Ideas
Agency, Possibilities, and Imagination: Countering Myths about Africa’s Past
11 min read.Tracing African pasts through the interlinked lenses of agency, possibility and imagination allows us to counter-narratives of Africa as a blank slate, and to debunk myths about Africa as a place that did not innovate or create.

“We die thirsting for knowledge, yet it is all around us.”— Saki Mafundikwa
In Crazy Normal, Trevor Noah makes a joke about South Africa that I think applies to all of Africa. In his sketch, Africa responds to the world moving in one direction with, “Okay…we’re going to go that way,” pointing in a different direction. The ‘rest-of-the-world’ is perplexed and Africa reassures, “No, don’t worry, we’ll find you there.”
What Trevor Noah illuminates is the ‘elsewhere-ness’ of Africa. Africa has impressive political, economic, social-ecological and cultural diversity – a diversity that is often un-understood for its defiance to being mappable by narrow Euro-American standards and statistics. So much so that Africa is today more often described in negatives than in anything else: lack, poverty, failed, corrupt and crisis being some of them.
But being elsewhere is not being nowhere. Studying Africa’s history is sense-making of this reality and truth, especially for Africans who have grown up in colonially inherited institutions, and are therefore at risk of reproducing an inherited scarcity mentality and inferiority complex. Engaging with precolonial and colonial African history is to remove inherited glasses, whose field of vision limits the scope of where and how ‘being’ is possible.
I discuss here three interlinked reasons for historical study of Africa: agency, possibility and imagination. Recognising Africans’ agency allows recognition of the worlds Africans create/d and opens up imagination for the continued creation of African worlds. At a time of ecological, political, and socio-economic crisis, this is not just about reclaiming identity, but also about regaining footing to create and determine the new worlds coming.
Agency
Africa’s history has been human history for the 200,000 years that homo sapiens have been in existence. This makes African history the longest history of all the world. Precolonial African history makes up about 99.8 per cent of African history for the earliest colonised African entities, Madeira and Canary Islands (1420 and 1496, respectively), Kongo (1472) and South Africa (1652). Indeed, the term ‘pre-colonial history’ is a shorthand that centres European colonialism as Africa’s defining feature, rather than the 99.8 per cent of history preceding it.
Locating Africans’ agency through history counters the erroneous idea propagated by Western scholars that Africans had no history prior to Europeans. Interrogating multiple archives, including documents, environments, materials, practices, language, oral history and more shows Africans in their full range of humanity, a beginning point from which one can ask questions about what happened in the past rather than making assumptions.
Reflecting on the history curriculum I learnt in high school, I noticed that there were gaps. Kenyan history was taught separately from ‘world history’, and in it, we learnt about some ethnic communities’ cultural institutions; the Indian Ocean Trade emphasising Arab and Portuguese influence; and colonial encounters. Following the discussion of the local emergence of the homo species, history quickly propelled to a ‘world’ stage, represented by various linearly progressive revolutions: Neolithic-Agrarian-Industrial. These were described in a manner as to make one aspire to the ladder of progress they represented, but not to see what they left out – the gender and class stratifications and colonialism and slavery, and their ripple effects on injustice in the world today.
The curriculum only returned to focus on the local when there were particular interactions with foreign entities, such as with Portuguese influence on the East African coast in the 15th century, and with the later European colonisation of the African continent in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Between species evolution in East Africa hundreds of thousands to millions of years ago, and present-day Kenya, the only significant events taught had foreigners as the main characters: Arabs, Portuguese, British. Indigenous history was limited to an ahistorical view of some ethnic groups’ customs.
Such gaps make significant processes, events, and local agents invisible in the history of what would later become Kenya, thus creating an incorrect view that only foreigners were and can be agents of Kenyan history. This negatively biases students’ view of their own agency in affecting history, making it appear as though Africans ‘froze’ while history was happening elsewhere, and only re-entered history upon contact with foreigners.
This experience speaks to a larger institutionalisation of silences and misrepresentations. The bias is evident in policies and popular media that undermine communities’ indigenous livelihood strategies and knowledge, depicting them as destructive and in need of reform in the interests of ‘development’ and ‘conservation’ agendas, both of which are largely driven by foreigners and benefit a minority elite while harming a majority. These policies and narratives do not engage with indigenous histories to show the many ways in which Africans have been agents in engaging with and changing their environments with a variety of impacts, and not simply as passive responders.
They also don’t engage with colonial history that would show how Africans’ agency was hidden, diminished or skewed, and thus entrench denigrating and dangerous received wisdoms. For example, in learning about the Perkerra Irrigation Scheme in school, no mention was made of it being inspired by an indigenous irrigation system by ilChamus peoples, nor was there a discussion of the reasons why ilChamus practised irrigation, how they managed to produce significant surpluses, and how and why they turned to other livelihood strategies, and with what effects. There was also no mention of the subsequent exclusion of ilChamus peoples from the ‘modern’ irrigation scheme when it was started.
Breaking the silence around indigenous Africans’ agency through integrating precolonial history into institutions, such as schools and the media, in ways that do not fall into either essentialising or negative stereotyping would counter damaging racist bias that Africa was a blank slate awaiting discovery and awakening by Europeans, or a ‘wrong’ place awaiting correction by the same.
Possibilities
In 2017, I studied permaculture, an environmental design-with-nature system articulated by the Australian Bill Mollison. The techniques and system, for which I was paying $400 to learn, I later found out, are part of a repertoire of indigenous agro-ecological techniques and social ethics developed and practised in various parts of Africa and elsewhere. These origins were not acknowledged in the teaching, and fellow students, myself included, were enthused by the ‘new’ knowledge we were gaining.
In my exploration of ecological, economic and social restorative technologies, I encounter a number of these systems articulated by Westerners drawing on often unacknowledged and/or unrematriated indigenous knowledges and practices, including those from this continent. Permaculture, as already mentioned, holistic rangeland management, a reformulation of pastoralists’ ways of working with livestock, family constellation therapy drawn from Zulu family healing techniques, bodywork techniques in process-oriented psychology, some drawn from unnamed Giriama healers, and restorative justice circles celebrate their often white, often male ‘inventors’ and have courses you can pay good sums for to learn these technologies.
Colonisation infused with ‘scientific racism’ placed Africans at the bottom of a ladder of humanity. It was unthinkable that Africans accomplished anything remarkable or constructive. This ladder perpetuated the myth that Africans don’t know and must be taught. Our knowledge and technologies are repackaged elsewhere and sold back to us at a premium, and we don’t recognise them. A permaculture practitioner I met in Tanzania, for example, confidently told a room of American undergraduates that there were no sustainable indigenous African food growing techniques except in her Chagga community. As Saki Mafundikwa comments, “We die thirsting for knowledge, yet it is all around us.”
