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Hustler Nation: Jobless Youth, Millennial Angst and the Political Economy of Underachievement

8 min read. Millennials should be the biggest beneficiaries of the demographic dividend, that virtuous cycle of rising savings, investment, growth and lower dependency. Instead, one in four want to leave and almost 70 percent cite unemployment as their biggest challenge. Here’s why – and how we can reverse the trend. By DAVID NDII

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Hustler Nation: Jobless Youth, Millennial Angst and the Political Economy of Underachievement
Photo: Olhar Angolano on Unsplash
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One out of four youths want to leave Kenya. They are disillusioned by what they see as lack of opportunities, corruption and tribalism. This is according to a recent study conducted by the British Council, titled ‘Next Generation Kenya’. The study interviewed 4000 young people aged 15 – 24 across the country.

These sentiments chime with a series of reflections by millennials published by The Elephant, that I have found revealing and intriguing. I was particularly struck by the millennials’ sense of a generational solidarity. I have no recollection of being similarly aware of such a connectedness with my age group outside my small circle of friends and professional peers. But then again, there was no internet or social media to spread generational memes. Though I have come across this demographic alphabet soup from marketers, I have until now been completely oblivious that I am a Generation X and we are responsible for all the millennial angst. I was also struck by the disconnect between the expectations and reality. Erudite though they are, the millennial writers seem unaware that they live in a poverty-stricken politically dysfunctional country in which only a very tiny minority gets a shot at living out their dreams.

Unemployment is the millennials’ biggest challenge by far, cited by 67 percent of the respondents.

Dear millennials, I have news for you.

An economy with a youth bulge such as we are experiencing should be cashing in on a demographic dividend. A demographic dividend is a virtuous cycle of rising saving, investment and growth associated with transition from high to low dependency population structure. Dependency ratio, which is the proportion of children and old people for each working-age adult, tells you how many dependents each income is supporting. A high dependency ratio undermines saving and investment.

Kenya’s dependency ratio has declined from a peak of 113 dependents per 100 working age adults in the early 80’s to 76 per 100 today. A decline of 36 per 100 is huge in three decades. It is in fact, one of the most dramatic in history. Our youth population is well educated by any standards, tech-savvy even, and we are told that we are one of Africa’s most attractive investment destinations. But far from rising, investment is trending downwards from 20 percent of GDP five years ago to 18 percent last year. This is despite Jubilee’s huge infrastructure spending, meaning that private investment rate has fallen precipitously. Sixty percent of the millennials interviewed in the British Council study said they were dependents. A demographic dividend is not evident.

Demographic dividends are not assured. Reaping it is subject to other enabling factors, in particular political stability, a favourable investment climate, and the youth need to be educated (not trained, but trainable). If these factors are not there, and the requisite investment fails to materialize, a demographic transition can turn into a political nightmare. The 90s wave of civil strife in West Africa, the Zimbabwe crisis and the Arab Spring all have elements of demographic transition.

Kenya’s dependency ratio has declined from a peak of 113 dependents per 100 working age adults in the early 80’s to 76 per 100 today. A decline of 36 per 100 is huge in three decades. It is in fact, one of the most dramatic in history. Our youth population is well educated by any standards, tech-savvy even, and we are told that we are one of Africa’s most attractive investment destinations. Bur far from rising, investment is trending downwards from 20 percent of GDP five years ago to 18 percent last year.

East Asia is the “go to” place to see how to cash in on a demographic dividend. The Asian Tiger’s export-led industrialization is now the stuff of legend. One of the less remarked aspects of the so called East Asian economic miracle is that it was unheralded. In those days, the leading development gurus were export pessimists. What made the East Asian leaders defy the economic wisdom of the day? There are many theories about this. My take is that they did not set out to perform miracles and become economic powerhouses. They set out to improve the lot of their people. This much one can discern by reading Lee Kwan Yew’s memoir From Third World to First: The Singapore Story. The economic miracle was a consequence, not a goal.

