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SEE NO EVIL: Uganda’s ‘development partners’ look the other way in the face of brutal repression

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Despite the reality of worsening oppression and impoverishment, Uganda’s donors continue to project an image of ethical support for President Yoweri Museveni’s government. By MARY SERUMAGA

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SEE NO EVIL: Uganda’s ‘development partners’ look the other way in the face of brutal repression
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A British MP once referred to Kabaka Mwanga as a “blood-stained ruffian”. (Hansard, Uganda, 20 March 1893). This view was echoed in the New York Times. It is interesting to contrast the perception and treatment of Mwanga, who resisted the colonisation of his nation, with the international tolerance of Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda, Brigadier Don Nabasa, head of the Special Forces Command (SFC), and Major General David Muhoozi, the Chief of Defence Forces responsible for so much of the terror and bloodshed witnessed in Uganda today.

Tear gas season in Uganda is a good time to observe the behaviour of her “development partners” (DPs), formerly known as donors, particularly the United Kingdom, the European Union, the United States and China. As is often the case, the 2018 tear gas season kicked off with elections. In the past, electoral violence by the State has included arrests of opposition politicians and their supporters, demonstrations rapidly followed by heavy military presence in the streets and the inevitable flogging and shooting of Ugandan citizens. The elections of 2001, 2006, 2011 and 2016 have all followed a similar pattern as have by-elections in between. It has been a way of life since, under pressure from the DPs, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) allowed the first multiparty elections in 2006.

Elections are part of the window-dressing that legitimates foreign support for despotic kleptocrats. As part of a wider legitimation programme, which includes pushing for a Freedom of Information Act and an Inspector General of Government (the Ombudsman), elections provide the appearance of a sovereign State as advanced in the ways of human rights as is to be expected after “years of civil strife” and “ravaged by AIDS”. Elections, therefore, are crucial to the status of the foreign debt. If loans can be found to have been used to oppress Ugandans, they can be legally repudiated under the doctrine of odious debt. The doctrine has been applied successfully in debt repudiation.

“The State is not liable for ‘odious’ debts incurred and utilised, with the knowledge of the creditors, for ends which are contrary to the nation’s interests, should that State succeed in ridding itself of the government that had incurred them. […] The creditors have committed a hostile act with regard to the people; they cannot therefore expect a nation freed from a despotic power to take on the ‘odious’ debts, which are personal debts of that power.” (Nahum Sack)[i].

The UK’s international development agency, DfID, which is Uganda’s largest donor, invested £8,000,000 over four years (2012-2016) in the Democratic Governance Facility (DGF). Current donors to the DGF are; Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway Sweden, and the European Union who invest a combined €85 million for January 2018 – December 2022 aiming, in their words “to address the continuing democratic deficits, and consolidate peace and stability in the country.

Elections are part of the window-dressing that legitimates foreign support for despotic kleptocrats. As part of a wider legitimation programme, which includes pushing for a Freedom of Information Act and an Inspector General of Government (the Ombudsman), elections provide the appearance of a sovereign State as advanced in the ways of human rights as is to be expected after “years of civil strife” and “ravaged by AIDS”.

Diplomacy at its best, state terror described as ‘a democratic deficit.’

Deepening Democracy Programme Phase II to achieve the following:

  • Political responsiveness and accountability by creating conditions for elected leaders to be more responsive to citizens’ needs and concerns and increasingly more accountable for their performance in office.
  • Democratic culture, space and values which will focus on developing a pluralistic political system.
  • Integrity of democratic processes aims to improve the integrity and credibility of key democratic processes and institutions, particularly elections.”

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID says the following on its website:

“USAID assists the Government of Uganda to build and sustain a democratic, well-governed state [….] USAID aims to strengthen democracy and governance systems and help make them more accountable. USAID’s program also assists in making the voices of marginalized people heard—particularly women and youth—and shapes the role of civil society in governance.”

British, European and American taxpayers will agree that the Arua atrocities of 2018 mean none of the above were achieved nor can they be under Museveni, the NRM and the SFC.

In other words, if anyone were to ask how has Uganda’s government and military have been able to maintain a regime of terror; how it can afford the instruments of oppression and why any foreign government would associate with the state brutality witnessed in Uganda in August 2018, DPs would only need to point to regular elections, the Deepening Democracy programme and other such initiatives and the good development assistance is doing.

When looking at overseas development assistance, or grants, only one fact and three figures need to be remembered: each year $41 billion are extracted from Africa (Mark Curtis, Tim Jones, Honest Accounts 2017 – How the world profits from Africa’s wealth 6 June 2017). $162 billion flow into Africa from overseas and each year $203 billion flow out. Loans (many unsustainable ab initio), illicit transfers, tax waivers, illegal and environmentally damaging activity and other economic benefits obtained from corrupt leaders ensure a permanent deficit.

Scandals involving the theft of public funds from Ugandan, British, American and European taxpayers have been dealt with by brief suspensions of aid. When most recently the American Department of Justice revealed that a Chinese government official had bribed the president and the foreign minister Sam Kutesa (a Museveni brother–in–law) in return for oil concessions, land, tax waivers and other illicit favours, there were no consequences for the pair.

President Museveni, who together with his family was promised joint business ventures with Patrick Ho, and Sam Kutesa remain at large. More than that, after the news broke, the American ambassador to Uganda, Debra Malac, paid a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that ended with the obligatory photo opportunity in which she holds hands with Kutesa.

There is a lot going on. American interests are having to be balanced against the bad optics. It is hard to dismiss as coincidence the Department of Justice’s release of the scandalous information in November followed by Museveni’s abrupt about-turn on GMOs the following January. He declined to sign into law the Biosafety Act, which had finally been passed after a six-year battle between environmental activists and the Bill Gates-founded Alliance for Science, a promoter of GMOs in administratively weak developing countries.

