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RIDING THAT TRAIN, HIGH ON COCAINE: Standard Gauge Railways In Kenya and Tanzania

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China colonises Africa
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Kenya has both narrow and standard gauge railways running in parallel between Mombasa and Nairobi. Tanzania is gearing up to build a standard gauge line to Morogoro and beyond while it goes ahead with rehabilitating the existing metre gauge line. The SGR is portrayed as an ambitious regional policy linking the six EAC countries, but without unprecedented cross-border cooperation and financial commitments, it is likely to end up as two costly unfinished initiatives: Luxury passenger trains from Mombasa to Nairobi and Dar to Morogoro and (maybe) Dodoma. As collateral damage, these politically driven projects sound the death knell of the existing railway networks, including moribund branch-lines, which have suffered from decades of neglect and poor management.

For better or for worse, most cross-border freight will continue to be transported by road thanks to the private fleets of trucks built up during the post-liberalisation years in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

For better or for worse, most cross-border freight will continue to be transported by road thanks to the private fleets of trucks built up during the post-liberalisation years in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The political influence of the trucking lobbies will help keep the roads in a reasonable state of repair. In theory, China’s One Belt One Road initiative includes the EAC-wide SGR, but in practice the rollout of the new railway will depend on intra-EAC politics, the availability of Chinese loans, or other funding, such as a sovereign “railway bond.” Going further down this route would be a recipe for disaster.

KENYA: A NEW ‘LUNATIC EXPRESS’?

“In terms of industrialisation and job creation, the impact of the SGR will be massive.”[1]

On May 31, President Uhuru Kenyatta inaugurated the Madaraka Express, thus fulfilling one of his 2012 election promises ahead of the 2017 election. If as seems likely, he retains the presidency, he will be looking for funds to continue the Express to Naivasha and beyond. The government has sold Kenyans the notion that SGR is preferable in all respects to the existing metre gauge. It is modern, faster, safer and capable of carrying greater loads, Kenyans are told. The country’s overused and murderous roads will be given a breather as freight and passengers revert en masse to rail.

Implausibly large increases in freight are required to justify the costs involved, particularly if the SGR is to extend beyond Nairobi. At $3.8 billion, the first section of the SGR is considered highly overpriced

More sober analysis suggests that, beyond short-term gains in terms of greater customer convenience, the SGR is likely to be economically and financially unviable. Implausibly large increases in freight are required to justify the costs involved, particularly if the SGR is to extend beyond Nairobi. At $3.8 billion, the first section of the SGR is considered highly overpriced.[2] To continue the line from Nairobi to the Ugandan border would cost an additional $7.2 billion, nearly double the cost of the Mombasa-Nairobi stretch.[3] Speed is not a key issue for freight, which is where the potential profits lie. What matters is cost, predictability and reliability.[4] For the projected freight volumes and axle loads, upgrading the metre gauge would have been quite adequate, some argue, at a fraction of the cost of SGR, and could have been entirely financed through the Railway Development Levy on imports.[5] SGR’s purported advantages over other gauges have been over-hyped: Brazil and South Africa move much more freight than the EAC is ever likely to with metre gauge and Cape Gauge respectively. As to being modern, the standard gauge has been around since the 1840s, when the US government declared it as the standard to be followed in all future railway construction for interconnectivity purposes.[6]

Currently, 95% of the freight leaving Mombasa goes by road and three-quarters of all freight is destined for Nairobi. Extending the SGR beyond Nairobi is unlikely to be economically viable. Trains cannot compete with trucks for scattered destinations in Kenya and further afield.[7] Last, anything near the cost of the Mombasa to Nairobi line ($5.6 million per kilometre) would be difficult to sell to Kenyans or potential financiers, and a more reasonable construction cost per km would lay bare the rip-off of SGR Part 1.

Qalaa Holdings, the main Rift Valley Railway (RVR) concessionaire, are rightly worried that the SGR will put them out of business. In 2014, RVR received a $70 million loan from a consortium of international financing agencies, as part of their $287 million financing plan for the period 2011-16. Though progress has been slow, RVR has at least increased its freight volumes, from under a million tonnes in 2012 to 1.5 million tonnes in 2014.[8] In April, Kenya Railways Corporation served RVR with a termination notice for failing to pay fees and missing performance targets.[9] Uganda is also terminating its agreement with RVR, who are likely to sue the GoK /GoU for the loss of business occasioned by the opening of the new line.[10]

By the standards of political corruption in Kenya, the SGR arguably represents considerable progress. Whereas the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing scams involved simple looting of the Kenyan Treasury over largely bogus projects, the SGR gives Kenyans a spanking new railway

