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COMMISSIONS OR OMISSIONS OF INQUIRY? Why Kenya has failed to address historical and other injustices

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COMMISSIONS OR OMISSIONS OF INQUIRY? Why Kenya has failed to address historical and other injustices
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Kenya experienced a protracted electoral period after the unprecedented nullification of the August 8 presidential election last year. After the Supreme Court gave its detailed ruling on September 20, the opposition leader Raila Odinga stated that if there were no reforms in the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the repeat election ordered by the Supreme Court in 60 days would not go ahead.

A majority of the Supreme Court judges said that the electoral agency had failed, neglected or refused to conduct the elections in the manner and dictates of the Constitution. Raila, therefore, argued, that the commission had to effect changes and punish those within its ranks who oversaw the illegalities and the irregularities in the August 8 presidential election.

Speaking in Kajiado County on September 10, Raila said his team was ready for the October 17 (that’s the initial date the IEBC gave) repeat presidential polls but insisted that they must be managed by a different team from the one accused of bungling the previous election. Later he started the anti-polls campaign under the mantra, “No reforms, No elections”.

One of the ways we have attempted to seek solutions to the issues facing Kenya, such as ethnic violence, marginalisation, electoral injustice, corruption and historical injustices, has been through commissions of inquiry. What became of them? Were they not effective or is it that their recommendations have not been taken seriously?

What changed? Kenya was in unchartered waters and the power struggle was escalating. Mistrust got to unmanageable levels. For Jubilee, President Uhuru Kenyatta’s party, it was not possible to get “meat from their mouth”.

Raila’s camp felt that without changes in the IEBC, the repeat polls would be rigged anyway. So why participate with a predetermined winner? The drama escalated when Raila withdrew his candidature from the repeat 26 October polls on October 10.

Why not use commissions of inquiry recommendations to solve the country’s problems? This was the Big Question in various platforms, especially on television talk shows, until the now much-talked about handshake between Uhuru and Raila on March 9 at the former’s Harambee House office.

But it is irritating because it ignores that we, as a country, have on several occasions asked ourselves this question and sought an answer to it through commissions of inquiry. Secondly, the assumption that all is well because the two leaders came together without a well structured dialogue framework does not help in solving the underlying issues.

One of the ways we have attempted to seek solutions to the issues facing Kenya, such as ethnic violence, marginalisation, electoral injustice, corruption and historical injustices, has been through commissions of inquiry. What became of them? Were they not effective or is it that their recommendations have not been taken seriously?

Commissions of inquiry in Kenya

Commissions of inquiry are ad hoc advisory bodies set up by the government to obtain information. In their work, they are expected to assess the facts and make recommendations to the government. Their primary function is to inform governments. They have been classified into two groups — based on the methods used to ascertain the facts. The first category of commissions are those charged with gathering information for policy formulation or review or to assess the functionality of a public entity. These are investigatory inquiries, and they play the same function as a researcher. Examples include the 1998 Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya, chaired by Davy Koech, which investigated the appropriateness of Kenya’s education system.

According to a report by journalist Dennis Onsaringo of the Standard last year, Oyugi was the mastermind of Ouko’s murder. “He was the trigger man, but the PS was not working alone,” he quotes Troon, who when asked whether the then president, Daniel arap Moi, knew who killed Ouko, quipped: “He is the president and his foreign affairs minister is murdered. What do you think?”

The second category comprises those charged with ascertaining the facts of a particular matter or question. They are inquisitorial inquiries. They investigate facts surrounding allegations of wrongdoing. The inquiry into the conduct of Justice Philip Tunoi, which didn’t conclude after he resigned, is a good example.

The Commissions of Inquiry Act guides the establishment of commissions of inquiry. Based on this law, the President can, whenever he considers it advisable, appoint a commission to inquire into the conduct of any individual, institution or matter.

However, it is important to note that despite the Commissions of Inquiry Amendment Act (2009) and the fact that the President appoints tribunals and commissions of inquiry, the former don’t present their findings to Parliament. For example, a tribunal investigating Justice Joseph Mutava directly recommended to President Uhuru Kenyatta that the judge be removed from office for misconduct.

The Commissions of Inquiry Amendment (2009), which gives oversight authority over these commissions to the National Assembly, states: “It shall be the duty of a commissioner, after making and subscribing the prescribed oath, to make a full, faithful and impartial inquiry into the matter into which he is commissioned to inquire, to conduct the inquiry in accordance with the directions contained in the commission and on completion of the inquiry, to report to the President and to the National Assembly, in writing, the result of the inquiry and the reasons for the conclusions arrived at.”

The key words I pick from this amendment are “full, faithful and impartial inquiry”. These are the adjectives that the National Assembly bound the commissions of inquiry with. Surprisingly, if we go by past reports, the same does not apply to Parliament in pushing for their implementation, even after this amendment.

The mover of the amendment Bill, John Olago Aluoch, the then Kisumu Town MP, noted that in the history of our country, numerous inquiries had been commissioned by the President under the provisions of Section 3 of Commissions of Inquiry Act, and based on Section 7 of that Act, the reports were presented to the President. As a result — certainly due to vested interests — the contents of these reports and their proposals have for decades remained unknown to the public. This is despite the fact that these inquiries were constituted to probe matters that were public in nature, in the “interest of the public” and funded by taxpayers’ money.

In his support for the aforementioned amendment of Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in June 2010, Budalang’i MP Ababu Namwamba said, “When you look at the history of these commissions, you see wastage of funds to the extent that you get a sneaky feeling that some of them may have been set up for no reason other than to act as cash cows.”

So, to ensure transparency of the commissions, and to fix this anomaly, Aluoch proposed the amendment to the aforementioned Section 7 that the reports be submitted to Parliament too, where they would be debated by the people’s representatives. However, we still haven’t seen much change with regards to pushing for its implementation. On the contrary, in some cases, MPs have taken sides on whether to debate a report. For example, when it came to the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) Report, legislators took political sides report is yet to be debated, despite numerous attempts.