In sending the Act back to Parliament for reconsideration, Museveni relied on arguments that had been made over the preceding six years by those urging caution and which he had previously ignored. One interpretation of his behaviour is that as long as his signature is still needed on the Biodiversity Act (and so many other deals Ugandans do not yet know about), he and his associates will be handled with kid gloves. Checkmate.

Similarly, in cases of human rights abuses, theft of public resources and plain incompetence, DPs continue to give the government leeway as they negotiate their own interests. This is why it took a whole four days for them to utter a single word about the electoral violence that began on 13th August 2018. It would explain why their statement, when it came, did not condemn the murder of Yasin Kawuma, the driver to Robert Kyagulanyi (popularly known as Bobi Wine) and others, the disappearance of the MP himself and the arrest of the other MPs supporting the Arua Municipality MP Kassiano Wadri’s campaign.

Similarly, in cases of human rights abuses, theft of public resources and plain incompetence, DPs continue to give the government leeway as they negotiate their own interests. This is why it took a whole four days for DPs to utter a single word about the electoral violence that began on 13th August 2018.

It should be recalled that in late 2017, a British trade delegation led by Lord Popat (a British peer of Ugandan–Asian origin) visited Uganda and left with a contract to construct a controversial airport for £315 million. There were other deals worth billions. In presenting his report to the House of Lords, Lord Popat made a case for reviving the Commonwealth after Brexit:

“I will briefly explain why this debate is so important. Britain has run a balance of payments deficit for decades. Quite simply, we do not export enough to pay for our imports. This is neither desirable nor sustainable, yet it receives very little attention or coverage outside of your Lordships’ House. Last year, Britain voted to leave the European Union [….] Last week, I led a delegation of 16 businesses in the oil and gas sector to Uganda. Two of the British companies, Fluor and CB&I, have been shortlisted to build a major oil pipeline to the value of just over $2 billion. This week, the Ugandan Parliament will approve a loan of £315 million for a British company, Colas Ltd, to build an international airport in Uganda

(27 November 2017 the House of Lords Exports: Africa and the Commonwealth debate Hansard)

Uganda’s economic collapse behind jittery junta

All indications are that Uganda’s economy is in very poor health. The Auditor General and the Governor of the Central Bank have warned that debt payments are becoming unsustainable. Interest payments consumed 23% of the budget in 2017. 2018 began with the closure of secondary schools delivering universal free education. Drug stock-outs in public hospitals that began six months earlier persisted. Then the flagship achievement of the NRM, Universal Primary Education (UPE), was finally unmasked. President Museveni floated the idea of a new tax on social media use. The World Bank made a rare communication to ordinary people when they said that it was healthy for the population to discuss revenue after focusing on (corrupt) expenditure for so long.

The Over the Top tax (OTT as it is now called) was included in the budget, with President Museveni completely misjudging the mood and calling it a tax on gossip. The #ThisTaxMustGo movement began. Leading from the front was Robert Kyagulanyi, a member of parliament and a popular musician, actor and activist with a track record in guiding and supporting the youth. He had also been prominent in trying to prevent Museveni remove presidential age limits, the #Togikwatako campaign. Mass demonstrations followed during one of which the police attempted to arrest him. His escape on the back of a boda-boda, facilitated by his many fans, was captured on video, further boosting his standing among ordinary people.

A further indicator of an economy in distress came on World Youth Day when the president voiced suspicions that universal primary education (UPE) and universal secondary education (USE) were being abused by people “pretending to be poor”. It was his Marie Antoinette moment. He instructed the Youth Council to gather opinions from grassroots leaders about the amounts of money parents would be able to contribute to the cost of educating their children. What he was saying was that the government could no longer fund free education.

Many will remember that teachers, confronted by parents who had been promised free education and school meals, were at a loss as to what to do. Those who charged small fees for porridge were threatened with arrest for “sabotaging my UPE programme”. Parents were instructed to report such teachers to the authorities.

The 2018 by-elections

The difference in August 2018 was the persistence and scope of the defiance against President Museveni’s brutality. The violent arrest and torture of Robert Kyagulanyi and his colleagues and the murder of his driver ensured it transcended national barriers via the Internet. Within four days, a group of Ghanaians and a Ugandan had designed and printed banners and held a peaceful demonstration at Accra’s Black Star Monument. After it began to trend on Twitter, other countries began to organise demonstrations. Kenya held a number, in Nairobi, Mombasa and Busia. The people of Africa spoke while the African Union remained silent. There is a lesson about pan-Africanism there.

The difference in August 2018 was the persistence and scope of the defiance against President Museveni’s brutality. The violent arrest and torture of Robert Kyagulanyi ensured it transcended national barriers via the Internet.

The #FreeBobiWine campaign has entered its third week, spreading across the globe. It will not be lost on the government or on its DPs that the demonstrators in the diaspora are Uganda’s second largest source of hard currency.

A word about the need for three by-elections so soon after the general election in 2016. They were made necessary by electoral fraud and murder. In the first case, the victory of the NRM candidate in Kyaddondo was cancelled by the courts, which cited irregularities by the Electoral Commission. The same happened in Jinja East when the Court of Appeal nullified the victory of the NRM candidate.

The third by-election became necessary when NRM’s Mohammed Abiriga was shot dead on his way home from the State of the Nation Address (SONA) in June. Abiriga, (known by the nickname Yellow Man because of his habit of expressing his support for the NRM by dressing head to toe in the party colour) typified the sometimes farcical blind support given to the ruling party by prominent opposition figures who have been persuaded to “join the Movement” or “return to the Movement”.