There is a view that KRC and Uganda Railways Corporation were never happy with the privatisation of the “lunatic express,” which was heavily leveraged by donors, and that the SGR will serve to kill it off once and for all. If this happens, there will be no freight service to Kampala until the SGR is extended. Moreover, all the narrow- gauge branch lines that could have been rehabilitated will be closed down once and for all.[11]

By the standards of political corruption in Kenya, the SGR arguably represents considerable progress. Whereas the Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing scams involved simple looting of the Kenyan Treasury over largely bogus projects, the SGR gives Kenyans a spanking new railway that will whizz them between Mombasa and Nairobi in double quick time with (hopefully) minimum risk to life and limb. No wonder wananchi are cheering. Even if the railway is (say) a billion dollars (Ksh100 billion) overpriced, that’s still a snip compared with the cost of Goldenberg (an estimated 10% of GNP)! Unfortunately, the cost of running uneconomic services may in the long-run exceed the cost of Goldenberg and Anglo-Leasing combined.

But equally sobering is the fact that just to build the Mombasa to Kampala SGR would cost in the region of a quarter of Kenya’s 2015 GDP at present estimates. There must be other priorities.

TANZANIA: PLAYING CATCH-UP?

“The new train is expected to travel at high speed of 160 kilometres per hour…”[12]

President Magufuli’s SGR initiative is his flagship infrastructure development project, but finding finance has proven problematic.[13] In January 2014, the SGR process was endorsed enthusiastically by the Davos World Economic Forum, attended by President Jakaya Kikwete. An agreement signed in May 2015 with the China Railway Materials Group proposed a standard gauge line from Dar es Salaam to Mwanza, Kigoma and Msongati in Burundi costing $7.6 billion. China’s Exim Bank would fund 10% of the project, which was partly justified as a means of accessing large mineral deposits in Tanzania and Burundi, while Tanzania was tasked to find the balance from private sources. Rothschild, one of the world’s largest financial advisory groups, was hired as a contract advisor, and it was hinted that a consortium of private financiers was being assembled. No such consortium emerged, and there has been no more talk of private finance. [14] In February 2016, Minister of Finance Philip Mpango “set the record straight,” declaring that “Tanzania cannot afford financing the SGR project using our own funds.”[15]

Why did Tanzania decide that it too wanted to go SGR when the experts warned that it was not a good idea? In a 2009 study, Canadian Pacific Consulting Services concluded that the benefit of replacing metre gauge by standard gauge in East Africa would be ‘marginal.’

Consequently, the contract with the Chinese was cancelled over alleged irregularities in the tendering process. Seeking alternative finance, President Magufuli unsuccessfully approached South African President Jacob Zuma for a loan from the BRICS bank, and the World Bank president Dr Jim Yong Kim for an IDA credit.[16] Turkish President Recep Erdogan was also lobbied during an official visit.

In April this year, Magufuli settled for a Phase 1 SGR from Dar to Morogoro (194km) costing Tsh1 trillion ($450 million), to be financed out of the country’s development budget. The contract was awarded to a Portuguese-Turkish consortium, said to have been the only bidder.[17] Phase 2 should see the line extended from Morogoro to Dodoma (263km), for an additional Tsh1.5 trillion ($675 million).

Why did Tanzania decide that it too wanted to go SGR when the experts warned that it was not a good idea? In a 2009 study, Canadian Pacific Consulting Services concluded that the benefit of replacing metre gauge by standard gauge in East Africa would be “marginal.” The conversion of the rail backbone to standard gauge was considered “cost prohibitive” using “even the most optimistic” traffic and income projections. [18] In a 2013 study, the World Bank concluded that rehabilitating existing lines was the most promising option, with a cost of $0.18 million per km compared with $3.25 million per km for standard gauge, or 18 times more.[19] But earlier feasibility studies claimed the SGR was viable. For example, in 2003, the African Development Fund financed a feasibility study for a standard gauge line from Isaka in Tanzania to Kigali and Bujumbura (1,435km) that declared the project feasible and “attractive to private investors.” This and subsequent detailed engineering proposals costing millions of dollars were based on the assumption that the new line would be built from Dar to Isaka (953km)![20]

Like Kenya, Tanzania has a poorly performing railway linking Dar to the rest of the country.[21] In November 2016, Prof Makame Mbarawa, Minister of Works Transport and Communications, told a transport sector meeting of officials and donors that the government planned to both rehabilitate the existing Central Line and start the construction of the SGR. On June 2, Reli Assets Holding Company Ltd (Rahco), issued tender documents to rehabilitate the existing railway from Dar es Salaam to Kilosa, a distance of 283km, using funds from the World Bank’s $300m Tanzania Intermodal Rail Development Project (TIRP). Launched in 2014, TIRP has had a hard time getting off the ground. It appears that while Rahco was negotiating the rehabilitation project with the World Bank, discussions were also going on with the Chinese for an SGR loan. While rehabilitating the Central Line makes sense, and is long overdue, doing this and launching the SGR concurrently makes no sense at all.[22]

While rehabilitating Tanzania’s Central Line makes sense, and is long overdue, doing this and launching the SGR concurrently makes no sense at all

Tanzania aspires to replace Kenya as the largest economy in the region, and this rivalry spills over into reciprocal trade restrictions and disagreement over the Economic Partnership Agreement with the European Union that hinder rather than promote regional integration. Inter-regional trade is said to be declining.[23] It is to be hoped that the two countries will not get involved in a wasteful beggar-thy-neighbour competition over who can build the swankiest SGR to capture the modest business in the region, especially freight, including that of their landlocked neighbours.