Ours not so.

By their own admission, the new managers of independent Kenya saw an opportunity to get rich. They could not resist it. In 1971, the Public Service Structure and Remuneration Commission popularly known as the Ndegwa Commission, summed it up thus:

“The achievement of independence in Kenya has brought with it great opportunities for individual advancement both as to main careers and in other less orthodox ways. It is understandable that public servants should have taken their opportunities like other citizens but if the benefits in some cases seem out to be out of proportion with other citizens it is inevitable that questions be asked as to how this came about.”

But the Commission went on to (in)famously applaud self-enrichment in public office: “There ought in theory to be no objection to the ownership of property or involvement in businesses by members of the public services to the point where their wealth is augmented perhaps substantially by such activities.” Ignore the “in theory” part— it was, and still is, all practice.

In a nutshell, when East Asian leaders were asking prospective investors what they needed to do for them, ours were asking what was in it for them.

What made the East Asian leaders defy the economic wisdom of the day? My take is that they did not set out to perform miracles and become economic powerhouses. They set out to improve the lot of their people. The economic miracle was a consequence, not a goal. Ours not so.

At around the time of the Ndegwa Commission Report, a high powered ILO mission in its report Employment, Incomes and Inequality: A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya noted:

“A search for the causes of persistent inequities and unemployment in spite of rapid growth since independence must start with the colonial situation. Kenya inherited a very lop-sided economy already organized for the effective maintenance of very different ways of life for a tiny minority on the one hand, and a very large majority on the other. Kenyanization has radically changed the racial composition of the group of people in the centre of power and many of its policies, but has had only a limited effect on the mechanisms which maintain its dominance. The power of the centre over the periphery may well be greater today than it was before.”

The ILO report was the first policy document to highlight the role of the informal economy, and to recognize its potential: “The informal sector provides income-earning opportunities for a large number of people. Though it is often regarded as unproductive and stagnant, we see it as providing a wide range of low-cost, labour intensive, competitive goods and services. Not only does it provide them without the benefit of the government subsidies and support that are received by the many firms in the formal sector, but operators in the informal sector are often harassed and hampered by restrictions imposed from outside.”

The advice went unheeded. As one Upton Sinclair observed many years ago, it is difficult to make a person understand something when their income depends on not understanding it. The policy makers the ILO mission was advising were the owners of subsidies and support they were dishing out to the formal sector firms.

In 2003, we wrote an economic recovery strategy that sought to engineer a paradigm shift in state policy from the “trickle down” economics of Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 as described above, to a “bottom up” strategy focused on raising productivity of resource poor smallholder farmers, pastoralists and the informal sector, in short, improving the lot of the people. This column has recounted on several occasions how that paradigm shift was frustrated by the so-called owners of capital culminating in restoration of trickle down economics a la Vision 2030.

The ILO report was the first policy document to highlight the role of the informal economy, and to recognize its potential. The advice went unheeded. As one Upton Sinclair observed many years ago, it is difficult to make a person understand something when their income depends on not understanding it. The policy makers the ILO mission was advising were the owners of subsidies and support they were dishing out to the formal sector firms.

 According to a study on dairy productivity by Tegemeo Institute, our “go-to” think tank on matters agricultural policy, our smallholder farmers obtained on average 1344 kg of milk per cow (data is for 2010 but it will suffice to illustrate). The bottom fifth (“quintile” in statistical jargon) obtained 600 kg per cow while the top fifth obtained more than three times as much, at 1,960 kg per cow. What accounts for this differential? The type of cattle is the most significant. Seventy percent of the cattle kept by farmers in the bottom were traditional breeds, while 70 percent of the cattle in the top quintile are improved breeds. Breeding cattle is not rocket science.