By bringing agency and possibilities together, studying African history can reclaim our humanity and world-making over 200,000 years of living. Tracing past creativity, innovation, technologies, and their lifeworlds re-presents innumerable possibilities of being and doing. Importantly, it helps Africans step outside of disadvantageous psychological, economic and technological dependency.
Histories of indigenous food provision illuminate the variety of technological skills, and knowledge-based practices in use in different parts of Africa, how these developed, and where they were curtailed by colonial officers, thus hampering their efficacy. Looking only at agriculture, indigenous irrigation technologies, such as dams and irrigation canals, were/are in use in Marakwet, Pokot, Baringo, and at Engaruka in East Africa for many decades if not centuries.
Other forms of water management, including mulching, cover cropping, pit planting, terracing and weather manipulation, were in use across the continent, as were fertility technologies to manipulate soil chemistry, such as burning and tilling in of weeds and crop residues, creating areas of high fertility dark earths, using animal manure, and managing insects such as termites. Practices such as mobility, fallowing, and cultivating or encouraging a diverse range of plants and plant varieties harnessed land and climate variability. The latter also selected plants for taste, maturation, ritual suitability, colour, drought and pest tolerance, effectively making indigenous African farmers crop scientists par excellence.
Social-ecological innovations, like building partnerships across livelihoods to harness symbiotic benefits, were also food provision innovations. There are several examples of pastoralist-cultivators-forager partnerships, such as between the Maa-Agikuyu and Mukogodo-Maa peoples in East Africa, and Bambara-Fula and Bambara-Maure peoples in West Africa. Interrogating the development, context, and practice of these and more food provision technologies would illuminate useful knowledge for continued innovation. Histories of food provision would also include pastoralism and foraging, which are marginalised in popular and political discourse, perhaps because they are less easily dominated by capitalist commercialisation for export and state benefit.
Archaeological research indicates the depth of indigenous sciences knowledge in various parts of Africa. The bronze sculptures of Igbo-Ukwu that were created using the lost-wax technique and dating prior to 1000 AC (after Christ) are unique for their age, fine pattern detailing and technological skill. Similarly, Africans independently developed a wide range of iron smelting techniques (more diverse than anywhere else in the world) – including some unique in the temperatures they achieved – invented in central Africa at least 4,000 years ago. That indigenous African technologies, such as pyramid building in Kemet and Nubia, are yet to be deciphered, are a testament to their depth of skill and innovation. The presence of such sciences counters the received wisdoms that there is nothing to show for Africa in terms of indigenous innovation.
Remarkable rock art is found in many African countries. These art forms were created using a variety of techniques and intents. Rock art also informs historical understanding of human movements. Saharan rock art from a wetter period than the present indicates the likelihood that Kemet (Ancient Egypt) was formed from people migrating from a drying Sahara. Rock paintings and a 100,000-year-old paint laboratory in southern Africa demonstrate the manipulation of various materials (including ochre, blood, egg yolk, shells, bone marrow and fats) to create different coloured paints, and the development of varied painting techniques, including fine line brush paintings, finger, and hand paintings, and the use of art to depict and enact complex cosmologies and healing arts.
The diverse ways in which Africans made worlds are openings for diverse ways of being and for understanding Africa’s technological legacy. They are also a basis for the imagination of alternatives to the present moment.
Imagination
Africa’s colonisation ushered in a period of global homogeneity that solidified a global political (the nation-state) and economic (capitalism) template that has so dominated the global imaginary of the following 150 years that it seems nearly impossible to imagine alternatives to it. This has come with grave consequences, including the climate crisis we in Africa are increasingly going to bear the brunt of. Pre-independence African history is a key to breaking the totalising nature and lure of the present moment.
Studying pre-colonial and colonial history enables understanding of how the world’s narrative came to occlude Africa’s abilities and possibilities, and how this continues into the present. Looking at this history by focusing on agency and possibilities makes one realise that Africa’s pasts are not ‘less than’ but a resource to be built on.
Formal schooling, which focuses mainly on Africa’s post-independence history, can lead to feelings of impotence and resignation that make one believe that that is how things are in the present are how they will forever be. Engaging the 99.8 per of African history to know that things can be different – that as an African one is an agent, and that there is no dearth of examples of knowledge and skills from Africa – allows one to imagine something else in the present, and to “dare to invent the future”, as Thomas Sankara challenged.
Breaking the lure of the present moment involves countering the notion of African timelessness through attending to change in our pasts. For example, though we are often presented with African traditions as though they have been static, we know that practices are fashioned to respond to the goals of a group of people, and that both goals and practices can change. For example, many Bantu communities moving into eastern and southern parts of the continent did not practise circumcision as part of their rites of passage for young people coming of age. Circumcision was added onto pre-existing practices that varyingly included seclusion, adorning the body with clay and other emollients, ancestral and nature rituals, instruction from family, clan or community elders on new life responsibilities in adulthood, and the celebration of successful passage. Circumcision was added to pre-existing rites often as a result of mixing with non-Bantu communities who practised this, possibly due to, or to enable, intermarriages. Using analysis of divergences in words and ideas, historians show how even this inclusion waxed and waned with increasing and decreasing contacts with other communities.
Indigenous history provides an arena to destabilise European Enlightenment divides such as nature-culture, mind-body disciplines, and anthropocentric notions of agency, all colonial inheritances that continue to define the present and contribute to the ongoing crisis. The practice of acknowledging those who came first, including land and forest spirits, is common in various African communities. When Anlo-Ewe peoples migrated into lagoon areas in West Africa, they incorporated ritual knowledge and the sea deities of neighbouring peoples, thus enabling them to develop a maritime fishing tradition, which was previously non-existent amongst them.
African symbologies, syllabaries and alphabets, such as Adinkra, Nsibidi, Chokwe veves, and Ge’ez scripts, illuminate communities’ values as well as the design and communication principles used to communicate them. These carriers of peoples’ aesthetic thought and principles can be used today both as reminders and harbingers of alternative futures, as Saki Mafundikwa, a graphic designer, and Nnedi Okorafor, a science fiction author, are doing.
Breaking the lure of the present moment also entails complexifying grand narratives through attending to histories of the particular and of change. For example, Sundiata Keita is famed as a great ruler of the Mali Empire. A charter he pronounced upon ascending the throne is celebrated as one of the first ‘constitutions’ in the world, contemporaneous with the Magna Carta, and lauded for its humaneness because it instructed that slaves should get one day off a week and own the property of their bags. Sundiata, in fact, reinstated slavery, which the guild of hunters had abolished a few years earlier in a charter they delivered. This history points to the fact that life, and therefore history, is processual and encourages a shift from linear progression and teleological thinking.
