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WHEN THE CENTRE NO LONGER HOLDS: Kenya’s Post-2017 Economic Prospects

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Nyani haoni

While the elections that took place in Kenya this month have played out like the latest episode in a familiar political drama series, the global and regional backdrop has continued to change. The pace of transformation is increasing, the big picture is blurred, and although the 2013 cocktail of ethnic alliances remained unchanged in 2017, the winners of the contest will be governing in a world that is significantly different from the one in 2013.

There was a time when Kenya’s developmental partners presented a united front when dealing with the government of the day, especially during ruptures like the 2007-2008 post-electoral violence. Now the Western donor frontline is fragmented and China’s growing influence is based on a different geopolitical optic. The Chinese are providing a financial alternative to the hegemony of the Bretton-Woods institutions, but with a different local cost-and-benefit equation.

The Donald Trump disengagement factor should be a significant concern for a country like Kenya, but it is not likely to materialise on the scale initially anticipated. Two-thirds of the American public still supports foreign assistance even though they think their largesse is much larger than it actually is. Renewed growth and the Merkel-Macron axis are now stabilising forces of populism that were never absent but less visible within European Union nations. While the UK sorts out the Brexit problem that induced Theresa May’s awkward flirtation with Donald Trump and his proposed special trade relationship, the EU will provide a useful counterbalance.

Otherwise, all is quiet on the Western donor front, at least for the time being, as the host of international election observers in Kenya have just confirmed. In any case, Kenya’s foreign policy wonks have been adjusting to the transition to a multipolar international order for over two decades. This process remains on course, while Kenya’s geopolitical location reinforces the multilateral status quo that includes reducing levels of external donor support. That this foreign policy did not feature prominently in the campaigns is indicative of its relative priority in the larger scheme of things.

There are still important issues waiting to be addressed, as David Mondo pointed out in a recent article on the subject, including the rebalancing of relations with China. Saudi Arabia’s militant activism demands vigilance in respect to relations across the Horn of Africa region and its direct ramifications for the situation in Somalia. But most of the challenges are closer to home.

Multiple developments, from the security threats posed by non-state insurgents to the parochial influence of social media, the emergence of highly contagious disease vectors, the spread of ethnic and regional nationalism and the implications of new technologies, are driving the overall pattern of change across the world.

Multiple developments, from the security threats posed by non-state insurgents to the parochial influence of social media, the emergence of highly contagious disease vectors, the spread of ethnic and regional nationalism and the implications of new technologies, are driving the overall pattern of change across the world. The organisational structure of governance is in flux, but this has been the case in Africa since the 1970s. African states have for the most part successfully resisted and selectively curbed the international pressures from above while conceding influence to the ethnic forces from below. The only news here is the resurgence of tribal identity across other world regions.

So maybe things are not so different after all?

Think again.

Although the day-to-day realities appear to be the same, over time both forces have reduced the political space that the traditional nation-state carved out over the last five hundred years, while liberalisation has further eroded the state’s control over the economy. Supra-national organisations and transnational networks are flattening the top-down hierarchical world order from above. The influence of new and old tribes are doing the same from below; free-scale networks are spreading, and all of these changes are reducing the economic primacy the state has long enjoyed.

The import of these shifts for the landscape of eastern Africa highlights the quest to achieve a flexible balance of national governance, economic integration, and enhanced cooperation among and across local and international system scales. Somalia and other areas of cross-border turbulence are regional problems that demand regional solutions. The dynamic is the same in respect to devolution; the counties are now the focal points of local development.

The required adjustments by the state in both instances serve the national interest; the problem is that the required concessions entail conceding a degree of national-level sovereignty. This is easier said than done in a world where the nation-state and the economic agents of centralisation appear to be driving globalisation. Bigger is better is still assumed to be the policy default. The corollary assumption presumes that material progress is a function of strong leadership at the top. Imperialism was one of the more draconian examples of how this principle actually works. The nation-state has long been the repository of global power, but in today’s world the influence of political leaders at the apex of the planet’s food chain is more a mirage than reality.

History shows that authority concentrated at the centre can be very effective in the beginning, but typically ends badly. A similar hegemonic model worked for a while in Somalia, but we saw how that turned out.

That China is the reigning contemporary exemplar highlights the economic strength of the command economy, but so was Stalin’s Soviet Union once upon a time. History shows that authority concentrated at the centre can be very effective in the beginning, but typically ends badly. A similar hegemonic model worked for a while in Somalia, but we saw how that turned out. On the neoliberal side of the ideological divide, Whitehall’s entrenched control of the British homeland may result in the break-up of the United Kingdom during the coming years.

These comparisons demonstrate the limits of sustained centralisation. The predicament facing governments across the globe is how to manage the directionality of political change in a milieu where small has gone from beautiful to powerful. This is not easy in countries like Kenya where the state has long enjoyed supremacy as the only game in town.

The Jubilee Party may have gained ground, but the inevitable partisan hangover and the problems of promoting progress in a deeply polarised nation are not going away.

The morning after

Nairobi dwarfs the rest of the country economically and across most other categories. Ninety-three per cent of its households fall within the top two quintiles of the country’s wealth index and only two per cent fall within the bottom twenty per cent, according to the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey.

Contemporary Kenya presents a distinctively problematic socio-economic equation. Its relatively sophisticated private sector is offset by problems of extreme poverty, endemic corruption, declining agricultural productivity, increasing seasonal water shortages in high rainfall areas, vulnerability to the effects of climate change, undiminished security challenges, and a perverse combination of reduced funding for civil society and sustained support for an ineffective military counterterrorism strategy.

Urban areas across the world are by definition more prosperous than the rural hinterland. But in this case the wealth concentrated in the capital translates into shortfalls elsewhere. No other city in Kenya really qualifies as a sectoral hub in comparison, and even though Mombasa and Nakuru formerly enjoyed this status due to the port and agricultural processing industries, both cities’ position has eroded relative to the capital.

Nairobi disproportionally benefits from the wealth generated in the countryside even though its contribution to the national economy in the form of industrial production is stagnant. Ownership of mobile phones and radios are the only exception to the pattern of material consumption for rural Kenya.

The concentration of wealth and power in the world’s capital cities fuel growing local demands for redistributed decision-making authority, secessionist movements, and the rise of militancy on the peripheries of the state-centric system. In Kenya, extending the national infrastructure is only part of the formula for alleviating the disparities between urban centers and the hinterland. It is a routine function that governments everywhere undertake, although this has been a major selling point for the current government.

In Kenya, the country’s spatial and regional socio-economic inequality is one major divide; the other is demographic. Kenya’s population is now approaching 50 million, and has doubled since 1992. The median age is 19, and three-quarters of the population is under 30. The fertility rate has abated from the apex of 3.9 per cent per annum in 1989, but at 2.7 per cent the decline remains higher than the decrease predicted by demographic transition models.

In Africa, two decades of colonial intervention effectively redirected Africa’s historical trajectory—accelerating socio-economic change in some areas while effectively ensuring that wide expanses would sink into a state of malaise and stagnation. It will take much longer to restore the natural equilibrium turned upside down by imperial intervention.