Some of the important commissions of inquiry that have been set up over the years include: the Kenya Maize Commission; the Commission on the Law of Marriage and Divorce; the Commission of Inquiry on the Law of Insurance, popularly known as the Hancock Commission; the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into allegations involving Charles Njonjo; the Ouko Commission of Inquiry (1990-91); the Akiwumi Commission into Ethnic Violence; the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair; the Commission on Higher Education, also known as the David Koech Commission; the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law Systems of Kenya (Njonjo Land Commission) and the Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission). We also had the Krigler Commission, the Inquiry into the Death of Former Cabinet Minister George Saitoti and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, which examined historical injustices in Kenya since independence and came up with recommendations on how they might be addressed.

Commissions of inquiry in other countries

SOUTH AFRICA
Between 1995 and 2002, South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission looked into crimes committed during the apartheid regime and made its report public. The commission investigated gross human rights violations that were perpetrated by the state and its agencies between 1960 and 1994, including abductions, killings, and torture. The TRC had an annual budget of $18 million. According to the United States Institute of Peace, the report was fully endorsed by the government. President Nelson Mandela apologised to all the victims on behalf of the state. And in 2006, the government established an agency to monitor the implementation of the TRC’s recommendations, especially on reparations and exhumations. Challenges in reparation, however, persist to date.

ENGLAND
According to AfriCoG, in England, commissions of inquiry are established when there are “rumoured instances, or lapses in accepted standards of public administration and other matters causing public concern which cannot be dealt with by ordinary civil or criminal process but which require investigation to allay public anxiety.”

However, Tor Butler-Cole, in her 2004 article in the Telegraph, says that the excessive costs and the lengthy durations of public inquiries are the arguments most commonly cited against them. The Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry, for example, cost an estimated £14 million, the BSE Inquiry around £27 million.

However, Butler-Cole argues that the economic costs of a public inquiry can be overlooked if the inquiry brings about catharsis, confidence and knowledge. “It has been argued that despite these good intentions, public inquiries do not in fact lead to improvements: There are few formal mechanisms for following up the findings and recommendations of inquiries. Many of the problems identified by inquiries are cultural and demand changes in attitudes, values, beliefs, and behaviours which are difficult to prescribe in any set of recommendations.”

Commissions are not always about uncovering the truth

The Ouko Commission of Inquiry was formed to establish the truth behind the brutal murder of Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Ouko on February 13, 1990. The murder case, perhaps the most intriguing in Kenyan history, remained unsolved after the commission was disbanded midstream. A second attempt into the probe in 2010 didn’t do any better after the report was rejected by Parliament on the grounds of “a lack of unity, and disagreements within the committee”.

An examination of past inquiries – how they were conducted or wound up and how their contents were hidden – points to the fact that commissions of inquiry are often used as tools by the government to create an impression that it cares when it doesn’t. The intention is to use the commission as a cover-up so that people can “forget and move on”.

In his report, the lead investigator John Troon from Scotland Yard said that Dr. Ouko’s murder was triggered and actualised by a corruption report he was compiling, in which prominent people, including cabinet ministers, were adversely implicated. He handed over the report to the government. Interestingly, the key suspect in the murder was Internal Security Permanent Secretary Hezekiah Oyugi.

According to a report by journalist Dennis Onsaringo of the Standard last year, Oyugi was the mastermind of Ouko’s murder. “He was the trigger man, but the PS was not working alone,” he quotes Troon, who when asked whether the then president, Daniel arap Moi, knew who killed Ouko, quipped: “He is the president and his foreign affairs minister is murdered. What do you think?”

How then did we expect such a commission to produce anything? Was it, in fact, a cover up?

The story of the Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the murder of former Nyandarua North MP JM Kariuki, paints a clearer picture. The Committee’s report implicated the Interior Security Minister Mbiyu Koinange, senior police officers, the Director of CID Ignatius Iriga Nderi, the head of the General Service Unit Ben Gethi, Arthur Wanyoike Thungu (President Jomo Kenyatta’s most trusted bodyguard), Patrick Shaw and senior administrative officers and politicians. According to Charse Honsby’s Kenya: A History Since Independence, Nderi refused to cooperate, and Koinange declined to respond to the committee’s summons. Waruhiu Itote, Kenyatta’s intelligence adviser, who also headed the National Youth Service, threatened to shoot anyone who summoned him to testify.

None of the people mentioned in the Committee’s report were investigated or punished.

A colleague of mine, who is also a veteran journalist, told me the story of what actually happened. Upon completion of the hearings and compilation of the report, Elijah Mwangale, who headed the Parliamentary Select Committee, accompanied by Starehe MP Charles Rubia and Lurambi North MP Buridi Nabwera, took a copy of the document wrapped in the national flag to President Kenyatta at State House. They took photos and proceeded inside to discuss “the damn thing”, as Kenyatta called it, before tabling it in Parliament that afternoon. Rubia recounts the President saying, “If you include my bodyguard Wanyoike Thungu, and you include my Minister of State, Mbiyu Koinange, why don’t you include me there as well?”

The Big Man was obviously not happy that his men were mentioned, and that clearly pointed at who then was behind the murder of JM. (Mbiyu Koinange had adversely been mentioned in the committee’s hearings.)

“But, sorry Mr. President, your minister has been mentioned because of what we have heard. But what can we do as a committee now?” said.

“Alright, if you can remove my minister’s name from that list, you can publish the damn thing!” responded the president.

And that’s how the 38-page committee report was doctored.

The government still maintains the case is still open and that any Kenyan who might have more information can produce it. But justice delayed is justice denied, and for the family of JM, and many other Kenyans who have been affected by unresolved injustices, that remains the case.

The Commission of Inquiry on the Law of Insurance, also known as the Hancox Commission, was established in October 1986 by President Daniel arap Moi to look into the insurance industry. Its only member was Justice Allan Robin Winston Hancox, assisted by Mary Ang’awa, who is now a judge. It was never made public, and instead, was reportedly released to select insurance stakeholders. This certainly informs why the sector is captured by selected individuals/institutions. Hancox was later appointed Chief Justice in 1989. (Moi has interests in the industry, among other sectors.)

