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Elections in Somalia have yet again been delayed, barely a month after the country agreed on a timetable for the much-anticipated polls and months after the end of the current president’s mandate and the expiry of the parliament’s term. At the close of their summit at the end of June, the National Consultative Council, made up of Somalia’s Prime Minister and the presidents of the Federal States, had announced an ambitious electoral schedule. The entire electoral process was to take place over 100 days.

However, going by Somali standards, keeping to this timeline was always highly improbable and country stumbled at the first hurdle—the election of the Upper House—following the failure by most federal regions to submit candidates’ lists to form local committees to cast the ballots in time. As of the first week of August, only two, Jubbaland and the South West State, had conducted the elections, which were meant to start on 25 July and be completed within four days. Yet to start are elections in the federal member states of Puntland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle, as well as the selection of special delegates to vote for Somaliland members of the Senate and the Lower House.

But as most political stakeholders would say, at least the process has finally begun. This was not the outlook just three short months ago. In fact, on 25 April, Somalia’s entire state-building project appeared to be unravelling after President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmaajo” unilaterally extended both his term and that of the Lower House of Parliament. Running battles between Somali security forces had erupted in the capital, with fissures evident within the Somali security forces, with some opposing the term extensions and others supporting the government.

This was the culmination of a yearlong conflict that was initially triggered by the government’s apparent inability to conduct the much-awaited one-person one-vote elections. This conflict led to the removal of the former prime minister for his divergent views in July 2020. Eventually, the president conceded and all parties agreed to sign yet another agreement on indirect elections—where appointed delegates, not the general public, do the voting—on 17 September 2020. But for months following the 17 September agreement, the process remained at a standstill as the implementation modalities were disputed. The president’s mandate expired on 8 February without a conclusive agreement on an electoral process or plan having been reached, several attempts at resuscitating talks between the president and some federal member states having flopped.

The three main sticking points were the composition of the electoral teams that included civil servants and members of the security services; the management of the electoral process in Gedo, one of the two electoral locations in the Federal Member State of Jubbaland, a state that is in conflict with the central administration; and the appointment of the electoral team for Somaliland seats, the breakaway state in the north (northern MPs protested the undue influence of President Farmaajo in their selection).

Additionally, security arrangements for the elections became a significant factor after a night attack on a hotel where two former presidents were staying and the use of lethal force against protesters, including a former prime minister, on 19 February. More than a month later, the electoral process tumbled further into crisis when the Lower House of Parliament introduced and approved the “The Special Electoral Law for Federal Election” bill to extend the mandate of the governing institutions, including that of the president, by two years. The president hastily signed the bill into law less than 48 hours later despite global condemnation and local upheaval. More critically, the move was the first real test of the cohesiveness of the Somali security forces. Forces, mainly from the Somali National Army, left the frontlines and took critical positions in the capital to protest the illegal extension, while the Farmaajo administration called on the allied units to confront the rival forces.

The ensuing clashes of the armed forces in the capital brought ten months of political uncertainty and upheaval to a climax as pro-opposition forces pushed forward and surrounded Villa Somalia demanding a change of course. With the country on the verge of a return to major violence, Somalia’s prime minister and the Federal Member State presidents loyal to the president rejected the illegal term extension and on the 1st of May,  the president and parliament jointly rescinded the resolution to extend the mandate of the governing institutions. The president finally handed the responsibility for electoral negotiations between the federal government and the federal member states to the prime minister. After a brief cooling-off period, the harmonized electoral agreement merging the 17 September agreement with the 16 February implementation recommendations by a technical committee was finally signed and agreed by the National Consultative Forum on 27 May. The electoral stalemate that had begun in June 2020 ended precisely a year after it began.