Increasing the average production per cow to equal the top quintiles 1,960 kg translates to an increase in milk output by two million tonnes per year, from 4.3 to 6.3 million tonnes. At Ksh. 35 per kilogramme. this translates to an additional Ksh. 70 billion shillings worth of raw milk per year. But in fact 1,960 kg per cow is quite low— it works out to only 6 kg per cow per day. Githunguri farmers, the most productive in the country do an average of 6800 kg per year, a respectable 18 kg per cow. Raising the average for all smallholders to half of that translates to close to an additional 6.5 million tonnes worth Ksh. 230 billion. These are not small numbers: Ksh 230 billion is more than Safaricom’s 2017 turnover (Ksh. 212 billion).

Productivity gaps of this kind are everywhere particularly in agriculture. Last year, we slaughtered 2.6 million cattle. The average carcass weight of the cattle we slaughter is 110 kg, against a potential 180 kg. This is explained by the fact that our cattle are taken off directly from pastoralists herds and trekked long distances to market. This is a loss of 180,000 tonnes of beef which translates to Ksh. 50 billion of forgone income to producers.

Pastoralists’ productivity can be easily raised by establishing finishing (fattening) facilities for the pastoralist communities, and providing proper cattle trucks to take animals to the market. But for some reason, the livestock authorities are preoccupied with abattoirs. I have failed to understand how slaughtering scrawny animals in fancy abattoirs adds value— a cow slaughtered under a tree or in an abattoir gives you the same beef. I suspect that they think that having modern abattoirs is industrialization.

Githunguri farmers, the most productive in the country, do an average of 6800 kg per year, a respectable 18 kg of milk per cow. Raising the average for all smallholders to half of that translates to close to an additional 6.5 million tonnes worth Ksh. 230 billion. These are not small numbers: Ksh 230 billion is more than Safaricom’s 2017 turnover (Ksh. 212 billion).

It is readily apparent how improving the lot of poor smallholder farmers would create jobs. The farmers have more money to spend. There is more produce to transport, process and distribute—more jobs. Productivity growth is a win-win for everyone, producers, consumers, processors, distributors, and suppliers. Food becomes cheaper for consumers but farmers make more money because they are producing a lot more, just as the affordability of mobile phones has spawned an industry that is now more than five percent of GDP.

Remarkably, an inclusive competitive, job-creating economy would make for a bigger more profitable market for the said state elite. Some of them see it, but how to extricate themselves from the monster they have created? That is the nature of greed—the head is willing, the heart even, but the stomach is weak.

An inclusive competitive, job-creating economy would make for a bigger more profitable market for the state elite. Some of them see it, but how to extricate themselves from the monster they have created? That is the nature of greed—the head is willing, the heart even, but the stomach is weak.

 “Nothing” wrote Jean Jacques Rosseau, “is more dangerous than the influence of private interests in public affairs. The abuse of the laws by the government is a lesser evil than the corruption of the legislator. In such a case, the State being altered in substance, all reformation becomes impossible.”

So there you have it dear millennials. You are on your own.

David Ndii
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David Ndii is serving on the Technical and Strategy Committee of the National Super Alliance (NASA).

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South Africa: Xenophobia Is in Fact Afrophobia, Call It What It Is

5 min read. Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.

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South Africa: Xenophobia Is in Fact Afrophobia, Call It What It Is
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Written in May 2008, as African bodies burned on the streets of South Africa, Ingrid De Kok’s throbbing poem Today I Do Not Love My Country poignantly captures the mood of an Afrophobic nation fluent in the language of violence and name-calling.  (I say Afrophobic because South Africa does not have a xenophobia problem. We don’t rage against all foreigners—just the poor, black ones from Africa.)

The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent. As the debris is cleared off the streets of Johannesburg after a week of violent looting and attacks against African migrant-owned businesses that saw eleven people killed and almost 500 arrested, Pretoria now faces calls to boycott South African-owned businesses on the continent.