Despite President Uhuru having received the 2,200-page TJRC report as soon as he assumed office during his first term, he is yet to officially make it public – although he did made a blanket apology during his State of the Nation address in March 2015, which was a key recommendation of the TJRC. The Judiciary also apologised. However, this apology did not extend to state security agencies that have continued to commit atrocities through brutality and killings, as we saw in the 2017 electioneering period.

In his support for the aforementioned amendment of Section 7 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in June 2010, Budalang’i MP Ababu Namwamba said, “When you look at the history of these commissions, you see wastage of funds to the extent that you get a sneaky feeling that some of them may have been set up for no reason other than to act as cash cows.”

A lot of financing goes into the establishment and running of these commissions. Although this writer was not able to access the figures at the State Law Office, you would need a considerably large amount of money for transport, security, administration support for commissioners, salaries, allowances and oversight of investigations.

The commissioners and the chairman are ostensibly paid huge salaries so that they are “not easy to bribe”. Well, it could that the salary itself acts as a form of bribery to cover up the very matter under investigation. As Pravin Bowry, an expert in court procedures and rules of evidence, noted in his “An Inquiry into Commissions of Inquiry” article in the Standard on January 13, 2010, often, commissions have been used to sideline and sidestep political issues and to defuse situations. “The elongation of proceedings always hurts the country. In contrast, in a commission of inquiry recently in England, thousands of relevant documents were posted on the Internet for the concerned and interested parties to peruse and make written observations and the inquiry was concluded within a month or so,” he wrote.

An examination of past inquiries – how they were conducted or wound up and how their contents were hidden – points to the fact that commissions of inquiry are often used as tools by the government to create an impression that it cares when it doesn’t. The intention is to use the commission as a cover-up so that people can “forget and move on”. It has now become a cliché that these reports have not been implemented because of lack of political will. But do we really expect governments to find evidence against itself (it is the President who forms these commissions) and take itself to jail?

This is probably why Deputy President William Ruto, speaking at a rally in Mariakani, Kilifi County in July 2017, had the guts to say that the Jubilee government would not implement the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s recommendations because they would divide Kenyans by “re-opening old wounds”. The TJRC, it is important to note, was established in the aftermath of the 2007-08 post-election violence and was tasked with inquiring into gross violations of human rights and historical injustices that occurred in Kenya between independence on December 12, 1963 and the date when the National Accord signed on February 28, 2008.

Despite President Uhuru having received the 2,200-page TJRC report as soon as he assumed office during his first term, he is yet to officially make it public – although he did made a blanket apology during his State of the Nation address in March 2015, which was a key recommendation of the TJRC. The Judiciary also apologised. However, this apology did not extend to state security agencies that have continued to commit atrocities through brutality and killings, as we saw in the 2017 electioneering period. Various agencies have relentlessly urged the president to make the report public and to effect its recommendations in the interest of promoting peace, justice and reconciliation.

The Krigler Commission, which was chaired by the South African judge Johann Krigler, made a raft of recommendations that included the setting up of an independent agency to manage elections and an integrated and secure tallying and data transmission system to allow computerised data entry and tallying at the constituency level. These were quite progressive recommendations, which we saw being undone by Parliament just before the August 8 general election and soon after the nullification of the presidential election. Kriegler also warned against “too many electoral laws” that are too cumbersome to enforce and which allow for scapegoating.

The key to these recommendations was the implementation of Agenda Four of the National Accord, which was expected to look into long-term measures and solutions, such as constitutional, institutional and legal reforms, land reform, poverty and inequity, unemployment, particularly among the youth, consolidating national cohesion and unity, transparency and accountability and addressing impunity.

Just how independent is the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission? The Krigler report recommended that the electoral commissioner be non-partisan, However, the accounts of former Commissioner Roselyn Akombe and Chairman Wafula Chebukati in the run-up to the October 26 repeat election that some commissioners voted against certain decisions along partisan lines suggest otherwise.

The recommendation that Kenya should have an integrated and secure tallying and data transmission system wasn’t really adhered to at the execution stage, and this was the basis of the August 8 election petition, which the opposition won. Even before the repeat polls, Parliament, with a Jubilee majority, amended this provision in the Electoral Laws Act.

The Ndung’u Land Commission’s findings were aimed at reversing unlawful land-related actions and ensuring land reform through creating an enabling policy and legal framework. At the heart of the commission’s report was the recommendation that all titles for illegally acquired land be cancelled and that such land be repossessed. How well or badly this was done is another story.

The report recommended that the plethora of provisions against the involvement of public servants in elections be consolidated into one provision in the consolidated electoral law that would also bar the use of any public financial and material resources by the candidates. Despite that having been done on paper, the government went ahead to use public resources and even intimidated chiefs in the Eastern region for not campaigning for the ruling party and threatened to revisit this if or when they won the elections. The government also used state resources to run commercials during the campaign period in blatant abuse of the law.

We also had the Akiwumi Commission that was to probe the tribal clashes since 1991with a view to establishing the the immediate and underlying causes of such clashes, action taken by the police and other law enforcement agencies with respect to any incidents of crime arising out of or committed in the course of the said tribal clashes, and where such action was inadequate or insufficient, the reasons for and the level of preparedness and the effectiveness of law enforcement agencies in controlling the said tribal clashes and in preventing the occurrence of such clashes in future. The report was made public in 2002. It recommended that a number of politicians, local administration officials, and security and police officers to be investigated over their alleged roles in the clashes, which led to the deaths of more than 800 people and the displacement of some 130,000 between 1991 and 1994, according to the Commission. These recommendations were not acted on and so the country blew up in 2007/08.

The Ndung’u Land Commission’s findings were aimed at reversing unlawful land-related actions and ensuring land reform through creating an enabling policy and legal framework. At the heart of the commission’s report was the recommendation that all titles for illegally acquired land be cancelled and that such land be repossessed. How well or badly this was done is another story.

