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Jubinomics in an Era of Austerity: Will the New VAT on Fuel Lead to an Economic Crisis?

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The increased taxation of fuel is making life harder for Kenyans and is neither good politics nor wise leadership. By DAUTI KAHURA

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JUBINOMICS IN AN ERA OF AUSTERITY: Will the new VAT on fuel lead to an economic crisis?
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Three weeks ago, at the Karen bus stop opposite the Karen Police Station, there was a face-off that pitted passengers against matatu crews and their surrogates, the freelance touts that hang around such stops soliciting for passengers. The 33-seater matatus headed to Ngong town, 10km from Karen, were charging Sh80. Just a couple of weeks ago, the standard fare was Sh30. Occasionally, if the demand outstripped supply, which happens from time to time in the matatu industry, the fare would go up by Sh10. Any increase in fare exceeding Sh40 for the 10km ride, whatever the circumstance, would be considered exorbitant. The passengers won this round, but the lingering problem of arbitrary and surreptitious increases in transport fare had not been solved.

The Nairobi-Karen-Ngong route is a microcosm of the looming confrontation between passengers and matatus. And Karen town could be the flashpoint. The route is a very lucrative one, especially during peak hours. Most of the matatu passengers on this route work in the many church institutions, mega malls, restaurants, schools and universities and a big hospital that are located in Karen. Some work for the wealthy Kenyans who have homes there. There are also a lot of casual labourers working in Karen for whom every penny counts.

The tension that had been building between the passengers and the matatu crews had been palpable: “Hawa wathii siku moja watachoma hizi matatu, hii hasira yao ni mbaya sana,” (“These passengers will torch these matatus one of these days, their anger is real”) said a matatu driver. Wary of the people’s wrath, the matatu crews wait for the people to board the matatu, then ambush and cajole them with the ridiculous fare increase. But a fortnight ago, the people refused to enter the matatus, until the crew members publicly announced the fare they were charging. After a 30-minute stalemate, the matatu crew eventually lowered the fare to Sh100. “Lakini bado hawa wathii wananung’unika, sasa sijui wanataka tufanye nini.” (“Even after giving them a fairer price, the people are still grumbling, I don’t know what they expect us to do.”)

Since September 1, 2018, when the new 16 per cent VAT (value added tax) on fuel took effect, there has been a commotion in the public transport industry. The Karen-Ngong town driver who said that angry passengers may one of these days burn down matatus to protest against what they consider to be unfair matatu fares, was voicing a concern that has in the past few weeks put matatu crews on edge. “Wathii wanateta sana, wengine wanataka tu guoko na sisi…si kupoa,” said a matatu driver operating on the Nairobi-Limuru town route. (“Passengers are really complaining, some are picking fights with us…it is not a good sign.”)

Since September 1, 2018, when the new 16 per cent VAT (value added tax) on fuel took effect, there has been a commotion in the public transport industry. The Karen-Ngong town driver who said that angry passengers may one of these days burn down matatus to protest against what they consider to be unfair matatu fares, was voicing a concern that has in the past few weeks put matatu crews on edge.

The Karen-Ngong driver who was edgy about passengers’ uneasiness with the hiked fares said that he was struggling to remit the Sh8,000 his boss demands at the end of each day. “On several instances, we’ve had to forego our own pay. At Sh115 a litre, the diesel has become way too expensive. We asked the matatu owner to stabilize his profit to Sh7,000, with the hope of balancing the books, at the end of every day but it is not working. I think some people have cut their reliance on matatus. This has a direct relation with frequency of the roundtrips we make – the fewer the roundtrips, the lesser the money we make.”

The matatu cooperatives (Saccos) in Nairobi are in a quandary: they have been mulling (even before the fuel tax increase) over how to “rationalise their increasing costs of operations without being seen as gleeful and uncaring,” said a top brass at the Matatu Owners Association (MOA). “The business is really hurting, but so are our customers, yet, somebody has to carry the load and feel the pain. Unfortunately, it has always to be the consumer.”

But the Saccos have been hesitant: They are afraid of pushing too hard lest their customers rebel and spark off a wave of street demonstrations. Conversely, the industry is undergoing one of its most trying times in recent times – dwindling fortunes occasioned by a gloomy economic outlook. “How long can they hold on like this? That is the Saccos’ bosses’ question,” said the MOA official.

In a bizarre incident on September 16, a matatu stopped at Corporation stage (that is before Uthiru on the Nairobi-Nakuru highway) to pick passengers to Nairobi. Before the driver could know what was going on, a chap grabbed the matatu keys, scaled the dividing wall of the dual carriageway and ran off with keys. The people milling around the stage seemed unperturbed by the incident and the passengers inside and outside the matatu did not seem to mind the ordeal. Afterwards, when I asked one of the freelance touts why the fellow (who is very well known around the area), was risking his life snatching keys from a matatu, his answer was: “Hizi mathree zinaumiza watu sana.” (“These matatus are squeezing people financially.”)

The matatus operating along long distances are not faring any better. My driver friend who operates a Nairobi-Nyahururu shuttle has been mourning since VAT on fuel was introduced. “I’m now spending Sh5,000 on fuel to and from Nyahururu, up from Sh3,200. Nyahururu is exactly 200km from Nairobi city centre. I used to charge my passengers Sh350 one way from Nairobi to Nyahururu before the fuel increase and I’d still take home between Sh3,200 and Sh3,500. It was reasonable.”

After September 1, he increased the fare to Sh400, but this has not helped. “Ndiraruta wira wa kuhura mai na ndiri.” (“I’ve resorted to pounding water in a mortar – in short, I’m doing zero work.”) Even after increasing the fare by Sh50 per person, the best he can take home at the end of the day, he told me, was Sh3,400, after deducting his expenses. As it is, his transport business was running on a Sh1,800 deficit every day – courtesy of the fuel tax. “I can’t dare push the fare more than Sh400: I know my customers, they are also suffering, we’ve to wait and hope President Uhuru will lower the prices,” said the driver nonchalantly.

The journey to Nyahururu is usually a one-way trip: A shuttle leaves Nairobi for Nyahururu in the morning at around 9.00am. The 200km trip usually takes about four hours. If the shuttle is lucky, it will make the return trip to Nairobi by between 5.00pm and 6.00pm, arriving in Nairobi at around 10.00pm. There are between 240 and 260 14-seater shuttles on the Nairobi-Nyahururu route. “If you make the round trip,” said my driver friend, “you count yourself lucky.”