EAC: CO-OPERATION OR COMPETITION?

The completion of the Mombasa-Nairobi section of the SGR does not guarantee that the remainder of the Kenyan portion to Kisumu and then on to the Ugandan border will be financed, let alone the Ugandan and Rwandan sections. Though China’s Exim Bank has financed the major part of the construction to date, it appears reluctant to advance further credit without guarantees that Uganda is committed to the project.[24] Both Rwanda and Uganda are weighing up the pros and cons of the Kenyan and Tanzanian SGR options.

The early promoters of the SGR sold the project as a major step towards East African integration and economic development, including stimulating mineral exports from the EAC, DRC and elsewhere. But the above discussion suggests that, far from constituting a co-ordinated strategy to promote EAC economic integration, the two SGRs in progress are competing for much of the modest cross-border freight business. Dar and Mombasa ports compete for transit traffic. When Dar announced in 2016 that it planned to impose VAT on goods in transit, importers switched to Mombasa.[25] Realising its mistake, the Tanzanian government removed the VAT, and now hopes to attract business back from Mombasa, helped with a $150 million loan from China to upgrade the port’s handling capacity.[26]

The completion of the Mombasa-Nairobi section of the SGR does not guarantee that the remainder of the Kenyan portion to Kisumu and then on to the Ugandan border will be financed

Two-thirds of the cargo arriving in Dar port stays in Tanzania, most of the rest heads for DRC, Zambia, Burundi and Rwanda. Most Mombasa cargo stops at Nairobi, as already pointed out. Thus, given the modest volume of freight destined for landlocked countries, the justification for an EAC-wide SGR cannot be based on facilitating cross-border trade, or its likely increase in volume in the foreseeable future. SGR apologists simply ignore the economics of the huge investments required to capture such little business. If one SGR is less than obviously viable, then two can only be disastrous.

KEEP ON TRUCKING?

One key element rarely discussed in all this is the robustness of road transport throughout the region. Since trade liberalisation, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have built up impressive fleets of trucks carrying both fuel and containers, and road haulage has largely replaced rail, reflecting the dynamism of the private trucking sector compared with the inefficiently managed and undercapitalised state railways. Pro-road policies have been lobbied for by business associations with the support of ruling elites, themselves involved in trucking. Passengers have also migrated to privately owned buses.

The question from an EAC transport policy perspective is how state-owned railways can claw back enough trade from the trucking industry to become profitable without state subsidies, the use of force, or additional taxes. In an age where commercial activities are overpoweringly undertaken by the private sector, the move to SGR looks suspiciously like an attempt to replace relatively efficient, competitive private enterprises by state-owned monopolies. Already, importers are getting ready to resist any attempts by the GOK to force traffic onto the SGR.[27] According to one commentator on Tanzania’s proposed SGR, President Magufuli will “have to deal with the truck cartels… that have succeeded for over 40 years in keeping the government out of railway construction and maintenance.”[28] Though perhaps an exaggeration, the concern is real for all three EAC giants. Arguably more important, aid agencies have poured billions of dollars into road construction and upgrading throughout the region, much of the work undertaken by Chinese contractors.

Since trade liberalisation, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have built up impressive fleets of trucks carrying both fuel and containers, and road haulage has largely replaced rail, reflecting the dynamism of the private trucking sector

To plan implementable Community-wide infrastructure initiatives for the EAC rather than ad hoc bits and pieces would require an empowered EAC Secretariat with both technical competence and a delegated political mandate. SGR initiatives to date reveal that neither condition holds.[29] In March 2017, Fred Mbidde, the chair of the East African Legislative Assembly’s Committee on Communication, Trade and Investments, complained of “minimal collaboration between the regional projects.”[30] So we can expect more of the same: Dar competing with Kenya for transit trade and economic dominance, while the landlocked countries blow hot and cold on which rival to support, if any.