Nairobi dwarfs the rest of the country economically and across most other categories. Ninety-three per cent of its households fall within the top two quintiles of the country’s wealth index and only two per cent fall within the bottom twenty per cent, according to the 2014 Demographic and Health Survey.

Kenya’s ongoing transition entails a gradual unwinding of the old order and the incremental redistribution of administrative decision-making and political power across local and regional system scales. The process of reconfiguration has just begun, and over time it should produce far greater benefits than the agrarian capitalism introduced by the colonial administration. Rectifying the structural inequalities it created is a prerequisite for this to happen, and this cannot occur in isolation. Overlapping economic unions like IGAD and the East African Community mark the commitment of the region’s governments to regional integration. Convergence will eventually create a more balanced and robust regional political economy. This, perhaps more than the efforts of individual governments, may prove to be the key that unlocks prosperity for this region’s surging populations. The problem is that although some of the national economies may achieve lift-off over the next decade, integration will probably take much longer. In the meantime, the new Kenyan government will inherit a politically, economically, spatially, and demographically divided land of contrasts.

Contemporary Kenya presents a distinctively problematic socio-economic equation. Its relatively sophisticated private sector is offset by problems of extreme poverty, endemic corruption, declining agricultural productivity, increasing seasonal water shortages in high rainfall areas, vulnerability to the effects of climate change, undiminished security challenges, and a perverse combination of reduced funding for civil society and sustained support for an ineffective military counterterrorism strategy.

All of these issues feed the stark realities that the new Kenyan government will have to confront once the political noise and legal controversies stirred up by the polling season subside. In a country where the recent crisis in Laikipia is only the most recent indicator of the intensifying competition over land and natural resources, Kenya’s pursuit of transformation is a race against time. The prospects for winning the race are not exactly sanguine at this juncture.

Devolution and the Vision thing

Many Kenyans retain an entrenched mentality about the developmental capacity of the central government. Despite the new constitution’s provisions for addressing structural inequalities, the ethnic power map still holds sway and manifests in the foot-dragging, revisionism, and state elites’ reluctance to embrace constitutionalism—even while devolution is opening up new pathways for problem solving, citizen participation in governance, and formerly inert communities’ developmental horizons.

In his influential work on economic history, Capitalism in the 21st Century, Thomas Picketty documents how a country’s rate of population growth translates over time into an equivalent percentage of economic growth. The corollary observation is that the government’s contribution to Kenya’s economy is actually considerably less than what the growth rates associated with the conventional indicators suggest.

The 70 per cent of Kenya’s citizens who think the country is not on the right track may discern a glimmer of hope in the technology-driven future. Innovations, like the blockchain, for example, can deliver results where previous attempts to reform the system have hit the wall of impunity and public apathy.

Vision 2030 is the latest top-down iteration of the five-year development plan. The technically well-informed document is still the grandchild of a century-old strategy that overestimates the capacity of the state relative to the pressures building up on the ground. In reality, government policy makers are banking on the prospects that an oil export boom and other extractive industries will provide an economic lifeline.

There’s nothing wrong with thinking big when conditions and resources favour implementation of visionary schemes. China became an industrial power over the course of a generation and the Americans took less time to land a man on the moon.

But historically, this region’s conditions have not been conducive to large-scale project interventions. The Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project, the latest product of this set piece way of thinking, is doomed to fail in its present form. Its planning was predicated on incorrect economic and political assumptions, including the value of the untapped crude oil justifying its US$24 billion price tag. Irrational initiatives, like the aborted plan to transport oil from Turkana in lorries, are indicative of the desperation to cash in on the fading demand for carbon energy resources. Even though it is now in limbo, the project is generating deep frictions among the communities in the areas it traverses.

The majority of Kenyans elsewhere, however, are reluctant to discriminate between the illusions spun by such “vision” statements and practical policies parlaying demographic-driven growth into economic transformation. The success of a given political party in these circumstances should not be seen as uncritical support for conventional development planning from above. Very few people bothered to read, much less debate, the Jubilee and NASA party manifestos, and Kenya’s developmental monoculture no longer holds sway in many areas.

Biological monocultures, like the fir forests in Scandinavia and the waves of amber grains spanning the American heartland, dominate in resource-rich environments. Biodiversity thrives in landscapes where climatic variation and the uneven distribution of ecological resources prevail. These initial conditions shaped the region’s cultural ecologies. Kenya’s cultural and linguistic diversity is the by-product of multiple niche adaptations. Clans served as the basic unit of economic production that merged into larger fuzzy-edged collectives that the colonials defined as tribes.

The Lamu Port and South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project, the latest product of this set piece way of thinking, is doomed to fail in its present form. Its planning was predicated on incorrect economic and political assumptions, including the value of the untapped crude oil justifying its US$24 billion price tag.

The edges became sharp and less permeable under the influence of the modern state. Three decades of reforms may have diminished the Leviathan but have left the motivations of the political class intact. The influence of neoliberal economic policies in Africa has converted the developmental focus of the post-independence era into a more transactional political economy over time. Liberalisation has also reactivated the environmental and spatial dynamics held in check by decades of centralised governance.

Infrastructure is a basic prerequisite for economic progress, as discussed in an insightful essay by Kenya’s Harvard-based Calestous Juma. Governments everywhere since antiquity have developed roads and ports. Fostering economic inclusivity is the real big project in the present Kenyan context. Enhancing the developmental capacity of county governments and empowering local aspirations to benefit from their natural resource endowments will go a long ways toward this goal.

It is not a simple matter of sharing some revenue with the counties. It follows that the current budget allocation formula favouring areas that benefitted from Kenya’s Sessional Paper No. 10 should be reviewed and adjusted as a matter of procedure. Although the county governments have issues of their own, in general they have displayed better problem-solving skills and have been more responsive to feedback and complaints than the monolithic central government.

After twenty years of failed sectoral reforms, the governor of Nyeri broke the stranglehold of the coffee barons. Now the county’s farmers are producing some of the best specialty coffees in the world. Mandera has raised water development to an unprecedented level. Kwale led the country in fiscal management, and there are many other feel-good county stories.

Despite problems of revenue generation and the duplication of services, in general devolution has been a success. And this is just the beginning. The government overseeing the second phase of the roll-out process will require a more creative mindset than what was on display during the just concluded elections if it wants to harness the energies generated and create new synergies.

Unfortunately, the winners of Kenya’s contested national elections will probably treat their victory as a mandate to conduct business as usual. This is a dilemma for counties on the margins who will continue to fight for their share of the spoils while state compradors cut deals with foreign investors. The constraints facing the counties in general reflect a yet bigger problem. Until proven otherwise, the transformational language of the victorious party’s manifesto will be seen as a smokescreen for the unrelenting appetite to eat at the centre. The violent suppression of protest and bellicose responses to criticism in general are also not consistent with a government confident of its performance and political legitimacy.

Are the nation’s political leaders capable of seeing the shape of things to come? This may not be the right question in light of the state’s tendency to shun opportunities to offset the inequities of the past.