His prayer about President Uhuru rescinding the implementation of VAT on the fuel sounded half-hearted and without conviction – like a person who already knows it is impossible but hopes for the unexpected to happen. “The truth of the matter,” he opined, “is that even if the fuel levy was dropped entirely, there certainly would be some relief, but life as it is, is already tough. Too much money had been stolen under President Uhuru’s watch and that is the price we’ve to pay for the profligacy.” But it has become increasingly difficult to hold a discussion on President Uhuru Kenyatta’s performance, especially with Jubilee supporters, like my driver friend. “Nitutigane na uhoro ucio.” (“Let’s just leave that topic alone.”)

President Kenyatta’s recent fulmination against matatu owners increasing fares, lest their licenses are revoked by National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA) was rebutted by MOA, which argued the threat had no basis in law. “The President,” said a Jubilee Party MP, “will soon realise that nobody will be taking his threats any more seriously. He is a lame duck president who is doing his final term and holds no sway whatsoever on the politics of the future.”

The imposition of VAT on fuel has had an inflationary effect on practically every commodity that must be transported from point A to point B. In effect, this means that soon almost every household item will become more expensive.

On 20 September, the controversial Finance Bill, 2018 was passed by MPs. And without wasting any time, the President assented to the Bill the following day. The Bill’s vote in Parliament had been preceded by a little-nested game between the MPs and the President. The Parliamentarians had already threatened to shoot down Uhuru’s proposal to halve the VAT to 8 per cent, maintaining that there should be none placed on fuel and defying party chief whips.

The imposition of VAT on fuel has had an inflationary effect on practically every commodity that must be transported from point A to point B. In effect, this means that soon almost every household item will become more expensive.

“I’m afraid to tell you that even with that seeming reprieve, nothing much will move immediately,” said an oilman who imports oil products and runs several petrol stations in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda. “These are the reasons: VAT is charged at the point of sale and is calculated as 16 per cent on all other costs of the product, over and above the other taxes and levies other than VAT. No importer will agree to sell at a loss simply because politics have been at play. So, even if the Finance Bill 2018 becomes law, with the President’s incorporation of the eight per cent VAT proposal, oil importers will not agree to lower their prices. We must first empty all the fuel bought within the time the VAT on fuel was imposed till we bring in new consignments. And this will take some time. If the people are thinking they are going to enjoy the VAT reprieve immediately, they are deluded.”

The oil tycoon told me that such a situation presents a perfect scenario for the industry to play market games. “If, for example, some oil importers, for whatever reason (most obviously, it would be for a quick super profit), choose to create an artificial oil shortage by hoarding their product, the price must necessarily shoot upwards, momentarily disrupting the official levy on fuel products.”

Apart from the matatu price jolts, the effects of the VAT on fuel has been heavily felt by the long-distance transport trucks that move all manner of goods from source to different markets. Businessmen who transport goats and sheep from Isiolo, Laisamis, Loiyangalani, Mandera, Maralal, Marsabit, Moyale, Turbi, Sololo and southern Ethiopia to Kiamaiko abattoirs in Huruma, Nairobi, told me that their fuel costs had gone by up by between Sh10,000 and Sh12,000 per trip. These animals are carried for up to 14 hours by 10-wheel Mitsubishi Fuso trucks on some of the roughest roads and in the most bandit-prone territories. “Already the wear and tear of the trucks has been staring down at us, but with this new tax on fuel, it has complicated our business,” said one of the transporters.

“The increase in the fuel costs means that they have to also pass down the burden to us butcher-men,” said Francis Kimani, a butcher, who goes to Kiamaiko every day to buy meat products, including goats’ heads, offal for making mutura (sausage-like delicacies) and hoofs for boiling soup. Until recently. Kimani was buying up to 100 goat heads every day at Kiamaiko to sell to his staunchly loyal customers at his outlet at the central bus station in Nairobi. “I arrive at Kiamaiko by 6.00am, pick my stuff and quickly head back to my base, because my customers want to find me ready by latest 11.00am.”

Kimani hires a boda-boda (motorcycle taxi) to transport his meat products in a box-like container. “I was paying the driver Sh250 per trip to the bus station, but after the VAT increase, he doubled the amount,” he said. But that is not the only burden he has to bear: already the prices of his meat products have gone up by more than 30 per cent. “I’ll confess I was doing a roaring business until this VAT thing came. My customers have dwindled, partly because I am buying less goat heads and partly because they are also feeling the pinch.” From selling 100 heads by the end of the day, Kimani is now barely selling 30. He said that if nothing improves, he will consider relocating to either Isiolo or Rumuruti in Laikipia County. The business was proving too difficult to sustain. “I was born in Rumuruti, I know there isn’t much there, but home is home.” “Nairobi tuokire gwetha ido na muturiri.” (“Nairobi’s not home, we just came here to look for money and a living.”) He said that in Isiolo he could look for work as a truck driver.

The VAT on petroleum products was first mooted in 2013, just after President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, formed the Jubilee coalition government. The VAT Act 2013, as it came to be known, was not implemented immediately; it was shelved for three years till 2016. When it came for review in September 2016, Treasury mandarins, through the drafting of the Financial Act 2016, postponed its introduction. But in March 2018, the Treasury Principal Secretary, Kamau Thugge, finally signalled the fact that beginning this September, the 16 per cent VAT on fuel would certainly be effected. This would mean that for every litre of fuel sold at a petrol station, Sh18 would be added on top of the original cost: a 14 per cent increase per litre.

Thugge was candid: The government had no option but to swallow the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s bitter pill. Since 2016, the IMF has wanted the government to levy VAT on fuel as a way for it to collect extra revenue domestically. However, it is important to note that although petroleum products were previously exempt from VAT, they are still one of the most taxed commodities in Kenya.

This time last year, the Jubilee government was reeling from two shambolic elections – both conducted within two-and-half-months. The government was broke and was looking for credit facilities, so it turned to the IMF. The VAT on fuel, therefore, is part of the stringent conditions that the IMF has imposed on the Jubilee government in exchange for access to a standby credit facility – a fallback plan for Kenya’s Exchequer in case the economy finds itself in the ICU and needs quick resuscitation.

“Playing good politics,” and presumably exhibiting “poor leadership”, President Uhuru seemingly chastised MPs for initially rejecting his proposal halve the VAT on fuel to 8 per cent. The truth of the matter is that the President himself, in regard to the “problematic” taxation issues, is neither playing good politics nor exhibiting wise leadership.