The SONA itself was a tissue of lies. President Museveni declared that the NRM had restored peace and security following a spate of serial killings in which 19 women were killed and their bodies desecrated; and kidnappings – the three female victims were found dead despite their families paying ransoms as high as $200,000. Abiriga repeated the claim in a TV interview after the Address. Some hours later, he lay dead inside his blood-drenched yellow Beetle.

After winning the Kyaddondo by-election by 77% of the vote, Kyagulanyi went on to support candidates in the Jinja East, Bugiri and Arua by-elections. The Jinja East by-election was typically Ugandan. According to the independent observer, Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), ballot papers pre–ticked in favour of the ruling party candidate were found stored at one polling station. CCEDU’s offices were broken into one night and their computers taken. Five hundred Forum for Democratic Change supporters were jailed before the poll.

Bugiri in July was particularly violent with supporters of the JEEMA candidate, Asuman Basalirwa, being stoned and stabbed and at least two others killed. Basalirwa complained that the police made no attempt to protect his team. During polling, an NRM MP was confronted by voters at one polling station accusing him of interfering with the process (one news report alleged he was offering money to voters in the queue). He drew a firearm to save himself from the crowd.

The true state of the nation has been revealed by the Arua by-election after which all the winners of the previous ones were arrested and taken to Gulu Central Prison to await trial for treason; FDC’s Paul Mwiru (Jinja East) R. Kyagulanyi, K. Wadri (Arua) and Gerald Karuhanga (Ntungamo Municipality). A fifth MP, Francis Zaake is in Lubaga Hospital with spinal injuries after being arrested with the others. (They were finally released on bail this week.)

Ugandans took to the streets in demonstrations that ended in shootings and whippings by the regular and military police, the army and the Special Forces Command, a criminal unit that began life as the Presidential Guard Brigade nearly two decades ago. In a report to the World Bank, Joel Barkan, an American political analyst with an interest in Africa, warned that it was turning in to a praetorian guard loyal only to President Museveni.

“Nevertheless, over the past two years the President has authorized the transformation and enlargement of his personal security unit into the Presidential Guard Brigade, a praetorian guard of an estimated 7,000 men. Its primary purpose is to keep President Museveni and his entourage in power, not national defense.”(Barkan.J. Uganda: An African ‘Success that has Peaked? 2005).

Over ten young people died and over 300 were arrested in Kampala alone. If the uprisings of 2009 are anything to go by, it will take many of them years and plenty of money in bribes to be processed and finally released. Many others across the country are unknown.

Dr Kizza–Besigye, a longtime opponent of what President Museveni stands for and a veteran of over 50 election-related arrests as a candidate in four presidential elections, demanded the immediate release of the abducted saying, “Trumped-up charges are the rule in how NRM [the ruling National Resistance Movement] addresses and criminalises opponents.”

“I have been charged with treason, rape, terrorism, illegal possession of guns…These people have been detained in the context of state-inspired violence. The idea choreographed in the media that people had guns must be dismissed with contempt.”

The United States and European Union missions took a softly-softly approach, with the Europeans expressing “deep concern” over the arrests, the “suffering of Ugandans” and the tarnished image of Uganda. The Americans were even more mealy-mouthed, calling for humane treatment, due process, fair trials and medical attention. They did not explain why persons falsely accused of crimes would require trials at all.

But it is not surprising. When Kizza Besigye was in prison on treason charges, the British High Commissioner visited him and urged him to plead guilty in order to qualify for a presidential pardon. (It was not clear whether the president had assured the high commissioner that he would grant it.) In the past few days, Museveni has said that he would consider pardoning the Arua 33.

The United States and European Union missions took a softly-softly approach, with the Europeans expressing “deep concern” over the arrests, the “suffering of Ugandans” and the tarnished image of Uganda. The Americans were even more mealy-mouthed, calling for humane treatment, due process, fair trials and medical attention. They did not explain why persons falsely accused of crimes would require trials at all.

When Kyagulanyi was produced in court ten days after the 32 other accused, his physical appearance confirmed his wife Barbie and brother’s statements that he had been tortured. The methods included striking him all over with a metal rod. He was also injected multiple times with unknown drugs. He now walks with the aid of crutches.

The charge of illegal possession of firearms was dropped and he now faces the same treason charges as the other accused. They all arise from an incident in which a youth threw a stone at the president’s motorcade, smashing a rear window.

Continuing repression

Reports of the arbitrary arrests of Bobi Wine’s bodyguard, E. Ssebuufu, and two associates. But there is no sign that the people have given up. As Bobi Wine sings “Freedom comes to those who fight.”

Meanwhile, from behind the high walls of their Kampala fortresses, the DPs continue to try and project an image of ethical support for the Museveni and the NRM. There is no such thing.

#FreeArua33 #FreeUganda #FreeBobiWine #Justice4Yasin
The Arua 33 were released on bond on 27 August 2018 and next appear in court on 30th August 2018.

[i] Les effets des transformations des États sur leurs dettes publiques et autres obligations financières : traité juridique et financier, Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1927. Pp157-8.

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Mary Serumaga is a Ugandan essayist, graduated in Law from King's College, London, and attained an Msc in Intelligent Management Systems from the Southbank. Her work in civil service reform in East Africa lead to an interest in the nature of public service in Africa and the political influences under which it is delivered.

Politics

Stealth Game: “Community” Conservancies and Dispossession in Northern Kenya

The fortress conservation model, created with support from some of the world’s biggest environmental groups and western donors, has led to land dispossession, militarization, and widespread human rights abuses.