Indigenous African polities demonstrate heterarchy as a form of societal organisation in which power is diffuse and vested in multiple spheres and people, none more important than the other, thus entrenching checks and balances. One person could belong to their family or clan lineage, an age-set group, a secret society, a knowledge or crafts guild, a deliberative body (e.g. council of elders), and a spiritual practice (e.g. a spirit medium or devotee) at the same time. Each of these institutions performed activities necessary for the health of the whole community rather than for the importance of single individuals, be they chiefs or kings. Amongst the Nanumba and others, chiefs were farmers like any other community member. Equally, deposition of leaders when they did not meet the reciprocal obligation to work for the health of the community was practised, as were migrations to start new communities in new areas.
Among the Alur, the power of the central polity increased rather than decreased as groups separated and left to start their own political formations. The hunter’s charter and ‘egalitarian/stateless societies’ like the Igbo of West Africa also provide examples of alternative political models. These different ways of organising the political can open up a discursive and praxis imaginary of the political that goes beyond the nation-state.
In many indigenous African societies, people, relationships and the knowledge embedded in them were more valued than material goods. The global capital system, however, has steadily devalued people, especially knowledgeable Africans who are placed at the bottom of a hierarchy, even while the system profits off the knowledge they hold in agriculture, medicine, knowledge production, and various other domains. In Equatorial Africa how much knowledge one had, understood as skilful generative action (not information) was highly valued. At present, however, extractive control over people, and the Earth, not the ownership of knowledge (productive skilful action) is what is more highly valued. A reframing of wealth using indigenous concepts of knowledge and skill might change how we organise our economies and societies, re-appreciating both the time and knowledge inherent in agroecological food production, craftwork, and forms of artistic production. It can also provide pathways out of global capitalism.
Statistics about Africa’s rapid urbanisation abound. Valuing and integrating indigenous forms of urbanism might hold answers to the challenges this presents. For example, urban agriculture was an integral part of several indigenous urban centres. Encouraging and supporting urban agriculture in African cities today might allow us to create cities that feed themselves. The floating city of Makoko in Lagos lagoon was settled 200 years ago. Today the ingenuity of design, construction, and socio-economic life in Makoko is under threat of demolition for ‘development’. A historical understanding of living in Makoko, coupled with an appreciation of the layers of knowledge and skill represented might allow imagination of indigenous urban development. Indeed, the residents of Makoko have been innovating it for 200 years already.
Conclusion
Tracing African pasts through the interlinked lenses of agency, possibility and imagination allows us to counter-narratives of Africa as a blank slate, to challenge the privileging of whiteness and Europeanness, and to debunk myths about Africans as people who are destructive or unchanging. It allows us to illuminate diverse possibilities of human living to build on against the hegemony of a present moment that unsees and devalues us. For Africans, studying African history is an opportunity to trace the stream of African living for the last 200, 000 years.
Unseeing was a colonial predicament. There is no reason why we must continue with these glasses on.
Support The Elephant.
The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.
Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.

Ideas
Northern Kenya Comes in from the Cold: A New Dawn for Kenyan Democracy?
Marginalised in the colonial era and ignored after independence, northern Kenya has experienced significant change over the past decade. But will the new trend endure?

The development projects that have been initiated in northern Kenya over the past decade are indicative of the promise of a new democratic ethos in the country. The various “flagship” projects — roads, an airport, infrastructure… — formally break the link with northern Kenya’s heritage of a past of deliberate marginalization.
These changes are attributed to the revival of a robust human rights programming, advocacy and implementation at regional and national level; the 2010 constitution, transitional justice mechanisms (the national cohesion and re-integration process and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission processes); Sessional Paper No. 10 of 2012; Vision 2030; a changing understanding of the value of land and other forms of productivity; and the strong advocacy work of northern Kenya’s civil society and allied pro-democracy reformers of the last two decades.
In northern Kenya the space for democratic engagement and respect for human rights was constricted from the word go.
New narratives are emerging in which socio-economic and governance prospects for northern Kenya are clothed in positive practical experiences. Northern Kenya is not only poised to rightfully partake in its democratic share but also to impact Kenya’s democratic profile in a substantive manner. But will these new trends endure?
The colonial Northern Frontier District
The future of northern Kenya was inauspicious from the start: Kenya became a British protectorate in 1890 and a crown colony in 1920. In the intervening period, the British struggled to create a buffer territory between the Italians and Ethiopians on the one side and the settled southern territory on the other. The move was prompted by rivalries between Italian Somaliland, the Abyssinian Empire and the British East Africa Protectorate. The rivalry was caused, in particular, by Abyssinia’s worrisome expansion southwards that started in 1895. The Northern Frontier District (NFD) ended up being the buffer zone. The NFD comprised that swath of territory comprising of upper eastern region, north-eastern region and the northern Rift Valley.
The NFD was declared a “closed district” to Kenyans from the south, who required special permits to visit. This resulted in the perception by the locals that they were not part of the “Building Kenya “project.
Between 1941 and 1950, with the exception of French Somaliland, all Somali territories were administered by the British. With the fall of Italian forces in 1941, the British could now expand their economic and political policies across all Somali territories and the Bevin Plan to unify all Somali territories under Britain was adopted. This inspired Somalis to seriously begin to consider the idea of a Pan-Somali nation.
Having been determined by the British to be a “wasteland” from which “no resources” could be extracted, it followed that, in the view of the colonialists, the territory warranted little investment being nothing but a financial drain. In the 1920s, the most the colonial authorities could get out of the drylands of northern Kenya was the livestock (30 cattle and 50 sheep) that the communities paid every year as tribute. However, it soon emerged that the Somali community was defaulting, putting a strain between the locals and the authorities.
The NFD was declared a “closed district” to Kenyans from the south, who required special permits to visit.
Social services were essentially non-existent. There were no hospitals built in the early years of colonial rule. Education lagged behind as there was no school in the province until 1946 when the first one was opened in Isiolo. In any case, to Muslim communities, schools were deemed to be the proselytizing agents of Christianity. Even the Christian missions were not permitted in the NFD since the British feared they would generate aspirations in the locals that that they would not be able to fulfil. Quranic schools could be found in every home where a Maalim taught the Quran and the hadiths (Prophet Mohammed’s teachings). There was only one provincial hospital which was located in Isiolo whose one doctor would make visits to the districts. A few trunk roads had started being built in the 20s that linked major towns like Wajir and Garissa.