This time last year, the Jubilee government was reeling from two shambolic elections – both conducted within two-and-half-months. The government was broke and was looking for credit facilities, so it turned to the IMF. The VAT on fuel, therefore, is part of the stringent conditions that the IMF has imposed on the Jubilee government in exchange for access to a standby credit facility – a fallback plan for the Kenya’s Exchequer in case the economy finds itself in the ICU and needs quick resuscitation.

“The Bill according to the Budget highlights by the Cabinet Secretary for the National Treasury and Planning is intended is to raise an additional KSh27.5billion to finance 2018/19 fiscal budget year,” observes the Department Committee on Finance and National Planning: Report on the Consideration of the Finance Bill 2018. The report says, “total projected expenditure and net lending for 2018/19 estimates amounted to KSh2.533 trillion to be financed through ordinary revenue (KSh1.743 trillion) and AIA (Annual-in-Advance) (KSh179.95 billion). Expected external grants will amount to KSh47.037 billion, bringing the revenue to KSh1.970 trillion. This leaves a fiscal deficit of KSh562.748 billion to be financed through debt. The proportion of revenue estimates to GDP for 2018/19 is 19.6 percent which is equivalent to that of the 2017/18 budget.”

The Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM), one of the lobby groups that presented its resolutions to the committee, argues in the report that, “(the) local manufacturer was losing competition vs major foreign player. The local industries are manufacturing basic products with low gross margin compared to most foreign players, who can support the duty costs. Local players had to increase their prices around (five percent) and it’s the final consumer that will pay for the final bill. This, in turn, was jeopardising local employment.”

A Kenyan industrialist who had intended to contract some local companies to manufacture carton boxes for packaging consumer goods, such as milk, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), told me he took his business to Uganda after he was hit with a prohibitive tax levy. “The Kenyan companies were charging me $0.7 per carton box – that is exclusive of transport logistics and documentation charges,” said the entrepreneur. “Yet in Kampala, I was being charged $0.42 – inclusive of transport and documentation costs, what they refer to as free on board (FOB).”

On September 18, 2018, President Uhuru Kenyatta rejected the Bill passed by MPs a fortnight before, citing his reasons in a memorandum that sought to overturn some of the proposals shot down by the MPs – chief among them, the 16 per cent VAT on petroleum products and the National Housing Fund, a new tax where the government hopes to impose a tax of 1.5 per cent of income on employees and their employers, ostensibly to fund a home ownership and social housing programme. According to the memorandum, the 16 per cent VAT on fuel has been scaled down to 8 percent in order to raise Sh17.5 billion in the current financial year.

A Kenyan industrialist who had intended to contract some local companies to manufacture carton boxes for packaging consumer goods, such as milk, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), told me he took his business to Uganda after he was hit with a prohibitive tax levy.

Another proposal contained in the President’s memorandum was to tax betting companies 15 per cent, down from 35 per cent as the case is now. This proposal, instead, hopes to raid the lottery winners’ cash by taxing it 20 per cent. The President is looking to raise between Sh25 and Sh30 billion accrued from the sports gaming taxes. The total computation of President Uhuru’s memorandum proposal was collecting Sh100 billion in this financial year.

Gitau Githongo, writing in the E Review, succinctly observed that “over the past five years, several tax measures have been introduced, including: 12 per cent Rental Income Tax on landlords from 2015, successive excise duty and fuel levy increases in 2015, 2016 and 2018; VAT on bottled water and juices, VAT on food served by restaurants, as well as, piped water; successive increases in excise duties on spirits, cigarettes and mobile telephony; and 50 per cent Gaming Tax on lotteries and bookmakers in 2017, among a host of others.”

Gitau’s article touched on the real reasons why President Kenyatta returned Kenya into the arms of hard-nosed IMF economists: “The parlous state of Kenya’s national accounts – most notably the KSh 5 trillion stock of public debt and ballooning budget deficit…suggests that the slew of tax measures proposed in Budget 2018 was purely about desperately seeking to finance reckless government spending and not about providing incentives for private sector economic growth.”

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Mr Kahura is a senior writer for The Elephant.

Politics

Congo-Brazzaville Strongman Buys Secret Weapons Haul from Azerbaijan

Congo-Brazzaville’s repressive government has quietly bought an arsenal from Azerbaijan. Opponents of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso say one recent cache is designed to tighten his grip on the nation.

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Congo-Brazzaville Strongman Buys Secret Weapons Haul from Azerbaijan
Photo: Marco Longari/AFP
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First published by our partner OCCRP and Mail & Guardian (South Africa, in English).

In January 2020, at the Turkish port of Derince on the eastern shores of the Sea of Marmara, a huge cache of weapons was loaded onto the MV Storm. Registered in the tax haven of Vanuatu, the ship set sail with an arsenal of mortar shells, multiple launch rockets, and explosives, en route from Azerbaijan to the Republic of the Congo, better known as Congo-Brazzaville.

In total, more than 100 tons of weaponry wound its way to a building that appears to be the headquarters of Congo-Brazzaville’s elite Republican Guard, according to a confidential cargo manifest obtained by OCCRP. The cargo, estimated to be worth tens of millions of dollars, was just the latest in a series of at least 17 arms shipments sent by Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense to the regime of President Denis Sassou-Nguesso since 2015, according to flight plans, cargo manifests, and weapons inventories obtained by OCCRP.

Saudi Arabia was listed as the “sponsoring party” on several of the cargo manifests reviewed by reporters. It’s unclear what that sponsorship entailed, but it could mean that Riyadh paid for the weapons or the cargo deliveries.

Credit: Edin Pasovic/OCCRP Key sites for arms deals between the Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan.

Key sites for arms deals between the Republic of the Congo and Azerbaijan. Credit: Edin Pasovic/OCCRP

There are no public records of Azerbaijan exporting these weapons, and no similar records of Congo-Brazzaville importing them. The latest transfer has sparked opposition concerns that Sassou-Nguesso is prepared to use force if necessary to maintain power as the country’s March 21 election nears.

His well-armed security services are a key reason he has ruled the Central African country for 36 years, split between two separate terms, making him one of the world’s longest-serving leaders. His party looms large over parliament, which recently changed the constitution to allow Sassou-Nguesso to run for office again, sparking local and international condemnation. The move means the 77-year-old could, in theory, run in every election for the rest of his life.

OCCRP has obtained confidential documents showing that in the eight months preceding the March 2016 election, and for over a year after it, Sassou-Nguesso’s security services bought more than 500 tons of arms from Azerbaijan in 16 separate shipments. Just weeks after the vote, the government began a brutal campaign against a militia from an opposition stronghold that lasted for more than a year.