The 70 per cent of Kenya’s citizens who think the country is not on the right track may discern a glimmer of hope in the technology-driven future. Innovations, like the blockchain, for example, can deliver results where previous attempts to reform the system have hit the wall of impunity and public apathy.

The state’s role as an agent of development may be antiquated, but its function as a vehicle for governance is likely to become even more critical as it is the one public institution with a democratically approved mandate to negotiate the relationship between society and technology-driven capitalism.

Blockchains are a peer-based accounting mechanism that gained fame for enabling the rise of crypto-currencies, such as Bitcoin and Etherium. Tech analysts believe their role in the management of commercial ledgers and financial flows also has revolutionary implications for the problems of corruption and mismanagement of public assets. Technological forces are also reconfiguring the prospects for more productive livelihoods. Data-based applications and machine-learning algorithms originally designed for large-scale technologies are now catalysing transformative efficiencies in areas such as precision agriculture, resource management, and a range of small-scale enterprises.

As Malcolm X declared, “The future belongs to those who prepare for it.” Governments that do not see the need to keep pace with these developments risk becoming irrelevant. It will be hard for policy makers to choose one set of technological innovations that improve economic productivity while rejecting others that enhance transparency and improve the management of public resources.

More devolution or the building of a Konza techcity will not alter the challenges on this front. Rather, as Professor Juma states, “new approaches will need to be pursued to ensure that the past failures of industrial policies are not repeated.” This imperative to facilitate what he describes as “adaptive open competitive and collaborative innovation ecosystems” is complicated by the looming scenario the good professor does not refer to: the fast approaching economic singularity and attendant loss of employment.

A recent article in Quartz magazine opined that Africa could suffer a forty per cent loss of it formal sector jobs to the machine economy over the next two decades. We still do not know how these fast-moving developments will impact society, but based on present evidence, I personally think the current pace of automation makes this prediction look optimistic.

The state’s role as an agent of development may be antiquated, but its function as a vehicle for governance is likely to become even more critical as it is the one public institution with a democratically approved mandate to negotiate the relationship between society and technology-driven capitalism. The implications of this remind us that despite its shortcomings, the nation-state is still the world’s most successful form of multicultural organisation.

Deep neural networks cannot replicate our uniquely human traditions of collective leadership and consultation or replace the role of a vibrant civil society. In his seminal treatise on the emergence of a distinctively African capitalism, John Illife addresses this quandary by concluding that “political skills on both sides of the state-society divide will determine whether or not African capitalism can establish itself as a creative force”.

The regime of capitalism in Kenya presently favours rent-seeking elites. Most of the key decision makers are neither creative nor visionary. After decades of accumulation where are the Kenyan Dangotes, where is the noblesse oblige?

The regime of capitalism in Kenya presently favours rent-seeking elites. Most of the key decision makers are neither creative nor visionary.

It is naive to expect that the latest government of the day will exchange its legacy of patrimonial governance for the kind of forward-looking leadership Kenya’s youth demographic deserves. But we can anticipate that the nation’s youth will assert themselves within the mix of new and existing selective forces that will begin to sort things during the run-up to the 2022 elections.

An oft-cited tech sector rule observes that just as we tend to overestimate what can be accomplished over the short term, we can also underestimate the scope of change that can occur over the longer term. In the case of Kenya, reversing the political status quo will begin with small steps. Ditching the Vision 2030 blueprint would be a good place to start. This will allow the executive to impart substance to its rhetoric of transformation by involving individual leaders from different sectors in tandem with the county governments to formulate a new vision for 2040.

Kenyans, as the 2017 World Athletic Championship once again demonstrated, may not be very competitive in the sprints, but they excel in the long distance race.

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Mr. Goldsmith is an American researcher and writer who has lived in Kenya for over 40 years.

Features

THE 21st CENTURY ECONOMY: In God We Trust, Everyone Else Bring Data

Blockchain technology has the necessary framework to address the challenge of accounting for human capital and allowing for democracy and the creation of knowledge in order to grow the economy. Argues BETTY WAITHERERO

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THE 21st CENTURY ECONOMY: In God We Trust, Everyone Else Bring Data

In a well-written article, economist David Ndii finally went on record with a counter-proposal to the Jubilee economic platform: “If knowledge and human capital are the engines of economic growth, what is the role of the foreign investment and infrastructure edifices that our governments are obsessed with?” he asked.

Dr. Ndii proposes a more realistic approach for a developing nation such as Kenya: Grow the economy by investing in both knowledge and human capital, rather than by mimicking growth seen in already developed nations that focus investments on infrastructure.

In developing countries like Kenya, the returns on government investments in infrastructure and inventory to create capital will always lag behind the initial amount invested i.e. there will be diminishing returns to scale. Ultimately, it will take Kenya a long time to recoup its investment in the standard gauge railway (SGR), for instance. As we can see currently with this particular infrastructural investment, the level of profits or benefits gained through the building of the SGR is significantly lower than the amount of money invested and will remain so for a long time. This is unhealthy growth, but expedient in the short term, in that it is convenient for the government to make such investments even when it is not necessarily wise or morally right to do so.

However, forming capital in an economy by investing in innovation and acquiring human capital – getting people to be productive and to work – will always lead or be at par in proportion to the initial amount of money or resources invested, creating constant returns to scale. Basically, an increase in investments in knowledge and human capital will cause an increase in economic productivity. This is healthy growth because knowledge is wealth, economic growth is learning, and the individual in conditions of economic and political liberty is the resource. These are uncomfortable notions that governments and people must accept before investing in knowledge; democracy must become an enabling means to ones’ productivity and livelihood, going beyond mere politics and electoral cycles.

Dr. Ndii’s explanatory narrative of how both Robert Lucas’s and Paul Romer’s models work together to generate endogenous growth allows us to understand that economic growth, for developing nations especially, is rooted in being able to account for human capital and innovation. In a nutshell, Paul Romer’s endogenous growth theory holds that it is the creation and investment in knowledge, human capital and innovation that is the more substantial contributor to economic growth.

Investing in people

For emerging economies like Kenya, endogenous growth theory and its possible application allows us to correct nearly 150 years of chasing the consequences of other nations’ economic decisions and interests. Put simply, Kenya, just like many other previously colonised African nations, has an economy that is designed to primarily serve the interests of its former coloniser. And despite the intentions of successive governments, a lack of human capital accounting (identifying, reporting and measuring the value of human resources in a country) has ensured that this economic model works to the detriment of the majority of the population.

Of all the devices created by human beings, the government is the most formidable and consequential. The government is responsible for all the best and all the worst happenings in humanity’s history, as well as for everything in between. This device has evolved over generations, taking on different forms and purposes consistent with the prevailing paradigms and needs of its wielders.

The aspirations of the Jubilee government, as expressed in its Big 4 agenda, are to spur and ignite Kenya’s economic growth by ensuring food security and universal healthcare, building affordable housing and increasing manufacturing. However, motivating an entire nation of more than 40 million people to achieve these goals demands a paradigm shift. Investing in human potential, knowledge, skills and creativity ought to be the drivers of economic growth, rather than the seemingly strict investment in state and capital assets, as is the current government’s approach.