The Ndungu Commission made a far-reaching series of findings, which, if effected, could sort out the protracted land question. The findings ascribed responsibility for established wrongdoing to a number of individuals. It also made a series of recommendations intended to correct the wrongdoing; key among them was the proposal to have a task force consisting of specialists in land administration advising the Ministry of Lands on the revocation of illegally registered titles, repossession of land, measures to be taken regarding claims filed in courts, information retrieval systems for multiple purposes and the verification of registered titles. It is imperative in this regard to evaluate how the National Land Commission can better handle these functions.

These commissions clearly represent where we are and provides an answer to the question: “Which way forward for Kenya?”

As it appears, commissions of inquiry have not been successful in solving political problems in Kenya. Why so? Lack of political will. This is despite their findings, which, if incorporated in decision-making, could curb some of the problems this nation faces. The government should go back to these reports and implement their recommendations in the interest of the country.

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Eliud Kibii is a sub-editor with The Star newspaper and writes on international relations, security and electoral processes.

Politics

Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya

Somali refugees in Kenya should not be held hostage by political disagreements between Mogadishu and Nairobi but must continue to enjoy Kenya’s protection as provided for under international law.

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Dadaab: Playing Politics With the Lives of Somali Refugees in Kenya
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For several years now, Kenya has been demanding that the UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, close the expansive Dadaab refugee complex in north-eastern Kenya, citing “national security threats”. Kenya has argued, without providing sufficient proof, that Dadaab, currently home to a population of 218,000 registered refugees who are mostly from Somalia, provides a “safe haven” and a recruitment ground for al-Shabaab, the al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia that constantly carries out attacks inside Kenya. Threats to shut down have escalated each time the group has carried out attacks inside Kenya, such as following the Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Garissa University attack in 2015.

However, unlike previous calls, the latest call to close Dadaab that came in March 2021, was not triggered by any major security lapse but, rather, was politically motivated. It came at a time of strained relations between Kenya and Somalia. Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County in north-western Kenya, is mostly home to South Sudanese refugees but also hosts a significant number of Somali refugees. Kakuma has not been included in previous calls for closure but now finds itself targeted for political expediency—to show that the process of closing the camps is above board and targets all refugees in Kenya and not only those from Somalia.

That the call is politically motivated can be deduced from the agreement reached between the UNHCR and the Kenyan government last April where alternative arrangements are foreseen that will enable refugees from the East African Community (EAC) to stay. This means that the South Sudanese will be able to remain while the Somali must leave.

Security threat

Accusing refugees of being a security threat and Dadaab the operational base from which the al-Shabaab launches its attacks inside Kenya is not based on any evidence. Or if there is any concrete evidence, the Kenyan government has not provided it.

Some observers accuse Kenyan leaders of scapegoating refugees even though it is the Kenyan government that has failed to come up with an effective and workable national security system. The government has also over the years failed to win over and build trust with its Muslim communities. Its counterterrorism campaign has been abusive, indiscriminately targeting and persecuting the Muslim population. Al-Shabab has used the anti-Muslim sentiment to whip up support inside Kenya.

Moreover, if indeed Dadaab is the problem, it is Kenya as the host nation, and not the UNHCR, that oversees security in the three camps that make up the Dadaab complex. The camps fall fully under the jurisdiction and laws of Kenya and, therefore, if the camps are insecure, it is because the Kenyan security apparatus has failed in its mission to securitise them.

The terrorist threat that Kenya faces is not a refugee problem — it is homegrown. Attacks inside Kenya have been carried out by Kenyan nationals, who make up the largest foreign group among al-Shabaab fighters. The Mpeketoni attacks of 2014 in Lamu County and the Dusit D2 attack of 2019 are a testament to the involvement of Kenyan nationals. In the Mpeketoni massacre, al-Shabaab exploited local politics and grievances to deploy both Somali and Kenyan fighters, the latter being recruited primarily from coastal communities. The terrorist cell that conducted the assault on Dusit D2 comprised Kenyan nationals recruited from across Kenya.

Jubaland and the maritime border dispute 

This latest demand by the Kenyan government to close Dadaab by June 2022 is politically motivated. Strained relations between Kenya and Somalia over the years have significantly deteriorated in the past year.

Mogadishu cut diplomatic ties with Nairobi in December 2020, accusing Kenya of interfering in Somalia’s internal affairs. The contention is over Kenya’s unwavering support for the Federal Member State of Jubaland — one of Somalia’s five semi-autonomous states — and its leader Ahmed “Madobe” Mohamed Islam. The Jubaland leadership is at loggerheads with the centre in Mogadishu, in particular over the control of the Gedo region of Somalia.

Kenya has supported Jubaland in this dispute, allegedly hosting Jubaland militias inside its territory in Mandera County that which have been carrying out attacks on federal government of Somalia troop positions in the Gedo town of Beled Hawa on the Kenya-Somalia border. Dozens of people including many civilians have been killed in clashes between Jubaland-backed forces and the federal government troops.

Relations between the two countries have been worsened by the bitter maritime boundary dispute that has played out at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The latest call to close Dadaab is believed to have been largely triggered by the case at the Hague-based court, whose judgement was delivered on 12 October.  The court ruled largely in favour of Somalia, awarding it most of the disputed territory. In a statement, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta said, “At the outset, Kenya wishes to indicate that it rejects in totality and does not recognize the findings in the decision.” The dispute stems from a disagreement over the trajectory to be taken in the delimitation of the two countries’ maritime border in the Indian Ocean. Somalia filed the case at the Hague in 2014.  However, Kenya has from the beginning preferred and actively pushed for the matter to be settled out of court, either through bilateral negotiations with Somalia or through third-party mediation such as the African Union.