President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is seen in 2014. Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Amanda Lucidon/White House

President Denis Sassou-Nguesso is seen in 2014. Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Amanda Lucidon/White House

Opposition leaders claim the Republican Guard used the Azerbaijani weapons in that post-election conflict, spurring a humanitarian emergency which the United Nations said affected around 140,000 people in the region of Pool, in the country’s south. Satellite imagery obtained by international media outlet The New Humanitarian appears to show widespread destruction caused by weapons like rocket launchers and explosives. (There is no way to be certain that these weapons were from Azerbaijan, since Congo-Brazzaville does not declare its arms imports.)

Since 2015, Congo-Brazzaville has bought a huge weapons stockpile from Azerbaijan, with over 500 tons of weapons delivered to the country in multiple shipments.

Sassou-Nguesso’s regime is facing one of Africa’s most severe debt crises, raising questions about how these arms shipments have been financed. Documents show that at least two consignments delivered between 2016 and 2017 were sponsored by Saudi Arabia, at a time when Riyadh was vetting Congo-Brazzaville’s application to join the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Given Congo-Brazzaville’s significant oil reserves, the kingdom had an incentive to have a compliant Sassou-Nguesso government in the Saudi-dominated club, according to leading arms expert Andrew Feinstein, author of The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade.

The world’s biggest arms importer, Saudi Arabia is also an unremorseful supplier of weapons to global conflict zones including Yemen, where it is fighting Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

Flight manifests list Saudi Arabia as a “sponsoring party” on multiple arms shipments to Congo-Brazzaville, dispatched in 2016 and 2017, as Congo-Brazzaville was on the verge of OPEC membership.

Described by critics as an oil cartel whose members must be compliant with Saudi output demands, OPEC helps the kingdom dominate global oil supply. The effect this has on oil prices, in turn, can boost petroleum revenues in member states.

OPEC’s 13 members include Africa’s biggest producers, Nigeria, Angola, and Algeria. Congo-Brazzaville, which eventually joined OPEC in 2018, would have been seen as a coveted member because it is one of the continent’s top oil producers, which gives OPEC even more heft.

Azerbaijan is not a full OPEC member but it is a significant oil producer.

Feinstein added that the latest Azerbaijan shipment could have been intended to give Sassou-Nguesso the arms to enforce his political will.

“The timing of this shipment is extremely suspicious, given Sassou-Nguesso’s previous crackdowns around elections,” he said. “The government is likely preparing to quash any dissent around the polls.”

A spokesman for Congo-Brazzaville’s government did not respond to multiple requests for comment. Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defence did not respond to a reporter’s email seeking comment, and neither did a ministry representative listed on multiple documents. Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Defense did not respond to questions about the nature of their sponsorship of the arms deals.

Boulevard Denis Sassou-Nguesso

The most recent weapons load, addressed to the Republican Guard at 1 Boulevard Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Brazzaville in January 2020, included 775 mortar shells and over 400 cases of rockets designed to be launched out of Soviet-era trucks, the confidential cargo manifest shows. The consignment from Azerbaijan was loaded onto the MV Storm at Derince, about 1,000 kilometers southeast of Istanbul.

The exact price paid by the Congolese regime for the arms shipment could not be verified, although an expert who examined the cargo manifests said it would be worth tens of millions of dollars. A former senior diplomat with access to information about arms inventories, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisal from authorities, confirmed the authenticity of the cargo manifest and other documents and noted the sale price for the arms was likely well below market value.

The port of Derince in Turkey, where the most recent arms shipment set off for Brazzaville. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The port of Derince in Turkey, where the most recent arms shipment set off for Brazzaville. Credit: Wikimedia Commons

The documents included end-user certificates, which are issued by the country importing the arms to certify the recipient does not plan to sell them onward.

In January 2020, more than 100 tons of weaponry was sent from Azerbaijan to Congo-Brazzaville’s Republican Guard, including 775 mortar shells and over 400 cases of rockets designed to be launched out of trucks.

Pieter Wezeman, a senior researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, said arms received at a discount are often either surplus weapons or those produced in Bulgaria or Serbia, which are both known for their cheap ordnance.

“It would be less likely that Congo-Brazzaville would be able to buy some of this equipment from … other European countries which have more restrictive arms export policies,” he said.

The Pool Offensive

The 100-ton shipment from Derince was significant, but separate documents reveal another arsenal sent from Azerbaijan between 2015 and 2017 that dwarfed it — and may have had terrifying consequences.

In total, over 500 tons of weapons, including hand grenades, mortar systems, and millions of bullets, were sent to Congo-Brazzaville in 16 shipments during those years, according to documents including inventories, end-user certificates, and cargo manifests obtained by reporters.

One end-user certificate shows five thousand grenades imported for the purposes of “training, anti-terrorism, security and stability operations.” It was signed by a special adviser to President Sassou-Nguesso on March 3, 2016, just days before the election.

After the vote, the opposition claimed the government had rigged the election in favor of Sassou-Nguesso, and unrest broke out in the capital, Brazzaville. The government blamed the unrest on a militia known as the Ninjas, made up of people mainly from the Lari ethnic group and based in the Pool region, which partially surrounds Brazzaville.

A burnt-out vehicle is seen on the road from Brazzaville to Kinkala. Credit: Philip Kleinfeld/IRIN, via The New Humanitarian

A burnt-out vehicle is seen on the road from Brazzaville to Kinkala. Credit: Philip Kleinfeld/IRIN, via The New Humanitarian

 

The weapons from Azerbaijan were then used, an opposition leader claims, to help fuel a prolonged armed conflict in Pool targeting the Ninjas. Amnesty International condemned the offensive as “an unlawful use of lethal force by the country’s security forces.” As the government pursued the Ninjas, witnesses to the carnage told Amnesty that dozens of bombs were dropped from helicopters, hitting a residential area and even a school.

“During the violence in Pool, the regime deployed a scorched earth strategy,” said Andréa Ngombet Malewa, leader of the Incarner l’Espoir political party. “The weapons that they bought from Azerbaijan went straight to that operation.”

The Baku-Brazzaville Connection

Azerbaijan has emerged as a key foreign ally of Congo-Brazzaville, providing its regime with discount arms and, perhaps more importantly, secrecy.

Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev, right, is seen with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a 2018 parade in Baku. Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Government of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan’s Ilham Aliyev, right, is seen with Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a 2018 parade in Baku. Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Government of Azerbaijan

Buying from Ilham Aliyev, strongman of the notoriously opaque South Caucasus nation, Congo-Brazzaville could do so in the knowledge that the sales wouldn’t be reported.