Politics trumps economics, as is often the case

Our presidential ruling elites are not driven to endorse major investment decisions involving private or state capital on the basis of techno-economic arguments. Their decisions are driven by short-term political considerations. When people like Kiriro wa Ngugi,[31] David Ndii[32] and John Githongo[33] blow large holes in the claims of the SGR apologists on technical, fiscal/financial and governance/corruption grounds, they are met with threats, not evidence-based counter-arguments. “No one and nothing will stop us from building the railway…” stormed Deputy President William Ruto in response to critics.[34]

For the most part, our ruling elites think short-term. Long-term concessional finance for large capital investments is attractive because the current incumbents will be retired by the time the bill arrives for the reckless projects they are committing us to today

For the most part, our ruling elites think short-term. Long-term concessional finance for large capital investments is attractive because the current incumbents will be retired by the time the bill arrives for the reckless projects they are committing us to today.[35] This helps explain why mobilising state power behind the SGR may even appear to undermine the elite’s own business interests in trucking. As long as politics is in control, elites and their supporters are confident that their trucking interests will not be threatened.

WHITE ELEPHANTS IN A CHINA SHOP?

As part of its One Belt One Road initiative, China is busy funding infrastructure, including railways, across Asia, worth up to a trillion dollars. East Africa’s SGRs are perhaps the end of the One Belt line. Beyond this, China is building long-haul and urban railway systems in 35 African countries.[36] Is China overreaching itself? The strict conditions placed on further loans for the Kenya-Uganda line suggest that China is becoming increasingly circumspect in its lending practices, worried perhaps that borrowers will start defaulting on their loans. For Africa, this wouldn’t be the first time. The Africa-wide debt crisis at the end of the last century was the result of decades of borrowing from the World Bank, IMF and other official sources, much of it on uneconomic and unsustainable projects. The debts currently piling up through soft loans from China and other sources are potentially fuelling a second debt crisis that will in turn trigger another round of debt relief. But the Chinese terms for a bail-out are unlikely to be as generous as those of the donors at the end of the last century.[37] Tying debt rescheduling to commodity exports to China, including food, is one imaginable scenario should defaults become an issue.

East Africa’s enthusiasm for the SGR solution to infrastructural constraints, for which China ultimately bears responsibility, is not going to significantly improve the region’s overall transport system or competitiveness, and at tremendous cost

Without an efficient “intermodal’” transport system in place in the region – including ports, roads, and railways – economic dynamism is seriously compromised. East Africa’s enthusiasm for the SGR solution to infrastructural constraints, for which China ultimately bears responsibility, is not going to significantly improve the region’s overall transport system or competitiveness, and at tremendous cost.

The challenge is how to temper politically motivated, short-term decision-making with a strong dose of economic and financial rationality. In this respect, for the moment, the EAC, and most of its external supporters, are failing badly.

By Boyce Sarokin
Mr Sarokin is an independent researcher based in Arusha, Tanzania

 

ENDNOTES

[1] Kenyan Cabinet Secretary for Transport and Infrastructure James Macharia quoted ahead of the opening of the SGR from Mombasa to Nairobi. See: Xinhua 2017. “Kenyans upbeat ahead of new railway launch,” Guardian, 31 May.

[2] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40171095.

[3] Allan Olingo 2017. “Through Beijing, East Africa is upgrading its roads, railway and ports,” The EastAfrican, May 20. Different sources give different cost estimates.

[4] ‘Freight traffic operations are much more dependent on price and service delivery (predictability of time of arrival at the destination) than on actual speed between stations. The extra speed capabilities of SGR therefore provide limited advantage over a metre gauge operation.’ Africon Ltd 2011. “The East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, Part II: Transport Strategy,” East African Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, EAC, November, page 61. The estimated cost (EARMP 2009) of upgrading the entire EAC railway network to SGR was between $13 billion and $29 billion.

[5] See Kiriro wa Ngugi at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgbARMS1pyY.

[6] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hMUP_XMi434. The first commercial train, George Stephenson’s Rocket (1824), ran on what was to become the US standard gauge. http://www.custom-qr-codes.net/history-steam-locomotive.html

[7] Rail costs need to be 15-20% lower than trucks to compete. Unlike trains, trucks provide door to door services on demand.

[8] http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/freight/rail-freight-traffic-increases-in-kenya.html?channel=000.

At its peak in 1973, the railway transported 4.4 million tonnes.

[9] http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/news/Kenya-to-review-RVR-termination-notice/539546-3884948-xjptjf/index.html.

[10] The concession gave RVR a 25-year monopoly of railway services.

[11] Claims to the contrary by the GOK notwithstanding. See: Allan Olingo 2017. “Kenya to maintain sections of metre gauge rail linking old stations with SGR,” The EastAfrican, June 10.

[12] Florence Mugarula 2017. ‘Far reaching socio-economic benefits of SGR’, Business Standard, 18 April.

[13] Samuel Kamndaya 2015. ‘Sh60tr needed for mega projects’, Citizen, 3 September.