Zambia and Madagascar cancelled football matches. Air Tanzania has suspended flights to South Africa. African artists are boycotting South Africa. Should an Afrophobic South Africa lead the African Union next year?

The irony of South Africa’s most recent attacks on African immigrants is that they happened in the wake of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement which positions the country as an economic gateway to the continent

The South African government has remained steadfast in its denial of Afrophobia, opting instead to condemn “violent attacks” and highlight the criminal elements involved in looting African-owned businesses. The police attributed the attacks to “opportunistic criminality”. By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.

The Afrophobic attacks are not spontaneous criminal mobs preying on foreigners. They are the result of an orchestrated, planned campaign that has been fuelled by the ongoing anti-immigrant rhetoric of South African politicians.

The All Truck Drivers Forum (ATDF), Sisonke People’s Forum and Respect SA stand accused of orchestrating last week’s violence. ATDF spokesperson, Sipho Zungu, denied that his group had instigated the violent looting, saying that “the nation is being misled here.” Zungu did stress, however, that South African truck drivers “no longer have jobs” and the government “must get rid of foreign truck drivers.”

Zungu echoes the sentiments of many poor South Africans, and their views are the end result of a drip-feed of anti-immigrant messages from South African politicians, particularly in the run-up to this year’s elections.

Anti-African violence in South Africa is fuelled by exclusion, poverty and rampant unemployment. This isn’t black-on-black violence. This is poor-on-poor violence.

One-third of South Africans are unemployed. Thirteen per cent of South Africans live in informal settlements, and a third of South Africans don’t have access to running water. The problems are a combination of the country’s apartheid past and rampant corruption and mismanagement within the ANC-led government. Crime is climbing, mainly due to corrupt and dysfunctional policing services, high unemployment and systemic poverty.

By denying that these are Afrophobic attacks, everyone can deny the role of South Africa’s political leadership in fomenting the hatred.

South African politicians from across the spectrum have blamed immigrants for the hardships experienced by poor South Africans. Political parties tell voters that foreigners are criminals flooding South Africa, stealing their jobs, homes and social services, undermining their security and prosperity.

Even the government sees poor and unskilled African migrants and asylum seekers as a threat to the country’s security and prosperity. Approved in March 2017, its White Paper on International Migration, separates immigrants into “worthy” and “unworthy” individuals. Poor and unskilled immigrants, predominantly from Africa, will be prevented from staying in South Africa by any means, “even if this is labelled anti-African behaviour” as the former Minister of Home Affairs, Hlengiwe Mkhize, pointed out in June 2017. The message is simple: there is no place for black Africans in South Africa’s Rainbow Nation.

In November 2018, Health Minister Aaron Motsoaledi claimed in a speech at a nurses summit that undocumented immigrants were flooding South Africa and overburdening clinics and hospitals. When immigrants “get admitted in large numbers, they cause overcrowding, infection control starts failing”, he said.

Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.

In a bid to attract more support, Mashaba and the DA have adopted an immigrant-baiting approach straight out of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro’s playbooks.

Mashaba has described black African migrants as criminals and has spoken of the need for a “shock-and-awe” campaign to drive them out.

In February 2019, Mashaba diverted attention away from protests against his administration’s poor service delivery in Johannesburg’s Alexandra township by tweeting that foreigners had made it difficult to provide basic services.

On August 1, police operations in Johannesburg to find counterfeit goods were thwarted by traders who pelted law-enforcement authorities with rocks, forcing the police to retreat. Social media went into overdrive, with many accusing the police of being cowards running away from illegal immigrants. Mashaba was “devastated” by the police’s restraint. A week later over 500 African immigrants were arrested after a humiliating raid, even though many said they showed police valid papers.

In 2017, South Africa’s deputy police minister claimed that the city of Johannesburg had been taken over by foreigners, with 80% of the city controlled by them. If this is not urgently stopped, he added, the entire country “could be 80% dominated by foreign nationals and the future president of South Africa could be a foreign national.”