Congo-Brazzaville has not reported any arms imports for more than three decades, and since there’s no arms embargo in place against the country, it isn’t required to do so. Nonetheless, a trail exists, with disclosures by other countries showing Sassou-Nguesso has been active in the arms market. In 2017, Serbia reported exporting 600 assault rifles to Congo-Brazzaville. Bulgaria sent 250 grenade launchers.

Opposition figures claim that previous shipments of weapons from Azerbaijan were used to fuel a brutal post-election offensive in 2016 that led to a humanitarian crisis.

But the Azeri weapons shipments have never been publicly reported, even though documentation seen by OCCRP shows Azerbaijan has been exporting lethal weapons to Sassou-Nguesso since at least as far back as September 2015. Some of the weapons were sourced from Transmobile, a Bulgarian company authorized to trade weapons for Azerbaijan, while others were bought from Yugoimport, a Serbian manufacturer. Neither company responded to requests for comment.

The first shipments of arms arrived in Brazzaville on Azerbaijani Air Force planes, but starting in 2017 a private carrier, Silk Way Airlines, began flying the weapons in instead. As a private carrier, Silk Way would have likely received less scrutiny than its military counterpart.

A Silk Way Airlines Boeing-737 leaves Hong Kong in 1999. Credit: Wilco

A Silk Way Airlines Boeing-737 leaves Hong Kong in 1999. Credit: Wilco

Silk Way is registered in the British Virgin Islands, a tax haven, and was previously linked to the Aliyev family. As well as previously winning lucrative contracts with the U.S. government to move ammunition and other non-lethal materials, Silk Way was found, in leaked correspondence reported by Bulgarian newspaper Trud, to have used flights with diplomatic clearance to secretly move hundreds of tons of weapons around the world, including to global conflict zones, between 2014 and 2017. The airline did not respond to a request for comment.

Braced for a Crackdown

As his regime heads to the polls on March 21, strongarm tactics mean Sassou-Nguesso is expected to win. He will reportedly face Mathias Dzon, his former finance minister from 1997 to 2002, and Guy-Brice Parfait Kolélas, who finished second in the 2016 presidential election, among others.

Saudi Arabia was listed as a “sponsoring party” in at least two arms consignments sent in 2016 and 2017, around the same time Congo-Brazzaville’s admittance to OPEC was being negotiated.

In 2016 he claimed 60 percent of the vote, with Kolélas securing just 15 percent. The U.S. slammed the government for “widespread irregularities and the arrests of opposition supporters.”

Then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry greets Denis Sassou Nguesso at a U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, D.C., on August 6, 2014. Credit: U.S. Department of State/Flickr

Then-U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry greets Denis Sassou Nguesso at a U.S.-Africa Summit in Washington, D.C., on August 6, 2014. Credit: U.S. Department of State/Flickr

Experts don’t believe the opposition will fare any better this time around. Abdoulaye Diarra, a Central Africa Researcher for Amnesty International, said the government is carrying out a pre-election campaign of intimidation, harassment and arbitrary detention against its political opponents.

Fears that press freedom could be under threat ahead of the polls have risen after Raymond Malonga, a cartoonist known for satirical criticism of the authorities, was dragged from his hospital bed by plainclothes police at the beginning of February.

And now, the weapons haul from Azerbaijan has the opposition concerned about the prospect of violence around the polls.

“We are worried that the weapons that Sassou-Nguesso’s regime bought from Azerbaijan could be used to crack down on the opposition during the upcoming election,” said opposition leader Ngombet.

“They don’t want the world to see how much the Congolese people are eager for political change.”

Simon Allison, Sasha Wales-Smith, and Juliet Atellah contributed reporting.

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Politics

A Class That Dare Not Speak Its Name: BBI and the Tyranny of the New Kenyan Middle Class

Even as they exert coercive power in Kenya, members of this class remain largely unrecognised as a class with its own economic interests and one that holds contemptuous and racist views of Africans despite being made up of Africans.

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A Class That Dare Not Speak Its Name: BBI and the Tyranny of the New Kenyan Middle Class
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Despite many Kenyans’ opposition to the Building Bridges Initiative there is a sense that politicians are moving with the project full steam ahead and there is nothing the people can do about it. More perplexing is the fact that with elections just over a year away, the fear of what supporting BBI could do to their political careers does not seem to faze the politicians. What explains this powerful force against democracy?

I argue here that the aspect of the BBI — and its charade of public participation — that most passes under silence is the role of the civil service and the intelligentsia. Behind the spectacle of car grants to members of the County Assemblies is an elite that is growing in influence and power, and is pulling the puppet strings of the political class. The bribery of MCAs would have been impossible without the civil service remitting public funds into their accounts. The president would not succeed in intimidating politicians if there were no civil servants — in the form of the police and prosecutors — to arrest politicians and charge them with corruption.

The academy’s contribution to the BBI has been in controlling the social discourse. The mere fact that it was written by PhD holders brought to the BBI an aura of technical expertise with its implied neutrality. Using this aspect of BBI, the media and academics tried to tone down the political agenda of the document. They demanded that discussion of the BBI remain within the parameters of academic discourse, bombarding opponents with demands of proof that they had read the document and exact quotations, refusing to accept arguments that went beyond the text to the politics and actors surrounding the initiative. Discussing the politics of BBI was dismissed as “irrelevant”.

Two cases, both pitting male academics against women citizens, illustrate this tyranny of technocracy and academics. In both cases, the professors implicitly appealed to sexist stereotypes by suggesting that the women were irrational or uninformed. In one debate in February last year, political science professor and vice-chair of the BBI task force, Adams Oloo, singled out Jerotich Seii as one of the many Kenyans who had “fallen into a trap” of restricting her reading of the document to only the two pages discussing the proposed prime minister’s post, while leaving out all the goodies promised in the rest of the document. Jerotich was compelled to reply, “I have actually read the entire document, 156 pages.”

Likewise, earlier this month, Ben Sihanya sat at a desk strewn with paper (to suggest an erudite demeanour) and spoke in condescending tones about Linda Katiba, which was being represented by Daisy Amdany. He harangued Linda Katiba as “cry babies”, demanded discussions based on constitutional sociology and political economy, and declared that no research and no citation of authorities meant “no right to speak”. He flaunted his credentials as a constitutional lawyer with twenty years’ teaching experience and often made gestures like turning pages, writing or flipping through papers as Amdany spoke.