Kenya views Somalia as an ungrateful neighbour given all the support it has received in the many years the country has been in turmoil. Kenya has hosted hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees for three decades, played a leading role in numerous efforts to bring peace in Somalia by hosting peace talks to reconcile Somalis, and the Kenyan military, as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, has sacrificed a lot and helped liberate towns and cities. Kenya feels all these efforts have not been appreciated by Somalia, which in the spirit of good neighbourliness should have given negotiation more time instead of going to court. In March, on the day of the hearing, when both sides were due to present their arguments, Kenya boycotted the court proceedings at the 11th hour. The court ruled that in determining the case, it would use prior submissions and written evidence provided by Kenya. Thus, the Kenyan government’s latest demand to close Dadaab is seen as retaliation against Somalia for insisting on pursuing the case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Nowhere safe to return to

Closing Dadaab by June 2022 as Kenya has insisted to the UNHCR, is not practical and will not allow the dignified return of refugees. Three decades after the total collapse of the state in Somalia, conditions have not changed much, war is still raging, the country is still in turmoil and many parts of Somalia are still unsafe. Much of the south of the country, where most of the refugees in Dadaab come from, remains chronically insecure and is largely under the control of al-Shabaab. Furthermore, the risk of some of the returning youth being recruited into al-Shabaab is real.

A programme of assisted voluntary repatriation has been underway in Dadaab since 2014, after the governments of Kenya and Somalia signed a tripartite agreement together with the UNHCR in 2013. By June 2021, around 85,000 refugees had returned to Somalia under the programme, mainly to major cities in southern Somalia such as Kismayo, Mogadishu and Baidoa. However, the programme has turned out to be complicated; human rights groups have termed it as far from voluntary, saying that return is fuelled by fear and misinformation. 

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed. Most of those who were repatriated returned in 2016 at a time when pressure from the Kenyan government was at its highest, with uncertainty surrounding the future of Dadaab after Kenya disbanded its Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) and halted the registration of new refugees.

Many of the repatriated ended up in camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Somalia, with access to fewer resources and a more dangerous security situation. Somalia has a large population of 2.9 million IDPs  scattered across hundreds of camps in major towns and cities who have been displaced by conflict, violence and natural disasters. The IDPs are not well catered for. They live in precarious conditions, crowded in slums in temporary or sub-standard housing with very limited or no access to basic services such as education, basic healthcare, clean water and sanitation. Thousands of those who were assisted to return through the voluntary repatriation programme have since returned to Dadaab after they found conditions in Somalia unbearable. They have ended up undocumented in Dadaab after losing their refugee status in Kenya.  

Many refugees living in Dadaab who were interviewed by Human Rights Watch said that they had agreed to return because they feared Kenya would force them out if they stayed.

Camps cannot be a permanent settlement for refugees. Dadaab was opened 30 years ago as a temporary solution for those fleeing the war in Somalia. Unfortunately, the situation in Somalia is not changing. It is time the Kenyan government, in partnership with members of the international community, finds a sustainable, long-term solution for Somali refugees in Kenya, including considering pathways towards integrating the refugees into Kenyan society.  Dadaab could then be shut down and the refugees would be able to lead dignified lives, to work and to enjoy freedom of movement unlike today where their lives are in limbo, living in prison-like conditions inside the camps.

The proposal to allow refugees from the East African Community to remain after the closure of the camps — which will mainly affect the 130,000 South Sudanese refugees in Kakuma —  is a good gesture and a major opportunity for refugees to become self-reliant and contribute to the local economy.

Announcing the scheme, Kenya said that refugees from the EAC who are willing to stay on would be issued with work permits for free. Unfortunately, this option was not made available to refugees from Somalia even though close to 60 per cent of the residents of Dadaab are under the age of 18, have lived in Kenya their entire lives and have little connection with a country their parents escaped from three decades ago.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees. Many have also integrated fully into Kenyan society, intermarried, learnt to speak fluent Swahili and identify more with Kenya than with their country of origin.

The numbers that need to be integrated are not huge. There are around 269,000 Somali refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma. When you subtract the estimated 40,000 Kenyan nationals included in refugee data, the figure comes down to around 230,000 people. This is not a large population that would alter Kenya’s demography in any signific ant way, if indeed this isis the fear in some quarters. If politics were to be left out of the question, integration would be a viable option.

Many in Dadaab are also third generation refugees, the grandchildren of the first wave of refugees.

For decades, Kenya has shown immense generosity by hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees, and it is important that the country continues to show this solidarity. Whatever the circumstances and the diplomatic difficulties with its neighbour Somalia, Kenya should respect its legal obligations under international law to provide protection to those seeking sanctuary inside its borders. Refugees should only return to their country when the conditions are conducive, and Somalia is ready to receive them. To forcibly truck people to the border, as Kenya has threatened in the past, is not a solution. If the process of returning refugees to Somalia is not well thought out, a hasty decision will have devastating consequences for their security and well-being.

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Politics

The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio

As CARICOM countries call for more profound changes that would empower the Haitian population, Western powers offer plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country.

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The Assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and the Haitian Imbroglio
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On Wednesday 7 July 2021, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, was assassinated in his home. His wife was injured in the attack. That the president’s assassins were able to access his home posing as agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency of the United States (DEA) brought to the fore the intricate relationship between drugs, money laundering and mercenary activities in Haiti. Two days later, the government of Haiti reported that the attack had been carried out by a team of assailants, 26 of whom were Colombian. This information that ex-soldiers from Colombia were involved brought to the spotlight the ways in which Haiti society has been enmeshed in the world of the international mercenary market and instability since the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the Lavalas movement in 2004.

When the French Newspaper Le Monde recently stated that Haiti was one of the four drug hubs of the Caribbean region, the paper neglected to add the reality that as a drug hub, Haiti had become an important base for US imperial activities, including imperial money laundering, intelligence, and criminal networks. No institution in Haiti can escape this web and Haitian society is currently reeling from this ecosystem of exploitation, repression, and manipulation. Under President Donald Trump, the US heightened its opposition to the governments of Venezuela and Cuba. The mercenary market in Florida became interwoven with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the financial institutions that profited from crime syndicates that thrive on anti-communist and anti-Cuba ideas.

