Connect with us

Politics

FROM INMATE TO PRESIDENT: Bemba’s star is shining but he could still be denied the presidency

10 min read.

After a decade in prison, it would take an abundance of optimism to say that the opposition leader is on the cusp of ascending to DR Congo’s highest office. By WAIRAGALA WAKABI

Published

on

FROM INMATE TO PRESIDENT: Bemba’s star is shining but he could still be denied the presidency
Download PDFPrint Article

Jean-Pierre Bemba is the man of the moment. He recently won a huge, unlikely acquittal at the International Criminal Court (ICC), returned home to the Democratic Republic of the Congo without hassle after a decade in jail in Europe, and lodged his papers to run for president in a poll in which the incumbent, President Joseph Kabila, won’t be running.

Veteran opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi, who stood for president in December 2011 on the ticket of a coalition of parties and lost with 32 per cent of the votes, died in February last year. His son, Félix Tshisekedi, took over the mantle of the country’s leading opposition party, the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) and remains the favoured opposition candidate to succeed Kabila as president. But Bemba might just overtake him. With Kabila himself not standing, Bemba is a strong contender among an opposition line-up that looks the favourite relative to Kabila’s candidate, former interior minister, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary.

Another leading opposition contender, Moise Katumbi, has been locked out of running by state authorities, further brightening Bemba’s prospects of clinching the top seat in the troubled central African country. And yet, it would take an abundance of optimism to say that Bemba is on the cusp of becoming DR Congo’s president, as events in Kinshasa and in The Hague, over which he lacks control, could extinguish his prospects for election come December.

Bemba, 55, founded the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) rebel group in 1998 with support and training from the government of Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni. He was 35years- old. The son of Jeannot Bemba Saolona, a powerful businessman, Bemba went on to become a successful entrepreneur himself.

Two decades ago, the MLC was one of a myriad of groups supported by Rwanda and Uganda to fight the government of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, Joseph Kabila’s father, whom the two countries had supported to grab power from veteran despot Mobutu Sese Seko in 1997. The MLC turned out to be the most stable of these groups, establishing extensive administrative control and public services (such as courts of law, health centres, and schools) in the large part of the country that it controlled. Having transformed itself into a political party, the MLC remains a major player in Congo’s politics, and is by far the most visible of the former rebel groups-turned political parties.

Under the power-sharing agreement aimed at ending the fighting, Bemba became one of Congo’s four vice presidents in 2003. He went on to contest elections three years later, emerging second to Kabila. The decade he has been away in The Hague has taken a toll on his party, and on his personal profile, and yet the time seems just right for him to be back to have another go at the presidency.

But there are various odds stacked against his candidacy, some of which he may not easily navigate.

Under the power-sharing agreement aimed at ending the fighting, Bemba became one of Congo’s four vice presidents in 2003. He went on to contest elections three years later, emerging second to Kabila. The decade he has been away in The Hague has taken a toll on his party, and on his personal profile, and yet the time seems just right for him to be back to have another go at the presidency.

First, we look at his prospects.

1. Riding the Kabila unpopularity vote

Joseph Kabila is hugely unpopular. His dogged attempt to defy the constitution and stand for a third term, his inefficient government that has failed to root out armed militia groups, his lukewarm response to rampant corruption in the public service, and his dithering as security forces killed peaceful protesters for months, all made him a hated figure among the electorate. Whereas Kabila has finally declared that he will not run, his unpopularity will necessarily rub off the ruling coalition’s candidate.

According to results of a nationally representative poll published in February, only 10 per cent of respondents would vote for Kabila if he stood for president, and in what is known as his last stronghold, only 37 per cent would vote for the incumbent. Moreover, the unpopularity is shared by other senior government officials and the elections commission. A large majority of respondents (70 per cent) had an unfavourable opinion of Prime Minister Bruno Tshibala – the same for Joseph Olenghankoy, who heads the committee implementing the agreement reached by government and the opposition in the lead-up to the elections.

In power since January 2001 when he replaced his assassinated father, Kabila has few successes to point to. His refusal to step down ahead of the elections and to fully implement the December 31, 2016 agreement signed between the opposition and the government did not endear him to voters. And his decision not to run in the December polls does not do much to improve his ruling coalition’s chances. As interior minister between 2016 and February 2018, Shadary oversaw the forceful repression of demonstrations and arrests of activists and opposition politicians. That did not earn him many admirers.

2. How the ICC trials boost Bemba’s chances

Whereas many Congolese nationals support the work of the ICC, a great number are frustrated with the fact that trials take way too long (it took ten years from Bemba’s arrest for his trial to be concluded with an acquittal on appeal). More distinctly, many Congolese citizens have always felt that Bemba’s arrest and prosecution was politically motivated – that it was meant to keep him away from Congo’s politics.

The criticism that Kabila conspired with “Western powers” to try Bemba has been around for several years, with one respected 2012 research report showing many Congolese believing that Bemba was “targeted”. The report added: “Many Congolese see his arrest as evidence that the court is being used as an instrument by the Congolese government to undermine its rivals. Whether or not this is the case, the action by the court removed a major political player from the scene ahead of the recent 2011 presidential elections, substantially weakening the challenge to President Kabila.”

Similarly, Bemba is likely to receive the support of those who feel sympathy for his perceived wrongful prosecution. Indeed, poll results released on July 31, 2018 by the Congo Research Group based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, indicated that Bemba’s popularity had gone up 16 per cent since last November, as 83 percent of respondents “thought his acquittal was a good thing.”