Somalia’s electoral calendar

  • Election of the Upper House – 25 July
  • Selection and preparation of electoral delegates – 15 July – 10 August
  • Election of members of Parliament – 10 August – 10 September
  • Swearing-in of the members of parliament and election of the speakers of both Houses of the Somali Parliament – 20 September
  • Presidential election – 10 October

Direct vs indirect elections

Although Somalia continues to experience many challenges, including al-Shabaab terrorism, and natural and man-made disasters, its rebuilding progress is modest and undeniable. The country has, despite many odds, managed to conduct elections and organise the peaceful handover of power regularly. This remarkable track record has been somewhat put to the test this electoral season, but the nation has since corrected course. It has been eight years since the end of the Somali transitional governments and the election of an internationally recognized government. In that time, subsequent Somali governments have conducted two indirect electoral processes that have facilitated greater participation and advanced progress towards “one person one vote”. In 2012, to usher in Somalia’s first internationally recognized administration since 1991, 135 traditional elders elected members of parliament, who in turn elected their speakers and the federal president. This process was conducted only in Mogadishu. The 275 seats were distributed according to the 4.5 clan-based power-sharing formula.

The electoral stalemate that had begun in June 2020 ended precisely a year after it began.

In 2016, further incremental progress was made with 14,025 Somalis involved in the selection of members of parliament and the formation of Somalia’s Upper House. Elections were also conducted in one location in each Federal Member State as the Federal Map was by then complete. The 135 traditional elders were still involved as they selected the members of 275 electoral colleges made up of 51 delegates per seat, constituting the total electoral college of 14,050. On the other hand, the Upper House,  made up of 54 representatives, represented the existing and emerging federal member states. The state presidents nominated the proposed senate contenders, while the state assemblies elected the final members of the Upper House. Each house elected its Speaker and Deputy/ies, while a joint sitting of both houses elected the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia.

The main task of this administration was therefore to build upon this progress and deliver one-person-one-vote elections. But despite high expectations, the current administration failed to deliver Somalia’s first direct election since 1969. The consensus model agreed upon is also indirect and very similar to that of the last electoral process. The main difference between this model and the 2016 indirect election is an increase in electoral delegates per parliamentary seat from 51 to 101, and the increase of electoral locations per Federal Member State from one location per FMS to two.

2016 Electoral Process - Presentation @Doorashada 2021
2016 Electoral Process – Presentation @Doorashada 2021

Slow but significant progress

While Somalia’s electoral processes appear complex and stagnant on the surface, the political scene has continued to change and to reform. Those impatient to see change forget that Somalia underwent total state collapse in 1991. The country experienced nearly ten years of complete anarchy without an internationally recognized central government, which would end with the establishment of the Transitional National Government in 2000. Immediately after Barre’s exit, Somaliland seceded and declared independence in May 1991 and the semi-autonomous administration of Puntland was formed in 1998. In the rest of the country, and particularly in the capital, warlords and clans dominated the political scene, with minimum state infrastructure development for more than a decade. As anarchy reigned, with widespread looting of state and private resources, and heinous crimes committed against the population, authority was initially passed to local clan elders who attempted unsuccessfully to curb the violence. Appeals by Islamists to rally around an Islamic identity began to take hold when the efforts to curb the violence failed, and several reconciliation conferences organized by Somalia’s neighbours failed to yield results. This led to the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 that would later morph into the Al-Shabaab insurgency following the intervention of Ethiopia with support from the US.

Simultaneously, external mediation efforts continued with the election of the Transitional National Government led by President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan in Arta, Djibouti, in 2000, the first internationally recognized central administration. In 2004, the IGAD-led reconciliation conference in Nairobi culminated in the formation of the Transitional Federal Government and the election of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. It was in 2000 at the Arta conference in Djibouti that the infamous 4.5 power sharing mechanism was introduced, while in 2004, federalism, as the agreed system of governance, was introduced to address participatory governance and halt the political fragmentation as demonstrated by the era of warlords and the formation of semi-autonomous territories. However, to date, the emergent federal states are largely drawn along clan lines.

President Abdiqasim was initially welcomed back into Mogadishu; he reinstated the government in the capital, settling into Villa Baidoa. President Abdullahi Yusuf faced stiffer opposition and initially settled in the city of Baidoa before entering the capital in 2007, supported by Ethiopian forces. He was able to retake the seat of government in Villa Somalia but resigned two years later, paving the way for the accommodation of the moderate group of Islamist rebels led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Sheikh Ahmed would later be elected president of the Transitional Federal Government in Djibouti, succeeding Abdullahi Yusuf. This would be the last Somali electoral process held outside Somalia.

