sensible to involve private companies in vaccine procurement and distribution in order to supplement the supplies available through COVAX. This is recognised in Kenyan and international law as an acceptable strategy for securing the right to health. But it must be done in a way that guarantees accessibility and the safety of citizens. Accordingly, Kenya should encourage Russia (and all vaccine manufacturers) to publish full trial data showing effectiveness and risks, and to seek WHO approval on this basis. It should require them to establish and publicise detailed indemnity frameworks to allow for comprehensive and accessible compensation. It should acknowledge that citizens accepting vaccines are not only protecting themselves, but also the wider national and global community. With adequate regulation before use, the risk of doing so can be minimised and made clearer. But some risk remains, and those who run it deserve to be compensated for doing so. It is therefore imperative for Kenya to establish its own no-fault indemnity scheme for all state-approved vaccines, including those imported by the private sector.
This article draws from COVID-19 in Kenya: Global Health, Human Rights and the State in a time of Pandemic, a collaborative project involving Cardiff Law and Global Justice, the African Population and Health Research Centre, and the Katiba Institute, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK).
Gone Is the Last Of the Mohicans: Tribute to Kenneth Kaunda
As we mourn President Kaunda, my prayer is that the death of this great African son and leader will remind us of the sacrifices that he and his contemporaries who fought for Africa’s independence made.
17 June 2021
Tonight, I was welcomed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, by the sad news of the death of the first President of the Republic of Zambia and a founding father of the nation, His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda.
In this moment of great loss to Zambians and indeed all Africans, I wish to express my heartfelt condolences to the Kaunda family, President Edgar Lungu, and the government and people of the Republic of Zambia.
The demise of President Kaunda at the grand old age of 97 years brings to end the pioneers and forefathers who led the struggles for decolonisation of the African continent and received the instrument of Independence from the colonial masters in Africa.
Let all Africans and friends of Africa take solace in the knowledge that President Kaunda has gone home to a well-deserved rest and to proudly take his place beside his brothers such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea, Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire, Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Nelson Mandela of South Africa to name but a few.
All of them, without exception, were nationalists who made sacrifices in diverse ways. Some, like Patrice Lumumba, untimely lost their lives soon after independence. We are consoled that God granted President Kaunda long life to witness the progression of Africa through five decades of proud and not-so proud moments.
In December 2015, I visited President Kaunda at his home in Lusaka in what was to be our last meeting. As we discussed about everything from family to politics in our two countries and indeed in Africa generally, I asked him if the Africa that we have today is the Africa for which he and his contemporaries struggled and fought. President Kaunda was visibly pained in his response and at some point he broke down and wept. It was obvious to me how disappointed he was about some of the challenges that have plagued our continent for decades since independence.
As we mourn President Kaunda, my prayer is that the death of this great African son and leader will remind us of the sacrifices that he and his contemporaries who fought for Africa’s independence made. Let it remind us of the vision that they had for Africa; their hopes and aspirations; their dream for a free, strong, united and prosperous Africa. Let us, African leaders and people, never let the labour of these heroes past be in vain.
Rest well, KK. Africa is free and will be great.
Politics1 week ago
From Shifta to Terrorist: A Shifting Narrative Of Northern Kenya
Long Reads2 weeks ago
Tanzania: The Dialectics of Maguphilia and Maguphobia
Politics2 weeks ago
The End of Abiy-Mania
Op-Eds2 weeks ago
BBI and Kenya’s Finest Jurists
Reflections2 weeks ago
Benjamin Ayimba: The Making of a Rugby Great
Op-Eds2 weeks ago
India’s COVID-19 Surge Is a Warning for Africa
Culture2 weeks ago
Forgotten Histories: Eugenics, Racism and Colonial Mental Doctors in Kenya
Long Reads5 days ago
The West and Its African Monsters Syndrome