The criticism that Kabila conspired with “Western powers” to try Bemba has been around for several years, with one respected 2012 research report showing many Congolese believing that Bemba was “targeted”. The report added: “Many Congolese see his arrest as evidence that the court is being used as an instrument by the Congolese government to undermine its rivals…”

There have been longstanding questions among Congolese critics of the court as to why, for instance, former Central African Republic president Ange-Félix Patassé was not tried with Bemba, or instead of him. As president, Patassé invited the MLC into his country to help him fight a coup attempt, and it was while the Congolese rebel troops and Central African forces were fighting the insurgents that the crimes over which Bemba was tried in The Hague were committed. Others wondered why senior MLC commanders who were in the CAR were not tried, as it was deemed that they bore more control over the group’s troops deployed in that country.

Nonetheless, as one close Congolese observer has pointed out, for some Congolese the acquittal merely highlights what in their minds is the injustice of the original decision to prosecute Bemba. According to her, even if Bemba is not allowed to run, he could make a significant impact on the electoral outcome by endorsing another candidate.

3. The potential opposition unity

There are strong indications that if the opposition fronted a united candidate, it would garner more votes than Kabila’s candidate. Opinion poll results showed at the end of July that the three main opposition candidates each had between 17 per cent and 19 per cent of the vote, while candidates from the ruling coalition would get a combined total of 19 per cent. At the very least, these results seem to show that, in a credible election, the ruling party’s candidate would not be the winner of a majority of votes; and if the top three opposition contenders front a common candidate, that candidate would have a smooth sail to the presidency.

The big question, however, is whether the opposition will throw its weight behind a single candidate. History does not favour this prospect. The DRC is a large country, with 46 million registered voters, more than 400 political parties, some of which have regional interests and whose agendas do not easily coalesce with those of national parties. That makes it difficult to forge national coalitions.

But the prospect of wrenching power from the ruling coalition could just push the political actors to put personal ambitions aside. Kabila has not always won by huge margins. In 2006, he took 44 per cent of votes in the first round, before getting elected with 58 per cent of the vote in a run-off against Bemba. In the last elections of 2011, he won with 48.95 per cent.

Who then should be the opposition candidate? Whereas Bemba has a loyal base in the country, his decade-long absence has seen a significant slide in the proportion of his party’s representation in parliament, with many senior party members decamping.

Currently, Tshisekedi has a better rating at the polls, and leads a larger party than the MLC. However, he is a political novice compared to Bemba, who has been vice president and senator, and has useful networks in some neighbouring countries, notably Uganda. His experience as the leader of a large rebel group, most of whose members were integrated into the national army, also means that at least a section of the military could find him more acceptable. With Katumbi out of the running, Bemba only has Tshisekedi to overtake as the leading opposition contender.

Currently, Tshisekedi has a better rating at the polls, and leads a larger party than the MLC. However, he is a political novice compared to Bemba, who has been vice president and senator, and has useful networks in some neighbouring countries, notably Uganda.

Bemba needs to court leading opposition actors, not least his former party members that have since moved on, and other key actors, including Vital Kamerhe, who took 7.7 per cent of the presidential vote in 2011. Moreover, Bemba’s prospects would improve further if he won an alliance with church groups that spearheaded the protests against Kabila’s third term project, as well as youth movements such as LUCHA and Filimbi.

The above notwithstanding, there are various factors that could still stand in the way of a Bemba presidency.

4. The upcoming sentencing at the ICC

In June this year, appeals judges at the ICC acquitted Bemba of war crimes and crimes against humanity after trial judges had convicted him in 2016 and handed him an 18-year prison sentence. The acquittal paved the way for his interim release to Belgium, where he has a residence, before he returned to Congo on August 1, after being away for 11 years.

The case for which Bemba was acquitted is one of two that he has faced at the court. In the first case, he was tried for failing to stop or punish his MLC soldiers who committed rape, murder, and pillaging in the CAR during 2002 and 2003. Although he was not in the CAR himself, he was tried under the principle of “command responsibility” whereby superiors are responsible for the actions of their subordinates.

Whereas that case was settled with finality when Bemba was acquitted last June, the conviction for the second case was confirmed by a separate appeals chamber. The sentence will be announced in the coming months. In the second case, judges found that Bemba and his former lawyers bribed witnesses to give false testimony on behalf of Bemba. Initially, judges had handed Bemba a one-year sentence and a fine of €300,000, but the appeals chamber ordered that a fresh sentence be pronounced since there were errors made in the initial sentencing. The prosecution is asking that Bemba be handed a maximum prison term permissible for this offence, namely five years, and that he should be sent back to the ICC detention centre to serve the sentence out.

It is unlikely that Bemba will be handed a five-year jail term, or that he will be sent back to the detention centre for a period longer than a few months. His lawyers argue that even if he were handed the maximum sentence, the four years and six months he spent in detention from the time the warrant for his arrest for witness tampering was issued should be subtracted from any prison term he may be required to serve. The defence also argues that the time he has already served is proportionate to the offences for which he was convicted.

Ultimately, it remains to be seen whether the judges will hand Bemba a custodial sentence – which could undermine his presidential campaign – or whether they will only issue a monetary fine.

5. Fighting the power of incumbency

Given the power of incumbency and the large network of patronage in the civil service, in the military and even in many provincial administrations, Shadary has huge advantages. It means Kabila’s party can use the largesse accumulated from siphoning off state resources in a state short on accountability mechanisms to run a large-scale campaign and to bribe voters to vote for the ruling coalition’s candidate.

