The just ended Forum of Chinese–African Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing may prove to be the straw that breaks the camel’s back for the United States, long irritated by Africa’s relationship with an Asian country as powerful as itself. The 2018 forum was attended by more African leaders than attended the last AU Summit. Only six heads of state did not show up; Tanzania, Burundi, DRC, Eritrea and Algeria and were represented by vice presidents and prime ministers. Swaziland alone had nothing at all to do with FOCAC.
On 3 August, the day FOCAC 2018 opened, sixteen US senators wrote to Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury and Michael Pompeo, Secretary of the Department of State demanding to know what the Administration proposes to do to stop China’s attempt to dominate the global economy. First signatory is Senator David Perdue, described as ‘Donald Trump’s Man in the Senate’. The letter is therefore guaranteed to get attention.
The senators point out that 23 of the 68 countries hosting Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects are at risk of debt distress. Eight countries with future BRI infrastructure investments are also at risk of debt distress. China is accused by the Senators of ‘predatory lending’,’weaponizing’ capital and holding poor countries to ransom when they fail to repay.
On 3 August, the day FOCAC 2018 opened, sixteen US senators wrote to Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury and Michael Pompeo, Secretary of the Department of State demanding to know what the Administration proposes to do to stop China’s attempt to dominate the global economy.
This is not to say that the West has not weaponized capital as a matter of course. Sometimes literally. For example, International Lending Institutions will lend to countries that suppress political opposition. Such oppression means citizens cannot fulfil their right and duty to oppose unsustainable debt through democratic processes. In Uganda, electoral violence prevents the citizenry from freely campaigning for elections. Knowing this, Western sovereign lenders provide the means of repression by arming, for example, Uganda’s Special Forces Command while lending to the perpetrators of violence.
The core of the argument the US Senators are preparing against China’s BRI is this: countries in debt distress caused by BRI projects are also in debt to the IMF and turn to the IMF for bailouts. The US is the IMF’s biggest shareholder. As such, IMF bailouts to countries in debt-distress from Chinese loans would be transferring US taxpayers’ money to China. Sri Lanka’s bailout in 2016 did not prevent the loss of Hambantota Port.
However the major immediate cause of concern is Pakistan, reportedly planning to apply for an IMF bailout after her BRI indebtedness under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor put Gwadar Port at risk. Djibouti whose debt to China is equivalent to 75% of her GDP (its total foreign debt to GDP ratio is 85%) is said to be at risk of losing Doraleh Container Terminal to China, an asset strategically important to the United States.
Uganda is not mentioned but is likely one of the other countries alluded to. Uganda’s debt–distress has been on the horizon for at least two years. The Auditor General signaled it in 2016. A recent attempt to increase tax revenues led to the #ThisTaxMustGo movement, an outcry from a public that sees little in the way of public services, and more recently, the disruption of a tax policy conference attended by donors.
What is important to Uganda is the questions put by the senators to the American Administration;
“As the largest contributor to the IMF, how can the United States use its influence to ensure that bailout terms prevent the continuation of ongoing BRI projects, or the start of new BRI projects?”
An understanding appears to have been reached with Kenya which this year applied for a bailout and simultaneously suspended all new infrastructure projects apparently in return for assistance.
The senators also require the Treasury and the State Department to investigate: i) which other countries are likely to require bailouts; ii) how BRI countries in debt distress can be assisted to repay their loans; and iii) alternative sources of infrastructure funding.”
The closing paragraph of the senators’ letter indicates that another proxy war is about to be fought on the African continent. It is clear the senators want the United States to disrupt Chinese–African cooperation:
“In his speech to the 19th Party Congress, President Xi declared, ‘China’s development does not pose a threat to any other country. No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.’ It is apparent that this statement is fundamentally false, and the goal of BRI is the creation of an economic world order ultimately dominated by China. It is imperative that the United States counters [emphasis mine] China’s attempts to hold other countries financially hostage and force ransoms that further its geostrategic goals.”
African leaders attending FOCAC have been promised $60 billion in development assistance. It will be made up of grants and more importantly, loans from Chinese financial institutions. China in 2018 has promised to import more non–commodities (finished goods) from Africa. At FOCAC 2015, the same amount was promised. Given that several countries are already struggling to repay Chinese debt, which carries higher interest and is repayable over a shorter period than loans from other sources, the offer is not necessarily an altruistic gesture.