None of this anti-immigrant rhetoric is based on fact. Constituting just 3% of the South African population, statistics show that immigrants are not “flooding” South Africa. They aren’t stealing jobs from South Africans and nor are they responsible for the high crime rate. South Africa’s crime problem has little to do with migration, and everything to do with the country’s dysfunctional policing services, unemployment and poverty.

Johannesburg—the epicentre of the anti-African violence—is run by the Democratic Alliance (DA), the second-largest political party in South Africa after the ruling African National Congress (ANC). DA mayor, Herman Mashaba, has been leading the war against African immigrants.

But South African politicians don’t let facts get in the way.  After all, it’s easier to blame African immigrants rather than face your own citizens and admit that you’ve chosen to line your own pockets instead of doing your job. If you can get others to shoulder the blame for the hopeless situation that many South Africans find themselves in, then why not?

South Africans are rightfully angry at the high levels of unemployment, poverty, lack of services and opportunities. But rather than blame African immigrants, frustration must be directed at the source of the crisis: a South African political leadership steeped in corruption that has largely failed its people.

The African Diaspora Forum, the representative body of the largest group of migrant traders, claimed that the police failed to act on intelligence that it had provided warning of the impending attacks. It took almost three days before Cyril Ramaphosa finally issued weak words of condemnation and for his security cluster to meet and strategise.  All of this points to a government refusing to own its complicity and deal with the consequences of its words.

South Africa has fallen far and hard from the lofty Mandela era and Thabo Mbeki’s soaring “I am an African” declaration.

Senior political leaders in South Africa are blaming vulnerable Africans for their failure to adequately provide a dignified life for all South Africans. Until this scapegoating stops, violent anti-African sentiment will continue to thrive, and South Africa will entrench its growing pariah status on the continent.

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A New Despotism in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism: A Reflection on Census 2019

6 min read. In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.

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A New Despotism in the Era of Surveillance Capitalism: A Reflection on Census 2019
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The just concluded census 2019 brought with it many strange occurrences including the official classification of my good friend Rasna Warah as a Mtaita, a community to which she is only very remotely connected by virtue of being married to a husband whose mother is a Mtaveta. The Taita and Taveta, who give their home county Taita-Taveta its name, are two related but distinct ethnic groups. Rasna’s ethnicity is unambiguous, she is a Kenyan Asian, which should be one of the ethnicities available on the census questionnaire.

In standard statistical practice, people’s racial and ethnic identity are self-declared and the identity questions usually have options such as “other” and “mixed” as well as the choice not to disclose. But Rasna was not given a choice, as she recounts here. While this may seem like a trivial matter, the undercurrents of racism and patriarchy in this action are disturbing. It is, I think, even more alarming that the enumerators, given a little authority, felt that they had the power to exercise discretion on the matter.

Past censuses have been rather uneventful statistical exercises. This one had the aura of a security operation. In the run-up, we were treated to all manner of threats and arbitrary orders from the Internal Security Cabinet Secretary, the Jubilee administration’s energetic and increasingly facile enforcer. On the eve of the census, the government spokesman added to the melodrama by issuing a statement informing the public that census enumerators would be asking for personal identification details, including national ID and passport numbers and, ominously, huduma namba registration status. There are few issues as controversial right now as huduma namba and to introduce that question was a sure way of heightening suspicion and undermining the credibility of the census.

More fundamentally, anonymity is a canon of statistical survey work. In fact, the law prohibits dissemination of any information which can be identified with a particular respondent without the respondent’s consent. For this reason, censuses and statistical surveys are usually designed and the data maintained in such a way as to ensure that the respondents remain anonymous.

In October last year, the Government gazetted the census regulations that include a schedule of the information that would be collected. Identity information is not listed in the schedule. In January this year, the Keya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) issued a media briefing, still on their website, that also listed the information that would be collected. It too does not mention identity information. That it was the Government spokesman—and not the KNBS—who appraised the public, and only on the eve of the census, is telling.