The conversation deteriorated at different moments when the professor accused Linda Katiba of presenting “rumors, rhetoric and propaganda”. When Amdany protested, Sihanya called for the submission of citations rather than “marketplace altercations”. The professor referred to the marketplace more than once, which was quite insensitive, given that the market is the quintessential African democratic space. That’s where ordinary Africans meet, trade and discuss. And women are often active citizens and traders at the market.

Meanwhile, anchor Waihiga Mwaura did too little too late to reign in the professor’s tantrums, having already taken the position that the media is promoting, which is that every opposition to BBI is a “No” campaign, essentially removing the opposition from the picture on the principle of a referendum taking precedence.

Both cases reveal a condescending and elitist attitude towards ordinary Kenyans expressing opinions that run counter to the status quo. The media and academy have joined forces in squeezing out ordinary voices from the public sphere through demands for academic-style discussions of BBI. When discussions of BBI first began in 2020, these two institutions bullied opponents of the process by imposing conditions for speaking. For instance, in the days before the document was released, opponents were told that it was premature to speak without the document in hand. In the days following the release of the document, demands were made of Kenyans to read the document, followed by comments that Kenyans generally do not read. The contradiction literally sounded like the media did not want Kenyans to read the BBI proposals. Now it has become typical practice for anchors and the supporters of BBI to challenge BBI opponents with obnoxious questions such as “You have talked of the problems with BBI, but what are its positive aspects?” essentially denying the political nature of BBI, and reducing the process to the cliché classroom discussion along the lines of “advantages and disadvantages of …”

Basically, what we are witnessing is autocracy by the media, the academy and the bureaucracy, where media and the academy exert symbolic power by denying alternative voices access to public speech, while the civil service intervenes in the material lives of politicians and ordinary people to coerce or bribe them into supporting BBI. Other forms of material coercion that have been reported include chiefs forcing people to give their signatures in support of the BBI.

In both these domains of speech and interactions in daily life, it is those with institutional power who are employing micro-aggression to coerce Kenyans to support BBI. This “low quality oppression”, which contrasts with the use of overt force, leaves Kenyans feeling helpless because, as Christine Mungai and Dan Aceda observe, low-quality oppression “clouds your mind and robs you of language, precision and analytical power. And it keeps you busy dealing with it so that you cannot even properly engage with more systemic problems.” In the end, despite the fact that there is no gun held to their heads, Kenyans face BBI with literally no voice.

But beyond the silencing of Kenyans, this convergence of the media, the academy and the civil service suggests that there is a class of Kenyans who are not only interested in BBI, but are also driven by a belief in white supremacy and an anti-democratic spirit against the people. I want to suggest that this group is symptomatic of “a new middle class”, or what Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich have referred to as the “professional managerial class”, which is emerging in Kenya.

For the purposes of this article, I would define this class as one composed of people whose managerial positions within institutions give them low-grade coercive power to impose the will of the hegemony on citizens. The ideology of this class sees its members as having risen to their positions through merit (even when they are appointed through familial connections), and holds that the best way to address problems is through efficient adherence to law and technology, which are necessarily neutral and apolitical. This class also believes that its actions are necessary because citizens do not know better, and that by virtue of their appointment or their training, the members of this class have the right to direct the behaviour of ordinary citizens. Basically, this class is anti-political.

The worst part about this class is that it is a group of people who cannot recognise themselves as such. As Amber A’Lee Frost puts it, it is “a class that dare not speak its name.” This means that even as they exert coercive power in Kenya, members of this class remain largely unrecognised or discussed as a class with its own economic interests.

Even worse, this is a class that holds contemptuous – and ultimately racist – views of Africans despite being made up of Africans. For example, Mohammed Hersi, chair of the Kenya Tourism Federation, has been at the forefront of proposing the obnoxious idea that Kenya should export her labour abroad, the history of the Middle Passage notwithstanding. Despite a history of resistance to the idea that Africans should not receive any education beyond technical training, from the days of WEB Dubois to those of Harry Thuku, the Ministry of Education has introduced the Competency Based Curriculum (CBC), a new education system affirming that ideology. A few months ago, Fred Matiang’i waxed lyrical about the importance of prisons with these words which I must repeat here:

“To Mandela, prison was a school; to Malcolm X, a place of meditation; and to Kenya’s founding fathers, a place where visions of this country were crystallised. We’re reforming our prisons to be places people re-engineer their future regardless of the circumstances they come in.”

How is it possible for educated Africans to talk in public like this?

One factor is historical legacy. The civil service and institutions such as the mainstream media houses were established during colonial rule and were later Africanised with no change in institutional logic. This factor is very disturbing given that the media and the civil service in Kenya opposed nationalist struggles. During colonialism, it was the civil service, its African employees in the tribal police and the local administrations (such as chiefs and home guards), who crushed African revolt against oppression. This means that the Africans who were in the civil service were necessarily pro-colonial reactionaries with no interest in the people’s freedom.

Essentially, Kenyan independence started with a state staffed with people with no economic or political allegiance to the freedom and autonomy of Africans in Kenya. The better-known evidence of this dynamic is the independence government’s suppression of nationalist memories through, for instance, the assassination of General Baimungi Marete in 1965. What remains unspoken is the fact that the colonial institutions and ideologies remained intact after independence. Indeed, certain laws still refer to Kenya as a colony to this day.

It is also important to note that colonial era civil servants were not even European settlers, but British nationals sent in from London. This meant that the primary goal of the civil service was to protect not the settlers’ interests both those of London. Upon the handover of the state to Africans, therefore, this focus on London’s interests remained paramount, and remains so to this day,  as we can see from the involvement of the British government in education reforms, from TPAD (Teacher Performance Appraisal and Development) to the curriculum itself. This dynamic is most overt in the tourism and conservation sector, where tourism is marketed by the government using openly racist and colonial tropes, including promises to tourists that in Kenya, “the colonial legacy lives on”.

There was also a practical aspect to the dominance of these kinds of Africans in the civil service. As Gideon Mutiso tells us in his book Kenya: Politics, Policy and Society, the Africans who were appointed to the civil service had more education than the politicians, because as other Africans were engaged in the nationalist struggles, these people advanced in their studies. Upon independence, Mutiso says, the educated Kenyans began to lord it over politicians as being less educated than they were.