The reality was obviously different in the south of the colony. On reaching Isiolo, a community member travelling south would declare that “they had reached Kenya. This was a matter of them being conscious of the fact of their difference and understanding that their loyalty would be questioned by what they called the “down Kenya” authorities on account of their irredentist aspirations.
By the 1920s northern Kenya had already been relegated to a future full of arbitrary pre- and post-independence policy-making, and unaccountable bureaucracies with their attendant misuse of power. The link between governance and civil society participation was a mirage. Apart from having to contend with unjust legal systems, the residents of northern Kenya did not participate in decision-making. NFD was essentially characterized by almost nothing else other than gross socio-economic, cultural and political marginalisation. It was clear to all that the region was not to be a welcome and integral part of the new Kenyan “nation-building project”. As long as NFD residents paid their taxes and conflict among them did not arise, they were left to their own devices.
State of emergency
The British held a referendum in 1962 with the objective of seeking to find out if northern Kenya residents preferred territorial unity with the young Somali nation to the north or with the future republic of Kenya. Residents overwhelmingly voted to secede and join Somalia. Jomo Kenyatta’s response was unequivocal: “Not an inch of Kenya” would be taken way. A four-year guerrilla war ensued involving sections of northern Kenya residents. It is reported that by the time the Shifta (Amharic for bandit) war technically ended in November 1967, nearly 2,000 people had been killed.
On reaching Isiolo, a community member travelling south would declare that “they had reached Kenya.
The Kenyan government declared a state of emergency on 28 December 1963, barely a fortnight after Kenya became independent. This marked a turning point in the relationship between the Kenyan government and north-eastern Kenya. The declaration of the state of emergency had been prompted by the formation of an alliance between the Gabra, Borana, Rendille and Somali pastoralist communities that was expressed in the form of a political party called the Northern Kenya Progressive Peoples Party (NPPP) which, since 1960 had become the vanguard for agitating for the secession of the region from Kenya. Perceived to have been the main agitators for secession, suspicion regarding the political views and citizenship of Kenyan Somalis has endured.
Social exclusion and marginalization
In northern Kenya the space for democratic engagement and respect for human rights was constricted from the word go. The colonial authorities had little time to foster inter-community harmony, instead forcing these communities to submit to the status quo. Statehood as an idea was in this case bereft of intercommunity coherence. The colonial authorities proceeded to allocate development resources to what were perceived as “high potential” areas that would provide good returns on investment because they had adequate water and fertile soils. This essentially consigned the so-called “arid lands” to social, economic and political marginalization and infrastructure development and other basic services were to be denied to the perceived “non-productive regions” for many decades to come. This is how northern Kenya — from Turkana and Pokot in the north-west to Mandera and Wajir — came to represent the perfect case of historically marginalized societies in Kenya.
Since the region was primarily governed from a security point of view, conversations around basic needs were barely allowed. It is for this reason that Hannah Whitaker argues that while scholarship predominantly and conveniently cites Somali nationalism and the influence of the external Somali state as the main driving factor for the Somali movement to secede, little is said of the internal socio-economic grievances that the northern Kenya residents then held. These long-standing grievances remain pertinent to this day. As Dominic Burbidge equally notes, the concerns of the communities in the north “include land access for cattle grazing, availability of water points and access to markets”. He adds that cattle rustling in the north during the colonial period was caused by poorly regulated borders with Somalia.
What is surprising is that successive post-independent governments have adopted the colonizer’s attitudes and approaches towards the region, including the divide-and-rule strategies that were frequently employed by the colonial authorities. This has come at great expense to Kenya’s nation-building project and to the livelihoods, freedoms and democratic rights of the residents of northern Kenya.
The multidimensional nature of the marginalization of the north has been documented in its social, political and economic aspects. Being both the cause and effect of marginalization, poverty cuts across such factors as gender, geography, and ethnic groups, among others. A case study of social exclusion and marginalization, the region has suffered exclusion from development projects and basic services that would ordinarily be availed to other regions or ethnic groups. Economic and social marginalization has prevented the residents of this region from accessing basic services, and has denied them income opportunities and even access to jobs. The extent to which various other Kenyan regions have been resourced and developed over the years can be gleaned from the glaring disparities reflected in GPD records. For instance, for decades before the democratic transition that brought Mwai Kibaki to power, nearly 45 per cent of the nation’s employment was based in only 15 towns. This exacerbated the ethno-regional profiles of political and economic discrimination.
It was the practice since colonial times for Kenyans from the south to be appointed to head the provincial administration and the security forces up in north. Local leaders with a better appreciation of the local dynamics were left out of key decision-making processes. Those with a little education could be appointed chiefs and sub-chiefs but were more often named to even less prominent positions. The state preferred to consult its external allies for assistance whenever it was confronted with an issue. Notable appointments of northern Kenyans emerged after the failed 1982 coup. The coup prompted the then president Daniel arap Moi to begin to systematically build alliances with marginalized communities such as the Maasai and Somali. Hussein Maalim Mohamed was appointed Minister of State in 1983. His brother Mahmoud Mohamed was named Chief of General staff in 1985.
Old narratives and alternative narratives
A critical impediment to realizing a democratic and equitable governance and development system in northern Kenya has had to do with lingering misconceptions by the policy makers, media and other development actors about pastoralists, their culture and livelihoods. These misunderstandings often dovetailed with neo-classical economics that linked exclusion and social inequality to perceived individual or group character flaws, or strengths, or culture. Certain groups, for instance, would be socially excluded based on what the dominant interests felt were their own faults.
It was the practice since colonial times for Kenyans from the south to be appointed to head the provincial administration and the security forces up in north.
The centuries-old practices and way of life of pastoralists contribute to food security stabilization in the drylands ecology and provide them with adaptive skills to confront a variable climate. Yet policy makers do not see this. Instead, they hold that it is a “backward, wasteful and irrational livelihood” that occurs in “fragile, degraded and unproductive ecosystems that simply generates trouble to non-pastoralists”. Edward Oyugi explains that the 2010 constitution provided for devolution as a policy instrument, broadly and vaguely intended to reign in runaway marginalization and the social exclusion of different actors of the Kenya society on the basis of such factors as ethnicity, region, gender, negation, urban versus rural and class and other identity forms. This was specially to assist us move away from the neoclassical thinking where we blamed or celebrated others based on non-functional attributes. Thus the need to stop thinking about the industrious-crafty Kikuyu, the happy-go-lucky coastal, the pleasure-loving Luo, the culturally backward Maasai, the obedient Kamba, etc.
