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The Politics of County Economies: Why Central Kenya MPs Are Wrong

10 min read. DAVID NDII pulls apart the old myth of Central Kenya’s economic dominance.

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The Politics of County Economies: Why Central Kenya MPs Are Wrong
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One of our problems is to decide how much priority we should give in investing in less developed provinces. To make the economy as a whole grow as fast as possible, development money should be invested where it will yield the largest increase in output. This approach will clearly favour the development of areas having abundant natural resources, good land and rainfall, transport and power facilities, and people receptive to and active in development.” – Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya.

Can Central Kenya contribute 60 percent of Kenya’s GDP, as recently claimed, nay, asserted, by the region’s members of parliament? If 12 percent (old Central Province) or 20 percent (including Meru, Embu, Tharaka Nithi and Laikipia) percent of the work force is responsible for 60 percent of the economy, what does that say about the rest of the country. What would make Kikuyus or GEMA community four or five times more productive than other Kenyans?

The word “contribute” is a loaded one. It suggests that there is a common kitty called economy to which some people put in more than others. This is of course not the case. The economy is the sum total of the goods and services produced in the country. When Nyandarua grows potatoes that are consumed in Nairobi: which county has contributed more to the other’s economy? Neither—they have exchanged value, with each profiting from the other. The argument can also be a self defeating one. It justifies domestic import substitution. If we can champion “buy Kenya build Kenya”, why not “Buy Kilifi, build Kilifi”?

The word “contribute” is a loaded one. It suggests that there is a common kitty called ‘economy’ to which some people put in more than others.

The Central Kenya MPs are most likely to be under the impression that the region contributes more to the tax kitty. This is also a fallacy. The tax base and the economy do not overlap. Ideally they should but they do not. In an economy with our structure we have, a large informal sector and largely untaxed smallholder agriculture account for half the economy, the correlation between the economy and tax base is pretty low. The main sources of tax are profits, payroll taxes and consumption taxes (excise and VAT).

The Central Kenya MPs are most likely to be under the impression that the region contributes more to the tax kitty. This is also a fallacy.

The regions that contribute more to the tax base are those with larger corporatized economy. Though I do not have figures, I would expect the coastal counties to constitute a larger tax yield (revenue to GDP ratio) than central Kenya on account of high concentration of the corporatized economy— tourism, manufacturing, mining and logistics industry. The tourism establishments for example sell more highly taxed alcoholic beverages than consumed in central Kenya. They pay more VAT on food, and their employees pay PAYE which the presumably more productive and prosperous farmers of Central Kenya do not. If Central Kenya is so much more prosperous, the more pertinent political question would be whether it is paying its fair share of tax.

That cleared up, we can now turn to the question of county economies. Which counties have the strongest economies? The simple answer is we do not know. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS), the national statistics agency, only publishes national accounts for the whole economy. It is now publishing “County Statistical Abstracts” but these do not include GDP. Six years on, the counties have not found it worthwhile to measure the sizes of their economies even though this is part of their mandate, and it is not particularly difficult or expensive.

In response, I posted a graphic with two sets of figures of the relative size of county economies. One is an estimate of county GDPs computed by World Bank researchers, and published in a paper titled Bright Lights, Big Cities: Measuring national & sub-national economic growth from outer space in Africa, with an application to Kenya and Rwanda.

Which counties have the strongest economies? The simple answer is we do not know. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) only publishes national accounts for the whole economy. It is now publishing “County Statistical Abstracts” but these do not include GDP. Six years on, the counties have not found it worthwhile to measure the sizes of their economies even though this is part of their mandate, and it is not particularly difficult or expensive.

This methodology is actually more technically sophisticated than it sounds. If one looks at a satellite image of earth taken at night, it becomes apparent that the night lights closely mirror the economic geography of the world. In fact, because the intensity of lights is captured accurately up to a square kilometre, they provide much more detailed geographical coverage than statisticians use to calculate national GDP. Moreover, night lights provide real time data while statistical samples can fall hopelessly out of date, as revealed by the latest rounds of “rebasing” which saw upward GDP revisions ranging from 13 percent in Uganda, 30 percent in Tanzania, to 90 percent in Nigeria. One only frowns at the night lights if they do not know what statisticians do in the kitchen. But as it turns out in fact that over time, the night lights estimate tracks the statistically estimated GDP growth quite well.