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Stealth Game: “Community” Conservancies and Dispossession in Northern Kenya
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With its vast expanses and diversity of wildlife, Kenya – Africa’s original safari destination – attracts over two million foreign visitors annually. The development of wildlife tourism and conservation, a major economic resource for the country, has however been at the cost of local communities who have been fenced off from their ancestral lands. Indigenous communities have been evicted from their territories and excluded from the tourist dollars that flow into high-end lodges and safari companies.

Protected areas with wildlife are patrolled and guarded by anti-poaching rangers and are accessible only to tourists who can afford to stay in the luxury safari lodges and resorts. This model of “fortress conservation” – one that militarizes and privatizes the commons – has come under severe criticism for its exclusionary practices and for being less effective than the models where local communities lead and manage conservation activities.

One such controversial model of conservation in Kenya is the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT). Set up in 2004, the NRT’s stated goal is “changing the game” on conservation by supporting communities to govern their lands through the establishment of community conservancies.

Created by Ian Craig, whose family was part of the elite white minority during British colonialism, the NRT’s origins date back to the 1980s when his family-owned 62,000-acre cattle ranch was transformed into the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Since its founding, the NRT has set up 39 conservancies on 42,000 square kilometres (10,378,426 acres) of land in northern and coastal Kenya – nearly 8 per cent of the country’s total land area.

The communities that live on these lands are predominantly pastoralists who raise livestock for their livelihoods and have faced decades of marginalization by successive Kenyan governments. The NRT claims that its goal is to “transform people’s lives, secure peace and conserve natural resources.”

However, where the NRT is active, local communities allege that the organization has dispossessed them of their lands and deployed armed security units that have been responsible for serious human rights abuses. Whereas the NRT employs around 870 uniformed scouts, the organization’s anti-poaching mobile units, called ‘9’ teams, face allegations of extrajudicial killings and disappearances, among other abuses. These rangers are equipped with military weapons and receive paramilitary training from the Kenyan Wildlife Service Law Enforcement Academy and from 51 Degrees, a private security company run by Ian Craig’s son, Batian Craig, as well as from other private security firms. Whereas the mandate of NRT’s rangers is supposed to be anti-poaching, they are routinely involved in policing matters that go beyond that remit.

Locals allege that the NRT compels communities to set aside their best lands for the exclusive use of wildlife.

Locals have alleged the NRT’s direct involvement in conflicts between different ethnic groups, related to territorial issues and/or cattle raids. Multiple sources within the impacted communities, including members of councils of community elders, informed the Oakland Institute that as many as 76 people were killed in the Biliqo Bulesa Conservancy during inter-ethnic clashes, allegedly with the involvement of the NRT. Interviews conducted by the Institute established that 11 people have been killed in circumstances involving the conservation body. Dozens more appear to have been killed by the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) and other government agencies, which have been accused of abducting, disappearing, and torturing people in the name of conservation.

Over the years, conflicts over land and resources in Kenya have been exacerbated by the establishment of large ranches and conservation areas. For instance, 40 per cent of Laikipia County’s land is occupied by large ranches, controlled by just 48 individuals – most of them white landowners who own tens of thousands of acres for ranching or wildlife conservancies, which attract tourism business as well as conservation funding from international organizations.

Similarly, several game reserves and conservancies occupy over a million acres of land in the nearby Isiolo County. Land pressure was especially evident in 2017 when clashes broke out between private, mostly white ranchers, and Samburu and Pokot herders over pasture during a particularly dry spell.

But as demonstrated in the Oakland Institute’s report Stealth Game, the events of 2017 highlighted a situation that has been rampant for many years. Local communities report paying a high price for the NRT’s privatized, neo-colonial conservation model in Kenya. The loss of grazing land for pastoralists is a major challenge caused by the creation of community conservancies. Locals allege that the NRT compels communities to set aside their best lands for the exclusive use of wildlife in the name of community conservancies, and to subsequently lease it to set up tourist facilities.

Although terms like “community-driven”, “participatory”, and “local empowerment” are extensively used by the NRT and its partners, the conservancies have been allegedly set up by outside parties rather than the pastoralists themselves, who have a very limited role in negotiating the terms of these partnerships. According to several testimonies, leverage over communities occurs through corruption and co-optation of local leaders and personalities as well as the local administration.

A number of interviewees allege intimidation, including arrests and interrogation of local community members and leaders, as tactics routinely used by the NRT security personnel. Furthermore, the NRT is involved not just in conservation but also in security, management of pastureland, and livestock marketing, which according to the local communities, gives it a level of control over the region that surpasses even that of the Kenyan government. The NRT claims that these activities support communities, development projects, and help build sustainable economies, but its role is criticized by local communities and leaders.

In recent years, hundreds of locals have held protests and signed petitions against the presence of the NRT. The Turkana County Government expelled the NRT from Turkana in 2016; Isiolo’s Borana Council of Elders (BCE) and communities in Isiolo County and in Chari Ward in the Biliqo Bulesa Conservancy continue to challenge the NRT. In January 2021, the community of Gafarsa protested the NRT’s expansion into the Gafarsa rangelands of Garbatulla sub-county. And in April 2021, the Samburu Council of Elders Association, a registered institution representing the Samburu Community in four counties (Isiolo, Laikipia, Marsabit and Samburu), wrote to international NGOs and donors asking them to cease further funding and to audit the NRT’s donor-funded programmes.

A number of interviewees allege intimidation, including arrests and interrogation of local community members and leaders, as tactics routinely used by the NRT security personnel.

At the time of the writing of the report, the Oakland Institute reported that protests against the NRT were growing across the region. The organization works closely with the KWS, a state corporation under the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism whose mandate is to conserve and manage wildlife in Kenya. In July 2018, Tourism and Wildlife Cabinet Secretary Najib Balala, appointed Ian Craig and Jochen Zeitz to the KWS Board of Trustees. The inclusion of Zeitz and Craig, who actively lobby for the privatization of wildlife reserves, has been met with consternation by local environmentalists. In the case of the NRT, the relationship is mutually beneficial – several high-ranking members of the KWS have served on the NRT’s Board of Trustees.