The response to the protestations that met the disclosure was vintage Jubilee—dishonest and inept. The spokesman explained that the personal identity information would be removed to restore the anonymity of the data. If indeed the purpose was to establish registration coverage, the professional statisticians would have asked respondents to state their registration status. Moreover, for planning purposes, professional statisticians would have designed a comprehensive module that would have included other critical information such as birth registration status.

The draconian zeal with which huduma namba is being pursued—including the proposed legislation—is all the more perplexing because, since all the functions listed are those that are currently served by the national ID, the sensible thing to do would be to upgrade the national ID. Seeing as we have already had three national ID upgrades since independence, it seems to me unlikely that a fourth upgrade would have generated the heat that the huduma namba has.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights. A republican system is democratic if political equality is universal, and aristocratic if the rights are a privilege that is denied to some members (e.g. slaves). In monarchical systems, the rulers have absolute authority governed by established rules. In a despotic system, the ruler is the law.

Montesquieu postulated for each system a driving principle, ethos if you like, on which its survival depends. The driving principle of a democratic republic is love of virtue— a willingness to put the public good ahead of private interests. He opined that a republican government failed to take root in England after the Civil War (1642-1651) because English society lacked the required principle, namely the love of virtue. The short-lived English republic, known as the Commonwealth of England, lasted a decade, from the beheading of Charles I in 1649 to shortly after the death Oliver Cromwell in 1659. The driving principle of monarchical systems is love of honour and the quest for higher social rank and privilege. For despotism it is fear of the ruler. The rulers are the law, and they rule by fear.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu classified political systems into three categories, namely republican, monarchical and despotic. He defined a republican system as characterised by citizenship rights.

Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya,

“The Kipande was worn around the neck like a dog collar. The Kipande contained the wearer’s tribe, their strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence, therefore, determining his pay or whether or not he would be employed. The government used the Kipande to curtail freedom of Africans and monitor labour supply. It also empowered the police to stop a native anywhere and demand to be shown the document. For Africans, the Kipande was like a badge of slavery and sparked bitter protests.”

In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages. But it was not perfect. Keren Weitzberg, a migration scholar and author of We Do Not Have Borders: Greater Somalia and the Predicaments of Belonging in Kenya, makes an interesting and insightful contextual link between huduma namba and the colonial quest to better the kipande revealed in a recommendation that appears in a 1956 government document:

“Consideration should be given to the provision of a comprehensive document for Africans, as is done in the Union of South Africa and the Belgian Congo. This should incorporate Registration particulars, payment of Poll Tax, and such other papers as the African is required to carry or are envisaged for him, e.g. Domestic Service record and permit to reside in urban areas. Eligibility under the Coutts proposals for voting might also be included in the document. The document would then become of value to the holder and there would be less likelihood of its becoming lost or transferred, as is the case with the present Identity document.” 

The purpose of the huduma namba is the same as that of the “comprehensive document for Africans”—to instill in people the sense that Big Brother is watching. But despotism is not an end in itself. The raison d’être of the colonial enterprise was economic exploitation. This has not changed.

The 2001 Nobel Prize for Economics was shared by George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz for their analysis of markets with asymmetric information. A market with asymmetric information is one where material attributes of a good or service are private information known only to the seller and not observable by the buyer; the seller has an incentive to conceal the attributes. In essence, it is a market where the buyer cannot be sure that they will get what they pay for. Asymmetric information problems are pervasive in labour and credit markets.

Identity documents are a key element of the apparatus of despotism. Our own identity card has its origins in the colonial kipande (passbook). As Juliet Atellah narrates in Toa Kitambulisho! Evolution of Registration of Persons in Kenya

A potential employer cannot tell in advance whether a worker is a performer or not, or even whether he or she is dishonest—they only get to know that after hiring the worker, and at considerable cost if they get it wrong. We know that job seekers go out of their way to misrepresent themselves, including faking qualifications and references, and concealing adverse information such as previous dismissals and criminal records. To mitigate the problem, employers go out of their way to obtain and check out references including certificates of good conduct from the police.