At the end of FOCAC 2015 held in Johannesburg, the dysfunctional relationship between Africa and China was already evident. The relief of the Chairman of the Africa Union as he welcomed the blandishments of President Xi Jinping was palpable. Probably remembering the Bandung Conference of 1955, in a quivering voice President Robert Mugabe (for it was he) delivered one of those lyrical declamations he was so good at, “Here is a man representing a country once called poor, a country which was never our coloniser. But there you are, he is doing what we expected those who colonised us yesterday to do.”
With the colonial and especially settler–state experience, and after the Continent has been all but disembowelled so that its endowment of natural resources has failed to translate to a decent standard of living as the norm, the current belief that China or anyone else is going to do the work, is astounding in its naïveté.
The relationship between China and Africa is said, over and again, to be rooted in friendship and equality. It is this that is expected to provide the impetus to begin to deliver on goals whose attainment is long overdue: industrialization, modernisation of agriculture, poverty reduction, technological capacity building and economic development. These are expected to be reached by means of Chinese capital, technology and personnel for the construction of roads and other infrastructure, investment and trade facilitation and environmental protection. Sino–sceptics recall the very same development goals were discussed at great length with Europe and America in the immediate post-independence period and beyond.
For his part, President Museveni expressed the hope in Beijing 2018, that the relationship with China would allow Africa to, “more easily work with our friends in the EU and the USA on the basis of win-win arrangements, not the win–lose arrangements of the last 500 years […] many African countries and the former colonizers can put to good use the historical relations with the British Commonwealth or the French Community. What was previously negative could become much more positive than it has been hitherto.”
The relationship between China and Africa is said, over and again, to be rooted in friendship and equality. It is this that is expected to provide the impetus to begin to deliver on goals whose attainment is long overdue: industrialization, modernisation of agriculture, poverty reduction, technological capacity building and economic development…Sino–sceptics recall the very same development goals were discussed at great length with Europe and America in the immediate post-independence period and beyond.
In the interim, raw materials have continued to dominate African exports. Structural Adjustment Programmes led to deindustrialisation on a grand scale. Despite mineral and other endowments dwarfing anything available in the West or the East, African countries continue to occupy the lower rungs of the Human Development Index.
Listening to Xi Jinping’s address at FOCAC 2015, one would have thought China has no needs of her own – they were not mentioned either by China or her African hosts – and that China is in it for purely altruistic reasons. Mugabe, the AU chairman, claimed that the -Sino-African relationship goes far deeper than mineral extraction. The 50,000 elephants we lose to poachers every year did not feature either.
Pro–FOCAC leaders no doubt recall the heady days of Bandung and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement, when there was an Afro–Asian bloc at the UN General Assembly. Back then, African countries were proactive and saw themselves as actors on the world stage rather than as mere props in other people’s scripts and proxies in their wars. An episode that occurred during the Cold War illustrates this. The US sought to bar China from membership of the UN General Assembly and African leaders were lobbied by high-level American officials to vote against China. Just a week after Nigeria gained independence in October 1960, Prime Minister Balewa called on President Eisenhower. Having assured Eisenhower that he was not a Communist, Balewa made a request for bilateral aid and was assured aid would be available through the UN Special Fund. He was advised that the United States preferred making loans to giving grants.
Later in the conversation in answer to a question from Prime Minister Balewa, President Eisenhower said that a vote by Nigeria in favour of Red Chinese representation at the UN would “constitute such a repudiation of the U.S. that we would be in a hard fix indeed.” [i] Balewa in turn expressed surprise that a nation of 650 million should be excluded from representation at the world body. In the event, Nigeria voted against the U.S. position on the Chinese delegation.
Nowadays things are different. Uganda abstained from the historic UN General Assembly vote against the United States’ endorsement of Israel’s annexation of East Jerusalem when Washington announced that the US was moving her Embassy there. Kenya dodged the vote altogether. In an earlier resolution (December 2016) against, among other things, Israel changing the status of internationally recognized Palestinian territory via settlements, Uganda abstained.