Moreover, the state has the opportunity to steal the election through the bloated voters’ roll, or by manipulating the electronic voting machines that are being introduced. The electoral body is not trusted to conduct free and fair polls, according to research, while courts of law may not impartially arbitrate electoral disputes.

The state of insecurity and the poor transport networks exacerbate the headaches which opposition candidates must endure to reach large parts of the country. That’s a challenge the ruling party does not share in equal measure. Nonetheless, Bemba has been known to have deep pockets and equally well-heeled backers, which means he could put up a more serious campaign in this regard relative to other contenders.

The state of insecurity and the poor transport networks exacerbate the headaches which opposition candidates must endure to reach large parts of the country. That’s a challenge the ruling party does not share in equal measure. Nonetheless, Bemba has been known to have deep pockets and equally well-heeled backers, which means he could put up a more serious campaign in this regard relative to other contenders.

Moreover, as stated earlier, the incumbency could in many respects prove to be a monkey on Shadary’s back, given the unpopularity of Kabila and the dysfunctionality of his government.

6. The government could derail’s Bemba’s bid

Will the Congo government invoke legal reasons to derail Bemba’s presidential bid? Following the close of presidential nominations on August 8, the electoral commission will announce on September 19 the list of candidates approved to run.

Prior to Bemba’s return to Congo, a spokesperson of the ruling coalition suggested that the former vice president should not be allowed to run for president due to his conviction for witness tampering. He cited Article 10 of the Congolese electoral law, which stipulates that a person guilty of corruption is not eligible to stand as a candidate in electoral processes. According to the spokesperson, the conviction at the ICC amounted to corruption and Bemba should, therefore, not be allowed to stand.

Given the challenge Bemba poses to the ruling coalition’s hold on power, it is likely that a challenge to his eligibility will be presented before the constitutional court. How that would pan out is unknown.

Prior to Bemba’s return to Congo, a spokesperson of the ruling coalition suggested that the former vice president should not be allowed to run for president due to his conviction for witness tampering. He cited Article 10 of the Congolese electoral law, which stipulates that a person guilty of corruption is not eligible to stand as a candidate in electoral processes. According to the spokesperson, the conviction at the ICC amounted to corruption and Bemba should, therefore, not be allowed to stand.

A second legal challenge to Bemba could arise from events in the weeks before he fled to Brussels in early 2007. At the time, the DRC’s attorney general had asked the senate to revoke Bemba’s immunity so that he could be charged for treason. The alleged treason resulted from deadly clashes earlier that year between Bemba’s loyalist troops and mainstream government forces. With the Congo government not averse to inventing charges to dog opponents (the same move used to block Katumbi from running for president), it is possible that the alleged treason charges from 2007 could be resurrected.

However, the fact that Bemba was allowed to return, was allowed free movement in the country where huge crowds welcomed him, with police securing his movements, could signal that the government may not slap charges against him. Barring Bemba from running could also be a recipe for civil disobedience, which the government might want to avoid.

Kabila knows that the eyes of much of the world are trained on him, not least those of the United States government, which has openly pushed him into not standing for re-election, so he might try to play fair after all. As it is, Bemba’s star is shining brightest than it ever did in the last decade, but whether this will be a false dawn remains to be seen.

Support The Elephant.

The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.

Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.

By

Wairagala Wakabi, PhD, has covered the Congo conflict since 1998 and has from 2009 monitored trials at the International Criminal Court.

Continue Reading

Politics

Stealth Game: “Community” Conservancies and Dispossession in Northern Kenya

The fortress conservation model, created with support from some of the world’s biggest environmental groups and western donors, has led to land dispossession, militarization, and widespread human rights abuses.

Published

on

Stealth Game: “Community” Conservancies and Dispossession in Northern Kenya
Download PDFPrint Article

With its vast expanses and diversity of wildlife, Kenya – Africa’s original safari destination – attracts over two million foreign visitors annually. The development of wildlife tourism and conservation, a major economic resource for the country, has however been at the cost of local communities who have been fenced off from their ancestral lands. Indigenous communities have been evicted from their territories and excluded from the tourist dollars that flow into high-end lodges and safari companies.

Protected areas with wildlife are patrolled and guarded by anti-poaching rangers and are accessible only to tourists who can afford to stay in the luxury safari lodges and resorts. This model of “fortress conservation” – one that militarizes and privatizes the commons – has come under severe criticism for its exclusionary practices and for being less effective than the models where local communities lead and manage conservation activities.

One such controversial model of conservation in Kenya is the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT). Set up in 2004, the NRT’s stated goal is “changing the game” on conservation by supporting communities to govern their lands through the establishment of community conservancies.

Created by Ian Craig, whose family was part of the elite white minority during British colonialism, the NRT’s origins date back to the 1980s when his family-owned 62,000-acre cattle ranch was transformed into the Lewa Wildlife Conservancy. Since its founding, the NRT has set up 39 conservancies on 42,000 square kilometres (10,378,426 acres) of land in northern and coastal Kenya – nearly 8 per cent of the country’s total land area.

The communities that live on these lands are predominantly pastoralists who raise livestock for their livelihoods and have faced decades of marginalization by successive Kenyan governments. The NRT claims that its goal is to “transform people’s lives, secure peace and conserve natural resources.”