The original kipande, as Atellah notes, included information on the bearers “strengths and weaknesses and comments from his employer on his competence.” It does not require too much imagination to see how errant natives would have made for a severe labour market information asymmetry problem, motivating the settler economy to invent this seemingly innocuous but probably effective labour market information system.

Similarly, a potential borrower’s creditworthiness is not observable to lenders. Lenders only get to sort out good and bad borrowers from experience. A customer’s credit history is a lender’s most valuable asset. A public credit reference system, such as the Credit Reference Bureaus, is a device for mitigating credit market information asymmetry. The parallel with the kipande character reference is readily apparent.

In essence, the kipande was a surveillance tool for an indentured labour system which enabled the settler economy to suppress wages.

As a credit information system, the digital panopticon envisaged by huduma namba is priceless, and as one of the country’s leading mobile lenders, the Kenyatta family-owned Commercial Bank of Africa (CBA) is the primary beneficiary. Indeed, well before the public was informed about it, huduma namba featured prominently in a CBA-led mobile lending platform project called Wezeshafeatured in this column—that was subsequently rebranded and launched as Stawi.

Nine years ago this week, we promulgated a new constitution. Since its enactment the political and bureaucratic establishment has spared no effort to restore the unfettered discretion and apparatus of rule by fear that the new constitutional dispensation is meant to dismantle. Early in its term, the Jubilee administration sought to pass a raft of security-related legislation that would have clawed back most of the civil liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights. Uhuru Kenyatta is on record, in one of the pre-election TV interviews, attributing his underwhelming performance to the constraints on his authority by the 2010 Constitution. He went on to express nostalgia for the old one.

In the creeping securocratisation of every sphere of the State, the incessant threats and arbitrary orders, the renewed quest for that elusive all-encompassing kipande, and even the arbitrary assignment of identity on citizens, Montesquieu would see a marked deficiency of love for virtue, the requisite principle for a democratic republic.

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Africa and Palestine: A Noble Legacy That Must Never Be Forgotten

4 min read. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that the solidarity between Africa and Palestine. Indeed, writes RAMZY BAROUD If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.

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Africa and Palestine: A Noble Legacy That Must Never Be Forgotten
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Europe’s “Scramble for Africa” began in earnest in 1881 but never ended. The attempt at dominating the continent using old and new strategies continues to define the Western relationship with this rich continent. This reality was very apparent when I arrived in Nairobi on June 23. Although I had come to address various Kenyan audiences at universities, public forums and the media, I had also to learn. Kenya, like the rest of Africa, is a source of inspiration for all anti-colonial liberation movements around the world. We Palestinians can learn a great deal from the Kenyan struggle.

Although African countries have fought valiant battles for their freedom against their Western colonisers, neocolonialism now defines the relationship between many independent African countries and their former occupiers. Political meddling, economic control and, at times, military interventions – as in the recent cases of Libya and Mali – point to the unfortunate reality that Africa remains, in myriad ways, hostage to Western priorities, interests and dictates.

In the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884, Western colonial regimes attempted to mediate between the various powers that were competing over Africa’s riches. It apportioned to each a share of the African continent, as if Africa were the property of the West and its white colonists. Millions of Africans died in that protracted, bloody episode unleashed by the West, which shamelessly promoted its genocidal oppression as a civilisational project.

Like most colonised peoples in the southern hemisphere, Africans fought disproportionate battles to gain their precious freedom. Here in Kenya, which became an official British colony in the 1920s, Kenya’s freedom fighters rose in rebellion against the brutality of their oppressors. Most notable among the various resistance campaigns, the Mau Mau rebellion of the 1950s remains a stark example of the courage of Kenyans and the cruelty of colonial Britain. Thousands of people were killed, wounded, disappeared or were imprisoned under the harshest of conditions.