But even as Haitian society is reeling from intensified destabilization, the so-called Core Group (comprising of the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union, the United States, France, Spain, Canada, Germany, and Brazil) offers plans for “consensual and inclusive” government that will continue to exclude the majority of the citizens of Haiti from participating in the running of their country. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, CARICOM countries are calling for more profound changes that would empower the population while mobilizing international resources to neutralize the social power of the money launderers and oligarchs in Haitian society.

Haiti since the Duvaliers

For the past thirty-five years, the people of Haiti have yearned for a new mode of politics to transcend the dictatorship of the Duvaliers (Papa Doc and Baby Doc). The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination. Since that revolution, France and the US have cooperated to punish Haiti for daring to resist white supremacy. An onerous payment of reparations to France was compounded by US military occupation after 1915.

Under President Woodrow Wilson, the racist ideals of the US imperial interests were reinforced in Haiti in a nineteen-year military occupation that was promoted by American business interests in the country. Genocidal violence from the Dominican Republic in 1937 strengthened the bonds between militarism and extreme violence in the society. Martial law, forced labour, racism and extreme repression were cemented in the society. Duvalierism in the form of the medical doctor François Duvalier mobilized a variant of Negritude in the 50s to cement a regime of thuggery, aligned with the Cold War goals of the United States in the Caribbean. The record of the Duvalier regime was reprehensible in every form, but this kind of government received military and intelligence assistance from the United States in a region where the Cuban revolution offered an alternative. Francois Duvalier died in 1971 and was succeeded by his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, who continued the tradition of rule by violence (the notorious Tonton Macoute) until this system was overthrown by popular uprisings in 1986.

The Haitian independence struggles at the start of the 19th century had registered one of the most fundamental blows to the institutions of chattel slavery and colonial domination.

On 16 December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the presidency by a landslide in what were widely reported to be the first free elections in Haiti’s history. Legislative elections in January 1991 gave Aristide supporters a plurality in Haiti’s parliament. The Lavalas movement of the Aristide leadership was the first major antidote to the historical culture of repression and violence. The United States and France opposed this new opening of popular expression such that military intervention, supported by external forces in North America and the Organization of American States, brought militarists and drug dealers under General Joseph Raoul Cédras to the forefront of the society. The working peoples of Haiti were crushed by an alliance of local militarists, external military peacekeepers and drug dealers. The noted Haitian writer, Edwidge Danticat, has written extensively on the consequences of repeated military interventions, genocide and occupation in the society while the population sought avenues to escape these repressive orders. After the removal of the Aristide government in 2004, it was the expressed plan of the local elites and the external forces that the majority of the Haitian population should be excluded from genuine forms of participatory democracy, including elections.

Repression, imperial NGOs and humanitarian domination

The devastating earthquake of January 2010 further deepened the tragic socio-economic situation in Haiti. An estimated 230,000 Haitians lost their lives, 300,000 were injured, and more than 1.5 million were displaced as a result of collapsed buildings and infrastructure. External military interventions by the United Nations, humanitarian workers and international foundations joined in the corruption to strengthen the anti-democratic forces in Haitian society. The Clinton Foundation of the United States was complicit in imposing the disastrous presidency of Michel Martelly on Haitian society after the earthquake. The book by Jonathan Katz, The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left Behind a Disaster, provides a gripping account of the corruption in Haiti. So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

In 2015, Jovenel Moïse was elected president in a very flawed process, but was only able to take office in 2017. From the moment he entered the presidency, his administration became immersed in the anti-people traditions that had kept the ruling elites together with the more than 10,000 international NGOs that excluded Haitians from participating in the projects for their own recovery. President Moïse carved out political space in Haiti with the support of armed groups who were deployed as death squads with the mission of terrorizing popular spaces and repressing supporters of the Haitian social movement. In a society where the head of state did not have a monopoly over armed gangs, kidnappings, murder (including the killing of schoolchildren) and assassinations got out of control. Under Moïse, Haiti had become an imbroglio where the government and allied gangs organized a series of massacres in poor neighbourhoods known to host anti-government organizing, killing dozens at a time.

Moïse and the extension of repression in Haiti

Moïse remained president with the connivance of diplomats and foundations from Canada, France and the United States. These countries and their leaders ignored the reality that the Haitian elections of 2017 were so deeply flawed and violent that almost 80 per cent of Haitian voters did not, or could not, vote. Moïse, with the support of one section of the Haitian power brokers, avoided having any more elections, and so parliament became inoperative in January 2020, when the terms of most legislators expired. When mayors’ terms expired in July 2020, Moïse personally appointed their replacements. This accumulation of power by the president deepened the divisions within the capitalist classes in Haiti. Long-simmering tensions between the mulatto and black capitalists were exacerbated under Moïse who mobilized his own faction on the fact that he was seeking to empower and enrich the black majority. Thugs and armed gangs were integrated into the drug hub and money laundering architecture that came to dominate Haiti after 2004.

After the Trump administration intensified its opposition to the Venezuelan government, the political and commercial leadership in Haiti became suborned to the international mercenary and drug systems that were being mobilized in conjunction with the military intelligence elements in Florida and Colombia. President Jovenel Moïse’s term, fed by spectacular and intense struggles between factions of the looters, was scheduled to come to a legal end in February 2021. Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

So involved were the Clintons in the rot in Haiti that Politico Magazine dubbed Bill and Hilary, The King and Queen of Haiti.

Since the removal of Aristide and the marginalization of the Lavalas forces from the political arena in Haiti, the US has been more focused on strengthening the linkages between the Haitian drug lords and the money launderers in Colombia, Florida, Dominican Republic, and Venezuelan exiles. It was therefore not surprising that the mercenary industry, with its linkages to financial forces in Florida, has been implicated in the assassination of President Moïse. The Core Group of Canada, France and the US has not once sought to deploy the resources of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to penetrate the interconnections between politicians in Haiti and the international money laundering and mercenary market.

Working for democratic transition in Haiti

The usual handlers of Haitian repression created the Core Group within one month of Moïse’s assassination. Canada, France and the United States had historically been implicated in the mismanaging of Haiti along with the United Nations. Now, the three countries have mobilized the OAS (with its checkered history), Brazil and the European Union to add their weight to a new transition that will continue to exclude the majority of the people of Haiti. It has been clear that under the current system of destabilization and violence, social peace will be necessary before elections can take place in Haiti.

