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FISHING FOR FRIENDS: Salva Kiir’s cynical flirtation with regional bodies

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FISHING FOR FRIENDS: Salva Kiir’s cynical flirtation with regional bodies
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On 8 March 2018, the Arab League’s Council of Ministers rejected South Sudan’s application for membership in the League. South Sudan’s curious application for membership in the Arab body raises eyebrows as the country is neither predominantly Muslim nor Arab. Besides, only eight out of the League’s twenty-two members are African countries; of these, seven countries (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia) are predominantly Muslim countries where Arabic is the official language. (Somalia is the only Arab League member where Arabic ceased to be an official language when the Somali language and script became more widely used officially in the 1970s.) So in terms of both religion and language, we can confidently conclude that South Sudan does not meet the conditions for membership in the Arab League.

The Republic of South Sudan ceased to be part of the Arab League when it attained independence from the Sudan in July 2011. The idea of joining the Arab League is something that never crossed the minds of most South Sudanese, including the pro-Arab Muslim minority.

The news of the rejection of South Sudan’s application came as a surprise to many South Sudanese – not because South Sudan was rejected but because nobody contemplated the application itself. This speaks volumes about how the government of President Salva Kiir could have undertaken such an important national security matter in complete secrecy. It also suggests that the people of South Sudan would not have accepted the idea of joining the Arab League, which explains the secrecy surrounding the process until the Council of Ministers broke the news. Internal as well as external national socio-economic and political/security priorities dictate membership in multilateral and regional organisations. States seek membership in multilateral organisations to satisfy their economic, security or political needs.

The Republic of South Sudan ceased to be part of the Arab League when it attained independence from the Sudan in July 2011. The idea of joining the Arab League is something that never crossed the minds of most South Sudanese, including the pro-Arab Muslim minority.

Perhaps the regime operatives confused the Arab League with the Organisation of Islamic States (OIS), which many South Sudanese Muslims would be upbeat about joining. It is, therefore, a flabbergasting turn of events that the government wants the people of South Sudan to become part of the Arab world after nearly seven decades of resisting Arab identity.

One outstanding cause for South Sudan’s secession was the definition of the Sudan along the two parameters of Islam and Arab culture. The Arab-dominated northern political elite also considered the Sudanese nationality as a transition to full integration into Arab nationhood. The first civil war (1955-1972) was secessionist in character while the second civil war (1983-2005) was for the radical transformation of the Sudanese polity.

As a nascent state, emerging from two decades of war of national liberation, South Sudan exhibited extreme conditions of fragility and instability. Its internal stability, therefore, depended on the socio-economic and political engineering processes that the government undertook internally, as well as the external diplomatic relations it constructed.

Upon attaining independence, South Sudan immediately acquired membership at the United Nations, the African Union and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). However, the internal socio-political stability could not hold and the nascent state descended into a civil war barely three years into its independence. This disturbed its internal legitimacy and so it had to rely on external legitimacy to maintain its equilibrium. This equilibrium hinged precariously on an oppressive kleptocratic totalitarian regime comprising a network of parasitic patrons and clients that fed on the dwindling oil revenues. The longer the civil war lasted, the more the system witnessed internal instability trending towards failure and collapse.

The East Africa Community (EAC), in a hushed process, admitted the Republic of South Sudan as a member in 2017. There was no internal debate in South Sudan to endorse the application for membership in the EAC.

The internal instability of the system triggered frenetic efforts to save itself. In 2016 and 2017, the system shopped for symbiotic associations as a strategy to keep itself afloat. The East Africa Community (EAC), in a hushed process, admitted the Republic of South Sudan as a member in 2017. There was no internal debate in South Sudan to endorse the application for membership in the EAC. The government of the Republic of South Sudan denied the people the opportunity to conscientise the community and its institutions. The process was rushed through the National Assembly in the heavy presence of national security officers to intimidate the legislators to meet the deadline for joining the East Africa Community Parliament. President Salva Kiir issued a republican decree appointing nine South Sudanese, all members of the ruling SPLM party (two incumbent presidential advisors and others occupied different positions in the government), to the EAC’s Legislative Assembly.