Investing in people is not restricted to education; it includes funding for research and innovation, and also investing in information platforms, healthcare and provision of sustenance. In other words, if indeed the Jubilee government wishes to create one million jobs every year, it ought to invest in the people who will do these jobs.

The aspirations of the Jubilee government, as expressed in its Big 4 agenda, are to spur and ignite Kenya’s economic growth by ensuring food security and universal healthcare, building affordable housing and increasing manufacturing. However, motivating an entire nation of more than 40 million people to achieve these goals demands a paradigm shift.

Automation and the productivity gap

The reality is that technology and automation are putting people out of jobs already. In August this year, the Daily Nation reported that 2,792 banking staff had been laid off due to increasing automation and declining profitability – the effect of unintended consequences of the move to mobile financial applications to reach the unbanked, eliminating the need for intermediaries in the banking hall, coupled with the effects of government policies seeking to cap interest rates. This is an ironic outcome given the government’s goal of financial inclusion and greater employment.

Automation in other economies is creating a productivity gap. Increasingly, jobs that were previously done by people are being taken over by more efficient and more accurate machines and robots. This cuts across industries ranging from manufacturing to food production, leaving behind a population of people who do not have the requisite skills for jobs outside their industries. These people fall through the gaps, and remain unemployable for months or even years.

In an article published in Fortune,This is the Future of Artificial Intelligence”,

the wealthy entrepreneur and Xerion CEO, Daniel Arbess, highlighted the profound manner in which Artificial Intelligence (AI) algorithms are eating up human jobs. “Our political leaders don’t seem up to the policy challenges of job displacement — at least not yet, but the application of Big Data software algorithms is elevating decision-making precision to a whole new level, creating efficiencies, saving costs or delivering new solutions to important problems.” he wrote. “The Bank of England estimates that 48% of human workers will eventually be replaced by robotics and software automation.”

Kenya’s unemployment rate is estimated to be 11.4 per cent. This unemployment rate translates to a further 30 per cent of the population living in extreme poverty. There are many harmful social and psychological effects of short- and long-term unemployment, including alcoholism, homelessness, and rising crime, especially crimes that target more vulnerable people such as women and children.

The situation is compounded by nearly three decades of missed growth opportunities brought about by the fact that there was a lack of human capital accounting. Even at its most prosperous, Kenya’s economic policies simply assumed that jobs would be created via investment in infrastructure rather than in people. Consequently, we have a debt culture that affects the entire nation.

Furthermore, having nearly 83 per cent of the working population in the informal sector means that capital is not accessible through tax revenues – a situation that the government opted to address through new taxation aimed at mobile transactions and data. Emerging economies like Kenya need small business to thrive, but work is not forthcoming. Business opportunities are declining, incomes are diminishing and purchasing power is diminishing.

The situation is compounded by nearly three decades of missed growth opportunities brought about by the fact that there was a lack of human capital accounting. Even at its most prosperous, Kenya’s economic policies simply assumed that jobs would be created via investment in infrastructure rather than in people. Consequently, we have a debt culture that affects the entire nation.

And because the government is hoarding tenders (in July, Uhuru Kenyatta ordered a freeze on new government projects), business is hoarding opportunities and banks are hoarding finance. As productivity is constrained, banks and non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) are distributing through debt the purchasing power that businesses are not distributing through salaries.

China is doing the same on an international scale by distributing purchasing power through debt as a substitute for national economic growth. It is building infrastructure, such as highways and railways, using loans that are then spent on Chinese companies that serve China’s interests, even though the infrastructure will, hopefully, eventually benefit the debtor nation.

Human capital accounting

A lack of accounting for human capital exacerbates the situation. An economic model that seeks great investment in infrastructure in order to boost the economy but does not account for people engaging in economic activity will result in a mismatch, most graphically seen in an absence of skilled and qualified professionals adept at doing the new jobs that are created. So, without the necessary skills, the locals fall through the employment gaps, and unfortunately, foreigners, with the requisite skills, are hired.

Governments advance the welfare of citizens by establishing and executing public policy for net positive outcomes. This is conventionally done through the creation of rules and regulations, and enforcing their compliance. If viewed in technology terms, the government can be described as a protocol stack (a set of rules) that responds to any input in a prescribed manner consistent with underlying statutes. Indeed, failures in government can be spectacularly linked to the ignoring, circumvention or subversion of the procedures set forth to guide healthy operability among various constituencies and concerns among the citizenry.

Smart-law is the idea that a legal statute can be implemented as a digital computational protocol to which users can connect, execute and return results exactly according to the purpose and design of the underlying legal architecture. There are benefits to a smart-law paradigm, including the fact that it can be censorship-resistant, in that transactions cannot be altered and anyone, without restriction, can enter into those transactions; it is trustless, meaning that trust (knowing and trusting the other party to fulfil their obligations) is not necessary or required, and it does not discriminate in the manner or order of its operations.

The Kenyan government has taken action to advance citizen-centred public service delivery through a variety of channels, including deploying digital technology and establishing citizen service centres across the country. Smart-laws that can provide compliant, straightforward and predictable interactions between citizens and the bureaucracy would have a big and important role to play in this endeavour.

The world in the 21st century is one of advancement through technology. Everything has made a leap forward in one way or another through the impact of technology. It is also true that among all entities, the government remains the most obstinately slow in embracing technology and innovation.

The Kenyan government has taken action to advance citizen-centred public service delivery through a variety of channels, including deploying digital technology and establishing citizen service centres across the country. Smart-laws that can provide compliant, straightforward and predictable interactions between citizens and the bureaucracy would have a big and important role to play in this endeavour.

The time is right for the government to undergo a technology-driven transformation that it so yearns and that will bring it up to par with the industries and sectors it intends to effect. By doing so, it can unleash the potential of the 21st-century citizen.

Blockchain technology

Kenya’s recognition of blockchain technology via its Blockchain Task Force headed by Dr. Bitange Ndemo allows for a little optimism. I will provide a simple explanation for this technology. Blockchain is very often conflated with bitcoin and cryptocurrency trading. However, blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger where transactions are recorded and cannot be altered. In securing these transactions, computer processors complete complex mathematical equations which when solved are rewarded with a token. The token can bitcoin, or ethereum, all depending on which blockchain platform is being utilised.

The trading and investing of these coins by laypeople in Kenya (sometimes leading to loss of funds) is what leads both Dr. Patrick Njoroge and Dr. David Ndii to call cryptocurrency a scam. I am inclined to agree with them on the matter of how the trading is conducted in Kenya – some traders entice investors with a multi-level marketing or Ponzi-style scheme. But I disagree with a blanket declaration writing off this technology and its potential utilisation in governance and its products, the cryptocurrencies. I recently had a robust discussion with Dr. Ndii on twitter on the same matter.

It is my firm belief that blockchain technology has the necessary framework to address the challenge of accounting for human capital and allowing for democracy and the creation of knowledge in order to grow the economy.