Both the NRT and the KWS receive substantial funding from donors such as USAID, the European Union, and other Western agencies, and champion corporate partnerships in conservation. The KWS and the NRT also partner with some of the largest environmental NGOs, including The Nature Conservancy (TNC), whose corporate associates have included major polluters and firms known for their negative human rights and environmental records, such as Shell, Ford, BP, and Monsanto among others. In turn, TNC’s Regional Managing Director for Africa, Matt Brown, enjoys a seat at the table of the NRT’s Board of Directors.

Stealth Game also reveals how the NRT has allegedly participated in the exploitation of fossil fuels in Kenya. In 2015, the NRT formed a five-year, US$12 million agreement with two oil companies active in the country – British Tullow Oil and Canadian Africa Oil Corp – to establish and operate six community conservancies in Turkana and West Pokot Counties.

The NRT’s stated goal was to “help communities to understand and benefit” from the “commercialisation of oil resources”. Local communities allege that it put a positive spin on the activities of these companies to mask concerns and outstanding questions over their environmental and human rights records.

The NRT, in collaboration with big environmental organizations, epitomizes a Western-led approach to conservation that creates a profitable business but marginalizes local communities who have lived on these lands for centuries.

Despite its claims to the contrary, the NRT is yet another example of how fortress conservation, under the guise of “community-based conservation”, is dispossessing the very pastoralist communities it claims to be helping – destroying their traditional grazing patterns, their autonomy, and their lives.

The  Constitution of Kenyan  2010 and the 2016 Community Land Act recognize community land as a category of land holding and pastoralism as a legitimate livelihood system. The Act enables communities to legally register, own, and manage their communal lands. For the first three years, however, not a single community in Kenya was able to apply to have their land rights legally recognized. On 24 July 2019, over 50 representatives from 11 communities in Isiolo, Kajiado, Laikipia, Tana River, and Turkana counties were the first to attempt to register their land with the government on the basis of the Community Land Act. The communities were promised by the Ministry of Land that their applications would be processed within four months. In late 2020, the Ministry of Lands registered the land titles of II Ngwesi and Musul communities in Laikipia.

The others are still waiting to have their land registered. In October 2020, the Lands Cabinet Secretary was reported saying that only 12 counties have submitted inventories of their respective unregistered community lands in readiness for the registration process as enshrined in the law.

Community members interviewed by the Oakland Institute in the course of its research repeatedly asked for justice after years of being ignored by the Kenyan government and by the police when reporting human rights abuses and even killings of family members. The findings reported in Stealth Game require an independent investigation into the land-related grievances around all of the NRT’s community conservancies, the allegations of involvement of the NRT’s rapid response units in inter-ethnic conflict, as well as the alleged abuses and extrajudicial killings.

Pastoralists have been the custodians of wildlife for centuries – long before any NGO or conservation professionals came along. While this report focuses on the plight of the Indigenous communities in Northern Kenya, it is a reality that is all too familiar to indigenous communities the world over. In far too many places, national governments, private corporations, and large conservation groups collude in the name of conservation, not just to force Indigenous groups off their land, but to force them out of existence altogether.

Pastoralists have been the custodians of wildlife for centuries – long before any NGO or conservation professionals came along.

The latest threat comes from the so-called “30×30 initiative”, a plan under the UN’s Convention on Biological Diversity that calls for 30 per cent of the planet to be placed in protected areas – or for other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) –  by 2030.

The Oakland Institute’s report, Stealth Game, makes it clear that fortress conservation must be replaced by Indigenous-led conservation efforts in order to preserve the remaining biodiversity of the planet while respecting the interests, rights, and dignity of the local communities.

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Politics

Nashulai – A Community Conservancy With a Difference

Before Nashulai, Maasai communities around the Mara triangle were selling off their rights to live and work on their land, becoming “conservation refugees”.

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Nashulai – A Community Conservancy With a Difference
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The Sekenani River underwent a mammoth cleanup in May 2020, undertaken by over 100 women living in the Nashulai Conservancy area. Ten of the 18 kilometres of fresh water were cleaned of plastic waste, clothing, organic material and other rubbish that presented a real threat to the health of this life source for the community and wildlife. The river forms part of the Mara Basin and goes on to flow into Lake Victoria, which in turn feeds the River Nile.

The initiative was spearheaded by the Nashulai Conservancy — the first community-owned conservancy in the Maasai Mara that was founded in 2015 — which also provided a daily stipend to all participants and introduced them to better waste management and regeneration practices. After the cleanup, bamboo trees were planted along the banks of the river to curb soil erosion.

You could call it a classic case of “nature healing” that only the forced stillness caused by a global pandemic could bring about. Livelihoods dependent on tourism and raising cattle had all but come to a standstill and people now had the time to ponder how unpredictable life can be.

“I worry that when tourism picks up again many people will forget about all the conservation efforts of the past year,” says project officer Evelyn Kamau. “That’s why we put a focus on working with the youth in the community on the various projects and education. They’ll be the key to continuation.”

Continuation in the broader sense is what Nashulai and several other community-focused projects in Kenya are working towards — a shift away from conservation practices that push indigenous people further and further out of their homelands for profit in the name of protecting and celebrating the very nature for which these communities have provided stewardship over generations.

A reckoning

Given the past year’s global and regional conversations about racial injustice, and the pandemic that has left tourism everywhere on its knees, ordinary people in countries like Kenya have had the chance to learn, to speak out and to act on changes.