Moïse sought to remain in power, notwithstanding the Haitian constitution, the electoral law, or the will of the Haitian people.

The continuous infighting among the Haitian ruling elements after the assassination was temporarily resolved at the end of July when Ariel Henry was confirmed by the US and France as Prime Minister. Henry had been designated as prime minister by Moïse days before his assassination. The popular groups in Haiti that had opposed Moïse considered the confirmation of Ariel Henry as a slap in the face because they had been demonstrating for the past four years for a more robust change to the political landscape. These organizations mobilized in what they called the Commission, (a gathering of civil society groups and political parties with more than 150 members), and had been holding marathon meetings to publicly work out what kind of transitional government they would want to see. According to the New York Times, rather than a consensus, the Core Group of international actors imposed a “unilateral proposal” on the people of Haiti.

Haiti is a member of CARICOM. The Caribbean community has proposed a longer transition period overseen by CARICOM for the return of Haiti to democracy. With the experience of the UN in Haiti, the Caribbean community has, through its representative on the UN Security Council, proposed the mobilization of the peacekeeping resources and capabilities of the UN to be deployed to CARICOM in order to organize a credible transition to democracy in Haiti. The nature and manner of the assassination of President Moïse has made more urgent the need for genuine reconstruction and support for democratic transition in Haiti.

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How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya

Despite the hostile rhetoric and threats of closure, the presence of refugees in the camps in northern-eastern Kenyan has benefited the host communities.

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How Dadaab Has Changed the Fortunes of North-Eastern Kenya
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In the 1960s, Kenya had a progressive refugee policy that allowed refugees to settle anywhere in the country and to access education. This approach created in Kenya a cadre of skilled and professional refugees. However, the policy changed in the 1990s due to an overwhelming influx of refugees and asylum seekers escaping conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia and South Sudan. Kenya switched to an encampment policy for refugees, who were mainly confined to camps.

Although there are refugees living in urban and peri-urban areas elsewhere in the country, for over two decades, northern Kenya has hosted a disproportionate number of the refugees living in Kenya. The region has been home to one of the world’s largest refugee camps, with generations of lineage having an impact on the economic, social, cultural, and ecological situation of the region because of the support provided by the government and by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in education, health and security services.

Mandera and Marsabit counties, both of which boarder with Ethiopia, Wajir County which borders with both Ethiopia and Somalia and, Garissa County which borders with Somalia, have hosted refugees and migrants displaced from their countries of origin for various reasons. In 2018, the town of Moyale, which is on the Ethiopian boarder in Marsabit County, temporarily hosted over 10,000 Ethiopians escaping military operations in Ethiopia’s Moyale District.    

Elwak town in Wajir County occasionally hosts pastoralist communities from Somalia who cross into Kenya seeking pasture for their livestock. While the movement of refugees into Marsabit and Wajir counties has been of a temporary nature, Garissa County has hosted refugees for decades.

Located 70 kilometres from the border with Somalia, the Dadaab refugee complex was established in the 1990s and has three main camps: Dagahaley, Ifo, and Hagadera. Due to an increase in refugee numbers around 2011, the Kambioos refugee camp in Fafi sub-county was established to host new arrivals from Somalia and to ease pressure on the overcrowded Hagadera refugee camp. The Kambioos camp was closed in 2019 as the refugee population fell.

According to the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, and the Refugee Affairs Secretariat (RAS), the Dadaab refugee complex currently hosts over 226, 689 refugees, 98 per cent of whom are from Somalia. In 2015, the refugee population in the Dadaab refugee complex was over 300,000, larger than that of the host community. In 2012, the camp held over 400,000 refugees leading to overstretched and insufficient resources for the growing population.

Under international refugee and human rights law, the government has the sole responsibility of hosting and caring for refugees. However, there is little information regarding the investments made by the Kenyan government in the refugee sector in the north-eastern region over time. Moreover, the government’s investment in the sector is debatable since there was no proper legal framework to guide refugee operations in the early 1990s. It was only in 2006 that the government enacted the Refugee Act that formally set up the Refugee Affairs Secretariat mandated to guide and manage the refugee process in Kenya.

While the Refugee Act of 2006 places the management of refugee affairs in the hands of the national government, devolved county governments play a significant role in refugee operations. With the 2010 constitution, the devolution of social functions such as health and education has extended into refugee-hosting regions and into refugee camps. While devolution in this new and more inclusive system of governance has benefited the previously highly marginalised north-eastern region through a fairer distribution of economic and political resources, there is however little literature on how the refugees benefit directly from the county government resource allocations.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds: Mandera County alone received US$88 million in the 2015/2016 financial year, the highest allocation of funds after Nairobi and Turkana, leading to developmental improvements.

However, it can be argued that the allocation of funds from the national government to the northern frontier counties by the Kenya Commission on Revenue Allocation—which is always based on the Revenue Allocation table that prioritizes population, poverty index, land area, basic equal share and fiscal responsibility—may not have been taking the refugee population into account. According to the 2019 census, the population of Dadaab sub-county is 185,252, a figure that is well below the actual refugee population. The increase in population in the north-eastern region that is due to an increase in the refugee population calls for an increase in the allocation of devolved funds.

The three north-eastern counties are ranked among the leading recipients of devolved funds.

Dadaab refugee camp has been in the news for the wrong reasons. Security agencies blame the refugees for the increased Al Shabaab activity in Kenya, and even though these claims are disputed, the government has made moves to close down the camp. In 2016, plans to close Dadaab were blocked by the High Court which declared the proposed closure unconstitutional. In 2021, Kenya was at it again when Ministry of Interior Cabinet Secretary Fred Matiang’I tweeted that he had given the UNHCR 14 days to draw up a plan for the closure of the camp. The UNHCR and the government issued a joint statement agreeing to close the camp in June 2022.