For the second series, I used household consumption expenditure shares from the most recent household budget survey data published by the KNBS, the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey (KIHBS 2015/16). This is the survey data that is used to measure poverty as well as to update the consumption basket used to calculate the rate of inflation. Household consumption expenditure is the largest component of GDP. Although the percentage is bound to vary from county to county, we have no reason to expect that to be very large. In general, survey data is more reliable than the methods used to estimate GDP, hence it provides a good check for the night lights data.

Another useful source of information is the relative size of a county’s workforce. In a fully integrated economy with free movement of labour and capital, the size of a region’s economy would be proportional to the labour force: if County A accounts for 5 percent of the workforce, then it should also account for 5 percent of GDP. This is because labour and capital will move to where the opportunities are until capital per worker, and in effect production per worker is the same across the whole economy.

Readers of this column may recall that I used this argument to respond to the urban legend, which still persists, that Nairobi accounts for 60 percent of GDP (people who make up numbers seem to like 60 percent). I argued that Nairobi’s GDP was at best between 15 and 20 percent of GDP. This was based on Nairobi accounting for 10 percent of the national labour force, and allowing for more capital than the national average. As we will see shortly, the estimate was overgenerous.

The conventional definition of labour force is population aged 15-64. Ideally, we should use actual participation rates because many young people between 15 – 24 are in full time education, and many older people also work full time, but this data is not readily available on a county by county basis. We will just have to assume that the youth and older people’s participation rates do not vary too much across counties. I use the data published in the Labour Force Survey Report 2015/16, which is part of the KIHBS 2015/16.

We want to see whether the three sources tell the same story. We call this research strategy i.e. cross-validating different data and methodologies, triangulation.

We are in luck. The three sources are remarkably consistent. The correlation between the night lights GDP and household expenditure is 70 percent, between the night lights GDP and labour force is 73 percent, and between household expenditure and labour force shares is 90 percent (see charts). The strong correlation between the night lights GDP and labour force shares tells us that the bright lights GDP is pretty good. We can conclude from these correlations that all these data are telling us the same story. What is the story?

Second, all three tell us that Nairobi has the largest economy as expected, but it is a far cry from 60 percent. The night lights GDP puts it at 12.7 percent, while the expenditure share puts it at 20 percent. But the labour force share weighs in close to the night lights GDP at 12 percent.

The counties with the largest economies according to the night lights GDP are Nairobi(12.5%), Kiambu (11.1) Nakuru (8.5%). Between them, they account for 32% of the GDP.

The household expenditure data have the same order, and their combined share is also about the same (31%) but Nairobi’s share is much bigger (19.8%) while Kiambu and Nakuru are closer at 5.6% and 5.2% respectively. Eight other counties have large economies between 3 and 4 percent of GDP (Nyeri Kilifi, Kajiado, Machakos, Kwale Mombasa and Meru). With the notable exceptions of Nyeri and Kwale, their expenditure shares are also in line with the GDP shares. However, when it comes to the GDP and labour force, Kiambu, Kwale, Nyeri and Nakuru have much larger shares of GDP than their share of the labour force. I will come back to this shortly.

Nairobi has the largest economy as expected, but it is a far cry from 60 percent. The night lights GDP puts it at 12.7 percent, while the expenditure share puts it at 20 percent.

At the other end of the scale, Isiolo, Lamu, and Samburu have the smallest economies accounting for 0.2 percent of the national GDP each, followed by Marsabit, Tharaka-Nithi and Elgeyo Marakwet at 0.4 percent, Nyamira and West Pokot follow at 0.6 percent and Baringo and Tana River, 0.7 percent each, complete the ten smallest county economies. There is very close correspondence between the between the GDP and household expenditure in the small counties.