South Sudan could have been a founding member of the EAC had the British colonial administration not reversed its 1946 policy, which aimed at annexing southern Sudan to the then British East Africa. The East African countries of Uganda, Kenya and to some extent Tanzania, welcomed Southern Sudanese refugees in the first (1955-1972) and second (1983-2005) civil wars. Many of them studied and obtained skills and academic degrees in East African universities.

However, the cultural integration of ordinary South Sudanese, particularly those hailing from Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile subregions, into the East Africa Community will not be without pains and difficulties. They are oriented towards Sudanese culture with Arabic cultural and religious streaks. Nevertheless, the economic and political interests of the parasitic capitalist class in South Sudan dictated joining the East Africa Community.

In the same vein as the EAC process, the Republic of South Sudan joined the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2017. This came at a time of great social, economic and political stress in the country, the result of the civil war and the dire humanitarian situation that produced two to three million South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya.

Tens of thousands of internally displaced South Sudanese are living in squalid conditions in UN-protected areas, while many others are scattered in inaccessible bushes and swamps. The economy has collapsed – people cannot find a day’s meal without international humanitarian intervention. Some ministers in the government, members of the National Legislature and senior bureaucrats who did not send their families to cities in East Africa now prefer to send their families to refugee camps.

The government of South Sudan assented to the ICGLR Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence Pact Art 2 (106) as a survival mechanism. It is an instrument to enable the regime to obtain political security and military support from the region and from the US administration. In fact, the regime’s most important expectation of this regional support is its declaration of the SPLM/SPLA (IO) and all opposition groups opposed to Salva Kiir and his regime as “negative forces”.

On 26 January this year, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, called the South Sudan government of President Salva Kiir an “unfit partner” of the United Nations.

In this context of political survival, President Kiir has tied South Sudan to the imperialist security projects in Africa, which purportedly are aimed at combating international terrorism. However, this strategy has allowed for the extraction and plunder of minerals and other resources in the Great Lakes Region.

Exclusive clubs

Poignant to the questions I have raised above is whether or not the regional multilateral organisations, such as the EAC, IGAD, the Arab League and AU, remain exclusive clubs for leaders who have little impact on the lives of the people in their respective constituent countries. In the Horn and Great Lakes Regions of Africa, civil wars rage in South Sudan, Sudan, Somalia, DR Congo and to some extent Burundi. These wars have triggered dire humanitarian consequences; there have been large-scale human displacements and migrations to neighbouring countries with serious economic and security implications for the host countries and communities. Nevertheless, we only see the United States, in cohort with the United Kingdom, the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union, engaged in trying to quell these wars or meet the humanitarian needs of the internally displaced and the refugees. The regional multilateral organisations are completely absent in this endeavour.

The leaders of these regional multilateral bodies hold periodic summits and issue communiques after every summit that declare that they “remain seized” on South Sudan’s particular situation. Does the suffering of the people not freak out the conscience of these leaders, particularly leaders of the countries that are also experiencing civil war? I am not sure if the Arab League has ever discussed the conditions in Somalia since civil war erupted in 1991. Why then would the Arab League be concerned about South Sudan, which is a predominantly Christian, non-Arab country?

The news of South Sudan application to join the Arab League took many citizens of South Sudan by surprise. This is partly because one of the strong points for the southern Sudanese to secede from the Sudan was on account of the Arab-dominated northern Sudanese political elite’s definition of Sudan along the two parameters of Islam and Arab culture. Not just that, but also because they considered Sudanese nationality as a transition to full integration of the Africans in the Sudan into Arab nationhood,

The collapse of the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan (ARCISS) leading to the escalation of war and proliferation of opposition groups created other dynamics in the search for peace in South Sudan. The IGAD sponsored high-level revitalisation (HLRF) of the collapsed ARCISS did not make headway. The process kicked off in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in December 2017 and brokered a cessation of hostilities agreement (COH). However, before the ink could dry, the government army violated the COH signed in Addis Ababa just before Christmas 2017, suggesting that the government was not interested in peace.

The violation of COH solicited unsavoury reaction from the US administration. On 26 January this year, the US ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, called the South Sudan government of President Salva Kiir an “unfit partner” of the United Nations. These strong words speak to the growing rift between the US Government and the regime in Juba.