Pastoralists have always been portrayed as permanently embroiled in conflicts when they are not victims of droughts. Depicted as largely lacking agency, their own adaptive capacity is rarely acknowledged.
Agitation for democratic reforms and social inclusion
During the constitutional reform processes, Kenyans agitated for the removal of the centralized political system, strongly rooting for a decentralised system to take its place. Kenyans fervently called for the equitable representation of all regions in national government. Pastoralists from the north joined other communities that had missed out on any significant and representative appointments to national government offices. An example of the inequitable allocation of national government positions can be gleaned from Jomo Kenyatta’s presidency during which 28.5 per cent of cabinet ministers were Kikuyu. During the presidency of Daniel Arap Moi the percentage of Kikuyus in the cabinet dropped to just about 4 per cent while that of the Kalenjin rose sharply to 22 per cent. In addition, in the 70s, 37.5 per cent of permanent secretaries were from the Kikuyu community while 8.3 per cent were from the Kalenjin community. In 2001 the percentage of permanent secretaries from the Kikuyu community dropped to 8.7 per cent while that of the Kalenjin rose to 34.8 percent. This was again reversed when Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, ascended to the presidency in 2001.
Changes in policy, law, rights programming and practice
Essentially, the democratizing project in Kenya and elsewhere was hugely aided by the strongly revived human rights programming, advocacy and activism that was experienced in Africa from 1990’s onwards. It was from this human rights language that a raft of regional and national legislations and policy frameworks were promulgated from the year 2001 onwards. This set the pace for the categorical recognition of the economic, social and cultural rights of pastoralists and other minorities. Significantly, most of these legal and policy instruments which came to benefit pastoralists and other minorities were as a result of this robust human rights re-awakening across Africa. This human rights revival was largely driven by the newly formed continental structures such as New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD — which came to represent a new vision for Africa’s development). During this period, all states within the African continent had become parties to international human rights conventions. In the years after 2001, states were obligated to respect the principles and objectives of NEPAD. Critical to some of these principles were the primacy of international human rights law which essentially provides that that legal obligations deriving from international human rights law have primacy over any other obligation. States were therefore under obligation to ensure that all their commitments — economic, financial, and commercial programmes — were aligned with international human rights law. Moreover, NEPAD established accessible, transparent and effective mechanisms to assess the exercise of responsibility, be it at the national level or at the level of the institution. These commitments were to be assessed through the procedures of the African Peer Review Mechanisms.
Understanding the existing human rights normative frameworks and their legal obligations by states for the purposes of advocating for government compliance became a requirement for the marginalized groups in northern Kenya and other parts of the country. This came in handy whenever they needed to engage in strategic litigation at various junctures in their efforts to seek redress for the violation of their economic, social, cultural and development rights. A number of communities that lodged complaints with the regional human rights mechanisms received precedent-setting decisions.
Pastoralists have always been portrayed as permanently embroiled in conflicts when they are not victims of droughts.
In the Endorois case against the Government of Kenya, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights elaborated the scope of the right to development. Article 22 of the African Charter states that all peoples have the economic, social and cultural right to development. The 2010 constitution seeks to strengthen national unity through building diversity as a crucial object of devolution. By recognizing the rights of collective identities, it vindicates the significance of self-governance and improved participation in decision-making as rights of communities. To this extent, it categorically identifies pastoralists as a collective identity whether nomadic or a “settled community that because of its relative geographical location has experienced only marginal participation in the integrated social, and economic life of Kenya as a whole”. The constitution further extends opportunities for redress for the marginalization and social exclusion that pastoralists and any other minority groups may have experienced when it makes provisions for affirmative action programmes in matters relating to representation in governance and in other areas related to education, access to health, employment, infrastructure and water.
Fortunes of Kenya’s first democratic transition
The 2002 democratic transition in Kenya under President Mwai Kibaki, and the attendant transitional mechanisms following the 2007 post-election violence had transformative policy ramifications for the future of northern Kenya. The transition provided hope and impetus for pastoralists and other minorities to advocate for their rights. In effect, policies directed at combating the social exclusion of certain groups began to be designed and implemented. These policies were couched in a language that saw social exclusion and inequality as not being merely a function of the operation of ideological choices, systems or structural conditions but as unjustifiable human rights violations under many human rights conventions. In the main, they emphasized recognition of the principle of non-discrimination and equality as fundamental elements of international human rights law which meant that states could not engage in the mischief of justifying less development for some groups or regions for whatever reason as has been the case previously. The principle of indivisibility of all human rights reinforced this position, clarifying the universality, indivisibility, and interdependent nature of rights. The preamble of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, notes:
“Civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as universality and the satisfaction of economic social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights”.
The African Union Policy Framework on Pastoralism (2010) set the stage not only for the recognition of pastoralism but also for the inclusion in the constitutional and legal texts of states. The enactment and implementation of the National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands (Sessional Paper No 12), as endorsed by the cabinet in 2012, followed suit and reversed the provisions of Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 that had entrenched discrimination in resource allocation based on perceived “high potential”, those associated with crop agriculture, to the detriment of the drylands where pastoralists reside. It is this 2012 Sessional Paper that comprehensively laid the ground for a series of flagship projects that were to be implemented in northern Kenya as part of the Vision 2030 development strategy.
Infrastructure galore
When a team of 50 men and women embarked on a 510-kilometre walk to campaign for the tarmacking of the Isiolo-Moyale Road on 7th November 2004, few thought that one day their dream would be realized. Northern Kenya is not only poised to rightfully partake in its democratic share but also to impact Kenya’s democratic profile in a substantive manner. But will these new trends endure? Only Kenyan citizens on the one hand — and not just the people of northern Kenya — and the state institutions, on the other, can guarantee that.
–
This publication was funded/co-funded by the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of The Elephant and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
Ideas
Reimagining Futures of Agriculture and Bioeconomy
A recent workshop brought together scholars, agricultural practitioners, and activists. Stefan Ouma, Eugen Pissarskoi, Kerstin Schopp and Leiyo Singo summarise some insights from a vital discussion from the degrowth and the critical agrarian studies communities discussing visions of agriculture which do not rely on growing productivity.

The transformation of the fossil-fuel based economies to a “bioeconomy” – an economy whose raw materials come mainly from renewable sources – as envisioned in the early industrialized societies of the Global North will make biomass the bottleneck resource of the 21st century. Visions of bioeconomy and agriculture which dominate debates both in the Global South and the Global North share the belief that the best means to alleviate the resulting challenges consists in increasing agricultural productivity. Critical agrarian studies scholars and activists have often flagged the negative impacts of capitalist visions of bioeconomy and agriculture, calling into questions the dominant and often capital-driven paradigms that seek to envision and implement particular agricultural futures. Interventions on roape.net and in the journal have powerfully contributed to those debates.