It’s worth pointing out here that the size of the county’s economy has no bearing on the incomes and well being. Whereas Lamu, Isiolo and Samburu are the smallest counties, Lamu’s incidence of poverty (28.5) percent is well below the national average of 36 percent; both Isiolo (56 percent) and Samburu (75 percent) are much higher. In fact, in terms of incomes and poverty Lamu, the smallest economy compares favorably with Nakuru, the third largest. This should put to rest those who are wont to argue that small counties are not economically viable. The Seychelles (Pop. 100,000, less than Lamu’s 130,000) has an average income ten times Kenya’s.

What explains the large difference between Nairobi’s GDP and household expenditure share.   Why are Kiambu and Nakuru’s GDP estimates so much larger than their shares of the labour force. Are there plausible economic explanations, or is it flaws in the data?

For Nairobi, cost of living is a plausible and likely explanation, in particular housing costs which are much higher than elsewhere. According to a national housing survey conducted by KNBS a few years ago, housing costs for house-renting Nairobi households take 40 percent of expenditures, a third more than the next highest, Mombasa and Kiambu, at 30 percent. Rural house renting households spent an average of 13 percent. Although the report does not give the percentages, we do know that Nairobi has a much larger percentage of renting households than other counties. Overall, 70 percent of urban households are renters, while 90 percent of rural households are owners. You would not know it from listening to Nairobi’s navel-gazing middle class going on about home ownership and mortgage interest. In aggregate 70 percent of Kenyans live in their own homes, and a good percentage of urban renters own decent debt-free rural homes. Home ownership is not a national priority, but I digress.

The large divergence of GDP and labour force shares is perhaps the more economically meaningful and insightful one. The straightforward interpretation of this observation is that the GDP per worker in Kiambu and Nakuru is considerably higher than average. Is this plausible? In the Census of Industrial Production conducted in 2010, Kiambu had 206 factories, second to Nairobi with 1090, out of a national total of 2252 establishments. In effect, Kiambu accounts for close to a fifth of the factories outside Nairobi. This is not a surprise given that Thika and Ruiru are large industrial towns, but even in my rural home I can count least six fairly large factories within shouting distance (4 tea factories, a chicken processing plant, and a dairy processor) and thats not counting the Bata shoe and a couple of other factories in Limuru town.

Nakuru may not count as many factories, only 95, but it certainly has a lot of capital. The country’s entire geothermal electricity industry, the flower industry as well as a very significant hotel industry around Lake Naivasha—that is a fair amount of capital. This ratio seems to be capturing, as it should, the capital intensity of the counties’ economy. If this is indeed what these data are telling us, then it is worthwhile to pay more attention to them, because they are conveying important information about the structure and character of the economy.

In the Census of Industrial Production conducted in 2010, Kiambu had 206 factories, second to Nairobi with 1090, out of a national total of 2252 establishments. In effect, Kiambu accounts for close to a fifth of the factories outside Nairobi.

If capital was evenly distributed across the country, all the ratios would be clustered around around 1. The actual ones range from 0.4 to 2.3. Kiambu’s ratio is the highest at 2.3 followed by Kwale and Nyeri (2) and Nakuru (1.9). There are three more counties with a ratio of 1.5 or higher, that is GDP share is 50 percent more than labour force share, Kajiado, Laikipia and Murang’a. Interestingly, Nairobi is not one of them. In fact, Nairobi is in the middle of the pack with a share just 10 percent higher, alongside Tana River. At the other end of the scale we have Elgeyo Marakwet and Nyamira with a GDP share which is 40 percent of the labour force share, and 12 counties where it is 50 percent. Looking at this pattern, it is readily apparent that the counties at the top are generally wealthier, while those at the bottom are poorer. The wealthier counties have more capital.