Egypt is only interested in the Nile waters, and has been threatening a war with Ethiopia on account of the Great Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. South Sudan is the weakest link, militarily speaking, in this confrontation, and therefore through it, membership in the Arab League would render its territory a buffer zone in the service of Egypt, the League’s most influential member.

It is worth mentioning that the Bush administration helped midwife the process that allowed the people of Southern Sudan to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination. The Obama administration had been instrumental in supporting the regime in Juba, including the continued incarceration in South Africa of Dr. Riek Machar, the leader of the armed SPLM/A (IO), in the vain belief that Riek’s absence from the region would help bring peace. This IGAD Council of Ministers Communique of 26 March echoed this belief by predicating Riek’s release on the opposition leader and former Vice President renouncing violence.

We view South Sudan’s application for membership in the Arab League in the context of the civil war in the country and the growing international isolation of Salva Kiir’s regime. South Sudan has no strategic interests in the Arab League. Therefore, the application must be viewed in the context of Kiir’s political survival in the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US support to his regime. It was a strategy to obtain other kinds of support in case the US administration pressures Kiir’s main supporter in the region, President Yoweri Museveni, to urge him to leave office.

In addition, South Sudan has an outstanding “defence pact” with Egypt to the chagrin of both the Sudan and Ethiopia. Both Egypt and Uganda have been involved in chaotic attempts to reunify the factions of the SPLM, a process started jointly in 2014 by Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi and South Africa’s African National Congress.

Therefore, admission of South Sudan into the Arab League on the recommendation of Egypt smacks of the nineteenth century Egyptian colonial adventure in the Sudan. Egypt is only interested in the Nile waters, and has been threatening a war with Ethiopia on account of the Great Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile. South Sudan is the weakest link, militarily speaking, in this confrontation, and therefore through it, membership in the Arab League would render its territory a buffer zone in the service of Egypt, the League’s most influential member. The people of South Sudan are therefore right in welcoming the rejection of South Sudan’s application for membership in the Arab League.

The next phase

President Salva Kiir did not have to subject the people of South Sudan to such national embarrassment. The 98.7% vote for secession in the referendum on self-determination in January 2011 was South Sudan’s march out of the Arab League. In fact, President Salva Kiir did not need to apply for membership in the Arab League had he implemented, without unnecessary hitches, the IGAD-brokered agreement on the resolution of conflict in South Sudan (2015).

The IGAD high-level revitalisation process (HLRF) is another opportunity for the people of South Sudan to make peace and return to stability and reconciliation. The third phase of HLRF kicked off in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, immediately after the Easter season. It is incumbent on all to give peace a chance.

The people of South Sudan have not seen meaningful peace since the nineteenth century European incursion, occupation, wars of pacification and the civil wars. The sticking point has been power-sharing and security sector reforms. It is imperative to undertake security sector reform in terms of effectiveness, proficiency and ethnic configuration. However, power-sharing during the transition and the elections are not the solution to the fundamental contradiction in the conflict.

President Kiir and his government, on the one hand, and the political and armed opposition, on the other, have to begin to think outside the box. The IGAD region or the international community will not bring peace to South Sudan. Only the people of South Sudan in their different social and political formations will bring peace if they so wish.

The IGAD region or the international community will not bring peace to South Sudan. Only the people of South Sudan in their different social and political formations will bring peace if they so wish.

The role of the region and the international community is only facilitation, nothing more. The focus, therefore, of the HLRF should not be on power-sharing but rather on how to get South Sudan and its people out of the social, economic and political avalanche. It requires a scientific understanding of the real issues facing South Sudan. This will enable the crafting of a comprehensive political programme to address the socio-economic and cultural backwardness of the people of South Sudan that play out as poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and superstition, all of which have fuelled the conflict. This requires a national government based on competence and knowledge of issues and bound only by the completion of the agreed programme to revive the economy, promote social and economic development and build physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, electric power generating plants, communication systems, etc).

It does not require patriotism to think outside the box. The situation demands both patriotism (love of the country and its people) as well as the courage to think outside the box. In his own words, President Salva Kiir, while swearing in the new Minister of Finance, admitted, “The country is broke, the pound has lost it value and South Sudanese have become the laughing stock everywhere.” These are words of the incumbent president not somebody in the opposition aspiring to replace him.