However, where the NRT is active, local communities allege that the organization has dispossessed them of their lands and deployed armed security units that have been responsible for serious human rights abuses. Whereas the NRT employs around 870 uniformed scouts, the organization’s anti-poaching mobile units, called ‘9’ teams, face allegations of extrajudicial killings and disappearances, among other abuses. These rangers are equipped with military weapons and receive paramilitary training from the Kenyan Wildlife Service Law Enforcement Academy and from 51 Degrees, a private security company run by Ian Craig’s son, Batian Craig, as well as from other private security firms. Whereas the mandate of NRT’s rangers is supposed to be anti-poaching, they are routinely involved in policing matters that go beyond that remit.

Locals allege that the NRT compels communities to set aside their best lands for the exclusive use of wildlife.

Locals have alleged the NRT’s direct involvement in conflicts between different ethnic groups, related to territorial issues and/or cattle raids. Multiple sources within the impacted communities, including members of councils of community elders, informed the Oakland Institute that as many as 76 people were killed in the Biliqo Bulesa Conservancy during inter-ethnic clashes, allegedly with the involvement of the NRT. Interviews conducted by the Institute established that 11 people have been killed in circumstances involving the conservation body. Dozens more appear to have been killed by the Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS) and other government agencies, which have been accused of abducting, disappearing, and torturing people in the name of conservation.

Over the years, conflicts over land and resources in Kenya have been exacerbated by the establishment of large ranches and conservation areas. For instance, 40 per cent of Laikipia County’s land is occupied by large ranches, controlled by just 48 individuals – most of them white landowners who own tens of thousands of acres for ranching or wildlife conservancies, which attract tourism business as well as conservation funding from international organizations.

Similarly, several game reserves and conservancies occupy over a million acres of land in the nearby Isiolo County. Land pressure was especially evident in 2017 when clashes broke out between private, mostly white ranchers, and Samburu and Pokot herders over pasture during a particularly dry spell.

But as demonstrated in the Oakland Institute’s report Stealth Game, the events of 2017 highlighted a situation that has been rampant for many years. Local communities report paying a high price for the NRT’s privatized, neo-colonial conservation model in Kenya. The loss of grazing land for pastoralists is a major challenge caused by the creation of community conservancies. Locals allege that the NRT compels communities to set aside their best lands for the exclusive use of wildlife in the name of community conservancies, and to subsequently lease it to set up tourist facilities.

Although terms like “community-driven”, “participatory”, and “local empowerment” are extensively used by the NRT and its partners, the conservancies have been allegedly set up by outside parties rather than the pastoralists themselves, who have a very limited role in negotiating the terms of these partnerships. According to several testimonies, leverage over communities occurs through corruption and co-optation of local leaders and personalities as well as the local administration.

A number of interviewees allege intimidation, including arrests and interrogation of local community members and leaders, as tactics routinely used by the NRT security personnel. Furthermore, the NRT is involved not just in conservation but also in security, management of pastureland, and livestock marketing, which according to the local communities, gives it a level of control over the region that surpasses even that of the Kenyan government. The NRT claims that these activities support communities, development projects, and help build sustainable economies, but its role is criticized by local communities and leaders.

In recent years, hundreds of locals have held protests and signed petitions against the presence of the NRT. The Turkana County Government expelled the NRT from Turkana in 2016; Isiolo’s Borana Council of Elders (BCE) and communities in Isiolo County and in Chari Ward in the Biliqo Bulesa Conservancy continue to challenge the NRT. In January 2021, the community of Gafarsa protested the NRT’s expansion into the Gafarsa rangelands of Garbatulla sub-county. And in April 2021, the Samburu Council of Elders Association, a registered institution representing the Samburu Community in four counties (Isiolo, Laikipia, Marsabit and Samburu), wrote to international NGOs and donors asking them to cease further funding and to audit the NRT’s donor-funded programmes.

A number of interviewees allege intimidation, including arrests and interrogation of local community members and leaders, as tactics routinely used by the NRT security personnel.

At the time of the writing of the report, the Oakland Institute reported that protests against the NRT were growing across the region. The organization works closely with the KWS, a state corporation under the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism whose mandate is to conserve and manage wildlife in Kenya. In July 2018, Tourism and Wildlife Cabinet Secretary Najib Balala, appointed Ian Craig and Jochen Zeitz to the KWS Board of Trustees. The inclusion of Zeitz and Craig, who actively lobby for the privatization of wildlife reserves, has been met with consternation by local environmentalists. In the case of the NRT, the relationship is mutually beneficial – several high-ranking members of the KWS have served on the NRT’s Board of Trustees.

Both the NRT and the KWS receive substantial funding from donors such as USAID, the European Union, and other Western agencies, and champion corporate partnerships in conservation. The KWS and the NRT also partner with some of the largest environmental NGOs, including The Nature Conservancy (TNC), whose corporate associates have included major polluters and firms known for their negative human rights and environmental records, such as Shell, Ford, BP, and Monsanto among others. In turn, TNC’s Regional Managing Director for Africa, Matt Brown, enjoys a seat at the table of the NRT’s Board of Directors.

Stealth Game also reveals how the NRT has allegedly participated in the exploitation of fossil fuels in Kenya. In 2015, the NRT formed a five-year, US$12 million agreement with two oil companies active in the country – British Tullow Oil and Canadian Africa Oil Corp – to establish and operate six community conservancies in Turkana and West Pokot Counties.

The NRT’s stated goal was to “help communities to understand and benefit” from the “commercialisation of oil resources”. Local communities allege that it put a positive spin on the activities of these companies to mask concerns and outstanding questions over their environmental and human rights records.