Players in the tourism industry in the country that have in the past privileged foreign visitors over Kenyans have been challenged. In mid-2020, a poorly worded social media post stating that a bucket-list boutique hotel in Nairobi was “now open to Kenyans” set off a backlash from fed-up Kenyans online.

The post referred to the easing of COVID-19 regulations that allowed the hotel to re-open to anyone already in the country. Although the hotel tried to undertake damage control, the harm was already done and the wounds reopened. Kenyans recounted stories of discrimination experienced at this particular hotel including multiple instances of the booking office responding to enquiries from Kenyan guests that rooms were fully booked, only for their European or American companions to call minutes later and miraculously find there were in fact vacancies. Many observed how rare it was to see non-white faces in the marketing of certain establishments, except in service roles.

Another conversation that has gained traction is the question of who is really benefiting from the conservation business and why the beneficiaries are generally not the local communities.

Kenyan conservationist and author Dr Mordecai Ogada has been vocal about this issue, both in his work and on social media, frequently calling out institutions and individuals who perpetuate the profit-driven system that has proven to be detrimental to local communities. In The Big Conservation Lie, his searing 2016 book co-authored with conservation journalist John Mbaria, Ogada observes, “The importance of wildlife to Kenya and the communities here has been reduced to the dollar value that foreign tourists will pay to see it.” Ogada details the use of coercion tactics to push communities to divide up or vacate their lands and abandon their identities and lifestyles for little more than donor subsidies that are not always paid in full or within the agreed time.

A colonial hangover

It is important to note that these attitudes, organizations and by extension the structure of safari tourism, did not spring up out of nowhere. At the origin of wildlife safaris on the savannahs of East Africa were the colonial-era hunting parties organised for European aristocracy and royalty and the odd American president or Hollywood actor.

Theodore Roosevelt’s year-long hunting expedition in 1909 resulted in over 500 animals being shot by his party in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, many of which were taken back to be displayed at the Smithsonian Institute and in various other natural history museums across the US. Roosevelt later recounted his experiences in a book and a series of lectures, not without mentioning the “savage” native people he had encountered and expressing support for the European colonization project throughout Africa.

Much of this private entertaining was made possible through “gifts” of large parcels of Kenyan land by the colonial power to high-ranking military officials for their service in the other British colonies, without much regard as to the ancestral ownership of the confiscated lands.

At the origin of wildlife safaris on the savannahs of East Africa were the colonial-era hunting parties organised for European aristocracy and royalty.

On the foundation of national parks in the country by the colonial government in the 1940s, Ogada points out the similarities with the Yellowstone National Park, “which was created by violence and disenfranchisement, but is still used as a template for fortress conservation over a century later.” In the case of Kenya, just add trophy hunting to the original model.

Today, when it isn’t the descendants of those settlers who own and run the many private nature reserves in the country, it is a party with much economic or political power tying local communities down with unfair leases and sectioning them off from their ancestral land, harsh penalties being applied when they graze their cattle on the confiscated land.

This history must be acknowledged and the facts recognised so that the real work of establishing a sustainable future for the affected communities can begin. A future that does not disenfranchise entire communities and exclude them or leave their economies dangerously dependent on tourism.

The work it will take to achieve this in both the conservation and the wider travel industry involves everyone, from the service providers to the media to the very people deciding where and how to spend their tourism money and their time.

Here’s who’s doing the work

There are many who are leading initiatives that place local communities at the centre of their efforts to curb environmental degradation and to secure a future in which these communities are not excluded. Some, like Dr Ogada, spread the word about the holes in the model adopted by the global conservation industry. Others are training and educating tourism businesses in sustainable practices.

There are many who are leading initiatives that place local communities at the centre of their efforts to curb environmental degradation.

The Sustainable Travel and Tourism Agenda, or STTA, is a leading Kenyan-owned consultancy that works with tourism businesses and associations to provide training and strategies for sustainability in the sector in East Africa and beyond. Team leader Judy Kepher Gona expresses her optimism in the organization’s position as the local experts in the field, evidenced by the industry players’ uptake of the STTA’s training programmes and services to learn how best to manage their tourism businesses responsibly.

Gona notes, “Today there are almost 100 community-owned private conservancies in Kenya which has increased the inclusion of communities in conservation and in tourism” — which is a step in the right direction.

The community conservancy

Back to Nashulai, a strong example of a community-owned conservancy. Director and co-founder Nelson Ole Reiya who grew up in the area began to notice the rate at which Maasai communities around the Mara triangle were selling or leasing off their land and often their rights to live and work on it as they did before, becoming what he refers to as “conservation refugees”.

In 2016, Ole Reiya set out to bring together his community in an effort to eliminate poverty, regenerate the ecosystems and preserve the indigenous culture of the Maasai by employing a commons model on the 5,000 acres on which the conservancy sits. Families here could have sold their ancestral land and moved away, but they have instead come together and in a few short years have done away with the fencing separating their homesteads from the open savannah. They keep smaller herds of indigenous cattle and they have seen the return of wildlife such as zebras, giraffes and wildebeest to this part of their ancient migratory route. Elephants have returned to an old elephant nursery site.

In contrast to many other nature reserves and conservancies that offer employment to the locals as hotel staff, safari guides or dancers and singers, Nashulai’s way of empowering the community goes further to diversify the economy by providing skills and education to the residents, as well as preserving the culture by passing on knowledge about environmental awareness. This can be seen in the bee-keeping project that is producing honey for sale, the kitchen gardens outside the family homes, a ranger training programme and even a storytelling project to record and preserve all the knowledge and history passed down by the elders.

They keep smaller herds of indigenous cattle and they have seen the return of wildlife such as zebras, giraffes and wildebeest to this part of their ancient migratory route.