We have what looks like credible estimates of county GDP shares, we have each county’s labour force, and we also have the conventional national GDP. With these we are able to compute GDP per worker for each county, which will give us an idea which counties have the strongest economies. Kiambu comes out on top with a 2016 GDP per worker of Sh. 673,000. This is telling us that people in Kiambu produced on average Ksh. 56.000 worth of goods and services per person per month. The ten strongest economies are Kiambu, Kwale, Nyeri, Nakuru, Kajiado, Laikipia, Muranga, Garissa, Kilifi and Machakos.

One of the striking findings is that the big city counties are not among the strongest economies.

Nairobi and Mombasa are about the same at 14th and 15th respectively with a GDP per capita of Sh. 300,000 and Kisumu is 16th with Sh. 263,000. Obviously Kisumu is both urban and rural – Kisumu City on its own would probably be comparable with Nairobi and Mombasa. Still, these data put some question marks on the widely held belief that big cities are the engines of economic growth. To be sure there could be other explanations. The cities, Nairobi in particular could have a larger share of young people in full time education and unemployed, but these are puzzles for curious students to write dissertations on.

One of the striking findings is that the big city counties are not among the strongest economies. Nairobi and Mombasa are about the same at 14th and 15th respectively with a GDP per capita of Sh. 300,000 and Kisumu is 16th with Sh. 263,000.

More significantly perhaps we also do not see an economically dominant region. Kwale’s economy compares favourably with Nyeri, both in absolute size and productivity. Kirinyaga sits next to Wajir in terms of productivity. Makueni is more productive than Nyandarua.

This is not to say that we’ve heard the last of central Kenya politicians’ ethnic chauvinism. As Bertrand Russell observed long ago, a man offered a fact that goes against his instincts will scrutinize it closely, and unless the evidence is overwhelming, refuse to believe it; but offered something which affords a reason for acting in accordance to his instincts, he will accept it even on the slightest evidence.

David Ndii
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David Ndii is serving on the Technical and Strategy Committee of the National Super Alliance (NASA).

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South Africa: Xenophobia Is in Fact Afrophobia, Call It What It Is

5 min read. Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.

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South Africa: Xenophobia Is in Fact Afrophobia, Call It What It Is
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Written in May 2008, as African bodies burned on the streets of South Africa, Ingrid De Kok’s throbbing poem Today I Do Not Love My Country poignantly captures the mood of an Afrophobic nation fluent in the language of violence and name-calling.  (I say Afrophobic because South Africa does not have a xenophobia problem. We don’t rage against all foreigners—just the poor, black ones from Africa.)

The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent. As the debris is cleared off the streets of Johannesburg after a week of violent looting and attacks against African migrant-owned businesses that saw eleven people killed and almost 500 arrested, Pretoria now faces calls to boycott South African-owned businesses on the continent.

Zambia and Madagascar cancelled football matches. Air Tanzania has suspended flights to South Africa. African artists are boycotting South Africa. Should an Afrophobic South Africa lead the African Union next year?

The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent

The South African government has remained steadfast in its denial of Afrophobia, opting instead to condemn “violent attacks” and highlight the criminal elements involved in looting African-owned businesses. The police attributed the attacks to “opportunistic criminality”. By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.

The Afrophobic attacks are not spontaneous criminal mobs preying on foreigners. They are the result of an orchestrated, planned campaign that has been fuelled by the ongoing anti-immigrant rhetoric of South African politicians.

The All Truck Drivers Forum (ATDF), Sisonke People’s Forum and Respect SA stand accused of orchestrating last week’s violence. ATDF spokesperson, Sipho Zungu, denied that his group had instigated the violent looting, saying that “the nation is being misled here.” Zungu did stress, however, that South African truck drivers “no longer have jobs” and the government “must get rid of foreign truck drivers.”

Zungu echoes the sentiments of many poor South Africans, and their views are the end result of a drip-feed of anti-immigrant messages from South African politicians, particularly in the run-up to this year’s elections.

Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.