The NRT, in collaboration with big environmental organizations, epitomizes a Western-led approach to conservation that creates a profitable business but marginalizes local communities who have lived on these lands for centuries.

Despite its claims to the contrary, the NRT is yet another example of how fortress conservation, under the guise of “community-based conservation”, is dispossessing the very pastoralist communities it claims to be helping – destroying their traditional grazing patterns, their autonomy, and their lives.

The  Constitution of Kenyan  2010 and the 2016 Community Land Act recognize community land as a category of land holding and pastoralism as a legitimate livelihood system. The Act enables communities to legally register, own, and manage their communal lands. For the first three years, however, not a single community in Kenya was able to apply to have their land rights legally recognized. On 24 July 2019, over 50 representatives from 11 communities in Isiolo, Kajiado, Laikipia, Tana River, and Turkana counties were the first to attempt to register their land with the government on the basis of the Community Land Act. The communities were promised by the Ministry of Land that their applications would be processed within four months. In late 2020, the Ministry of Lands registered the land titles of II Ngwesi and Musul communities in Laikipia.

The others are still waiting to have their land registered. In October 2020, the Lands Cabinet Secretary was reported saying that only 12 counties have submitted inventories of their respective unregistered community lands in readiness for the registration process as enshrined in the law.

Community members interviewed by the Oakland Institute in the course of its research repeatedly asked for justice after years of being ignored by the Kenyan government and by the police when reporting human rights abuses and even killings of family members. The findings reported in Stealth Game require an independent investigation into the land-related grievances around all of the NRT’s community conservancies, the allegations of involvement of the NRT’s rapid response units in inter-ethnic conflict, as well as the alleged abuses and extrajudicial killings.

Pastoralists have been the custodians of wildlife for centuries – long before any NGO or conservation professionals came along. While this report focuses on the plight of the Indigenous communities in Northern Kenya, it is a reality that is all too familiar to indigenous communities the world over. In far too many places, national governments, private corporations, and large conservation groups collude in the name of conservation, not just to force Indigenous groups off their land, but to force them out of existence altogether.

Pastoralists have been the custodians of wildlife for centuries – long before any NGO or conservation professionals came along.

The latest threat comes from the so-called “30×30 initiative”, a plan under the UN’s Convention on Biological Diversity that calls for 30 per cent of the planet to be placed in protected areas – or for other effective area-based conservation measures (OECMs) –  by 2030.

The Oakland Institute’s report, Stealth Game, makes it clear that fortress conservation must be replaced by Indigenous-led conservation efforts in order to preserve the remaining biodiversity of the planet while respecting the interests, rights, and dignity of the local communities.

Continue Reading

Politics

Nashulai – A Community Conservancy With a Difference

Before Nashulai, Maasai communities around the Mara triangle were selling off their rights to live and work on their land, becoming “conservation refugees”.

Published

on

Nashulai – A Community Conservancy With a Difference
Download PDFPrint Article

The Sekenani River underwent a mammoth cleanup in May 2020, undertaken by over 100 women living in the Nashulai Conservancy area. Ten of the 18 kilometres of fresh water were cleaned of plastic waste, clothing, organic material and other rubbish that presented a real threat to the health of this life source for the community and wildlife. The river forms part of the Mara Basin and goes on to flow into Lake Victoria, which in turn feeds the River Nile.

The initiative was spearheaded by the Nashulai Conservancy — the first community-owned conservancy in the Maasai Mara that was founded in 2015 — which also provided a daily stipend to all participants and introduced them to better waste management and regeneration practices. After the cleanup, bamboo trees were planted along the banks of the river to curb soil erosion.

You could call it a classic case of “nature healing” that only the forced stillness caused by a global pandemic could bring about. Livelihoods dependent on tourism and raising cattle had all but come to a standstill and people now had the time to ponder how unpredictable life can be.

“I worry that when tourism picks up again many people will forget about all the conservation efforts of the past year,” says project officer Evelyn Kamau. “That’s why we put a focus on working with the youth in the community on the various projects and education. They’ll be the key to continuation.”

Continuation in the broader sense is what Nashulai and several other community-focused projects in Kenya are working towards — a shift away from conservation practices that push indigenous people further and further out of their homelands for profit in the name of protecting and celebrating the very nature for which these communities have provided stewardship over generations.

A reckoning

Given the past year’s global and regional conversations about racial injustice, and the pandemic that has left tourism everywhere on its knees, ordinary people in countries like Kenya have had the chance to learn, to speak out and to act on changes.

Players in the tourism industry in the country that have in the past privileged foreign visitors over Kenyans have been challenged. In mid-2020, a poorly worded social media post stating that a bucket-list boutique hotel in Nairobi was “now open to Kenyans” set off a backlash from fed-up Kenyans online.

The post referred to the easing of COVID-19 regulations that allowed the hotel to re-open to anyone already in the country. Although the hotel tried to undertake damage control, the harm was already done and the wounds reopened. Kenyans recounted stories of discrimination experienced at this particular hotel including multiple instances of the booking office responding to enquiries from Kenyan guests that rooms were fully booked, only for their European or American companions to call minutes later and miraculously find there were in fact vacancies. Many observed how rare it was to see non-white faces in the marketing of certain establishments, except in service roles.

Another conversation that has gained traction is the question of who is really benefiting from the conservation business and why the beneficiaries are generally not the local communities.