The conservancy only hires people from within the community for its various projects, and all plans must be submitted to a community liaison officer for discussion and a vote before any work can begin.

Tourism activities within the conservancy such as stays at Oldarpoi (the conservancy’s first tented camp; more are planned), game drives and day visits to the conservation and community projects are still an important part of the story. The revenue generated by tourists and the awareness created regarding this model of conservation are key in securing Nashulai’s future. Volunteer travellers are even welcomed to participate in the less technical projects such as tree planting and river clean-ups.

Expressing his hopes for a paradigm shift in the tourism industry, Ole Reiya stresses, “I would encourage visitors to go beyond the superficial and experience the nuances of a people beyond being seen as artefacts and naked children to be photographed, [but] rather as communities whose connection to the land and wildlife has been key to their survival over time.”

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Battery Arms Race: Global Capital and the Scramble for Cobalt in the Congo

In the context of the climate emergency and the need for renewable energy sources, competition over the supply of cobalt is growing. This competition is most intense in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nick Bernards argues that the scramble for cobalt is a capitalist scramble, and that there can be no ‘just’ transition without overthrowing capitalism on a global scale.

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Battery Arms Race: Global Capital and the Scramble for Cobalt in the Congo
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With growing attention to climate breakdown and the need for expanded use of renewable energy sources, the mineral resources needed to make batteries are emerging as a key site of conflict. In this context, cobalt – traditionally mined as a by-product of copper and nickel – has become a subject of major interest in its own right.

Competition over supplies of cobalt is intensifying. Some reports suggest that demand for cobalt is likely to exceed known reserves if projected shifts to renewable energy sources are realized. Much of this competition is playing out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The south-eastern regions of the DRC hold about half of proven global cobalt reserves, and account for an even higher proportion of global cobalt production (roughly 70 percent) because known reserves in the DRC are relatively shallow and easier to extract.

Recent high profile articles in outlets including the New York Times and the Guardian have highlighted a growing ‘battery arms race’ supposedly playing out between the West (mostly the US) and China over battery metals, especially cobalt.

These pieces suggest, with some alarm, that China is ‘winning’ this race. They highlight how Chinese dominance in battery supply chains might inhibit energy transitions in the West. They also link growing Chinese mining operations to a range of labour and environmental abuses in the DRC, where the vast majority of the world’s available cobalt reserves are located.

Both articles are right that the hazards and costs of the cobalt boom have been disproportionately borne by Congolese people and landscapes, while few of the benefits have reached them. But by subsuming these problems into narratives of geopolitical competition between the US and China and zooming in on the supposedly pernicious effects of Chinese-owned operations in particular, the ‘arms race’ narrative ultimately obscures more than it reveals.

There is unquestionably a scramble for cobalt going on. It is centered in the DRC but spans much of the globe, working through tangled transnational networks of production and finance that link mines in the South-Eastern DRC to refiners and battery manufacturers scattered across China’s industrializing cities, to financiers in London, Toronto, and Hong Kong, to vast transnational corporations ranging from mineral rentiers (Glencore), to automotive companies (Volkswagen, Ford), to electronics and tech firms (Apple). This loose network is governed primarily through an increasingly amorphous and uneven patchwork of public and private ‘sustainability’ standards. And, it plays out against the backdrop of both long-running depredations of imperialism and the more recent devastation of structural adjustment.

In a word, the scramble for cobalt is a thoroughly capitalist scramble.

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Chinese firms do unquestionably play a major role in global battery production in general and in cobalt extraction and refining in particular. Roughly 50 percent of global cobalt refining now takes place in China. The considerable majority of DRC cobalt exports do go to China, and Chinese firms have expanded interests in mining and trading ventures in the DRC.

However, although the Chinese state has certainly fostered the development of cobalt and other battery minerals, there is as much a scramble for control over cobalt going on within China as between China and the ‘west’. There has, notably, been a wave of concentration and consolidation among Chinese cobalt refiners since about 2010. The Chinese firms operating in the DRC are capitalist firms competing with each other in important ways. They often have radically different business models. Jinchuan Group Co. Ltd and China Molybdenum, for instance, are Hong Kong Stock Exchange-listed firms with ownership shares in scattered global refining and mining operations. Jinchuan’s major mine holdings in the DRC were acquired from South African miner Metorex in 2012; China Molybdenum recently acquired the DRC mines owned by US-based Freeport-McMoRan (as the New York Times article linked above notes with concern). A significant portion of both Jinchuan Group and China Molybdenum’s revenues, though, come from speculative metals trading rather than from production. Yantai Cash, on the other hand, is a specialized refiner which does not own mining operations. Yantai is likely the destination for a good deal of ‘artisanal’ mined cobalt via an elaborate network of traders and brokers.

These large Chinese firms also are thoroughly plugged in to global networks of battery production ultimately destined, in many cases, for widely known consumer brands. They are also able to take advantage of links to global marketing and financing operations. The four largest Chinese refiners, for instance, are all listed brands on the London Metal Exchange (LME).

In the midst of increased concentration at the refining stage and concerns over supplies, several major end users including Apple, Volkswagen, and BMW have sought to establish long-term contracts directly with mining operations since early 2018. Tesla signed a major agreement with Glencore to supply cobalt for its new battery ‘gigafactories’ in 2020. Not unrelatedly, they have also developed integrated supply chain tracing systems, often dressed up in the language of ‘sustainability’ and transparency. One notable example is the Responsible Sourcing Blockchain Initiative (RSBI). This initiative between the blockchain division of tech giant IBM, supply chain audit firm RCS Global, and several mining houses, mineral traders, and automotive end users of battery materials including Ford, Volvo, Volkswagen Group, and Fiat-Chrysler Automotive Group was announced in 2019. RSBI conducted a pilot test tracing 1.5 tons of Congolese cobalt across three different continents over five months of refinement.