What then are we waiting for? It must be clear to all and sundry that the onus of saving the country lies in our hands. We will succeed to save this country only if we think and act outside the box. It is now or never.

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Peter Adwok Nyaba trained as a geologist and lectured in Juba and Asmara Universities. He is a trade unionist, an activist, a former commander in the SPLA, a Noma Award (1998) winner and a former minister in the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Government of the Republic of South Sudan. He is currently a member of the SPLM in Opposition.

Politics

Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.

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The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

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Politics

Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.

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“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

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Politics

The Murang’a Factor in the Upcoming Presidential Elections

The Murang’a people are really yet to decide who they are going to vote for as a president. If they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves. Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Can Jimi Wanjigi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction?

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In the last quarter of 2021, I visited Murang’a County twice: In September, we were in Kandiri in Kigumo constituency. We had gone for a church fundraiser and were hosted by the Anglican Church of Kenya’s (ACK), Kahariro parish, Murang’a South diocese. A month later, I was back, this time to Ihi-gaini deep in Kangema constituency for a burial.

The church function attracted politicians: it had to; they know how to sniff such occasions and if not officially invited, they gate-crash them. Church functions, just like funerals, are perfect platforms for politicians to exhibit their presumed piousness, generosity and their closeness to the respective clergy and the bereaved family.

Well, the other reason they were there, is because they had been invited by the Church leadership. During the electioneering period, the Church is not shy to exploit the politicians’ ambitions: they “blackmail” them for money, because they can mobilise ready audiences for the competing politicians. The politicians on the other hand, are very ready to part with cash. This quid pro quo arrangement is usually an unstated agreement between the Church leadership and the politicians.

The church, which was being fund raised for, being in Kigumo constituency, the area MP Ruth Wangari Mwaniki, promptly showed up. Likewise, the area Member of the County Assembly (MCA) and of course several aspirants for the MP and MCA seats, also showed up.

Church and secular politics often sit cheek by jowl and so, on this day, local politics was the order of the day. I couldn’t have speculated on which side of the political divide Murang’a people were, until the young man Zack Kinuthia Chief Administrative Secretary (CAS) for Sports, Culture and Heritage, took to the rostrum to speak.

A local boy and an Uhuru Kenyatta loyalist, he completely avoided mentioning his name and his “development track record” in central Kenya. Kinuthia has a habit of over-extolling President Uhuru’s virtues whenever and wherever he mounts any platform. By the time he was done speaking, I quickly deduced he was angling to unseat Wangari. I wasn’t wrong; five months later in February 2022, Kinuthia resigned his CAS position to vie for Kigumo on a Party of the National Unity (PNU) ticket.

He spoke briefly, feigned some meeting that was awaiting him elsewhere and left hurriedly, but not before giving his KSh50,000 donation. Apparently, I later learnt that he had been forewarned, ahead of time, that the people were not in a mood to listen to his panegyrics on President Uhuru, Jubilee Party, or anything associated to the two. Kinuthia couldn’t dare run on President Uhuru’s Jubilee Party. His patron-boss’s party is not wanted in Murang’a.

I spent the whole day in Kandiri, talking to people, young and old, men and women and by the time I was leaving, I was certain about one thing; The Murang’a folks didn’t want anything to do with President Uhuru. What I wasn’t sure of is, where their political sympathies lay.

I returned to Murang’a the following month, in the expansive Kangema – it is still huge – even after Mathioya was hived off from the larger Kangema constituency. Funerals provide a good barometer that captures peoples’ political sentiments and even though this burial was not attended by politicians – a few senior government officials were present though; political talk was very much on the peoples’ lips.

What I gathered from the crowd was that President Uhuru had destroyed their livelihood, remember many of the Nairobi city trading, hawking, big downtown real estate and restaurants are run and owned largely by Murang’a people. The famous Nyamakima trading area of downtown Nairobi has been run by Murang’a Kikuyus.

In 2018, their goods were confiscated and declared contrabrand by the government. Many of their businesses went under, this, despite the merchants not only, whole heartedly throwing their support to President Uhuru’s controversial re-election, but contributing handsomely to the presidential kitty. They couldn’t believe what was happening to them: “We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him.”