[14] Brian Cooksey 2016. ‘Railway rivalry in the East African Community’, GREAT Insights Magazine, Volume 5, Issue 4. July/August 2016 http://search.ecdpm.org/?q=*&fld_posttype=GREAT+insights+magazine&fld_author=Brian+Cooksey

[15] Christopher Majaliwa 2016. ‘High costs stymie standard gauge plan’, Daily News, 6 February.

[16] http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-struggles-to-finance-SGR/2560-3935412-rggugq/index.html

[17] Athuman Mtulya 2017. ‘Issue sovereign bond to fund railway project, govt advised’, Citizen, 30 April.

[18] CPCS 2009 ‘East Africa Railways Master Plan Study’, East African Community Secretariat.

[19] World Bank 2013. ‘The Economics of Rail , Gauge in the East African Community, Africa Transport Unit, August.

[20] Craig Mathieson 2016. ‘The political economy of regional integration in Africa: the East African Community’, ECDPM, January, http://ecdpm.org/peria/eac.

[21] Managed separately, the Chinese-built and heavily indebted TAZARA railway from Dar to Zambia uses the 3ft 6in Cape Gauge. Jointly owned and managed by Tanzania and Zambia, TAZARA had accumulated debts of USD787m in 2016, blamed on ‘weaknesses in management’. See: Jaston Binala 2016. ‘Plans underway to revamp Tazara railway’, East African, 14 May.

[22] To prepare the way for the SGR, many legal commercial structures and over 250 houses in Dar es Salaam worth billions of shillings have been summarily demolished without warning or compensation. See Hellen Nachilongo 2017. ‘Tears, heartbreak as houses near railway line demolished’, Citizen, 12 March; Mwassa Jingi 2017. ‘Why the latest demolitions in Dar were illegal’, Citizen on Sunday, 19 March.

[23] James Anyanzwa 2017. ‘EA states looking outward for trading patners as local ties sour’, East African, 1 July.

[24] Frederic Musisi 2017. ‘Tanzania Starts Construction of Railway Line Link to Uganda’, Monitor, 16 April

[25] Abduel Elinaza 2016. ‘Dar Port in massive transit cargo traffic volume slump’, Daily News, 3 April.

[26] https://eblnews.com/…/china-inks-multimillion-dollar-deal-expand-dar-es-salaam-port

[27] ‘Cargo transportation should be based on what the importer wants, not what the government wants.’ See: Njiraini Muchira 2017. ‘Mandatory SGR use causes unease among importers’, East African, 11 March.

[28] Attilio Tagalile 2015. Blessing and hatred from Chinese aid’, Guardian, 13 December.

[29] Craig Mathieson 2016, op. cit.

[30] Zephania Ubwani 2017. ‘EA states faulted on railway project’, Citizen, 11 March.

[31] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IgbARMS1pyY; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rk4lJKgB4RU.

[32] https://www.kenya-today.com/politics/david-ndii-jubilee-spent-sh4-5b-19th-century-old-school-chinese-locomotives.

[33] https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000218960/eurobond-sgr-heists-to-finance-2017-election-campaigns-claims-githongo.

[34] Quoted in Cooksey op. cit. In Tanzania, neither civil society nor the media has challenged SGR decision-making.

[35] ‘The loan … from EXIM Bank of China comprised of a concessional loan of USD 1.6 billion and a commercial loan of USD 1.63 billion. The concessional loan is for 20 years and has a grace period of 7 years and an interest rate of 2% per annum while the commercial loan is for 10 years and grace period of 5 years…’ http://bankelele.co.ke/2017/05/funding-the-sgr.html.

[36] According to SMARTRAIL WORLD: ‘the most crucial factor in the developing African rail industry is … the influence of China, who despite warnings on their own domestic economy, are continuing to invest huge sums in the continent.’ See: Smartrail World 2016. ‘Special report: How five major African rail projects are supported by China’, 10 November. https://www.smartrailworld.com/five-major-african-projects-supported-by-china.

[37] That is, prepare and implement Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, underwritten with more aid.

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Competing Narratives and the Crisis in Ethiopia

Since November last year, Ethiopia has been fighting a devastating civil war with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front. Hibist Kassa argues that the scale of misinformation on the war, lack of context and attempts to impose false narratives is deeply troubling and pervasive. Kassa calls for a nuanced and historically grounded approach to properly analyse the course of events.

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Competing Narratives and the Crisis in Ethiopia
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Since 4 November last year Ethiopia has been caught in a devastating civil war with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) which has been marked by escalating genocidal attacks on ethnic minorities in Ethiopia. The scale of misinformation and disinformation on the war, brazen lack of context, shameless and downright dangerous attempts to not only impose false narratives, but also impose a narrow human rights agenda skewed to ignore abuses by Tigrayan Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and its allies is deeply troubling and pervasive.