Major end users including automotive and electronics brands have, in short, developed increasingly direct contacts extending across the whole battery production network.

There are also a range of financial actors trying to get in on the scramble (though, as both Jinchuan and China Molybdenum demonstrate, the line between ‘productive’ and ‘financial’ capital here can be blurry). Since 2010, benchmark cobalt prices are set through speculative trading on the LME. A number of specialized trading funds have been established in the last five years, seeking to profit from volatile prices for cobalt. One of the largest global stockpiles of cobalt in 2017, for instance, was held by Cobalt 27, a Canadian firm established expressly to buy and hold physical cobalt stocks. Cobalt 27 raised CAD 200 million through a public listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange in June of 2017, and subsequently purchased 2160.9 metric tons of cobalt held in LME warehouses. There are also a growing number of exchange traded funds (ETF) targeting cobalt. Most of these ETFs seek ‘exposure’ to cobalt and battery components more generally, for instance, through holding shares in mining houses or what are called ‘royalty bearing interests’ in specific mining operations rather than trading in physical cobalt or futures. Indeed, by mid-2019, Cobalt-27 was forced to sell off its cobalt stockpile at a loss. It was subsequently bought out by its largest shareholder (a Swiss-registered investment firm) and restructured into ‘Conic’, an investment fund holding a portfolio of royalty-bearing interests in battery metals operations rather than physical metals.

Or, to put it another way, there is as much competition going on within ‘China’ and the ‘West’ between different firms to establish control over limited supplies of cobalt, and to capture a share of the profits, as between China and the ‘West’ as unitary entities.

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Thus far, workers and communities in the Congolese Copperbelt have suffered the consequences of this scramble. They have seen few of the benefits. Indeed, this is reflective of much longer-run processes, documented in ROAPE, wherein local capital formation and local development in Congolese mining have been systematically repressed on behalf of transnational capital for decades.

The current boom takes place against the backdrop of the collapse, and subsequent privatization, of the copper mining industry in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1988, state-owned copper mining firm Gécamines produced roughly 450 000 tons of copper, and employed 30 000 people, by 2003, production had fallen to 8 000 tons and workers were owed up to 36 months of back pay. As part of the restructuring and privatization of the company, more than 10 000 workers were offered severance payments financed by the World Bank, the company was privatized, and mining rights were increasingly marketized. By most measures, mining communities in the Congolese Copperbelt are marked by widespread poverty. A 2017 survey found mean and median monthly household incomes of $USD 34.50 and $USD 14, respectively, in the region.

In the context of widespread dispossession, the DRC’s relatively shallow cobalt deposits have been an important source of livelihood activities. Estimates based on survey research suggest that roughly 60 percent of households in the region derived some income from mining, of which 90 percent worked in some form of artisanal mining. Recent research has linked the rise of industrial mining installations owned by multinational conglomerates to deepening inequality, driven in no small part by those firms’ preference for expatriate workers in higher paid roles. Where Congolese workers are employed, this is often through abusive systems of outsourcing through labour brokers.

Cobalt mining has also been linked to substantial forms of social and ecological degradation in surrounding areas, including significant health risks from breathing dust (not only to miners but also to local communities), ecological disruption and pollution from acid, dust, and tailings, and violent displacement of local communities.

The limited benefits and high costs of the cobalt boom for local people in the Congolese copperbelt, in short, are linked to conditions of widespread dispossession predating the arrival of Chinese firms and are certainly not limited to Chinese firms.

To be clear, none of this is to deny that Chinese firms have been implicated in abuses of labour rights and ecologically destructive practices in the DRC, nor that the Chinese state has clearly made strategic priorities of cobalt mining, refining, and battery manufacturing. It does not excuse the very real abuses linked to Chinese firms that European-owned ones have done many of the same things. Nor does the fact that those Chinese firms are often ultimately vendors to major US and European auto and electronic brands.

However, all of this does suggest that any diagnosis of the developmental ills, violence, ecological damage and labour abuses surrounding cobalt in the DRC that focuses specifically on the character of Chinese firms or on inter-state competition is limited at best. It gets Glencore, Apple, Tesla, and myriad financial speculators, to say nothing of capitalist relations of production generally, off the hook.

If we want to get to grips with the unfolding scramble for cobalt and its consequences for the people in the south-east DRC, we need to keep in view how the present-day scramble reflects wider patterns of uneven development under capitalist relations of production.

We should note that such narratives of a ‘new scramble for Africa’ prompted by a rapacious Chinese appetite for natural resources are not new. As Alison Ayers argued nearly a decade ago of narratives about the role of China in a ‘new scramble for Africa’, a focus on Chinese abuses means that ‘the West’s relations with Africa are construed as essentially beneficent, in contrast to the putatively opportunistic, exploitative and deleterious role of the emerging powers, thereby obfuscating the West’s ongoing neocolonial relationship with Africa’. Likewise, such accounts neglect ‘profound changes in the global political economy within which the “new scramble for Africa” is to be more adequately located’. These interventions are profoundly political, providing important forms of ideological cover for both neoliberal capitalism and for longer-run structures of imperialism.

In short, the barrier to a just transition to sustainable energy sources is not a unitary ‘China’ bent on the domination of emerging industries as a means to global hegemony. It is capitalism. Or, more precisely, it is the fact that responses to the climate crisis have thus far worked through and exacerbated the contradictions of existing imperialism and capitalist relations of production. The scramble for cobalt is a capitalist scramble, and one of many signs that there can be no ‘just’ transition without overturning capitalism and imperialism on a global scale.

This article was published in the Review of African political Economy (ROAPE).

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