Kenyan conservationist and author Dr Mordecai Ogada has been vocal about this issue, both in his work and on social media, frequently calling out institutions and individuals who perpetuate the profit-driven system that has proven to be detrimental to local communities. In The Big Conservation Lie, his searing 2016 book co-authored with conservation journalist John Mbaria, Ogada observes, “The importance of wildlife to Kenya and the communities here has been reduced to the dollar value that foreign tourists will pay to see it.” Ogada details the use of coercion tactics to push communities to divide up or vacate their lands and abandon their identities and lifestyles for little more than donor subsidies that are not always paid in full or within the agreed time.

A colonial hangover

It is important to note that these attitudes, organizations and by extension the structure of safari tourism, did not spring up out of nowhere. At the origin of wildlife safaris on the savannahs of East Africa were the colonial-era hunting parties organised for European aristocracy and royalty and the odd American president or Hollywood actor.

Theodore Roosevelt’s year-long hunting expedition in 1909 resulted in over 500 animals being shot by his party in Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan, many of which were taken back to be displayed at the Smithsonian Institute and in various other natural history museums across the US. Roosevelt later recounted his experiences in a book and a series of lectures, not without mentioning the “savage” native people he had encountered and expressing support for the European colonization project throughout Africa.

Much of this private entertaining was made possible through “gifts” of large parcels of Kenyan land by the colonial power to high-ranking military officials for their service in the other British colonies, without much regard as to the ancestral ownership of the confiscated lands.

At the origin of wildlife safaris on the savannahs of East Africa were the colonial-era hunting parties organised for European aristocracy and royalty.

On the foundation of national parks in the country by the colonial government in the 1940s, Ogada points out the similarities with the Yellowstone National Park, “which was created by violence and disenfranchisement, but is still used as a template for fortress conservation over a century later.” In the case of Kenya, just add trophy hunting to the original model.

Today, when it isn’t the descendants of those settlers who own and run the many private nature reserves in the country, it is a party with much economic or political power tying local communities down with unfair leases and sectioning them off from their ancestral land, harsh penalties being applied when they graze their cattle on the confiscated land.

This history must be acknowledged and the facts recognised so that the real work of establishing a sustainable future for the affected communities can begin. A future that does not disenfranchise entire communities and exclude them or leave their economies dangerously dependent on tourism.

The work it will take to achieve this in both the conservation and the wider travel industry involves everyone, from the service providers to the media to the very people deciding where and how to spend their tourism money and their time.

Here’s who’s doing the work

There are many who are leading initiatives that place local communities at the centre of their efforts to curb environmental degradation and to secure a future in which these communities are not excluded. Some, like Dr Ogada, spread the word about the holes in the model adopted by the global conservation industry. Others are training and educating tourism businesses in sustainable practices.

There are many who are leading initiatives that place local communities at the centre of their efforts to curb environmental degradation.

The Sustainable Travel and Tourism Agenda, or STTA, is a leading Kenyan-owned consultancy that works with tourism businesses and associations to provide training and strategies for sustainability in the sector in East Africa and beyond. Team leader Judy Kepher Gona expresses her optimism in the organization’s position as the local experts in the field, evidenced by the industry players’ uptake of the STTA’s training programmes and services to learn how best to manage their tourism businesses responsibly.

Gona notes, “Today there are almost 100 community-owned private conservancies in Kenya which has increased the inclusion of communities in conservation and in tourism” — which is a step in the right direction.

The community conservancy

Back to Nashulai, a strong example of a community-owned conservancy. Director and co-founder Nelson Ole Reiya who grew up in the area began to notice the rate at which Maasai communities around the Mara triangle were selling or leasing off their land and often their rights to live and work on it as they did before, becoming what he refers to as “conservation refugees”.

In 2016, Ole Reiya set out to bring together his community in an effort to eliminate poverty, regenerate the ecosystems and preserve the indigenous culture of the Maasai by employing a commons model on the 5,000 acres on which the conservancy sits. Families here could have sold their ancestral land and moved away, but they have instead come together and in a few short years have done away with the fencing separating their homesteads from the open savannah. They keep smaller herds of indigenous cattle and they have seen the return of wildlife such as zebras, giraffes and wildebeest to this part of their ancient migratory route. Elephants have returned to an old elephant nursery site.

In contrast to many other nature reserves and conservancies that offer employment to the locals as hotel staff, safari guides or dancers and singers, Nashulai’s way of empowering the community goes further to diversify the economy by providing skills and education to the residents, as well as preserving the culture by passing on knowledge about environmental awareness. This can be seen in the bee-keeping project that is producing honey for sale, the kitchen gardens outside the family homes, a ranger training programme and even a storytelling project to record and preserve all the knowledge and history passed down by the elders.

They keep smaller herds of indigenous cattle and they have seen the return of wildlife such as zebras, giraffes and wildebeest to this part of their ancient migratory route.

The conservancy only hires people from within the community for its various projects, and all plans must be submitted to a community liaison officer for discussion and a vote before any work can begin.

Tourism activities within the conservancy such as stays at Oldarpoi (the conservancy’s first tented camp; more are planned), game drives and day visits to the conservation and community projects are still an important part of the story. The revenue generated by tourists and the awareness created regarding this model of conservation are key in securing Nashulai’s future. Volunteer travellers are even welcomed to participate in the less technical projects such as tree planting and river clean-ups.

Expressing his hopes for a paradigm shift in the tourism industry, Ole Reiya stresses, “I would encourage visitors to go beyond the superficial and experience the nuances of a people beyond being seen as artefacts and naked children to be photographed, [but] rather as communities whose connection to the land and wildlife has been key to their survival over time.”