One-third of South Africans are unemployed. Thirteen per cent of South Africans live in informal settlements, and a third of South Africans don’t have access to running water. The problems are a combination of the country’s apartheid past and rampant corruption and mismanagement within the ANC-led government. Crime is climbing, mainly due to corrupt and dysfunctional policing services, high unemployment and systemic poverty.

By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.

South African politicians from across the spectrum have blamed immigrants for the hardships experienced by poor South Africans. Political parties tell voters that foreigners are criminals flooding South Africa, stealing their jobs, homes and social services, undermining their security and prosperity.

Even the government sees poor and unskilled African migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to the country’s security and prosperity. Approved in March 2017, its White Paper on International Migration, separates immigrants into “worthy” and “unworthy” individuals. Poor and unskilled immigrants, predominantly from Africa, will be prevented from staying in South Africa by any means, “even if this is labelled anti-African behaviour” as the former Minister of Home Affairs, Hlengiwe Mkhize, pointed out in June 2017. The message is simple: there is no place for black Africans in South Africa’s Rainbow Nation.

In November 2018, Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi claimed in a speech at a nurses summit that undocumented immigrants were flooding South Africa and overburdening clinics and hospitals. When immigrants “get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control starts failing”, he said.

Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.

In a bid to attract more support, Mashaba and the DA have adopted an immigrant-baiting approach straight out of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro’s playbooks.

Mashaba has described black African migrants as criminals and has spoken of the need for a “shock-and-awe” campaign to drive them out.

In February 2019, Mashaba diverted attention away from protests against his administration’s poor service delivery in Johannesburg’s Alexandra township by tweeting that foreigners had made it difficult to provide basic services.

On August 1, police operations in Johannesburg to find counterfeit goods were thwarted by traders who pelted law-enforcement authorities with rocks, forcing the police to retreat. Social media went into overdrive, with many accusing the police of being cowards running away from illegal immigrants. Mashaba was “devastated” by the police’s restraint. A week later over 500 African immigrants were arrested after a humiliating raid, even though many said they showed police valid papers.

In 2017, South Africa’s deputy police minister claimed that the city of Johannesburg had been taken over by foreigners, with 80% of the city controlled by them. If this is not urgently stopped, he added, the entire country “could be 80% dominated by foreign nationals and the future president of South Africa could be a foreign national.”

None of this anti-immigrant rhetoric is based on fact. Constituting just 3% of the South African population, statistics show that immigrants are not “flooding” South Africa. They aren’t stealing jobs from South Africans and nor are they responsible for the high crime rate. South Africa’s crime problem has little to do with migration, and everything to do with the country’s dysfunctional policing services, unemployment and poverty.

Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.

But South African politicians don’t let facts get in the way.  After all, it’s easier to blame African immigrants rather than face your own citizens and admit that you’ve chosen to line your own pockets instead of doing your job. If you can get others to shoulder the blame for the hopeless situation that many South Africans find themselves in, then why not?

South Africans are rightfully angry at the high levels of unemployment, poverty, lack of services and opportunities. But rather than blame African immigrants, frustration must be directed at the source of the crisis: a South African political leadership steeped in corruption that has largely failed its people.

The African Diaspora Forum, the representative body of the largest group of migrant traders, claimed that the police failed to act on intelligence that it had provided warning of the impending attacks. It took almost three days before Cyril Ramaphosa finally issued weak words of condemnation and for his security cluster to meet and strategise.  All of this points to a government refusing to own its complicity and deal with the consequences of its words.

South Africa has fallen far and hard from the lofty Mandela era and Thabo Mbeki’s soaring “I am an African” declaration.

Senior political leaders in South Africa are blaming vulnerable Africans for their failure to adequately provide a dignified life for all South Africans. Until this scapegoating stops, violent anti-African sentiment will continue to thrive, and South Africa will entrench its growing pariah status on the continent.

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A New Despotism in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism: A Reflection on Census 2019

6 min read. In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.