Together with two of my colleagues, Andrew Amadi, who is a sustainable energy engineer, and Chris Daniels, who is an economist and programmer, we created the Freework Society in 2017 with the aim of achieving this particular goal through a programmable economic model built on ethereum blockchain. (Ethereum is an open-source, public, blockchain-based and distributed computing platform and operating system featuring smart contract functionality.)

It is my firm belief that blockchain technology has the necessary framework to address the challenge of accounting for human capital and allowing for democracy and the creation of knowledge in order to grow the economy.

In developing a public computing infrastructure that can implement smart-laws, and which can also account for anyone’s work and effort, and can allow for investment in innovation, we were compelled to improve the very platform we would utilise by creating a standard. This standard is called an Ethereum Improvement Proposal (EIP), which describes core protocol specifications, client application programming interface (API) and contract standards. In a nutshell, an EIP describes how the platform will function if the proposal is implemented.

In developing countries like Kenya, the returns on government investments in infrastructure and inventory to create capital will always lag behind the initial amount invested i.e. there will be diminishing returns to scale.

Our proposal is to utilise the opportunities presented on ethereum blockchain technology by creating a human capital accounting framework that provides a merit-based system of indexing human resources, knowledge and talent, and subsequently reducing market search costs and challenges to price discovery and increasing the desirability to share value, work, and assets within the economy. This proposal has been accepted and assigned Ethereum Improvement Proposal EIP1491.

EIP1491 is a proposal that intends to contribute to the development of a human capital accounting standard on blockchain. EIP1491 allows for the implementation of standard APIs for human cost accounting tokens within smart contracts. This standard provides basic functionality to discover, track and transfer the motivational hierarchy of human resources.

Whereas blockchain architecture has succeeded in the financialising of integrity by way of transparency, correspondingly real-world outcomes will be proportional to the degree of individualisation of capital by way of knowledge.

What this means in an entrepreneurial economy is that where you have employers and workers looking to exchange value (work for money) there is now a proposed standard of how to go about this, and these standard assigns unit value to the labour/work that is done, and creates a meritocracy for those who will do the work i.e. a standard unit of labour with a coefficient that assigns value via points to education, years of experience, talent, and interests.

Suppose there is an employer who wishes to have job X done by a university graduate with three years’ experience, for which he is willing to pay Y amount of money. Utilising our standard API, the employer is able to compute how many labour hours he will be required to pay for, and what exact merit the employee will have, meeting the challenge of price discovery. The employer will also reduce his market search cost because he is able to track and locate the right candidate for the job. Both employer and employee are happy with the work because both are correctly directed to the right smart contract.

For millions of people in emerging economies around the world, the potential of EIP1491 will allow for individualised agency, rather than that agency being rooted in government. As we can all agree, despite the best of intentions, governments cannot be trusted to act in the interest of citizens. The best example for this is the debt-based culture that currently runs economies.

This means that an individual’s human resource, talent, interest and work has a value that can be exchanged at will because the individual has control over his agency. He is able to turn his different trades into capital that can be exchanged directly for purchasing power.

The ability to factor in growth in a knowledge-based economy ultimately should mean that not only is unemployment impeded, but that with increased utilisation, time becomes money, waste is reduced and the incidences of unrealised potential and missed opportunities are eliminated. Total factor productivity can be achieved in a shared agency ecosystem where millions engage willingly in exchanging value propositions using their own human capital.

We invite robust engagement and discussion on this standard and its applicability, and comments on the same.

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DEPOLITICISING DEVELOPMENT: Jubilee and the Politics of Spin

The tissue that connects the depoliticisation of development, the blind deployment of technology, and the professionalisation of the cabinet is Jubilee’s shamelessness. No political party is without faults and foibles, but in Jubileeland, shamelessness has taken an insidious form. By ABDULLAHI BORU HALAKHE

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DEPOLITICISING DEVELOPMENT: Jubilee and the Politics of Spin

In the Jubilee universe, it is almost an article of faith that politics is “bad” and development is “good”. It’s not uncommon to hear President Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy President William Ruto, and high-level administration officials and their supporters’ constant put-downs directed at their opponents: “We don’t have time for politics, we are only interested in development.” They believe that the depoliticisation of development is necessary in order for them to deliver on their campaign promises.

While such a rhetorical sleight of hand is occasionally designed to silence opponents – who are supposedly opposed to development – in practice, it also reveals the Jubilee government’s limited understanding of politics. For them development is a cold, apolitical, technical exercise that is not only immune to politics, but transcends it.

More broadly, Jubilee’s politics-development dichotomy is an insidious attempt at redefining politics as criticising Jubilee, whether fairly or unfairly, and development as praising the administration, whether they are delivering or not. The net aim is to induce self-censorship among critical voices.

Techno-fallacy

Building a rhetorical firewall between development and politics is not a new idea; President Daniel arap Moi’s favourite retort when placed under pressure was “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya” (bad politics, bad life), never mind that under him, Kenya was firmly in mbaya zone. Maisha was so mbaya under Moi that economy growth was a mere 0.6 per cent when his successor Mwai Kibaki took over in 2002. Dissent was penalised and the country felt like a band that was dedicated to singing his praises. It is rather ironic that Jubilee, which would like to be remembered for good economic stewardship, would look to Moi for inspiration.

Building a rhetorical firewall between development and politics is not a new idea; President Daniel arap Moi’s favourite retort when placed under pressure was “Siasa mbaya, maisha mbaya”

The Jubilee government has also coupled the depoliticisation of development with a similar rhetoric on technology, in the process completely eviscerating nuances, complexities or grey areas when discussing public policy. You are either part of the cult of technology or you are not interested in progress.

In his book, To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism, Evgeny Morozov captures Jubilee’s approach to development: “Recasting all complex social situations either as neat problems with definite, computable solutions or as transparent and self-evident processes that can be easily optimised — if only the right algorithms are in place! — this quest is likely to have unexpected consequences that could eventually cause more damage than the problems they seek to address.”

For instance, one of Jubilee’s bright ideas of fixing the education system is to provide every child with a laptop, in line with their emphasis on learning science, technology, engineering, and mathematics as opposed to the humanities, which they see as not “marketable”. Never mind that only slightly over half of Kenya has access to electricity, that the teachers have not yet been trained or hired for the switch to using laptops, and most schools do not have computer labs. Jubilee is, after all, led by the dynamic digital duo that needs everyone to be wired.

Along with a blind faith in technology, Jubilee also regards corporate experience as a most prized asset in public appointments – as exemplified by the Harvard-educated former Barclays CEO, Adan Mohamed, who is the Cabinet Secretary for Industrialisation. For Kenyatta and his ilk, corporate experience, when coupled with technology, will fix pesky inefficiency and sloth in the public service.

This is not new; under pressure domestically from opposition groups, and externally from the Bretton Woods institutions, Moi appointed a “Dream Team” to key public offices. The officials were drawn from the private sector, international finance and development organisations. The group was led by Richard Leakey (the famous paleoanthropologist and former head of the Kenya Wildlife Service who had even formed a political party to oppose Moi in 1990s), who was appointed as the Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service. Martin Oduor-Otieno, a former director of finance and planning at Barclays Bank, was appointed as the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and Planning and Mwangazi Mwachofi, the resident representative of the South Africa-based International Finance Corporation, became the Finance Secretary.