Continue Reading

Politics

Battery Arms Race: Global Capital and the Scramble for Cobalt in the Congo

In the context of the climate emergency and the need for renewable energy sources, competition over the supply of cobalt is growing. This competition is most intense in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Nick Bernards argues that the scramble for cobalt is a capitalist scramble, and that there can be no ‘just’ transition without overthrowing capitalism on a global scale.

Published

on

Battery Arms Race: Global Capital and the Scramble for Cobalt in the Congo
Download PDFPrint Article

With growing attention to climate breakdown and the need for expanded use of renewable energy sources, the mineral resources needed to make batteries are emerging as a key site of conflict. In this context, cobalt – traditionally mined as a by-product of copper and nickel – has become a subject of major interest in its own right.

Competition over supplies of cobalt is intensifying. Some reports suggest that demand for cobalt is likely to exceed known reserves if projected shifts to renewable energy sources are realized. Much of this competition is playing out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The south-eastern regions of the DRC hold about half of proven global cobalt reserves, and account for an even higher proportion of global cobalt production (roughly 70 percent) because known reserves in the DRC are relatively shallow and easier to extract.

Recent high profile articles in outlets including the New York Times and the Guardian have highlighted a growing ‘battery arms race’ supposedly playing out between the West (mostly the US) and China over battery metals, especially cobalt.

These pieces suggest, with some alarm, that China is ‘winning’ this race. They highlight how Chinese dominance in battery supply chains might inhibit energy transitions in the West. They also link growing Chinese mining operations to a range of labour and environmental abuses in the DRC, where the vast majority of the world’s available cobalt reserves are located.

Both articles are right that the hazards and costs of the cobalt boom have been disproportionately borne by Congolese people and landscapes, while few of the benefits have reached them. But by subsuming these problems into narratives of geopolitical competition between the US and China and zooming in on the supposedly pernicious effects of Chinese-owned operations in particular, the ‘arms race’ narrative ultimately obscures more than it reveals.

There is unquestionably a scramble for cobalt going on. It is centered in the DRC but spans much of the globe, working through tangled transnational networks of production and finance that link mines in the South-Eastern DRC to refiners and battery manufacturers scattered across China’s industrializing cities, to financiers in London, Toronto, and Hong Kong, to vast transnational corporations ranging from mineral rentiers (Glencore), to automotive companies (Volkswagen, Ford), to electronics and tech firms (Apple). This loose network is governed primarily through an increasingly amorphous and uneven patchwork of public and private ‘sustainability’ standards. And, it plays out against the backdrop of both long-running depredations of imperialism and the more recent devastation of structural adjustment.

In a word, the scramble for cobalt is a thoroughly capitalist scramble.

*

Chinese firms do unquestionably play a major role in global battery production in general and in cobalt extraction and refining in particular. Roughly 50 percent of global cobalt refining now takes place in China. The considerable majority of DRC cobalt exports do go to China, and Chinese firms have expanded interests in mining and trading ventures in the DRC.

However, although the Chinese state has certainly fostered the development of cobalt and other battery minerals, there is as much a scramble for control over cobalt going on within China as between China and the ‘west’. There has, notably, been a wave of concentration and consolidation among Chinese cobalt refiners since about 2010. The Chinese firms operating in the DRC are capitalist firms competing with each other in important ways. They often have radically different business models. Jinchuan Group Co. Ltd and China Molybdenum, for instance, are Hong Kong Stock Exchange-listed firms with ownership shares in scattered global refining and mining operations. Jinchuan’s major mine holdings in the DRC were acquired from South African miner Metorex in 2012; China Molybdenum recently acquired the DRC mines owned by US-based Freeport-McMoRan (as the New York Times article linked above notes with concern). A significant portion of both Jinchuan Group and China Molybdenum’s revenues, though, come from speculative metals trading rather than from production. Yantai Cash, on the other hand, is a specialized refiner which does not own mining operations. Yantai is likely the destination for a good deal of ‘artisanal’ mined cobalt via an elaborate network of traders and brokers.

These large Chinese firms also are thoroughly plugged in to global networks of battery production ultimately destined, in many cases, for widely known consumer brands. They are also able to take advantage of links to global marketing and financing operations. The four largest Chinese refiners, for instance, are all listed brands on the London Metal Exchange (LME).

In the midst of increased concentration at the refining stage and concerns over supplies, several major end users including Apple, Volkswagen, and BMW have sought to establish long-term contracts directly with mining operations since early 2018. Tesla signed a major agreement with Glencore to supply cobalt for its new battery ‘gigafactories’ in 2020. Not unrelatedly, they have also developed integrated supply chain tracing systems, often dressed up in the language of ‘sustainability’ and transparency. One notable example is the Responsible Sourcing Blockchain Initiative (RSBI). This initiative between the blockchain division of tech giant IBM, supply chain audit firm RCS Global, and several mining houses, mineral traders, and automotive end users of battery materials including Ford, Volvo, Volkswagen Group, and Fiat-Chrysler Automotive Group was announced in 2019. RSBI conducted a pilot test tracing 1.5 tons of Congolese cobalt across three different continents over five months of refinement.

Major end users including automotive and electronics brands have, in short, developed increasingly direct contacts extending across the whole battery production network.