Many of these interventions have had a focus on Africa or the Global South more generally. But what are the visions of agriculture of those who are not in a position of political or economic power both in the Global North and the Global South? Does there exist a shared vision among them? Also, many of these interventions in one way or another are against ‘modern’ forms of agriculture, which often implies being against the industrial productivity paradigm that underpins capital-driven agricultural futures. While this paradigm has a long history, going back to the work of 18th century philosopher John Locke, and resurfacing during both colonial and post-colonial attempts to ‘modernize’ African agriculture (as Andrew Coulson shows here), it is often not clear what role ‘productivity’ would play in alternative visions of agriculture. What would make an agriculture without productivity growth attractive to small producers such as smallholder farmers and livestock keepers? Do indigenous communities and the degrowth movement (which lately has received more attention by critical agrarian studies scholars, see here and here) have their own conception of productivity or an own attitude to it? Given the recent calls that we need a deeper dialogue between degrowth and decoloniality scholars, how could decolonized conceptions of productivity capture more space in public debates and policy circles? These questions foregrounded the reflections and conversations of the workshop aptly named: Beyond Productivity: Reimagining Futures of Agriculture and Bioeconomy, held as a digital event on 8 October, 2021.
The workshop drew about 40 scholars, agricultural practitioners and policy activists from different countries including Germany, Ghana, France, India, South Africa, Tanzania, United Kingdom, and the United States. We deliberately wanted to span boundaries and gather diversely positioned scholars and activists, many of whom would normally not share the same space. This diversity, we believe, influenced the contributions and deliberations during the workshop. Of course, the theme of the workshop itself – the role of productivity for a radically sustainable agriculture and bioeconomy – constitutes a puzzle. There are contradictory attitudes towards it, even within more critical academic circles, as well as among grassroots movements representing peasant farmers and livestock keepers.
In the following, we present some insights from the discussions about this “productivity puzzle”. A lengthier documentation of the workshop’s debates can be found here.
Part 1: Role of Productivity in Agricultural Visions
The first session brought together visions of agricultural practices, which do not strive for further increase in land or labour productivity. The contributions were made by Henryk Alff and Michael Spies (Eberswalde University for Applied Sciences), Theodora Pius and Lina Andrew (Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Wadogo Tanzania (MVIWATA), member of La Via Campesina), Christina Mfanga (Tanzania Socialist Forum), Gaël Plumecocq (French National Institute for Agriculture, Food, and Environment Toulouse), Leiyo Singo (University of Bayreuth), Paula Gioia (Arbeitsgemeinschaft bäuerliche Landwirtschaft (AbL), Germany, member of La Via Campesina), Richard Mbunda (University of Dar es Salaam), and Divya Sharma (University of Sussex). The discussions took part in parallel breakout rooms addressing the differences and similarities of the visions presented in the session.
It is incontestable that a rise in productivity can improve people’s livelihoods. However, the established notions of “productivity” are strongly influenced by capitalist imperatives. They contribute to class differentiation and uneven capital accumulation in countries such as Tanzania as several participants pointed out. These notions of productivity have been exported to Africa.Meanwhile, the idea of productivist agriculture has become deeply entrenched in farmers’ own reasoning. Due to that, they consider productivity increases as a means to rising incomes which, in turn, they need since a growing number of needs cannot be satisfied without cash.
Most participants agreed that mainstream notions of productivity need to be adjusted by recognition of additional values, for instance, frugality (or simplicity) and the well-being of the future generations. Given that we already have reached a planetary state of climate breakdown, visions that do not envision productivity rise are deemed more realistic compared to what is formulated within the conventional productivity paradigm. Agro-ecology is an option to increase productivity in quality, not quantity. Qualitative productivity improvements rest on incorporating a wide range of social and ecological values and not merely economic ones. Additionally, legal, and political frameworks that are formulated in a deliberate, collective manner could help to develop a commonly shared vision of a future agriculture and the role of productivity in it.
Some participants mentioned that the allegation of low productivity is used to continue the alienation of farmers from their means of production (seeds/land) across Tanzania. It is used to help “modern seeds” penetrate rural areas. While it is true that many farmers, especially young ones, increasingly consider agriculture as a dead-end, agriculture has rather been made to be not rewarding. Additionally, the role of brokers at the interface between farmers and markets should be critically scrutinized.
Another key question is that of political power. How can other visions of agriculture become effective? Recent policy dynamics in Tanzania provide a vital example. Despite some of well-known shortcomings, the previous regime under late-President Joseph Pombe Magufuli shared certain visions with small-scale farmers, e.g., banning trials on genetically modified organisms. Magufuli also took away land from investors that had been obtained under questionable circumstances. The current regime, however, supports investors. “For the government, investors are business partners, but for the majority these are enemies, not development partners.”, argued Christina Mfanga.
The session ended with a paradox. While we can raise several critical points about the thrust for productivity, it can be patronizing to say that small-scale farmers don’t want productivity. If asked, many farmers would probably agree that anything reducing their workload is good. At the same time, this does not mean to go down the corporate road to productivity. Another question that emerged was: “Who are the people”? How do we account for social differentiation, and potentially differentiated interests, among the peasantry and livestock keepers?
Part 2: Towards Decolonization of Productivity?
Introducing the second round of the workshop, Stefan Ouma raised the linkage between productivity and coloniality, emphasizing that notions of productivity cannot be understood without considering the colonial experience. Colonial administrators already promoted modernisationist discourses on raising productivity among ‘backward’ African producers, a rhetoric that still shines through the contemporary productivity gospel. Endorsement of economic prerogatives such as efficiency, labour productivity, and the coupling of private property and the ideology of “improvement” have European origins and buttressed colonial expansion.
Two keynote addresses were presented by Julien-François Gerber and Emmanuel Sulle followed by the commentary by Wendy Wilson-Fall. Subsequently, participants discussed in three groups the following questions:
What would make an agriculture without productivity growth attractive to smallholder producers?
Some participants suggested focusing on the plurality of productivities instead of abandoning the notion of productivity at all. This plurality should integrate social and environmental forms of productivity, such as the freedom for smallholder farmers to decide which crops they cultivate when and which crop quality they want to achieve, which is an important issue for smallholder farmers.
Other participants, however, pointed out, that the established political-economic rules make an agriculture decoupled from productivity growth unattractive. It is unrealistic to make a beyond-productivity-agriculture attractive to a young generation within the existing economic systems. The macro-level is vital since the dominant economic framing of agriculture in politics and business makes agro-industrial notions of productivity (in the narrow sense) a prerequisite. As a consequence, these participants called for a paradigm shift towards a decommodification of agriculture. This decommodification will have implications on the decolonization of agriculture since the redistributive and alienating dimensions of capitalist markets are central issues for both political projects.