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A New Despotism in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism: A Reflection on Census 2019
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The just concluded census 2019 brought with it many strange occurrences including the official classification of my good friend Rasna Warah as a Mtaita, a community to which she is only very remotely connected by virtue of being married to a husband whose mother is a Mtaveta. The Taita and Taveta, who give their home county Taita-Taveta its name, are two related but distinct ethnic groups. Rasna’s ethnicity is unambiguous, she is a Kenyan Asian, which should be one of the ethnicities available on the census questionnaire.

In standard statistical practice, people’s racial and ethnic identity are self-declared and the identity questions usually have options such as “other” and “mixed” as well as the choice not to disclose. But Rasna was not given a choice, as she recounts here. While this may seem like a trivial matter, the undercurrents of racism and patriarchy in this action are disturbing. It is, I think, even more alarming that the enumerators, given a little authority, felt that they had the power to exercise discretion on the matter.

Past censuses have been rather uneventful statistical exercises. This one had the aura of a security operation. In the run-up, we were treated to all manner of threats and arbitrary orders from the Internal Security Cabinet Secretary, the Jubilee administration’s energetic and increasingly facile enforcer. On the eve of the census, the government spokesman added to the melodrama by issuing a statement informing the public that census enumerators would be asking for personal identification details, including national ID and passport numbers and, ominously, huduma namba registration status. There are few issues as controversial right now as huduma namba and to introduce that question was a sure way of heightening suspicion and undermining the credibility of the census.

More fundamentally, anonymity is a canon of statistical survey work. In fact, the law prohibits dissemination of any information which can be identified with a particular respondent without the respondent’s consent. For this reason, censuses and statistical surveys are usually designed and the data maintained in such a way as to ensure that the respondents remain anonymous.

In October last year, the Government gazetted the census regulations that include a schedule of the information that would be collected. Identity information is not listed in the schedule. In January this year, the Keya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) issued a media briefing, still on their website, that also listed the information that would be collected. It too does not mention identity information. That it was the Government spokesman—and not the KNBS—who appraised the public, and only on the eve of the census, is telling.

The response to the protestations that met the disclosure was vintage Jubilee—dishonest and inept. The spokesman explained that the personal identity information would be removed to restore the anonymity of the data. If indeed the purpose was to establish registration coverage, the professional statisticians would have asked respondents to state their registration status. Moreover, for planning purposes, professional statisticians would have designed a comprehensive module that would have included other critical information such as birth registration status.

The draconian zeal with which huduma namba is being pursued—including the proposed legislation—is all the more perplexing because, since all the functions listed are those that are currently served by the national ID, the sensible thing to do would be to upgrade the national ID. Seeing as we have already had three national ID upgrades since independence, it seems to me unlikely that a fourth upgrade would have generated the heat that the huduma namba has.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights. A republican system is democratic if political equality is universal, and aristocratic if the rights are a privilege that is denied to some members (e.g. slaves). In monarchical systems, the rulers have absolute authority governed by established rules. In a despotic system, the ruler is the law.

Montesquieu postulated for each system a driving principle, ethos if you like, on which its survival depends. The driving principle of a democratic republic is love of virtue— a willingness to put the public good ahead of private interests. He opined that a republican government failed to take root in England after the Civil War (1642-1651) because English society lacked the required principle, namely the love of virtue. The short-lived English republic, known as the Commonwealth of England, lasted a decade, from the beheading of Charles I in 1649 to shortly after the death Oliver Cromwell in 1659. The driving principle of monarchical systems is love of honour and the quest for higher social rank and privilege. For despotism it is fear of the ruler. The rulers are the law, and they rule by fear.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights.

Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya,

“The Kipande was worn around the neck like a dog collar. The Kipande contained the wearer’s tribe, their strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence, therefore, determining his pay or whether or not he would be employed. The government used the Kipande to curtail freedom of Africans and monitor labour supply. It also empowered the police to stop a native anywhere and demand to be shown the document. For Africans, the Kipande was like a badge of slavery and sparked bitter protests.”