FOCAC 2015 provided US$5 billion in grants as a sweetener and US$ 55 billion in loans. In 2018 a further $60 billion has been pledged. Going on precedent, the majority of these funds will not reach their intended beneficiaries, for easily understandable reasons. Apart from the bureaucracy surrounding the loan applications, most African countries lack a strong regulatory framework. The result: massive waste and theft of public funds. Uganda, for example, has spent billions of dollars of tax revenues and loans on civil service reform, and millions on programmes to deepen democracy yet an enabling environment for sustainable development continues to elude her citizens. State brutality is on the increase.
Uganda’s allegiance to China does not require her to address failures in deepening democracy and inclusive development even for public relations purposes. Although the Western development industry too has tolerated what it calls ‘democratic deficits’ their leaders can be called to account because unlike China, they continually profess democratic values. What follows below is a brief run-through of recent examples of kleprocracy and incompetence supported in Uganda:
The National Roads Authority (UNRA) was established in 2006 to make road construction more efficient than it was under the Ministry of Transport. With its large budget, the UNRA quickly became known for some of the country’s more colourful corruption scandals. In 2015 UNRA excelled itself when the country lost in the region of UGX 24.7 billion (US$ 6.5 million at current rates) in the Mukono–Katosi road scam. The Inspector General of Government found that the Minister for Transport, Abraham Byandala, abused his office by inducing the supposedly independent UNRA to give a contract to one Eutaw, a firm claiming to be related to an American firm of a similar name. The firm, which turned out to have no relation to its American ‘parent company’, was paid advances for work it was unable to complete. Byandala was acquitted in August 2018, for insufficient evidence.
Uganda’s allegiance to China does not require her to address failures in deepening democracy and inclusive development even for public relations purposes. Although the Western development industry too has tolerated what it calls ‘democratic deficits’ their leaders can be called to account because unlike China, they continually profess democratic values.
Meanwhile in the south, the brand new highway to Rwanda literally split in two with one half sliding down the hill. The much–praised Northern By–pass in Kampala was closed as the swamp through which it was built began to reclaim it in the March rains. The Roads Authority is slated to be disbanded by presidential decree as a waste of resources.
The Uganda National Bureau of Standards (UNBS), was established in 1983, “to enforce standards for protection of public health and safety and the environment against dangerous, counterfeit and substandard products; ensuring fairness in trade and precision in industry; strengthening Uganda’s economy….” Given that the disposal of disused short–life cheap goods imported from China is becoming an environmental hazard and counterfeit drugs a health hazard, UNBS and other specialised quality assurance agencies would need to be much stronger if the goals of green development, health and prosperity are to be attained.
The CEO of UNBS was suspended in 2015 with various management weaknesses cited as the reason. In 2018, the situation has deteriorated to the degree that foods have been found to be adulterated, notably meat preserved with formaldehyde.
The judiciary (Justice Law and Order Sector) is at once a source of hope and a constant source of disappointment. Sovereign debt has legal and constitutional ramifications. For example, Uganda’s constitution requires the state and its citizens to ‘defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda’ and to build national strength in political, economic and social spheres to avoid undue dependence on other countries and institutions.’ This is meant to be done mainly through Parliament which approves or rejects debt. Clearly unsustainable debt flies in the face of independence.
Other indebted countries too have fallen into debt in contravention of the law. Mozambique’s $2 billion secret loans (one from a Russian bank) were taken out by the finance minister who was not authorised to do so. He later admitted that he was unaware when he signed the guarantee that he gave the creditors sovereign powers over all Mozambican assets until the debt was repaid.
Sovereign debt has legal and constitutional ramifications. For example, Uganda’s constitution requires the state and its citizens to ‘defend the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Uganda’ and to build national strength in political, economic and social spheres to avoid undue dependence on other countries and institutions.’ This is meant to be done mainly through Parliament which approves or rejects debt.
This is what the US Senators refer to as ‘predatory lending.’ However, the same administrative weaknesses taken advantage of by Chinese and Russian lenders are relied on by Western lenders despite the claim that they operate under different standards.
It was expected that the Constitutional Court would strike down Parliament’s removal of presidential age limits further reducing the chance of removing the incumbent kleptocratic regime.. What came as a shock was the ruling on the invasion of Parliament by the Special Forces beating, torturing several Members of Parliament” physical assault on the elected representatives of the people by ‘security operatives’.