Along with a blind faith in technology, Jubilee also regards corporate experience as a most prized asset in public appointments – as exemplified by the Harvard-educated former Barclays CEO, Adan Mohamed, who is the Cabinet Secretary for Industrialisation. For Kenyatta and his ilk, corporate experience, when coupled with technology, will fix pesky inefficiency and sloth in the public service.

While Moi was boxed into a corner and had no option but to cater to donors’ wishes, Jubilee’s appointment of well-credentialed public officials from the private sector is an attempt to demonstrate that the government is using corporate best practice principles to manage the public sector. However, the appointment of individuals with private sector or international expertise is rooted in a lack of appreciation for received bureaucratic wisdom; it is a system of faceless, unelected officials keeping the state’s institutions humming along and ensuring continuity from one administration to another.

For Jubilee, bureaucracy is a dirty word. Both under Moi and under Jubilee, the credentialed senior public officials failed to deliver, although on balance, Moi’s cabinet, which had more court poets than individuals with diplomas from good schools abroad, did better.

Grievances and greed

Jubilee’s weaponisation of optics and breathless spin was honed when Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto – the two principals in the Jubilee coalition – were indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for their alleged role in 2007-2008 violence.

Ruto and Kenyatta make an unlikely political team. The latter is a prince of Kenya’s politics and the former is a self-declared “hustler”. Even when considering Kenya’s shape-shifting political landscape and allegiances, the two couldn’t be more different.

But they were brought together by grievance and greed. They regarded their prosecution at the International Criminal Court as a witch-hunt; they argued that the two top presidential candidates during the 2007 election that led to violence and displacement were former President Mwai Kibaki and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga.

During the course of their indictments, the duo skillfully used social media and established themselves as bona fide underdogs. As a result, they refined their enduring ability to generate sometimes pugnacious, if not altogether needless, spin, which had tremendous traction with their base. Ruto and Kenyatta cast the ICC as an imperial project bent on getting them, effectively framing themselves – not those killed, maimed or displaced – as the victims of the post-election violence. Their spin was so effective that even some of the victims of the violence held “prayer rallies” for them.

In fairness, some of the reputational damage experienced by the ICC was self-inflicted. When I visited a IDP camp in Nakuru in 2011, one of the IDPs told me that the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor, Moreno Ocampo, had no time to visit them, and was busy doing safaris in Nairobi National Park.

During the course of their indictments, the duo skillfully used social media and established themselves as bona fide underdogs. As a result, they refined their enduring ability to generate sometimes pugnacious, if not altogether needless, spin, which had tremendous traction with their base. Ruto and Kenyatta cast the ICC as an imperial project bent on getting them, effectively framing themselves – not those killed, maimed or displaced – as the victims of the post-election violence.

The ICC was not the only victim of Jubilee’s rage; Raila Odinga, the cottage industry of upstart politicians, felt the full weight of Jubilee’s relentless propaganda blitzkrieg, part of it also emanating from his support for the ICC process, which Ruto, his lieutenant in 2007, interpreted as throwing him under the bus. (Ruto was a leading member of Odinga’s team during the 2007 election.)

After claiming some big domestic and foreign scalps, Jubilee started believing is own hype. While many dismissed Jubilee’s breathless social media campaigns during the elections as a passing fad once the cold reality of governing sets in, for Jubilee social media was the system. Beyond the hype, any critical assessment of Jubilee’s grand ideas, such as a 24-hour economy, 9 international standard stadia, and 21st century public transport, would show that they are all sizzle and no steak. The large-scale infrastructure projects were mostly designed as a gravy train, as the Standard Gauge Railway amply demonstrated.

Politics of shamelessness

The tissue that connects the depoliticisation of development, the blind deployment of technology, and the professionalisation of the cabinet is Jubilee’s shamelessness. No political party is without faults and foibles, but in Jubileeland, shamelessness has taken an insidious form. The shamelessness here is not the kind citizens have come to almost expect from the politicians; in Jubilee’s case, it is its modus operandi, a blunt object to hit opponents with. The lack of shame has not only been adopted by Kenyatta and Ruto, but also by their close lieutenants.

When the presidential results were announced two days after the annulled August 8, 2017 election, demonstrators and the police engaged in a running a battle in the Mathare slum in Nairobi. Police used live bullets and killed both demonstrators and bystanders. I spoke to some of the families of the victims and corroborated their stories with medical records and family witnesses.

The tissue that connects the depoliticisation of development, the blind deployment of technology, and the professionalisation of the cabinet is Jubilee’s shamelessness. No political party is without faults and foibles, but in Jubileeland, shamelessness has taken an insidious form.

But on August 12, at a press conference, the then Acting Internal Affairs Cabinet Secretary, Fred Matiangi’ denied that police had shot and killed people. He stated, “I am not aware of anyone who has been killed by live bullets in this country. Those are rumours. People who loot, break into people’s homes, burn buses are not peaceful protesters.” Yet it is not that Matiangi’ did not have access to the details of the people killed, some of whose deaths have been recorded in government hospitals and by the media and human rights groups.

Jubilee learnt some of this shameless spin from Moi’s Kanu party. In 2000, when drought was ravaging parts of Northern Kenya, the then government minister, Shariff Nassir, denied there was drought when pressed in Parliament by one of the area MPs. A few days later, the government declared a famine in Kenya.

President Kenyatta says that fighting corruption will be a key pillar of his legacy. The Auditor General’s Office has done more than any other state organ to reveal the level of corruption in government agencies through audit reports. In an ideal world, you’d think that the president would consider the Auditor General’s Office as a key ally. But the president scoffed at the Auditor General’s plan to investigate the activities of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in relation to the alleged misuse of $2 billion Eurobond cash that Kenya raised in 2014. The president was quoted telling the Auditor General, “When you say that the Eurobond money was stolen and stashed in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, are you telling me that the Kenyan government and United States have colluded?” The president then insinuated that the Auditor General, Edward Ouko, was stupid. Never mind that the president’s remarks came during a State House anti-corruption summit. It is also likely that the story of the missing Eurobond money will be the story of Jubilee’s corruption.

Lack of shame is dangerous when it comes from a place of entitlement – the #Mtado? phenomenon. Which naturally breads impunity.

David Ndii wrote, “Jomo Kenyatta’s regime was corrupt, illiberal and competent. Moi’s was corrupt, illiberal and mediocre. Kibaki’s was corrupt, liberal and competent. So, Moi scores zero out of three. Jomo scores one out of three. Kibaki scores two out of three.”

The original sin after 2010 constitution was promulgated was when a court ruled that Kenyatta and Ruto could contest the 2013 elections despite being indicted by the ICC. This officially killed Chapter Six on leadership and integrity of the Katiba, which effectively set Kenya down the path of “anything goes”.

Lack of shame is dangerous when it comes from a place of entitlement – the #Mtado? phenomenon. Which naturally breads impunity.