At the moment, a dangerously simplistic and false narrative labelling the federal government as having an agenda for centralisation, as opposed to the TPLF which is pushing for federalism, is being spread in mainstream media outlets and through scholarly networks. This is drawing on a further over-simplification of the history of empire building and contestation, and the nature of cultural and language identities and their relationship to class stratification.

This year marked the 125th anniversary of the Battle of Adwa in 1896, a historic defeat of a European imperialist power by Africans, with the unification of divided peoples. Lords, serfs and slaves, women and men, mobilised an army of about 100,000 to defeat Italian troops in a matter of hours. The aftermath of the victory also laid the basis for further empire consolidation and forging of the modern state, a contested historical process that has been foregrounded in the current conflict. A nuanced and historically grounded approach is needed to analyse the ways the centre-periphery tensions shaped autonomy in Tigray, recognise the wide spectrum of debates within the TPLF and how elites have deployed this in the current conflict (I examine this in some detail in the Agrarian South Bulletin here).

While the need to get the analysis right on the crisis is important to inform interventions, we also need to understand the nature of the accumulation strategies of elites, the contradictions in these strategies and where this leaves the working class and the advancement of a progressive alternative from below.

What are the competing narratives?

At the moment, mediation is being proposed as was recently advocated in a statement by African intellectuals, that eerily followed the line of the United States and TPLF on the crisis. A robust response by the Global Ethiopian Scholars Initiative and Jon Abbink have highlighted the problematic nature of the statement, and the need for an understanding of what is really at stake in the volatile Horn of Africa region, where a realignment of geopolitical relations between Eritrea-Ethiopia-Somalia, with South Sudanese solidarity, is potentially decentring US domination in the region, and sealing the decline of TPLF. Understanding the tricky and complicated context of the changes underway, demands also for careful attention to what is left out of the dominant narrative of the crisis.

For instance, it was shocking to hear pro-TPLF commentator, Martin Plaut, and now visiting researcher at Kings College Department of War Studies, declared boldly on 5 February this year, that even though a massacre in Mai-Kadra in Western Tigray was terrible, ‘I don’t care who carried them out’ (see 30:00-31:21). This was a genocide of about 1000 men, the elderly and children who were identified as ethnic Amhara by TPLF youth groups. As the men were being slaughtered, women overheard them say they would come for them next. Zelalem Tessema, Co-Chair Ethiopian Association in the UK, who was on the same panel as Plaut said that this was the ‘Srebrenica massacre’ of Ethiopia. Accountability which was so important for Plaut when examining Amhara militias, Ethiopian federal troops and Eritrea’s involvement, was suspended in the case where TPLF militia and its youth members, who later escaped to join refugees on the Sudanese border. The TPLF has continued to commit atrocities in its vicious expansion into Afar and Amhara regions displacing up to 4 million people.

Meanwhile, a coherent campaign sympathetic to TPLF by the US, EU and UN, including the IMF and World Bank, have focused on aspects of the Tigray crisis pressuring the Ethiopian Federal government to revert to mediations with the TPLF. Even when a unilateral ceasefire was declared by the government, the TPLF has continued to encroach upon other provinces in Amhara and Afar provinces, temporarily occupying Lalibela, and slaughtering civilians, destroying historic Churches in Gondar, there was still no universal condemnation of the TPLF except for the instance where the USAID Director in Ethiopia cited widespread TPLF looting of aid goods.

There has also been complete disinterest in the killings of ethnic minorities elsewhere which have been linked to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), openly allied to TPLF. In principle, violations by any state and non-state actor in Tigray and other parts of Ethiopia should be investigated, victims provided care and culprits held to account. But the geopolitical power struggle that is ongoing has no interest in this kind of accountability agenda. Instead, human rights violations, whether they be genocide, widespread rape, recruitment of children as combatants and violations against Eritrean refugees, have been ignored when TPLF forces have been identified culprits. Talk of accountability and human rights is just a game in a bigger geopolitical battlefield.

Getting the facts right is key!

To make sense of what is an intensely complex crisis, it is important to focus on the following key facts:

  1. On 4 November, after the Federal Government of Ethiopia had transferred US$281 million to the Tigray provincial government, a ‘lightning strike’ so described by TPLFs’ spokesperson, was unleashed on federal troops who were undertaking joint operations with the Tigray provincial forces. Unarmed soldiers and generals were slaughtered in their pyjamas and their bodies left to rot, while other troops were taken as prisoners. Soldiers with specialised training were later summarily executed, ran over with trucks, and women soldiers were raped. When the news of this shocking attack trickled in, it horrified the general public and ended all attempts to mediate tensions between the Federal government and the TPLF.
  2. Prior to the above attack, tensions had been building between the Federal government based in Addis Ababa and the TPLF. The loss of TPLFs almost three-decade dominance of power in the federal government had aggrieved the committee members. To recall, TPLF itself was a political party, with its own hierarchies and membership drawing from various constituencies within Tigray province.
  3. Normalisation of relations with Eritrea was an extremely significant change introduced by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018. This significant change in foreign policy of Ethiopia was made possible under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition with new leadership under Abiy Ahmed as a member of Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO). It was a decisive break from TPLF foreign policy which had treated the Eritrean government as a lethal enemy. The latter which has acted as a bulwark against the expansion of the United States’ AFRICOM in the Horn of Africa, and retained some semblance of sovereignty over its national policy space. These former allies who waged war against the Derg (the military regime that ruled Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1974 to 1987), soon turned into foes over the TPLFs ethnonationalist agenda entrenched in the Ethiopian federalist system, redrawing provinces and the entire governance system on the basis of ethnicity. Each province formed standing armies of their own and entrenched the right to secede in the constitution.
  4. Tigray province is in the northern most part of Ethiopia and shares a border with Eritrea, over which war was waged from 1998-2000, when Abiy was then on the frontline as a solider. A peace treaty was only signed in 2018 once the OPDO under Abiy was in power after a wave of popular protests against TPLF. According to Iqbal Jhazbay (former South Africa ambassador to Eritrea) since the Peace Treaty was signed, this provided Eritrea, ‘a previously isolated regime which has stubbornly resisted being turned into a pawn by foreign powers’ a bridge with which to expand its foreign policy influence in the volatile Horn of Africa. Asmara has resisted a regime change agenda, a challenge now facing Ethiopia, under the new Progress Party (PP) under Abiy, which has now had to resist pressure from foreign powers to dictate its relations with Eritrea.
  5. The successful completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has been resisted not only by Egypt and Sudan, but also with backing from the US and Israel. Although GERD was conceptualised and initiated by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, its successful implementation did not have full backing of his heirs in the TPLF. The Metal and Engineering Corporation, a mega-parastatal, which was charged with manufacturing parts of GERD, manufactured them below expected standards. This delayed the project and has been suspected as an act of subversion instead of incompetence on the part of the parastatal. The combination of Egypt and Sudan, and the realignment of interests with internal actors, like the TPLF (and now OLF), has created another deadly alliance that threatens stability in the Horn of Africa.
  6. Ethiopia is on the brink of national self-sufficiency in wheat production within two years. The Abiy government has also been setting up bread factories to ensure affordability for the urban poor and working people (especially in a time when food prices continue to skyrocket). In addition to the GERD and its potential to provide renewable energy resource to the Horn of Africa and beyond, these developments should be seen as efforts to strengthen productive capacity in the region and hopefully also address energy poverty that falls on the back of women. It is also a case that the infrastructure investments and Industrial Parks especially in the garments industry, have had keen interest from global brands, but also significantly drawn upon domestic resource mobilisation. All these are signs that concrete gains are being made in the country.
  7. Nonetheless, in spite of the Ethiopian governments commitment to liberalisation, this has not enamoured the regime to donors and the Bretton Wood Institutions. Sanctions have been imposed on government officials to travel to the US. Conditionalities for loans are being attached to ensure mediation with TPLF. The interest of the IMF, primarily influenced by the US, in this conflict is noteworthy.
  8. Bretton Woods Institutions, especially the IMF, have been attaching conditionalities to assistance obliging the government to make concessions to the TPLF. This hard-line towards the PP government is puzzling given that it has declared the country open for business, liberalising one of Africa’s last heavily regulated economies and allowing competition with State-Owed Enterprises, electricity and the telecommunications. The Abiy government has also been a very consistent partner in the War on Terror, especially as it relates to operations against Al-Shabab in Somalia.
  9. This indicates that there are higher stakes in Ethiopia’s forging of alliances with Eritrea and Somalia and the broader goal to stabilise the Horn of Africa in a manner that has not centred Washington and its ‘War on Terror’. Lawrence Freeman, on a panel on Ethiopia Television, “Addis Dialogue”, argues that a global political oligarchic faction that maintains neo-colonial control of African countries in particular, sees any actor operating outside US control as threatening their dominance and needing to be dealt with as a threat. Deacon Yoseph Tafari, Chairman of the Ethiopian American Civic Council, concurs and emphasises that the US had initially misread the Abiy government in the beginning of its tenure, and had to confront the reality of its more autonomous approach to foreign policy and its persistence with state led developmental initiatives such as the GERD. It is this aspect that has informed a regime change agenda.
  10. The TPLF which was the dominant force in the previous coalition government had been able to control the security and governance arms of the state and considerable investments in SOEs. It is an open secret that the TPLF had amassed offshore accounts of US$30 billion. At its height, foreign aid reached US$3.5 billion a year. Two to three billion dollars were lost annually through under and over invoicing of imports. Parastatals had become effective vehicles for accumulation of wealth by the top tier of the regime, with varied forms of patrimonial relations with less powerful actors within the party machinery. Proximity to power had its benefits, but none compared with the accumulation of wealth and deepening inequality that was apparent over the last three decades.