Do indigenous communities and the degrowth movement have an own conception of productivity or an own attitude to it? How does it look like?
In his plenary presentation, Julien-François Gerber pointed out that the degrowth movement stresses a plurality of values among which an agricultural system must balance: well-being, meaningful work, resilience to shocks, land and labour productivity among others. Land/labour productivity (and the resulting monetary income) constitute only a part of the valuable properties of agricultural systems.
This picture of a plurality of values which need to be adequately balanced actually represents the realities of indigenous farmers and pastoralists in sub-Sahara Africa and Latin America. These groups balance the productivity of ecosystems and non-human organisms (“livestock”) with the productivity of social bonds and relationships in a different manner than the industrial farmers in the Global North. The latter put more weight on the land and labour productivity and less weight on livestock’s well-being and intensity of social bonds.
A remarkable difference lies in the fact that while the degrowth vision is largely aspirational, the pastoralist economies of provisioning are an already existing reality. Their common point – the requirement of balance amid a plurality of values – is far from being recognized by the political mainstream in the Global South or North.
How could decolonized conceptions of productivity capture more space in public debates and policy circles?
Taking the case of Tanzania, a largely agrarian society, discussants acknowledged that the country’s politics are dominated by urban elites. Therefore, without a broader movement taking on the existing ruling class, nothing will change. Those working with grassroot movements pointed out that the “people are there, but funding is the issue”. Christina Mfanga came across a lot of struggles among farmers which are “extra-organizational” (outside of organized farmer groups and movements) and thus less visible. Most of the movements she mentioned are not donor dependent. The involvement of donor funds is often a setback for radical struggles.
Researchers need to get closer to the grassroots to learn about the real struggles of the poor. Richard Mbunda emphasized the need for research that is strongly grounded in decolonial conceptions of agriculture. Data is helping the proponents of hegemonic models of productivity to speak, so alternatives need data, too. We need to have a larger discussion about decolonizing productivity and associated research. We should turn the Global North-South axis upside down; “we” in the Global North can learn a lot from the Global South in terms of human-environment relations.
Conclusion
The debates at the workshop have demonstrated that there are similar objections raised against the dominant, capital-driven visions of agricultural futures (see here and here) and the bioeconomy (see here and here) by scholars and activists from different parts of the world. The dominant visions both in the Global North and the Global South endorse the goal of productivity growth. In light of mainstream economic theories, the socio-economic institutions established in the early industrialized societies of the Global North, and their values – which have been exported to other parts of the world- productivity growth seems to be an indispensable condition for a flourishing life.
However, as the workshop debates stated, there are grassroot movements in the Global North – which are small and politically unrepresented – who object to the pursuit of further increases in land or labour productivity and who search for socio-economic models which do not depend on growth of economic aggregates yet enables life to truly flourish. There are also communities in the Global South – often politically marginalized and currently in existential crisis such as the Maasai in Tanzania – which have preserved and still realize ways of life in which growth of productivity does not play a significant role.
As such, there is fertile ground for fruitful exchange and mutual learning between critical agrarian studies researchers and activists studying these marginalized communities and grassroot movements and activists striving for recognition of their values from the Global North and the Global South. Such an exchange should avoid the temptation to romanticize these communities and movements, taking their internal contradictions and struggles around cultural values and practices seriously, as Andrew Coulson reminded us in the aftermath of the workshop.
–
This article was first published by ROAPE.
Ideas
Boda Boda Justice
Local and national institutions should move beyond perpetuating harmful narratives about boda boda riders and instead leverage their capacity to contribute towards grassroots processes of protection and justice.

We are all familiar with the idea that we, as people, plan, but those plans can be quickly altered by the animate and ever-moving process of life. On October 5th, I had a pretty straightforward plan for the day, and having an accident that could have taken my life was certainly not part of it. I was jogging along my regular route when, ahead of me, I saw a car turning into a wide driveway at great speed. I instinctively slowed down to allow the car to turn, only to be hit from behind by a motorcycle that had veered off the road.
Thrown into a ditch but fully conscious, I touched my head and felt it to be completely drenched. Before I looked at my hand, I readied myself for the eventuality that it was blood I was feeling, and that this could be my last day alive. To my relief, it was just mud. I slowly moved each part of my body, to find that I had no severe injuries. I picked up my glasses, stood up, and processed that I was, indeed, alive. A crowd quickly grew around me, with people asking me who to call, or whether I wanted go to hospital immediately. Through tears, full of adrenaline and in a state of shock, I insisted that I wanted to go home; I hadn’t jogged far. I got onto one of the many boda bodas that had gathered at the scene, and home I went.
Some 20 minutes later, as I was getting into a car with a family friend to be taken to the hospital, still in a state of shock and disarray, a boda boda rider approached me. He is a rider in the local area, so we were familiar with each other. He happened to have seen me leave for my jog before the accident, and was at the same place as I was being brought back, covered in mud and crying, some ten minutes later. He explained that he had been told what had happened, that he knew who had hit me and that he was willing to participate in a justice process. I won’t go into what I went through both physically and emotional here except to say that I had avoided a neck fracture and wore a brace for a few days to allow a slight injury at the back of my neck to heal. The shock took a few days to wear off, and I remain very aware of the fact that October 5th could have gone very differently.
However, what I learned from this experience is that there is an organized structure within the boda boda community that has the capacity to administer justice at the grassroots level, which the local boda boda rider wanted deployed. The episode highlighted the social, political and economic consequences of the way in which this working-class community is perceived by the wider society, and how Kenyan society could change for the better if these broad-brush and often negative societal perspectives were abandoned.
Several months before the incident, a group of boda boda riders had been recorded violently physically and sexually assaulting a woman whose car had hit one of them along Forest Road. The ensuing aggressive and outraged discourse across social media targeted the boda boda community and its collective culture. Given the nature of the injustice faced by that woman—an incident that I can only imagine would leave a person emotionally impacted long after the assault itself—the uproar, indignation, and anger of Kenyans was not misplaced.
What I learned from this experience is that there is an organized structure within the boda boda community that has the capacity to administer justice at the grassroots level
However, even with my limited experience of the country, I felt uneasy about the state’s knee-jerk reaction which was to take all boda bodas off the road in response to the incident. Firstly, I think that the culture of women being subjected to sexual violence as a result of men, or society in general, experiencing emotions like anger towards who they are and what they do has less to do with who boda boda riders are as people, and more to do with what patriarchy has normalized regarding how women should suffer the consequences when men get emotional.