In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages. But it was not perfect. Keren Weitzberg, a migration scholar and author of We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya, makes an interesting and insightful contextual link between huduma namba and the colonial quest to better the kipande revealed in a recommendation that appears in a 1956 government document:

“Consideration should be given to the provision of a comprehensive document for Africans, as is done in the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. This should incorporate Registration particulars, payment of Poll Tax, and such other papers as the African is required to carry or are envisaged for him, e.g. Domestic Service record and permit to reside in urban areas. Eligibility under the Coutts proposals for voting might also be included in the document. The document would then become of value to the holder and there would be less likelihood of its becoming lost or transferred, as is the case with the present Identity document.” 

The purpose of the huduma namba is the same as that of the “comprehensive document for Africans”—to instill in people the sense that Big Brother is watching. But despotism is not an end in itself. The raison d’être of the colonial enterprise was economic exploitation. This has not changed.

The 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics was shared by George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analysis of markets with asymmetric information. A market with asymmetric information is one where material attributes of a good or service are private information known only to the seller and not observable by the buyer; the seller has an incentive to conceal the attributes. In essence, it is a market where the buyer cannot be sure that they will get what they pay for. Asymmetric information problems are pervasive in labour and credit markets.

Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya

A potential employer cannot tell in advance whether a worker is a performer or not, or even whether he or she is dishonest—they only get to know that after hiring the worker, and at considerable cost if they get it wrong. We know that job seekers go out of their way to misrepresent themselves, including faking qualifications and references, and concealing adverse information such as previous dismissals and criminal records. To mitigate the problem, employers go out of their way to obtain and check out references including certificates of good conduct from the police.

The original kipande, as Atellah notes, included information on the bearers “strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence.” It does not require too much imagination to see how errant natives would have made for a severe labour market information asymmetry problem, motivating the settler economy to invent this seemingly innocuous but probably effective labour market information system.

Similarly, a potential borrower’s creditworthiness is not observable to lenders. Lenders only get to sort out good and bad borrowers from experience. A customer’s credit history is a lender’s most valuable asset. A public credit reference system, such as the Credit Reference Bureaus, is a device for mitigating credit market information asymmetry. The parallel with the kipande character reference is readily apparent.

In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages.

As a credit information system, the digital panopticon envisaged by huduma namba is priceless, and as one of the country’s leading mobile lenders, the Kenyatta family-owned Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) is the primary beneficiary. Indeed, well before the public was informed about it, huduma namba featured prominently in a CBA-led mobile lending platform project called Wezeshafeatured in this column—that was subsequently rebranded and launched as Stawi.

Nine years ago this week, we promulgated a new constitution. Since its enactment the political and bureaucratic establishment has spared no effort to restore the unfettered discretion and apparatus of rule by fear that the new constitutional dispensation is meant to dismantle. Early in its term, the Jubilee administration sought to pass a raft of security-related legislation that would have clawed back most of the civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Uhuru Kenyatta is on record, in one of the pre-election TV interviews, attributing his underwhelming performance to the constraints on his authority by the 2010 Constitution. He went on to express nostalgia for the old one.

In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.

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Africa and Palestine: A Noble Legacy That Must Never Be Forgotten

4 min read. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that the solidarity between Africa and Palestine. Indeed, writes RAMZY BAROUD If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.

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Africa and Palestine: A Noble Legacy That Must Never Be Forgotten
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Europe’s “Scramble for Africa” began in earnest in 1881 but never ended. The attempt at dominating the continent using old and new strategies continues to define the Western relationship with this rich continent. This reality was very apparent when I arrived in Nairobi on June 23. Although I had come to address various Kenyan audiences at universities, public forums and the media, I had also to learn. Kenya, like the rest of Africa, is a source of inspiration for all anti-colonial liberation movements around the world. We Palestinians can learn a great deal from the Kenyan struggle.

Although African countries have fought valiant battles for their freedom against their Western colonisers, neocolonialism now defines the relationship between many independent African countries and their former occupiers. Political meddling, economic control and, at times, military interventions – as in the recent cases of Libya and Mali – point to the unfortunate reality that Africa remains, in myriad ways, hostage to Western priorities, interests and dictates.