Strengthening state security

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping force was deployed in South-Central Somalia in early 2007 to help stabilize the country and provide support to the internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG). AMISOM’s deployment was instrumental in the withdrawal of the unpopular invading Ethiopian forces whose historical enmity with Somalia and the atrocities it committed against the Somali population provided rich fodder for Al-Shabaab’s recruitment efforts. But even as AMISOM helped the TFG and, later the FGS, to uproot AS from large swathes of Somalia, rekindling latent possibilities for a second liberation, the mission has not been without fault. While the mission is credited with helping create a conducive environment to further the political processes, it has also been equally culpable of hindering Somalia’s political progress by including in the mission Somalia’s arch-enemies, its problematic neighbours.

Ethiopia rehatted its troops in Somalia in 2014, following Kenya’s lead. Kenya had made the unilateral decision to invade Somalia in October 2011, in Operation Linda Nchi, Operation Protect the Nation, and subsequently rehatted into AMISOM in November 2011. Djibouti, Somalia’s northern neighbour, had warm relations with Somalia and is the only neighbour whose inclusion in AMISOM in December 2011 did not follow a previous unilateral invasion and was welcomed by the federal government. At face value, the interventions were seemingly motivated by national security interests. In particular, Ethiopia and Kenya share a long porous border with Somalia, and the spillover of the active al-Shabaab insurgency was considered a national security risk. But both Ethiopia and Kenya have dabbled in Somalia’s political affairs, routinely recruiting, training, and backing Somali militia groups whose leaders are thereafter propelled to political leadership positions. Somalia’s neighbours have been guilty of providing an arena for proxy battles and throwing Somalia’s nascent federalism structures into disarray.

AMISOM is also credited with enabling greater international community presence in Somalia and the improvement of social and humanitarian efforts. The international presence has also facilitated the completion of the federal map, with the formation of Jubbaland, South-West, Galmudug, and Hirshabelle member states. Somaliland and Puntland have strengthened their institutions and political processes. The most recent Somaliland parliamentary elections pointed to a maturing administration. Opposition parties secured a majority and formed a coalition in preparation for next year’s presidential elections.

To date, the emergent federal states are largely drawn along clan lines.

Meanwhile, the Puntland Federal Member State has also embarked on an ambitious programme of biometric registration of its electorate to deliver the region’s first direct elections since its formation. But on the flip side, the international partners, who mainly re-engaged in Somalia after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, are guilty of engaging with the country solely through the security perspective. The partners also often dictate solutions borrowed from their experiences elsewhere that do not necessarily serve in Somalia’s context. The insistence on electoral processes, specifically at the national level, that disregard bottom-up representation and genuine reconciliation, is a case in point; any Somali administration joins a predetermined loop of activities set out by partners with little room for innovation or change.

Key among these critical tasks is the completion of the provisional constitution, which would cement the federal system of government. For the federal government, the provisional nature of the constitution has hamstrung the completion of the federal governance system and framework. Both Somalia’s National Security Architecture and the Transition Plan have faced implementation hurdles due to the differences between the federal government and the federal member states. This has fundamentally hampered the tangible rebuilding of Somali security forces and synergizing operations for liberation and stabilization between the centre and the periphery.

Yet all the state-building steps taken by Somalia, wrought with political upheaval and brinkmanship at the time, still presented progress as Somalis moved away from anarchy towards some semblance of governance. There is no doubt that the application of the new federal dispensation has also witnessed several false starts as the initial transitional governments and federal governments have been beset by the dual challenge of state-building while battling the al-Shabaab insurgency. But however imperfect, Somalia’s electoral processes have managed to keep the peace between most of Somalia’s warring political elite.

Somalia’s political class 

Somalia’s protracted conflict has revolved primarily around clan competition over access to power and resources both at community and at state level. Historically, the competition for scarce resources, exacerbated periodically by climatic disasters, has been the perpetual driver of conflict, with hostilities often resulting in the use of force. Additionally, due to the nature of nomadic life, characterized by seasonal migration over large stretches of land, inter-clan conflict was and remains commonplace. This decentralized clan system and the nature of Somalis can also explain the difficulty that Somalis face in uniting under one leader and indeed around a single national identity. This is in contrast with the high hopes that Somalia’s post-independence state-building would be smoother than for its heterogenous neighbours. In fact, Somalia has illustrated that there is sub-set of heterogeneity within its homogenous society.