During the appeal against age limit removal, only one out of five judges ruled that state violence is unconstitutional in all circumstances and that it therefore rendered the Age Limit Act null and void. Justice Kenneth Kakuru said,
“The Constitution demands that citizens of this Country be treated with respect and dignity by all agencies of the State. Again I am constrained to refer to the maiden speech of President when in 1986 he promised Ugandans that no citizen would be beaten by the army (read or the Police) as it had been the norm in the past regimes.
The police in Uganda have no right to frog march Members of Parliament, beat them and humiliate them the way they now routinely do which this Court takes judicial notice of being a notorious fact [emphasis mine].”
The rest of the judges were of the view that the attack on Parliament did not nullify the Age Limit Act opening the way for President Museveni’s life tenure and also for assaults on members of parliament.
Many blame the constitutional court’s failure to condemn state violence for the subsequent attack on members of parliament and their supporters in the Arua by–election weeks later.
For two weeks beginning in Arua on 13 August 2018 the armed forces indulged in a wave of electoral violence that spread to other cities. At the time of writing, a high level press conference has just ended in Kampala. Briefing the media about the electoral violence, the Minister for Security said the armed forces acted with restraint and that had they not, casualties would have been more severe. In other words – be grateful we let you live. A further update: President Museveni addressing his party caucus warned them that he has the power to shut down Parliament.
Justice, law and order, health, education, immigration, infrastructural development and tax administration, are all sectors important for development which have exhibited persistent weaknesses. Neither debt nor grants (Chinese or Western) have removed precarity from the manner in which the country is governed or from the day–to–day existence of the majority of Ugandans. Increased debt and grants are not the answer.
In any case, the Chinese project is about to receive major push–back from the United States. A decade ago, correspondence between the US Embassy in Kampala and Washington indicated concern about the manner in which China beats American firms in bids for oil concessions and infrastructure projects by bribing government officials. (Email-2011-10-19 07:38:18 From: firstname.lastname@example.org To: email@example.com. Source: Wikileaks). At some point, officials discussed (with the UK) but did not implement travel bans on the senior government officials taking bribes, possibly leaving room for negotiation. That era may have ended.
There are two possible outcomes for Africa. It is just possible that African, Asian and South American countries could become active negotiators this time around. If they were to engage regional blocs they would be able to come away with more profitable and transparent financial arrangements. The best case scenario would include repudiation of illegitimate debt; all monies recklessly loaned to kleptocrat administrations and all those used to perpetuate despots in power.
The best case scenario would include repudiation of illegitimate debt…Failing that China, Europe and the United States will simply agree to a second partition of Africa into new spheres of influence…The current crop of African leaders, noted mainly for bribe-taking and theft of public resources is more likely to cooperate in the second partition of Africa than to restructure the basis of the Continent’s relationship with the imperial powers.
Failing that China, Europe and the United States will simply agree to a second partition of Africa into new spheres of influence. Which brings us to the main ingredient lacking: leadership. The current crop of African leaders, noted mainly for bribe-taking and theft of public resources is more likely to cooperate in the second partition of Africa than to restructure the basis of the Continent’s relationship with the imperial powers.
[i] FRUS 1958-1960 v.14 Newly Independent States, Document 77, Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, October 8, 1960.
South Africa: Xenophobia Is in Fact Afrophobia, Call It What It Is
5 min read. Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.
Written in May 2008, as African bodies burned on the streets of South Africa, Ingrid De Kok’s throbbing poem Today I Do Not Love My Country poignantly captures the mood of an Afrophobic nation fluent in the language of violence and name-calling. (I say Afrophobic because South Africa does not have a xenophobia problem. We don’t rage against all foreigners—just the poor, black ones from Africa.)
The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent. As the debris is cleared off the streets of Johannesburg after a week of violent looting and attacks against African migrant-owned businesses that saw eleven people killed and almost 500 arrested, Pretoria now faces calls to boycott South African-owned businesses on the continent.
Zambia and Madagascar cancelled football matches. Air Tanzania has suspended flights to South Africa. African artists are boycotting South Africa. Should an Afrophobic South Africa lead the African Union next year?
The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent
The South African government has remained steadfast in its denial of Afrophobia, opting instead to condemn “violent attacks” and highlight the criminal elements involved in looting African-owned businesses. The police attributed the attacks to “opportunistic criminality”. By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.