In the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884, Western colonial regimes attempted to mediate between the various powers that were competing over Africa’s riches. It apportioned to each a share of the African continent, as if Africa were the property of the West and its white colonists. Millions of Africans died in that protracted, bloody episode unleashed by the West, which shamelessly promoted its genocidal oppression as a civilisational project.

Like most colonised peoples in the southern hemisphere, Africans fought disproportionate battles to gain their precious freedom. Here in Kenya, which became an official British colony in the 1920s, Kenya’s freedom fighters rose in rebellion against the brutality of their oppressors. Most notable among the various resistance campaigns, the Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s remains a stark example of the courage of Kenyans and the cruelty of colonial Britain. Thousands of people were killed, wounded, disappeared or were imprisoned under the harshest of conditions.

Palestine fell under British occupation, the so-called British Mandate, around the same period that Kenya also became a British colony. Palestinians, too, fought and fell in their thousands as they employed various methods of collective resistance, including the legendary strike and rebellion of 1936. The same British killing machine that operated in Palestine and Kenya around that time, also operated, with the same degree of senseless violence, against numerous other nations around the world.

While Palestine was handed over to the Zionist movement to establish the state of Israel in May 1948, Kenya achieved its independence in December 1963.

At one of my recent talks in Nairobi, I was asked by a young participant about “Palestinian terrorism”. I told her that Palestinian fighters of today are Kenya’s Mau Mau rebels of yesteryear. That if we allow Western and Israeli propaganda to define Paestine’s national liberation discourse, then we condemn all national liberation movements throughout the southern hemisphere, including Kenya’s own freedom fighters.

We Palestinians must however shoulder part of the blame that our narrative as an oppressed, colonised and resisting nation is now misunderstood in parts of Africa.

When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation. Instead, it subscribed to a whole new discourse, riddled with carefully-worded language sanctioned by Washington and its European allies. Whenever Palestinians dared to deviate from their assigned role, the West would decree that they must return to the negotiating table, as the latter became a metaphor of obedience and submission.

Throughout these years, Palestinians mostly abandoned their far more meaningful alliances in Africa. Instead, they endlessly appealed to the goodwill of the West, hoping that the very colonial powers that have primarily created, sustained and armed Israel, would miraculously become more balanced and humane.

When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation.

However, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, etc., remained committed to Israel and, despite occasional polite criticism of the Israeli government, continued to channel their weapons, warplanes and submarines to every Israeli government that has ruled over Palestinians for the last seven decades. Alas, while Palestinians were learning their painful lesson, betrayed repeatedly by those who had vowed to respect democracy and human rights, many African nations began seeing in Israel a possible ally. Kenya is, sadly, one of those countries.

Understanding the significance of Africa in terms of its economic and political potential, and its support for Israel at the UN General Assembly, right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has launched his own “Scramble for Africa”. Netanyahu’s diplomatic conquests on the continent have been celebrated by Israeli media as “historic”, while the Palestinian leadership remains oblivious to the rapidly changing political landscape.

Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes. Tel Aviv had hoped that the first-ever Israel-Africa summit in Togo would usher in a complete paradigm shift in Israeli-African relations. However, the October 2017 conference never took place due to pressure by various African countries, including South Africa. There is still enough support for Palestine on the continent to defeat the Israeli stratagem. But that could change soon in favour of Israel if Palestinians and their allies do not wake up to the alarming reality.

The Palestinian leadership, intellectuals, artists and civil society ambassadors must shift their attention back to the southern hemisphere, to Africa in particular, rediscovering the untapped wealth of true, unconditional human solidarity offered by the peoples of this ever-generous continent.

Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes

The legendary Tanzanian freedom fighter, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who is also celebrated in Kenya, knew very well where his solidarity lay. “We have never hesitated in our support for the right of the people of Palestine to have their own land,” he once said, a sentiment that was repeated by the iconic South African leader Nelson Mandela, and by many other African liberation leaders. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that noble legacy. If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.

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