Mutiso’s analysis also points us to the fact that colonial control remained in Kenya through the management of the state by people whose credentials and appointments were based on western education. The insidious role of western education became that of hiding the ideology of white supremacy behind the mask of “qualifications”. As such, Africans who had a western education considered themselves superior to fellow Africans, and worse, British nationals remained civil servants in major positions even a decade into independence, under the pretext that they were technically more qualified.

Less known, and even less talked about, is the virulent anti-African dispensation in the post-independence government. The new government not only had within its ranks Africans who had fought against African self-determination during colonial rule, but also British nationals who remained in charge of key sectors after independence, among them the first minister of Agriculture Bruce McKenzie. Similarly, the only university in Kenya was staffed mainly by foreigners, a situation which students complained about during a protest in 1972.

The continuity of colonial control meant that civil servants were committed to limiting the space for democratic participation. Veteran politicians like Martin Shikuku and Jean-Marie Seroney complained that the civil service was muzzling the voice of the people which was, ideally, supposed to have an impact through their elected representatives. In 1971, for instance, Shikuku complained that the government was no longer a political organ, because “Administrative officers from PCs have assumed the role of party officials [and] civil servants have interfered so much with the party work.” Shikuku Inevitably arrived at the conclusion that “the foremost enemies of the wananchi are the country’s senior civil servants.” For his part, Seroney lamented that parliament had become toothless, because “the government has silently taken the powers of the National Assembly and given them to the civil service,” reducing parliament to “a mere rubber stamp of some unseen authority.” Both men where eventually detained without trial by Jomo Kenyatta.

However, the scenario was no different in the education sector. As Mwenda Kithinji notes, major decisions in education were made by bureaucrats rather than by academics. It was for this reason, for example, that Dr Josephat Karanja was recalled from his post as the High Commissioner to the United Kingdom to succeed Prof.  Arthur Porter as the first principal of the University of Nairobi, going over the head of Prof. Porter’s deputy, Prof. Bethwell Ogot, who was the most seasoned academic in Kenya with a more visionary idea of education.

Unfortunately, because the appointment went to a fellow Kikuyu, reactions were directed at Dr Karanja’s ethnicity, rather than his social status as a bureaucrat. Ethnicity was a convenient card with which to downplay the reality that decisions about education were being removed from the hands of academics and experts and placed in the hands of bureaucrats.

And so began the long road towards an increasingly stifling, extremely controlled administrative education system whose struggles we witness today in the CBC. As Kithinji observes, government bureaucrats regularly interfered in the academic and management affairs of the university, to the point of demanding that the introduction of new programmes receive approval from the Ministry of Education. Other measures for coercing academics to do the bidding of civil servants included imposing bonding policies and reducing budgetary allocations.

In the neoliberal era, however, this ideology of bureaucracy expanded and coopted professionals through managerial and administrative appointments. For instance, the practice of controlling academic life was now extended to academics themselves. Academics appointed as university managers began to behave like CEOs, complete with public relations officers, personal assistants and bodyguards. The role of regulating academic life in Kenya has now been turned over to the Commission for University Education whose headquarters are in the plush residential suburb of Gigiri. CUE regularly contracts its inspection work to academics who then exercise power over curriculum and accreditation under the banner of the commission.

With neoliberalism, therefore, bureaucrats and technocrats enjoy an increase in coercive power, hiding behind the anonymity provided by technology, the audit culture and its reliance on numbers, and concepts such as “quality” to justify their power as neutral, necessary and legitimate. However, the one space they now need to crack is the political space, and by coincidence, Kenya is cursed with an incompetent and incoherent political class. Life could not get better for this class than with the BBI handshake.

BBI therefore provided an ideal opportunity for an onslaught of the managerial class against the Kenyan people. The document under debate was written by PhD-holders, and initial attempts by professors and bureaucrats to defend the document in townhall debates hosted by the mainstream media backfired spectacularly. These technocrats were not convincing because they adamantly refused to answer the political questions raised around BBI, so they have taken a back seat and sent politicians off to the public to give BBI an air of legitimacy. Behind the scenes, however, support for BBI brings together the bureaucrats and the foot soldiers who are behind Uhuru, and the educated intelligentsia that is behind Raila.

And as if things could not get more stifling, Kenyans are looking favourably at the declared candidacies of Kivutha Kibwana, a former law academic, and Mukhisa Kituyi, a former United Nations bureaucrat, in the next presidential election. The point here is not their winning prospects, but the belief that maybe people with better paper credentials and institutional careers might do better than the rambling politicians. However, this idea is dangerous, because it places inordinate faith in western-educated Africans who have not articulated their political positions about African self-determination in an age when black people worldwide are engaged in decolonisation and the Black Lives Matter movement.

Basically, BBI is camouflaging the attack on politics and democracy in Kenya by a new managerial class. We are paying a heavy price for not decolonising our institutions at independence. Since independence, bureaucrats have whittled away at our cultural and institutional independence through police harassment, underfunding, the tyranny of inspections and regulatory control, and through constriction of the Kenyan public and cultural space. Even the arts and culture are tightly regulated these days, with the Ministry of Education providing themes for schools’ drama festivals and the government censoring artists in the name of morality. Worse, this new managerial class collaborates with foreign interests in a shared contempt for African self-determination.

Kenyans must be wary of academics and bureaucrats who use their credentials, acquired in colonial institutions, to bully Kenyans into silence. We must not allow bureaucrats and technocrats to make decisions that affect our lives without subjecting those decisions to public debate. We must recognise and reproach the media for legitimising the bullying from this new managerial class. And we must continue to recognise the Kenyan government as fundamentally colonial in its logic and practice and pick up the failed promise of the NASA manifesto to replace the master-slave logic of the Kenyan civil service. Most of all, we must learn to demystify education, credentials and institutional positions. Kenya is for everybody, and we all have a right to discuss and participate in what happens in our country.

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For J.M’s Ten Million Beggars, the Hustler vs Dynasty Narrative is a Red Herring

Hon. William Ruto’s hustler vs dynasty narrative is a shrewd way of redefining Kenyan identity politics in order to avoid playing the tribal card in his quest for the presidency.

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For J.M’s Ten Million Beggars, the Hustler vs Dynasty Narrative is a Red Herring
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Stifling the “hustler” vs “dynasty” debate will not save us from the imminent implosion resulting from Kenya’s obscene inequalities. While the debate is a welcome distraction from our frequent divisive tribal politics, leaders in government and society are frightened that it might lead to class wars. Our sustained subtle, yet brazen, war against the poor has made class conflict inevitable. If only we had listened to Hon. J. M. Kariuki, the assassinated former Member of Parliament for Nyandarua (1969-1975), and provided the poor with the means to develop themselves, perhaps the prospect of revolt would now be remote.