The Afrophobic attacks are not spontaneous criminal mobs preying on foreigners. They are the result of an orchestrated, planned campaign that has been fuelled by the ongoing anti-immigrant rhetoric of South African politicians.
The All Truck Drivers Forum (ATDF), Sisonke People’s Forum and Respect SA stand accused of orchestrating last week’s violence. ATDF spokesperson, Sipho Zungu, denied that his group had instigated the violent looting, saying that “the nation is being misled here.” Zungu did stress, however, that South African truck drivers “no longer have jobs” and the government “must get rid of foreign truck drivers.”
Zungu echoes the sentiments of many poor South Africans, and their views are the end result of a drip-feed of anti-immigrant messages from South African politicians, particularly in the run-up to this year’s elections.
Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.
One-third of South Africans are unemployed. Thirteen per cent of South Africans live in informal settlements, and a third of South Africans don’t have access to running water. The problems are a combination of the country’s apartheid past and rampant corruption and mismanagement within the ANC-led government. Crime is climbing, mainly due to corrupt and dysfunctional policing services, high unemployment and systemic poverty.
By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.
South African politicians from across the spectrum have blamed immigrants for the hardships experienced by poor South Africans. Political parties tell voters that foreigners are criminals flooding South Africa, stealing their jobs, homes and social services, undermining their security and prosperity.
Even the government sees poor and unskilled African migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to the country’s security and prosperity. Approved in March 2017, its White Paper on International Migration, separates immigrants into “worthy” and “unworthy” individuals. Poor and unskilled immigrants, predominantly from Africa, will be prevented from staying in South Africa by any means, “even if this is labelled anti-African behaviour” as the former Minister of Home Affairs, Hlengiwe Mkhize, pointed out in June 2017. The message is simple: there is no place for black Africans in South Africa’s Rainbow Nation.
In November 2018, Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi claimed in a speech at a nurses summit that undocumented immigrants were flooding South Africa and overburdening clinics and hospitals. When immigrants “get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control starts failing”, he said.
Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.
In a bid to attract more support, Mashaba and the DA have adopted an immigrant-baiting approach straight out of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro’s playbooks.
Mashaba has described black African migrants as criminals and has spoken of the need for a “shock-and-awe” campaign to drive them out.
In February 2019, Mashaba diverted attention away from protests against his administration’s poor service delivery in Johannesburg’s Alexandra township by tweeting that foreigners had made it difficult to provide basic services.
On August 1, police operations in Johannesburg to find counterfeit goods were thwarted by traders who pelted law-enforcement authorities with rocks, forcing the police to retreat. Social media went into overdrive, with many accusing the police of being cowards running away from illegal immigrants. Mashaba was “devastated” by the police’s restraint. A week later over 500 African immigrants were arrested after a humiliating raid, even though many said they showed police valid papers.
In 2017, South Africa’s deputy police minister claimed that the city of Johannesburg had been taken over by foreigners, with 80% of the city controlled by them. If this is not urgently stopped, he added, the entire country “could be 80% dominated by foreign nationals and the future president of South Africa could be a foreign national.”
None of this anti-immigrant rhetoric is based on fact. Constituting just 3% of the South African population, statistics show that immigrants are not “flooding” South Africa. They aren’t stealing jobs from South Africans and nor are they responsible for the high crime rate. South Africa’s crime problem has little to do with migration, and everything to do with the country’s dysfunctional policing services, unemployment and poverty.
Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.
But South African politicians don’t let facts get in the way. After all, it’s easier to blame African immigrants rather than face your own citizens and admit that you’ve chosen to line your own pockets instead of doing your job. If you can get others to shoulder the blame for the hopeless situation that many South Africans find themselves in, then why not?
South Africans are rightfully angry at the high levels of unemployment, poverty, lack of services and opportunities. But rather than blame African immigrants, frustration must be directed at the source of the crisis: a South African political leadership steeped in corruption that has largely failed its people.
The African Diaspora Forum, the representative body of the largest group of migrant traders, claimed that the police failed to act on intelligence that it had provided warning of the impending attacks. It took almost three days before Cyril Ramaphosa finally issued weak words of condemnation and for his security cluster to meet and strategise. All of this points to a government refusing to own its complicity and deal with the consequences of its words.