Thus, state-building in Somalia has had to contend with the fact that Somalia was never a single autonomous political unit, but rather a conglomeration of clan families centred around kinship and a loosely binding social contract. Although the Somali way of life might have been partially disrupted by the colonial construct that is now Somalia, clan remains a primary system of governance for Somalis, especially throughout the 30 years that followed state collapse. Parallels between the Somali nation prior to colonization and present-day Somalia reveal an inclination towards anarchy and disdain for centralized authority.

Independence in 1960 did little to change the socio-economic situation of the mostly nomadic population. Deep cleavages between the rural and urban communities became evident as the new political elite, rather than effecting economic and social change for their people, engaged in widespread corruption, nepotism, and injustices. Despite the best intentions and efforts of some of the nation’s liberation leaders, the late sixties witnessed the beginning of social stratification based on education and clan. Western observers at the time hailed the democratic leanings of the post-colonial civilian regime for Africa’s first peaceful handover of power after the defeat of the president in a democratic election. However, many Somalis saw corruption, tribalism, indecision and stagnation, particularly after liberation leaders left power. As such, the military coup orchestrated by the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) led by General Mohamed Siad Barre was seen as an honest alternative.

Both Ethiopia and Kenya have dabbled in Somalia’s political affairs, routinely recruiting, training, and backing Somali militia groups

This initial positive reception to military rule was quickly repudiated as the council could not deliver on its pledges, and in addition to corruption and nepotism, violent repression prevailed. The oppressive military dictatorship followed and reigned for the next two decades. During his 22-year rule, Barre succeeded in alienating the majority of the population through his arbitrary implementation of Scientific Socialism. He introduced policies that outlawed clan and tribal identities while simultaneously cracking down on religious scholars. Armed opposition and a popular uprising ended the repressive rule but led the way to a complete collapse of the Somali state as different factions fought for control. The blatant nepotism of the military regime and the subsequent bloody era of the warlords re-tribalized the society. Somalis turned to religion as the common unifying identity as evident in the gradual increase of new Islamist organizations and increased religious observance.

With over 70 per cent of the population under the age of 35, the average Somali has known no other form of governance, having lived under either military rule or anarchy. The cumulative 30 years after state collapse and the previous 21 years of military rule have not really given Somalia the chance to entrench systems and institutions that would aid the democratization of the state. As such, the progress made thus far is admirable.

Possibilities for success – Somalia’s democratization process

Somalia’s numerous challenges notwithstanding, there has always existed some semblance of a democratic process. Every president has been elected through an agreed process, as imperfect as that may be. And the peaceful transfer of power has become an expectation.  That is why it was quite notable that when there was a threat of subversion of the democratic process in April this year, the military that had historically been used as a tool to cling on to power, in this instance revolted to return the country to the democratic path. It is clear that the still-nascent fragile institutions of the past 12 years require protection. So far, Somalia’s democratization process has been a process towards building trust. Civilian rule was replaced with an autocratic military regime that was subsequently replaced by lawlessness and the tyranny of warlords.

However imperfect, Somalia’s electoral processes have managed to keep the peace between most of Somalia’s warring political elite.

Since 2000, Somalia has steadily been making its way out of the conflict. But rebuilding trust and confidence in the governing authorities has been an uphill battle. The checks and balances that are built into the implementation of federalism will serve to further this journey. The next two Somali administrations will need to implement full political reforms if this path is to lead to a positive destination. These political reforms will encompass the implementation of the political Parties Act that would do away with the despised 4.5 clan-based construct, improve political participation and representation, and bring about inclusive and representative government.

Even then, there are crucial outstanding tasks, key among which is the completion of the Provisional Constitution. The contentious issues such as allocation of powers, natural resource sharing between the centre and the periphery, separation of powers and the status of the capital remain unsolved and threaten the trust-building process that Somalia has embarked on. The missing ingredient is political settlements, settlements between Somalia’s elite. The next four years will be therefore be key for Somalia to maintain and possibly accelerate its steady progress towards full democratization.