Could this be the angry ghost of J.M. Kariuki coming back to haunt us? Listen to his voice still crying from the grave, as did his supporters at a rally in 1974: “We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars. Our people who died in the forests died with a handful of soil in their right hands, believing they had fallen in a noble struggle to regain our land . . . But we are being carried away by selfishness and greed. Unless something is done now, the land question will be answered by bloodshed” (quoted by Prof. Simiyu Wandibba in his book J.M. Kariuki). Fired by this speech, his followers set ablaze 700 acres of wheat on Mzee Jomo Kenyatta’s farm in Rongai and slaughtered cattle with malice. Thus did J.M. invite his death.

What Hon. William Ruto propounds in his hustler vs dynasty debate is a shrewd way of redefining Kenyan identity politics. Ruto is re-directing the political narrative from the “us” vs “them” of tribalism, to one characterised by the poor and desperate (hustlers) who have seen subsequent governments betray their hopes for a better life, pitted against “them”, Ruto’s rivals, the offspring of politicians born to unfair and unearned privilege.

Wycliffe Muga, the Star newspaper columnist, has eloquently described them as the “sons of a hereditary political elite who absorbed all the benefits that came with independence, leaving ‘the rest of us’ destitute and having no choice but to beg for the crumbs under their table.” By opting for an alternative approach, Ruto hopes to avoid playing the tribal card to attain the presidency. For, besides his own, he would need the support of at least one other of the five big tribes who often reserve support for their own sons unless there is a brokered alliance. But even then, the underlying logic of Kenyan politics remains that of identity politics, which creates a binary narrative of “us” against “them”.

Meanwhile, Ruto has not only radicalised the poor, but he has also hastened the country’s hour of reckoning — judgement for the years of neglect of the poor — and this may ignite the tinder sooner we imagine.

In their article in The Elephant, Dauti Kahura and Akoko Akech observe that, “Ruto might have belatedly discovered the great socio-economic divide between the walala-hoi and the walala-hai in Kenya”. Ruto has galvanised the poor and their plight around the banner of the “hustler nation”, a nation aspiring to erase the tribal or geographical lines that have kept Kenyans apart. As a result the poor are restless as they compare their state with the ease of the lives of the affluent. But Ruto is not organising to awaken class-consciousness among the exploited.  ‘As Thandika Mkandawire, citing Karl Marx, observed, “The existence of class may portend class struggles, but it does not automatically trigger them. It is not enough that classes exist in themselves, they must also be for themselves”’, Kahura and Akech further reiterate.

The problem kicks in immediately he points to the “dynasty”. In juxtaposing the hustlers and dynasty, the poor find a target of hate, an object of their wrath. This situation can easily slide into violence, the violence emerging only when the “us” see themselves as all good and the “them” as all evil.

I worry this controversy has led us to that radicalisation stage where the poor see themselves as the good children of light fighting evil forces of darkness. In our case, the so-called hustler nation believe they are against the deep-state which doesn’t care about them but wants to give to the dynasty that which is due to them. They believe that this collusion between deep-state and dynasty is preventing them from reaching prosperity and so they blame their situation on those who they perceive to be the cause of their wretchedness. Interestingly, the colonial state always feared the day when the masses would rise up and topple it. Unfortunately, Ruto is using the crisis of the underclass created by the colonial state and perpetuated by the political class for political expediency and for his own self-advancement.

By declaring himself the saviour of the hustlers from the dynasties, Ruto — who is devoid of any pro-democracy and pro-suffering citizens political credentials — is perceived to be antagonising the Kenyatta family’s political and financial interests. He has with precision stoked the anger of the poor against particular political elites he calls dynasties and the Odingas, the Kenyattas, the Mois and their associates have become the hustler nation’s enemy. So, one understands why President Uhuru Kenyatta considers Ruto’s dynasty vs hustler debate “a divisive and a major threat to the country’s security”, which he fears may degenerate into class warfare.

Hon. Paul Koinange, Chairman of the Parliamentary Administration and Security Committee errs in his call to criminalise the hustler vs dynasty narrative. If this is hate speech, as Koinange wants it classified, then neglect of the poor by their government is a worse form of hate speech. The application of policies favouring tender-preneurs at the expense of the majority poor, landless and unemployed will incite Kenyans against each other faster than the hustler vs dynasty narrative. The failure to provide public services for the poor and the spiralling wealth of the political class must be confronted.

We have been speeding down this slippery slope for years. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) data released in December 2020, only 2.92 million Kenyans work in the formal sector, of which 1.34 million or 45.9 per cent earn less than Sh30,000. If we accept that the informal sector employs another 15 million Kenyans, an overwhelming majority (71 per cent) would be in micro-scale enterprises or in small-scale enterprises (which make up 26 per cent). This implies that 97 per cent of our enterprises are micro or small, and these are easily wound up. The situation is exasperated by the opulence at the top. The UK-based New World Wealth survey (2014) conducted over 5 years paints a grim picture of wealth distribution in Kenya. Of the country’s 43.1 million people then, 46 per cent lived below the poverty line, surviving on less than Sh172 ($2) a day.

The report shows that nearly two-thirds of Kenya’s Sh4.3 trillion ($50 billion) economy is controlled by a tiny clique of 8,300 super-wealthy individuals, highlighting the huge inequality between the rich and the poor. Without a clear understanding of these disparities, it is difficult to evaluate the currents that are conducive to the widening of this gap not to mention those that would bridge it. Hon. Koinange should be addressing these inequalities that the masses are awakening to rather than combatting the hustler narrative. Our government must be intentional in levelling the playing field, or live in perpetual fear like the British colonials who feared mass revolt across imaginary ethnic lines.

In Kenya, past injustices have yielded gross inequalities. In Reading on inequality in Kenya: Sectoral Dynamics and Perceptions, Okello and Gitau illustrate how state power is still being used to perpetuate differences in the sharing of political and economic welfare. Okello further observes that: “In a country where for a long time economic and political power was/has been heavily partisan, where the state appropriated for itself the role of being the agency for development, and where politics is highly ethnicised, the hypothesis of unequal treatment has been so easy to build.”

This, and not the euphoria of the hustler nation, is the pressure cooker that is about to explode. The horizontal manifestation of inequality stemming from the failure of state institutions and policies that have continued to allow inequalities to fester is what should be of concern to the state. How can the government not see the risk such extreme economic disparities within the population pose for the nation’s stability?

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