Palestine fell under British occupation, the so-called British Mandate, around the same period that Kenya also became a British colony. Palestinians, too, fought and fell in their thousands as they employed various methods of collective resistance, including the legendary strike and rebellion of 1936. The same British killing machine that operated in Palestine and Kenya around that time, also operated, with the same degree of senseless violence, against numerous other nations around the world.

While Palestine was handed over to the Zionist movement to establish the state of Israel in May 1948, Kenya achieved its independence in December 1963.

At one of my recent talks in Nairobi, I was asked by a young participant about “Palestinian terrorism”. I told her that Palestinian fighters of today are Kenya’s Mau Mau rebels of yesteryear. That if we allow Western and Israeli propaganda to define Paestine’s national liberation discourse, then we condemn all national liberation movements throughout the southern hemisphere, including Kenya’s own freedom fighters.

We Palestinians must however shoulder part of the blame that our narrative as an oppressed, colonised and resisting nation is now misunderstood in parts of Africa.

When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation. Instead, it subscribed to a whole new discourse, riddled with carefully-worded language sanctioned by Washington and its European allies. Whenever Palestinians dared to deviate from their assigned role, the West would decree that they must return to the negotiating table, as the latter became a metaphor of obedience and submission.

Throughout these years, Palestinians mostly abandoned their far more meaningful alliances in Africa. Instead, they endlessly appealed to the goodwill of the West, hoping that the very colonial powers that have primarily created, sustained and armed Israel, would miraculously become more balanced and humane.

When the Palestine Liberation Organisation committed its historical blunder by signing off Palestinian rights in Oslo in 1993, it abandoned a decades-long Palestinian discourse of resistance and liberation.

However, Washington, London, Paris, Berlin, etc., remained committed to Israel and, despite occasional polite criticism of the Israeli government, continued to channel their weapons, warplanes and submarines to every Israeli government that has ruled over Palestinians for the last seven decades. Alas, while Palestinians were learning their painful lesson, betrayed repeatedly by those who had vowed to respect democracy and human rights, many African nations began seeing in Israel a possible ally. Kenya is, sadly, one of those countries.

Understanding the significance of Africa in terms of its economic and political potential, and its support for Israel at the UN General Assembly, right-wing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has launched his own “Scramble for Africa”. Netanyahu’s diplomatic conquests on the continent have been celebrated by Israeli media as “historic”, while the Palestinian leadership remains oblivious to the rapidly changing political landscape.

Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes. Tel Aviv had hoped that the first-ever Israel-Africa summit in Togo would usher in a complete paradigm shift in Israeli-African relations. However, the October 2017 conference never took place due to pressure by various African countries, including South Africa. There is still enough support for Palestine on the continent to defeat the Israeli stratagem. But that could change soon in favour of Israel if Palestinians and their allies do not wake up to the alarming reality.

The Palestinian leadership, intellectuals, artists and civil society ambassadors must shift their attention back to the southern hemisphere, to Africa in particular, rediscovering the untapped wealth of true, unconditional human solidarity offered by the peoples of this ever-generous continent.

Kenya is one of Israel’s success stories. In November 2017, Netanyahu attended the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta. Netanyahu was seen embracing Kenyatta as a dear friend and ally even as Kenyans rose in rebellion against their corrupt ruling classes

The legendary Tanzanian freedom fighter, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who is also celebrated in Kenya, knew very well where his solidarity lay. “We have never hesitated in our support for the right of the people of Palestine to have their own land,” he once said, a sentiment that was repeated by the iconic South African leader Nelson Mandela, and by many other African liberation leaders. Today’s generation of African leaders should not deviate from that noble legacy. If they betray it, they betray themselves, along with the righteous struggles of their own peoples.

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