South Africa has fallen far and hard from the lofty Mandela era and Thabo Mbeki’s soaring “I am an African” declaration.
Senior political leaders in South Africa are blaming vulnerable Africans for their failure to adequately provide a dignified life for all South Africans. Until this scapegoating stops, violent anti-African sentiment will continue to thrive, and South Africa will entrench its growing pariah status on the continent.
A New Despotism in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism: A Reflection on Census 2019
6 min read. In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.
The just concluded census 2019 brought with it many strange occurrences including the official classification of my good friend Rasna Warah as a Mtaita, a community to which she is only very remotely connected by virtue of being married to a husband whose mother is a Mtaveta. The Taita and Taveta, who give their home county Taita-Taveta its name, are two related but distinct ethnic groups. Rasna’s ethnicity is unambiguous, she is a Kenyan Asian, which should be one of the ethnicities available on the census questionnaire.
In standard statistical practice, people’s racial and ethnic identity are self-declared and the identity questions usually have options such as “other” and “mixed” as well as the choice not to disclose. But Rasna was not given a choice, as she recounts here. While this may seem like a trivial matter, the undercurrents of racism and patriarchy in this action are disturbing. It is, I think, even more alarming that the enumerators, given a little authority, felt that they had the power to exercise discretion on the matter.
Past censuses have been rather uneventful statistical exercises. This one had the aura of a security operation. In the run-up, we were treated to all manner of threats and arbitrary orders from the Internal Security Cabinet Secretary, the Jubilee administration’s energetic and increasingly facile enforcer. On the eve of the census, the government spokesman added to the melodrama by issuing a statement informing the public that census enumerators would be asking for personal identification details, including national ID and passport numbers and, ominously, huduma namba registration status. There are few issues as controversial right now as huduma namba and to introduce that question was a sure way of heightening suspicion and undermining the credibility of the census.
More fundamentally, anonymity is a canon of statistical survey work. In fact, the law prohibits dissemination of any information which can be identified with a particular respondent without the respondent’s consent. For this reason, censuses and statistical surveys are usually designed and the data maintained in such a way as to ensure that the respondents remain anonymous.
In October last year, the Government gazetted the census regulations that include a schedule of the information that would be collected. Identity information is not listed in the schedule. In January this year, the Keya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) issued a media briefing, still on their website, that also listed the information that would be collected. It too does not mention identity information. That it was the Government spokesman—and not the KNBS—who appraised the public, and only on the eve of the census, is telling.
The response to the protestations that met the disclosure was vintage Jubilee—dishonest and inept. The spokesman explained that the personal identity information would be removed to restore the anonymity of the data. If indeed the purpose was to establish registration coverage, the professional statisticians would have asked respondents to state their registration status. Moreover, for planning purposes, professional statisticians would have designed a comprehensive module that would have included other critical information such as birth registration status.
The draconian zeal with which huduma namba is being pursued—including the proposed legislation—is all the more perplexing because, since all the functions listed are those that are currently served by the national ID, the sensible thing to do would be to upgrade the national ID. Seeing as we have already had three national ID upgrades since independence, it seems to me unlikely that a fourth upgrade would have generated the heat that the huduma namba has.
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights. A republican system is democratic if political equality is universal, and aristocratic if the rights are a privilege that is denied to some members (e.g. slaves). In monarchical systems, the rulers have absolute authority governed by established rules. In a despotic system, the ruler is the law.
Montesquieu postulated for each system a driving principle, ethos if you like, on which its survival depends. The driving principle of a democratic republic is love of virtue— a willingness to put the public good ahead of private interests. He opined that a republican government failed to take root in England after the Civil War (1642-1651) because English society lacked the required principle, namely the love of virtue. The short-lived English republic, known as the Commonwealth of England, lasted a decade, from the beheading of Charles I in 1649 to shortly after the death Oliver Cromwell in 1659. The driving principle of monarchical systems is love of honour and the quest for higher social rank and privilege. For despotism it is fear of the ruler. The rulers are the law, and they rule by fear.
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights.
Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya,
“The Kipande was worn around the neck like a dog collar. The Kipande contained the wearer’s tribe, their strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence, therefore, determining his pay or whether or not he would be employed. The government used the Kipande to curtail freedom of Africans and monitor labour supply. It also empowered the police to stop a native anywhere and demand to be shown the document. For Africans, the Kipande was like a badge of slavery and sparked bitter protests.”