The security rhetoric is not new. There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms. During the 554th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Forum held in November 2015, it was concluded that the humanitarian character of the Dadaab refugee camp had been compromised. The AU statements, which may have been drafted by Kenya, claimed that the attacks on Westgate Mall and Garissa University were planned and launched from within the refugee camps. These security incidents are an indication of the challenges Kenya has been facing in managing security. For example, between 2010 and 2011, there were several IED (Improvised Explosive Devices) incidents targeting police vehicles in and around Dadaab where a dozen officers were injured or killed. In October 2012, two people working for the medical charity Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in Dadaab. Local television network NTV has described the camp as “a womb of terror” and “a home for al-Shabaab operations”.

There has been a sustained campaign by Kenya to portray Dadaab as a security risk on national, regional and international platforms.

Security restrictions and violent incidents have created a challenging operational environment for NGOs, leading to the relocation of several non-local NGO staff as well as contributing to a shrinking humanitarian space. Some teachers and health workers from outside the region have refused to return to the area following terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab, leaving behind large gaps in the health, education, and nutrition sectors.

However, despite the challenging situation, the refugee camps have also brought many benefits, not only to Kenya as a country but also to the county governments and the local host communities.

Education

According to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) half the refugee population in the IGAD member states are children of school-going age, between 4 and 18 years.

In Garissa, the education sector is one of the areas that has benefited from the hosting of refugees in the county because the host community has access to schools in the refugee camps. Windle Trust, an organisation that offers scholarships to students in secondary schools and in vocational training institutes, has been offering scholarships to both the refugees and the host communities. In July 2021, over 70 students benefited from a project run by International Labour Organisations (ILO) in partnership with Garissa county governments, the East African Institute of Welding (EAIW) and the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) to give industrial welding skills to refugees and host communities.

However, despite the measures taken by the Kenyan government to enrol refugees in Kenyan schools, there is a notable gap that widens as students go through the different levels of education. Statistics show that of the school-going refugee population, only a third get access to secondary education of which a sixth get to join tertiary institutions. This is well below the government’s Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4 target that seeks to ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education. This also reflects the situation of the host community’s education uptake. Other investments in the education sector that have targeted the host communities include recruitment and deployment of early childhood education teachers to schools in the host community by UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Non-governmental/intergovernmental support 

The presence of refugees has led to NGOs setting up and running projects in the camps. According to Garissa County’s Integrated Development Plan, there are over 70 non-governmental organisations present, with the majority operating around the Dadaab refugee complex and within the host communities. The UNHCR estimates that it will require about US$149.6 million to run its operations in Dadaab Camp this year. However, as of May 2021, only US$45.6 million—31 per cent of the total amount required—had been received.

The decrease in humanitarian funding has had an impact on the livelihoods of refugees and host communities in north-eastern Kenya.  According to the World Bank, 73 per cent of the population of Garissa County live below the poverty line. In the absence of social safety nets, locals have benefited from the humanitarian operations in and around the camp. The UNHCR reports that about 40,000 Kenyan nationals within a 50km radius of the Dadaab refugee camp ended up enrolling as refugees in order to access food and other basic services in the camps.

In 2014, the UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million worth of community assets since 2011. The presence of refugees has also increased remittances from the diaspora, and there are over 50 remittance outlets operating in the Dadaab camp, increasing economic opportunities and improving services. Using 2010 as the reference year, researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

The UNHCR reported that it had supported the Kenyan community residing in the wider Daadab region in establishing over US$5 million of community assets since 2011 since 2011.

To reduce overdependence on aid and humanitarian funding in running refugee operations, the County Government of Garissa developed a Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan (GISEDP) in 2019 that provided ways of integrating refugees into the socio-economic life of the community to enhance their self-reliance. The European Union announced a Euro 5 million funding programme to support the socio-economic development plan, thus opening up opportunities for development initiatives including income generating activities such as the flourishing businesses at Hagadera market. The recent announcement of the planned closure of the camp has put these plans at risk.

A voice

The host community is increasingly involved in issues that affect both the locals living around the Dadaab refugee complex and the refugees themselves, with the voice of the community gaining prominence in decision-making regarding the county budget and sometimes even regarding NGO operations. NGOs periodically conduct needs assessments in and around the camp to guide the budgeting and planning process for subsequent years and the host community is always consulted.

Interest in governance issues has also increased. For example, between 2010 and 2015 the host community successfully lobbied for increased employment opportunities for locals in the UNHCR operations. With experience in the humanitarian field, some from within the host communities have secured positions as expatriates in international organizations across the globe, adding to increased international remittances to Garissa County.

Health

Research reveals that, compared to other pastoralist areas, health services for host communities have improved because of the presence of aid agencies in Dadaab. Hospitals managed by Médicins Sans Frontières and the International Red Cross in Dagahaley and Hagadera respectively are said to be offering better services than the sub-county hospital in Dadaab town. The two hospitals are Ministry of Health-approved vaccination centres in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite the massive investments made in the health sector by humanitarian organisations in and around Dadaab, both UNICEF and the World Health Organisation have identified the camp as an entry point for infectious diseases like polio and measles into Kenya. There was a confirmed case of WPV1 (wild poliovirus) in a 4-month-old girl from the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2013. This is a clear indication of the health risks associated with the situation.

Researchers have found that the economic benefits of the Dadaab camp to the host community amount to approximately US$14 million annually.

Other problems associated with the presence of the camps include encroachment of the refugee population on local land, leading to crime and hostility between the two communities. These conflicts are aggravated by the scramble for the little arable land available in this semi-arid region that makes it difficult to grow food and rear farm animals, leading to food shortages.

While it is important to acknowledge that progress has been made in integrating refugees into the north-eastern region, and that some development has taken place in the region, more needs to be done to realise the full potential of the region and its communities.  Kenya’s security sector should ensure that proper measures are put in place to enhance security right from the border entry point in order to weed out criminals who take advantage of Kenya’s acceptance of refugees. The country should not expel those who have crossed borders in search of refuge but should tap fully into the benefits that come with hosting refugees.

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