Kanu and Jubilee have ruled Kenya longer than any other party, and in the process have created the Kenyatta and Moi family and business dynasties. When under pressure, it is not uncommon to see Kenyatta and Jubilee seek Moi’s eternal wisdom. The visits to Moi’s home are done at the exclusion of William Ruto, which sets up 2022 neatly as the battle between the princes and the hustler.

Raila was a key player in the 2002 elections, and in 2013, Ruto was a key player in defeating Raila. In 2022, Ruto could face Raila’s fate. While Ruto’s defeat could delight many, the techno-dignified political opportunism that is Jubilee, which is illiberal, incompetent and corrupt, will endure.

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TERRORISM: Officialdom’s baffling silence in the wake of Sylvia Romano’s abduction

The potential significance of the abduction of Ms Sylvia Romano has already been pushed into the background but will this be yet another wake-up call to be ignored by the Government of Kenya. By ANDREW FRANKLIN

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TERRORISM: Officialdom’s baffling silence in the wake of Sylvia Romano’s abduction

Ms Sylvia Constanca Romano, a twenty-three year-old Italian NGO worker, was abducted on Tuesday, November 20, 2018 at 8 pm from her lodging in the remote trading centre of Chakama, located 80 km west of the Kenyan Indian Ocean resort town of Malindi in Kilifi County. Ms Romano was managing a children’s home for the Italian NGO, African Milele Onlus, and the armed men who took her were identified as being of Somali origin.

Weeks later, this Italian woman is still missing and while not immediately dismissing the involvement of Al Shabaab, the Government of Kenya is still resisting suggestions that the kidnappers were terrorists rather than ordinary thugs carrying AK-47s. Although initial reports in the Italian media were quick to blame Al Shabaab, the Italian Government just as rapidly asserted that the kidnappers were “armed herders” although, as quoted in the local media, fears were expressed that Ms Romano might have been sold on to Al Shabaab elements inside Somalia.

Italy was the preeminent colonial power in the Horn of Africa, especially in what is today effectively the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) territory, which is currently being contested by jihadists. Italy contributes paramilitary police advisors to the nine-nation European Union Mission to FGS and has trained the Somalia Government police at its base in Djibouti; Italian Navy elements have participated in anti-piracy patrols off Somalia since 2008.

In October 2018, Al Shabaab in Mogadishu targeted a convoy of Italian security personnel returning to their base with a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED). Although there were no Italian casualties, this attack on foreigners is not Shabaab’s modus operandi; the main targets of the terrorist organisation’s operations within Somalia have mainly been Somalis, although neighbouring Kenya has been a target since Operation Linda Nchi – the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia in October 2011. Some of the most deadly Al Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil include the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi in September 2013 in which 67 people lost their lives and the Garissa University College massacre in April 2015, in which 147 students were brutally gunned down.

Elsewhere in the region, the Kenya Police recently took delivery of four Italian-made utility helicopters for use in its operations domestically against terrorists. Italy’s continuing role in the war on terror within the region remains low key and its government prefers to keep it that way.

It has been confirmed that at least three of the attackers had arrived in Chakama several days earlier and had rented lodgings and apparently observed village routines, including Ms Romano’s activities. Initial reports were that five heavily armed assailants had shot wildly during the Tuesday evening attack, wounding five Kenyans before seizing the Italian; there has yet to be an explanation for the origin of AK-47s or when they were smuggled into the trading centre. According to the police, the attackers fled with their hostage using two subsequently abandoned motorbikes before crossing a major river and disappearing into a rather thick bush.

It has been confirmed that at least three of the attackers had arrived in Chakama several days earlier and had rented lodgings and apparently observed village routines, including Ms Romano’s activities. Initial reports were that five heavily armed assailants had shot wildly during the Tuesday evening attack, wounding five Kenyans before seizing the Italian…

There is no permanent police presence in Chakama, which is located in a remote area of Kilifi County. It seems that there was no organised security forces’ response during the first 24 hours following the abduction. The security forces’ operating capabilities during the hours of darkness cannot be evaluated except for certain elite units (i.e. General Service Unit [GSU] Recon and KDF Rangers and Special Forces). Regular police and Administration Police (AP) units, regardless of designation, are not trained, organised or equipped for extensive patrolling. Although police helicopters were deployed to the area, it’s unlikely that the hastily cobbled together rescue force, comprising Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) Game Rangers, KDF troops, GSU, APs and regular police, had the ability to coordinate ground forces with air support.

In fact, in the event that this was an Al Shabaab operation, the seeming reticence on the part of the security forces is understandable as it would be expected that Al Shabaab would plant IEDs and organise ambushes to slow down pursuit and inflict maximum damage on the rescuers. This is standard procedure and characteristic of all guerrillas fighting road-bound conventional forces; since 2016 Al Shabaab has been regularly ambushing KDF and/or police patrols across all five frontline counties in Kenya. Another foreseeable risk is that Al Shabaab will attempt to shoot down a police helicopter, as was reported on 2 September in the vicinity of Boni Forest in Lamu County.

Although remaining somewhat tight-lipped about the actual affiliation of the attackers, the expansion of search activities outside Kilifi County into neighbouring Lamu, specifically into Boni Forest, which straddles the Kenya-Somalia border, and the issuance of “WANTED” posters for three men of ethnic Somali origin – albeit without specific background details – point to officials believing this to have been an Al Shabaab terrorist operation. Since the kidnapping, the Kenya Police have taken more than twenty civilians in and around Chakamba into custody for questioning; the wife and brother-in-law of one of the three named suspects were arrested in Garsen in Tana River County when a telephone call was intercepted and traced back. As with the previously noted lack of explanation regarding the presence of AK-47s in Chakamba, there was no information provided as to whether the security forces were able to trace the GPS signatures of the suspects; Al Shabaab operatives would no doubt discard their phones to avoid detection. Perhaps these men are part-time insurgents or even freelancers?

Although remaining somewhat tight-lipped about the actual affiliation of the attackers, the expansion of search activities outside Kilifi County into neighbouring Lamu, specifically into Boni Forest, which straddles the Kenya-Somalia border, and the issuance of “WANTED” posters for three men of ethnic Somali origin – albeit without specific background details – point to officials believing this to have been an Al Shabaab terrorist operation.

Operation Linda Nchi and its after-effects

Operation Linda Nchi, a cross-border punitive expedition by 1,800 KDF troops, was launched on 15 October 2011 ostensibly in retaliation for alleged Al Shabaab kidnappings of Spanish MSF workers from the Dadaab refugee camp and tourists from Manda Island in Lamu, The latter attacks were eventually found to be the work of common criminals based in Ras Kamboni where pro-FGS forces hold sway. Al Shabaab’s involvement in the kidnapping of the Spanish volunteers was neither confirmed nor denied. Anecdotal evidence, however, indicates that the kidnappings within Somalia of locals has been used to raise funds not only by criminals but also by Al Shabaab, which has long made money from participating in transnational organised criminal activities, including charcoal smuggling, arms dealing, human trafficking and trade in illicit narcotics.