There are also a range of financial actors trying to get in on the scramble (though, as both Jinchuan and China Molybdenum demonstrate, the line between ‘productive’ and ‘financial’ capital here can be blurry). Since 2010, benchmark cobalt prices are set through speculative trading on the LME. A number of specialized trading funds have been established in the last five years, seeking to profit from volatile prices for cobalt. One of the largest global stockpiles of cobalt in 2017, for instance, was held by Cobalt 27, a Canadian firm established expressly to buy and hold physical cobalt stocks. Cobalt 27 raised CAD 200 million through a public listing on the Toronto Stock Exchange in June of 2017, and subsequently purchased 2160.9 metric tons of cobalt held in LME warehouses. There are also a growing number of exchange traded funds (ETF) targeting cobalt. Most of these ETFs seek ‘exposure’ to cobalt and battery components more generally, for instance, through holding shares in mining houses or what are called ‘royalty bearing interests’ in specific mining operations rather than trading in physical cobalt or futures. Indeed, by mid-2019, Cobalt-27 was forced to sell off its cobalt stockpile at a loss. It was subsequently bought out by its largest shareholder (a Swiss-registered investment firm) and restructured into ‘Conic’, an investment fund holding a portfolio of royalty-bearing interests in battery metals operations rather than physical metals.

Or, to put it another way, there is as much competition going on within ‘China’ and the ‘West’ between different firms to establish control over limited supplies of cobalt, and to capture a share of the profits, as between China and the ‘West’ as unitary entities.

*

Thus far, workers and communities in the Congolese Copperbelt have suffered the consequences of this scramble. They have seen few of the benefits. Indeed, this is reflective of much longer-run processes, documented in ROAPE, wherein local capital formation and local development in Congolese mining have been systematically repressed on behalf of transnational capital for decades.

The current boom takes place against the backdrop of the collapse, and subsequent privatization, of the copper mining industry in the 1990s and 2000s. In 1988, state-owned copper mining firm Gécamines produced roughly 450 000 tons of copper, and employed 30 000 people, by 2003, production had fallen to 8 000 tons and workers were owed up to 36 months of back pay. As part of the restructuring and privatization of the company, more than 10 000 workers were offered severance payments financed by the World Bank, the company was privatized, and mining rights were increasingly marketized. By most measures, mining communities in the Congolese Copperbelt are marked by widespread poverty. A 2017 survey found mean and median monthly household incomes of $USD 34.50 and $USD 14, respectively, in the region.

In the context of widespread dispossession, the DRC’s relatively shallow cobalt deposits have been an important source of livelihood activities. Estimates based on survey research suggest that roughly 60 percent of households in the region derived some income from mining, of which 90 percent worked in some form of artisanal mining. Recent research has linked the rise of industrial mining installations owned by multinational conglomerates to deepening inequality, driven in no small part by those firms’ preference for expatriate workers in higher paid roles. Where Congolese workers are employed, this is often through abusive systems of outsourcing through labour brokers.

Cobalt mining has also been linked to substantial forms of social and ecological degradation in surrounding areas, including significant health risks from breathing dust (not only to miners but also to local communities), ecological disruption and pollution from acid, dust, and tailings, and violent displacement of local communities.

The limited benefits and high costs of the cobalt boom for local people in the Congolese copperbelt, in short, are linked to conditions of widespread dispossession predating the arrival of Chinese firms and are certainly not limited to Chinese firms.

To be clear, none of this is to deny that Chinese firms have been implicated in abuses of labour rights and ecologically destructive practices in the DRC, nor that the Chinese state has clearly made strategic priorities of cobalt mining, refining, and battery manufacturing. It does not excuse the very real abuses linked to Chinese firms that European-owned ones have done many of the same things. Nor does the fact that those Chinese firms are often ultimately vendors to major US and European auto and electronic brands.

However, all of this does suggest that any diagnosis of the developmental ills, violence, ecological damage and labour abuses surrounding cobalt in the DRC that focuses specifically on the character of Chinese firms or on inter-state competition is limited at best. It gets Glencore, Apple, Tesla, and myriad financial speculators, to say nothing of capitalist relations of production generally, off the hook.

If we want to get to grips with the unfolding scramble for cobalt and its consequences for the people in the south-east DRC, we need to keep in view how the present-day scramble reflects wider patterns of uneven development under capitalist relations of production.

We should note that such narratives of a ‘new scramble for Africa’ prompted by a rapacious Chinese appetite for natural resources are not new. As Alison Ayers argued nearly a decade ago of narratives about the role of China in a ‘new scramble for Africa’, a focus on Chinese abuses means that ‘the West’s relations with Africa are construed as essentially beneficent, in contrast to the putatively opportunistic, exploitative and deleterious role of the emerging powers, thereby obfuscating the West’s ongoing neocolonial relationship with Africa’. Likewise, such accounts neglect ‘profound changes in the global political economy within which the “new scramble for Africa” is to be more adequately located’. These interventions are profoundly political, providing important forms of ideological cover for both neoliberal capitalism and for longer-run structures of imperialism.

In short, the barrier to a just transition to sustainable energy sources is not a unitary ‘China’ bent on the domination of emerging industries as a means to global hegemony. It is capitalism. Or, more precisely, it is the fact that responses to the climate crisis have thus far worked through and exacerbated the contradictions of existing imperialism and capitalist relations of production. The scramble for cobalt is a capitalist scramble, and one of many signs that there can be no ‘just’ transition without overturning capitalism and imperialism on a global scale.

This article was published in the Review of African political Economy (ROAPE).

Continue Reading

Trending