We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him

Last week, I attended a Murang’a County caucus group that was meeting somewhere in Gatundu, in Kiambu County. One of the clearest messages that I got from this group is that the GEMA vote in the August 9, 2022, presidential elections is certainly anti-Uhuru Kenyatta and not necessarily pro-William Ruto.

“The Murang’a people are really yet to decide, (if they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves) on who they are going to vote for as a president. And that’s why you see Uhuru is craftily courting us with all manner of promises, seductions and prophetic messages.” Two weeks ago, President Uhuru was in Murang’a attending an African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPCA) church function in Kandara constituency.

At the church, the president yet again threatened to “tell you what’s in my heart and what I believe and why so.” These prophecy-laced threats by the President, to the GEMA nation, in which he has been threatening to show them the sign, have become the butt of crude jokes among Kikuyus.

Corollary, President Uhuru once again has plucked Polycarp Igathe away from his corporate perch as Equity Bank’s Chief Commercial Officer back to Nairobi’s tumultuous governor seat politics. The first time the bespectacled Igathe was thrown into the deep end of the Nairobi murky politics was in 2017, as Mike Sonko’s deputy governor. After six months, he threw in the towel, lamenting that Sonko couldn’t let him even breathe.

Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people

“Igathe is from Wanjerere in Kigumo, Murang’a, but grew up in Ol Kalou, Nyandarua County,” one of the Mzees told me. “He’s not interested in politics; much less know how it’s played. I’ve spent time with him and confided in me as much. Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people. President Uhuru wants to use Igathe to control Nairobi. The sad thing is that Igathe doesn’t have the guts to tell Uhuru the brutal fact: I’m really not interested in all these shenanigans, leave me alone. The president is hoping, once again, to hopefully placate the Murang’a people, by pretending to front Igathe. I foresee another terrible disaster ultimately befalling both Igathe and Uhuru.”

Be that as it may, what I got away with from this caucus, after an entire day’s deliberations, is that its keeping it presidential choice close to its chest. My attempts to goad some of the men and women present were fruitless.

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest. Kiambu has produced two presidents from the same family, Nyeri one, President Mwai Kibaki, who died on April 22. The closest Murang’a came to giving the country a president was during Ken Matiba’s time in the 1990s. “But Matiba had suffered a debilitating stroke that incapacitated him,” said one of the mzees. “It was tragic, but there was nothing we could do.”

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest

It is interesting to note that Jimi Wanjigi, the Safina party presidential flagbearer is from Murang’a County. His family hails from Wahundura, in Mathioya constituency. Him and Mwangi wa Iria, the Murang’a County governor are the other two Murang’a prominent persons who have tossed themselves into the presidential race. Wa Iria’s bid which was announced at the beginning of 2022, seems to have stagnated, while Jimi’s seems to be gathering storm.

Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Jimi’s campaign team has crafted a two-pronged strategy that it hopes will endear Kenyans to his presidency. One, a generational, paradigm shift, especially among the youth, targeting mostly post-secondary, tertiary college and university students.

“We believe this group of voters who are basically between the ages of 18–27 years and who comprise more than 65 per cent of total registered voters are the key to turning this election,” said one of his presidential campaign team members. “It matters most how you craft the political message to capture their attention.” So, branding his key message as itwika, it is meant to orchestrate a break from past electoral behaviour that is pegged on traditional ethnic voting patterns.

The other plunk of Jimi’s campaign theme is economic emancipation, quite pointedly as it talks directly to the GEMA nation, especially the Murang’a Kikuyus, who are reputed for their business acumen and entrepreneurial skills. “What Kikuyus cherish most,” said the team member “is someone who will create an enabling business environment and leave the Kikuyus to do their thing. You know, Kikuyus live off business, if you interfere with it, that’s the end of your friendship, it doesn’t matter who you are.”

Can Jimi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction? As all the presidential candidates gear-up this week on who they will eventually pick as their running mates, the GEMA community once more shifts the spotlight on itself, as the most sought-after vote basket.

Both Raila Odinga and William Ruto coalitions – Azimio la Umoja-One Kenya and Kenya Kwanza Alliance – must seek to impress and woe Mt Kenya region by appointing a running mate from one of its ranks. If not, the coalitions fear losing the vote-rich area either to each other, or perhaps to a third party. Murang’a County, may as well, become the conundrum, with which the August 9, presidential race may yet to be unravelled and decided.

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