Al Shabaab attacks have taken place fairly regularly across the five Kenyan counties bordering Somalia, whose populations are overwhelmingly Muslim and predominately of ethnic Somali origin. Although Al Shabaab has eschewed headline-grabbing terror attacks, such as that on the Westgate mall in September 2013, its fighters regularly target police and KDF patrols, permanent security force bases, mobile telephone masts and power stations. Occasionally they also take control of villages and harangue inhabitants at night with little or no government interference. In June 2016, for instance, Al Shabaab took control of the villages of Mpeketoni and Poromoko in Lamu County and killed 60 men. The security response to this attack was dismal; there were stories of police stations in Mpeketoni being abandoned prior to the attack and villagers being left to their own devices to deal with the terrorists.

Since 2016, most professional security analysts agree that the Al Shabaab attacks have derailed devolution in the frontline counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Tana River by severing the people from administrative functions. The attacks have throttled formal economic activities and disrupted delivery of education and social and health services. Civil servants, teachers, traders and students from outside these counties fear returning there after an attack. Most of the students who survived the Garissa University College attack, for example, were relocated to campuses in other parts of the country. Many teachers have also refused to be sent to these counties for fear of being attacked by Al Shabaab. These attacks have effectively normalised a state of endemic insecurity within which police elements and KDF units are alienated from the local citizens, many of whom are not convinced that they are truly citizens of the Republic of Kenya as their regions have been systematically marginalised and neglected since independence in 1963.

Despite attempts by all parties in Nairobi to portray events in Garissa, Tana River, Mandera, Wajir and Lamu counties as merely episodic terrorism that can happen anywhere in the world, the reality is that Al Shabaab insurgents are conducting a reasonably successful, low-intensity conflict that complements its operations to defeat the Western-backed FGS based in Mogadishu. In fact, the KDF invasion of Somalia and its subsequent incorporation into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) inadvertently provided Al Shabaab opportunities to subvert the Kenyan government’s influences across the restive predominantly ethnic Somali counties, to expand recruitment, to increase revenue from transnational crime and to undermine the morale of a major troop-contributing country. Kenya, out of all the states adjacent to Somalia or involved in AMISOM, has been shown to have the most fragile domestic security architecture amidst a fractious political environment in which little or no attention is paid to matters of national insecurity.

Despite attempts by all parties in Nairobi to portray events in Garissa, Tana River, Mandera, Wajir and Lamu counties as merely episodic terrorism that can happen anywhere in the world, the reality is that Al Shabaab insurgents are conducting a reasonably successful, low-intensity conflict that complements its operations to defeat the Western-backed FGS based in Mogadishu.

The abduction of an Italian NGO worker from a remote market centre in Kilifi County, which is outside of Al Shabaab’s normal area of operations, had to have been well-researched and carefully planned. Nearly all Western states have prohibited their officials from working within the five frontline counties and tourists have been actively discouraged from visiting even popular resorts on Lamu Island. Travel advisories issued since 2012 have crippled Kenya’s tourism sectors, especially along the Coast in Malindi, Watamu, Kilifi and the beaches north of Mombasa; however foreigners like Sylvia Romano would not really have been warned off by their governments and are now the best targets available to Al Shabaab and/or disparate armed groups, including livestock raiders and poachers.

Western governments have pretty much placed most of the five frontline counties off limits to their employees and strongly discouraged their citizens from visiting them for any purposes. Al Shabaab has been very active in mainland Lamu County, which resulted in foreigners being discouraged from visiting popular locations on Lamu Island and adjoining islands. Although the UK lifted its travel advisory in May 2017, the position of the US Government and others remains oddly ambiguous.

However, Al Shabaab is considered one of the most dangerous of Al Qaeda’s global franchises; Al Qaeda cells blew up US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on 7 August 1998 and the terrorist organisation launched a suicide bomber against the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala in 2002. Simultaneously, Al Qaeda operatives unsuccessfully attempted to shoot down an El Al charter flight taking off from Mombasa. Al Qaeda has never backed away from threats to retaliate against citizens of enemy nations wherever they are located and it seems likely that Al Shabaab will expand activities wherever targets can be found.

The Italian connection

There are nearly 15,000 Italian citizens living in Malindi, Watamu and elsewhere on the Kenyan coast. The Italian government operates an official satellite tracking/space research facility just north of Malindi. During the pending festive season, hundreds more Italians will descend on an otherwise depressed holiday destination. In my view, Al Shabaab is implicitly threatening the safety of these people in order to leverage the Italian government to reduce its footprint in Mogadishu.

As with the kidnappings of foreigners in 2011, whether Al Shabaab fails to take responsibility or is ultimately found not to be culpable is less important than popular perception. The longer Sylvia Constanca Romano remains unfound, the greater the possibility that media attention, particularly in Italy, will speculate on whether Al Shabaab is involved and whether there is a link between the Italian government’s counterterrorism activities against Al Qaeda/Al Shabaab and her abduction.

Although the Chakamba market centre is several kilometres away from major Indian Ocean tourist towns, it is located in an area traversed by foreigners visiting Kenya for luxury safaris – the very same bush into which the Italian woman’s abductors fled. Whether this incident is the start of a high season offensive intended by Al Shabaab to further undermine the economy of Kilifi County cannot be ruled out. Doing so would further undermine support by the Kenyan public, especially at the coast, for KDF’s continued deployment to AMISOM, particularly if Italian security assistance to FGS is seen to falter.

So far, Nairobi’s Western allies have not extended stringent travel advisories outside of the five frontline counties but it can be expected that an unhappy outcome of yet another botched Government of Kenya anti-terrorist operation will impact negatively on economies of already shell-shocked coastal counties where there are strong undercurrents of opinion favouring self-determination and even secession.

Regardless of how this unfortunate incident plays out, the fact of its occurrence indicates that expert advice concerning best practices to respond to cross-border and even domestic attacks of this type have been ignored for more than seven years. The initial reaction to the news of the kidnapping followed the same old script in which personnel from different security forces were thrown together without appropriate training and organisation to track a small gang through unfamiliar terrain during the hours of darkness. Reports that police were detaining witnesses may mask employment by security personnel of heavy-handed and counterproductive methods, which have been the trademark of government forces since before independence in 1963.

It is notable, however, that the Kenyan government has successfully controlled the flow of information although it has to date set the narrative by avoiding any narrative. In this, the authorities have been aided by a seemingly disinterested and largely uninformed domestic media. Kenya’s mainstream press has avoided anything suggesting that the government’s war on terror, whether at home or in the near abroad, is less than a reasonable success under the circumstances. Local and international media have excluded security professionals who can document how officialdom has perversely ignored practical, common sense solutions to the myriad security issues that have evolved into a comprehensive existential threat to national security.

It is notable, however, that the Kenyan government has successfully controlled the flow of information although it has to date set the narrative by avoiding any narrative. In this the authorities have been aided by a seemingly disinterested and largely uninformed domestic media.

The potential significance of this kidnapping has already been pushed into the background; will this be yet another wake-up call to be ignored?

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