In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages. But it was not perfect. Keren Weitzberg, a migration scholar and author of We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya, makes an interesting and insightful contextual link between huduma namba and the colonial quest to better the kipande revealed in a recommendation that appears in a 1956 government document:
“Consideration should be given to the provision of a comprehensive document for Africans, as is done in the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. This should incorporate Registration particulars, payment of Poll Tax, and such other papers as the African is required to carry or are envisaged for him, e.g. Domestic Service record and permit to reside in urban areas. Eligibility under the Coutts proposals for voting might also be included in the document. The document would then become of value to the holder and there would be less likelihood of its becoming lost or transferred, as is the case with the present Identity document.”
Interesting historical context for #HudumaNamba. As far back as 1956, colonial authorities had ambitious (and unsuccessful) goals of consolidating Kenyans’ various records into a single “comprehensive document.” Plus ca change… pic.twitter.com/yFhui7JtHY
— Dr. Keren Weitzberg (@KerenWeitzberg) August 19, 2019
The purpose of the huduma namba is the same as that of the “comprehensive document for Africans”—to instill in people the sense that Big Brother is watching. But despotism is not an end in itself. The raison d’être of the colonial enterprise was economic exploitation. This has not changed.
The 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics was shared by George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analysis of markets with asymmetric information. A market with asymmetric information is one where material attributes of a good or service are private information known only to the seller and not observable by the buyer; the seller has an incentive to conceal the attributes. In essence, it is a market where the buyer cannot be sure that they will get what they pay for. Asymmetric information problems are pervasive in labour and credit markets.
Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya
A potential employer cannot tell in advance whether a worker is a performer or not, or even whether he or she is dishonest—they only get to know that after hiring the worker, and at considerable cost if they get it wrong. We know that job seekers go out of their way to misrepresent themselves, including faking qualifications and references, and concealing adverse information such as previous dismissals and criminal records. To mitigate the problem, employers go out of their way to obtain and check out references including certificates of good conduct from the police.
The original kipande, as Atellah notes, included information on the bearers “strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence.” It does not require too much imagination to see how errant natives would have made for a severe labour market information asymmetry problem, motivating the settler economy to invent this seemingly innocuous but probably effective labour market information system.
Similarly, a potential borrower’s creditworthiness is not observable to lenders. Lenders only get to sort out good and bad borrowers from experience. A customer’s credit history is a lender’s most valuable asset. A public credit reference system, such as the Credit Reference Bureaus, is a device for mitigating credit market information asymmetry. The parallel with the kipande character reference is readily apparent.
In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages.
As a credit information system, the digital panopticon envisaged by huduma namba is priceless, and as one of the country’s leading mobile lenders, the Kenyatta family-owned Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) is the primary beneficiary. Indeed, well before the public was informed about it, huduma namba featured prominently in a CBA-led mobile lending platform project called Wezesha—featured in this column—that was subsequently rebranded and launched as Stawi.
Nine years ago this week, we promulgated a new constitution. Since its enactment the political and bureaucratic establishment has spared no effort to restore the unfettered discretion and apparatus of rule by fear that the new constitutional dispensation is meant to dismantle. Early in its term, the Jubilee administration sought to pass a raft of security-related legislation that would have clawed back most of the civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Uhuru Kenyatta is on record, in one of the pre-election TV interviews, attributing his underwhelming performance to the constraints on his authority by the 2010 Constitution. He went on to express nostalgia for the old one.
In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.
Africa and Palestine: A Noble Legacy That Must Never Be Forgotten
4 min read. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that the solidarity between Africa and Palestine. Indeed, writes RAMZY BAROUD If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.
Europe’s “Scramble for Africa” began in earnest in 1881 but never ended. The attempt at dominating the continent using old and new strategies continues to define the Western relationship with this rich continent. This reality was very apparent when I arrived in Nairobi on June 23. Although I had come to address various Kenyan audiences at universities, public forums and the media, I had also to learn. Kenya, like the rest of Africa, is a source of inspiration for all anti-colonial liberation movements around the world. We Palestinians can learn a great deal from the Kenyan struggle.