Secondly, the dogmatic nature of the car drivers vs boda boda riders conversation on Twitter felt unfair. Months before the Forest Road incident, I had been part of a small group of people that had spent hours trying to help a boda boda rider that had been hit and badly injured by a car that had then fled the scene. Bystanders at the scene supported the boda boda riders pursuing the car in question, even though they were aware that he might be subjected to violence if caught.
Thirdly, I just couldn’t see where the post-Forest Road social media discourse was going and I was nervous to wade in with what, in the face of the national outrage, felt like a fickle personal opinion of a guest in the country naively suggesting “not all boda boda riders are…” I kept quietly to myself the thought that this just wasn’t who I had experienced the boda boda community to be. Not being a Swahili speaker, one of the ways in which I navigate new parts of Nairobi, and the country generally, is by locating the nearest boda boda stage if I need to ask for directions or for any other help. I have come to know boda boda riders in a way that the capitalist culture doesn’t allow you to get to know the service providers you engage with on a daily basis. But it would have seemed tone-deaf to contribute this experiences to the discourse at the time, although I was reminded of them again following of the October 5th accident.
Bystanders at the scene supported the boda boda riders pursuing the car in question, even though they were aware that he might be subjected to violence if caught.
Victor* the boda boda rider that approached me on my way to the hospital, is the security officer of the local boda boda riders committee. This is why, when he saw that I had been injured and learned that it was as a result of being hit by a boda boda rider, he made it his personal responsibility to advocate for me in a dialogue involving the police, the owner of the bike, the local boda boda community and the person who had hit me. This process lasted a week before I decided to stop pursuing the case because of the intimidation that Victor was facing from boda boda riders in the area. As the week unfolded, I was not only struck by Victor’s commitment to ensure that I obtained justice, but I was struck by his belief in the system that he was a part of and within which he was a leader, a system that I think many Kenyans don’t know exists, or if they do, aren’t sure of its purpose or its effectiveness. Even though in my case the effectiveness of this system was compromised because of the power relations between the owner of the bike and others in the local area, it has inspired me, time and time again, to see Victor organize and mobilize a grassroots system that he has played a role in creating, for the cause of community-based justice.
A few days after we stopped pursuing the case, Victor and I sat down for an interview. Victor, who is 26 years old, has been a rider in the area for just over two years. Prior to that, Victor had been working in personal and housing security. In his words, it’s because of that experience that he was encouraged to take on the role of security officer and was elected by an overwhelming majority. “First of all, you have to understand, when you see a boda boda rider, you need to know that he is not only standing there for the money. We are keeping an eye on our surroundings in order to keep it secure,” was how Victor began his response to my question about the specifics of his role as a security officer. He went on to explain that “When anything happens regarding boda bodas, a security officer is the first person that is asked, ‘What happened?’ It doesn’t matter if it is 1 am or 3 am in the morning; if there is an incident, I have to wake up and attend to the situation, to understand what happened, who was involved, and what process is required moving forward. If you consider my area, it is part of my job to know every corner of it and be aware of every person operating in my constituency.” Victor explains that each boda boda committee that exists per constituency has a chairperson, security officer, treasurer, and secretary. “As committees, we are known by the NTSA [National Transport and Safety Authority], local police, and local community elders,” he says. People can serve in these positions until they move on, there is no term limit, and, he adds, one does not earn more for taking a leadership position. Sometimes, a person who has received help from a boda boda rider or from the committee will offer compensation in the form of materials such as boots or jackets, or cash. “We also support people financially. If a driver needs to repair his bike because of a hit, or if he needs to pay for damages caused and can’t afford it, we can organize amongst ourselves to support the person affected and be repaid slowly,” Victor explains.
It has inspired me, time and time again, to see Victor organize and mobilize a grassroots system that he has played a role in creating, for the cause of community-based justice.
I asked Victor whether the level of organization that he was describing was present before the Forest Road incident. “After [that incident], measures got much stricter when it comes to registering with the NTSA. It used to be easy. You could talk to someone at any stage and you can start driving. Now it’s much more organized. There was the president’s order that this is the case, but even us, it is something that we took very seriously. You know, it causes you shame when someone from your community harms others.” When I asked Victor why he does this work, and why he pursued my case so vigorously, he shared the following moving reflections: “I didn’t study security or go past Form 2, but this comes from inside of me. I feel very good when I know that everybody in my surroundings is safe and secure. The only reason that I do this is because I care about justice and fairness.” Interestingly, towards the end of our discussion, Victor also described a brief encounter he had had with the recently elected Governor of Nairobi, Johnson Sakaja. “I told him that we need to know each other; he needs to know us guys and we need to know them.”
As an Oromo who is actively engaged in the liberation struggle going on in Ethiopia today, I cannot help but feel a connection between the way Oromo grassroots cultural and political processes and institutions interested in the administration of justice have been misrepresented by the political and economic elites (of all ethnicities), and the way the reality of the boda boda community’s collective life has been similarly unjustly misinterpreted. If local and national institutions could move beyond perpetuating harmful narratives about boda boda riders in order to keep them at the margins of society and use them as political scapegoats when convenient, they could play a productive role in empowering and resourcing this community’s capacity to organise for grassroots justice and projection.
“The only reason that I do this is because I care about justice and fairness.”
Speaking off the record (but giving permission to use this information on the record), Victor told me about a domestic violence dispute that he was able to safely intervene in because of the work he does as a security officer. The victim in question was over 30kms away from Victor’s station, but because he could identify her as a member of his local community whose safety he feels personally responsible for, he took effective action to protect the woman. Even if—like in any institution where power and people are involved—the security institution within the boda boda community is not perfect, it is one of the many ways through which grassroots processes of protection and justice can have a transformative impact where more formalized institutional processes fall short. There is great scope for the latter to be empowered by the former in order to achieve that which I think we all want: to live safely and freely.
*Name has been changed to protect the rider
-
Culture2 weeks ago
The Illuminating Power of Disputes
-
Culture2 weeks ago
The Lost City of Gedi
-
Long Reads1 week ago
Within the Margin of Error? — A Post-Election Polling Retrospective
-
Politics2 weeks ago
Notes From Uganda’s Sexual Culture War
-
Op-Eds2 weeks ago
The Blind Spot: A Graphic Novel on Food Security and Farmers’ Rights
-
Politics2 weeks ago
Understanding the Crisis in Northern Kenya
-
Politics1 week ago
Africa in the New World Disorder
-
Politics1 week ago
Nigeria: A Messiah Will Not Fix Country’s Problems