Although African countries have fought valiant battles for their freedom against their Western colonisers, neocolonialism now defines the relationship between many independent African countries and their former occupiers. Political meddling, economic control and, at times, military interventions – as in the recent cases of Libya and Mali – point to the unfortunate reality that Africa remains, in myriad ways, hostage to Western priorities, interests and dictates.
In the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884, Western colonial regimes attempted to mediate between the various powers that were competing over Africa’s riches. It apportioned to each a share of the African continent, as if Africa were the property of the West and its white colonists. Millions of Africans died in that protracted, bloody episode unleashed by the West, which shamelessly promoted its genocidal oppression as a civilisational project.
Like most colonised peoples in the southern hemisphere, Africans fought disproportionate battles to gain their precious freedom. Here in Kenya, which became an official British colony in the 1920s, Kenya’s freedom fighters rose in rebellion against the brutality of their oppressors. Most notable among the various resistance campaigns, the Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s remains a stark example of the courage of Kenyans and the cruelty of colonial Britain. Thousands of people were killed, wounded, disappeared or were imprisoned under the harshest of conditions.
Palestine fell under British occupation, the so-called British Mandate, around the same period that Kenya also became a British colony. Palestinians, too, fought and fell in their thousands as they employed various methods of collective resistance, including the legendary strike and rebellion of 1936. The same British killing machine that operated in Palestine and Kenya around that time, also operated, with the same degree of senseless violence, against numerous other nations around the world.
While Palestine was handed over to the Zionist movement to establish the state of Israel in May 1948, Kenya achieved its independence in December 1963.
At one of my recent talks in Nairobi, I was asked by a young participant about “Palestinian terrorism”. I told her that Palestinian fighters of today are Kenya’s Mau Mau rebels of yesteryear. That if we allow Western and Israeli propaganda to define Paestine’s national liberation discourse, then we condemn all national liberation movements throughout the southern hemisphere, including Kenya’s own freedom fighters.
We Palestinians must however shoulder part of the blame that our narrative as an oppressed, colonised and resisting nation is now misunderstood in parts of Africa.
When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation. Instead, it subscribed to a whole new discourse, riddled with carefully-worded language sanctioned by Washington and its European allies. Whenever Palestinians dared to deviate from their assigned role, the West would decree that they must return to the negotiating table, as the latter became a metaphor of obedience and submission.
Throughout these years, Palestinians mostly abandoned their far more meaningful alliances in Africa. Instead, they endlessly appealed to the goodwill of the West, hoping that the very colonial powers that have primarily created, sustained and armed Israel, would miraculously become more balanced and humane.
When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation.
However, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, etc., remained committed to Israel and, despite occasional polite criticism of the Israeli government, continued to channel their weapons, warplanes and submarines to every Israeli government that has ruled over Palestinians for the last seven decades. Alas, while Palestinians were learning their painful lesson, betrayed repeatedly by those who had vowed to respect democracy and human rights, many African nations began seeing in Israel a possible ally. Kenya is, sadly, one of those countries.
Understanding the significance of Africa in terms of its economic and political potential, and its support for Israel at the UN General Assembly, right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has launched his own “Scramble for Africa”. Netanyahu’s diplomatic conquests on the continent have been celebrated by Israeli media as “historic”, while the Palestinian leadership remains oblivious to the rapidly changing political landscape.
Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes. Tel Aviv had hoped that the first-ever Israel-Africa summit in Togo would usher in a complete paradigm shift in Israeli-African relations. However, the October 2017 conference never took place due to pressure by various African countries, including South Africa. There is still enough support for Palestine on the continent to defeat the Israeli stratagem. But that could change soon in favour of Israel if Palestinians and their allies do not wake up to the alarming reality.
The Palestinian leadership, intellectuals, artists and civil society ambassadors must shift their attention back to the southern hemisphere, to Africa in particular, rediscovering the untapped wealth of true, unconditional human solidarity offered by the peoples of this ever-generous continent.
Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes
The legendary Tanzanian freedom fighter, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who is also celebrated in Kenya, knew very well where his solidarity lay. “We have never hesitated in our support for the right of the people of Palestine to have their own land,” he once said, a sentiment that was repeated by the iconic South African leader Nelson Mandela, and by many other African liberation leaders. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that noble legacy. If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.
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