Q & A between Munyaradzi Gwisai and Hibist  Kassa which reflects on the state of the working class in Ethiopia today.

MG: The emergent Ethiopian working class was a key player in the 1974 revolution that eventually ousted Emperor Haile Selassie. The wave of strikes helped inspire the popular protests of students, peasants and the junior soldiers. The later eventually wrested power led by the [Marixst Leninist] Derg, provoking a nearly two-decade period of Civil War and instability.

What happened to the Ethiopian working class in this period, in the struggles that ensued… Was class militancy and organisation crushed by repression and war?

HK: As the parastatal, Metal and Engineering Corporation (MetEC)  case highlights, trade unions have struggled, and continued to struggle to organise in Ethiopia. IndustriALL Federation has been making important interventions especially in industrial parks. Important analytical work has been done  on the super exploitation of women workers has drawn attention to how the accumulation strategy of the state that relies on cheap wage labour and the creation of an enabling environment for foreign direct investment, demands the repression of organised labour.

In response to high turnover of the workforce and a wave of wildcat strikes, there have been some moderate reforms to create a means for workers to raise concerns through the Labour Department inspectors and the provision of district offices. In spite of this, trade unions still need to be able to organise workers on the shopfloor. Resistance to this persist.

Moreover, the tension between the focus on large scale foreign direct investments as a means of enabling industrialisation places this strategy in tension with the dynamic and diversified economic activities by smallholder producers in agriculture, cottage industries and the retail sector. Ethiopia has a history of cooperative associations traced to the Derg regime, but these were demobilised by the TPLF dominated EPRDF regime.

MG: Ethiopia is amongst the top five performing economies in Africa in the last decade with annual growth rates of over 10%. A new, younger and expanded working class must therefore have emerged. If the working class retreated in this period leaving the petite bourgeoisie in charge, was there not a significant growth and re-emergence of the working class in the period after 1995? Quantitatively and qualitatively especially after 2000?

What is the degree of organisation, class consciousness, and militancy of this new expanded class? How does it compare to the leading role played by other working classes in the region recently, in Sudan, Egypt, Kenya for example and does it provide a counter to the petite bourgeoisie and their ethnicity – region based politics and mobilization?

HK: A new, younger and expanded working class has emerged, and its face is that of women migrants. The new subjects arising out of the industrialisation process is that of women workers, who are being superexploited as part of the country’s development strategy. Rural-urban migration, and now with covid-19, urban-rural migration, has become significant.

I think if we are to consider the primarily informal character of the labouring classes or working people (as Issa Shivji says) we needs to use different approaches to analyse the forms of resistance to capital and the state, and the ways in which people are building autonomy from below through their livelihoods and even survival strategies. This expanded approach to resistance and understanding of class helps us better draw the connections between the urban poor and dispossessed masses, and rural communities who in carrying the burden of social reproduction even as a gendered cheap wage labour strategy is imposed from above become a basis for drawing  organic linkages with ‘wage workers’ in the formal sector. I think this is an opportunity to think in an interlinked manner and develop a more holistic understanding of what organising interventions can be made by trade unions working in alliance with women’s groups, farmers associations, artisanal miners and casual workers.

Elite wealth accumulation and the gendered working class

It is crucial to also reflect on the nature of corruption facilitated via illicit financial flows and how this has fed into the wealth accumulation strategies of elites in the TPLF dominated ethnic coalition government prior to its removal in 2018. A prime example of this is the mega parastatal, Metal and Engineering Corporation (MetEC).

With about seventy SOEs, seven military hardware manufacturing entities, about 12,500 employees, MetEC is a significant force in the Ethiopian economy. Under the TPLF, it successfully disbanded trade union organising on the shopfloor. In 2014, labour unions confronted the then CEO Knife Dangew and they were dismissed for being focused on rights bargaining and of being wedded to the legacy of the previous ‘Marxist Leninist’ military dictatorship. Instead, the trade union federation was expected to focus on the objective of attaining middle income status. In 2018, a parliamentary review revealed extensive graft, with overpricing of domestic and international procurement of up to US$2 billion, in some cases 400% higher than market prices. He was arrested in November 2018, and charged over the procurement of two shipping vessels, two hotels and a plastics factory.

The description below by Tim Hall of an industrial park, in Hawassa, now in the newly established Sidama province, gives us a glimpse of the pre-Covid situation:

Over 17,000 young women from predominately rural areas and a variety of ethnicities have, from 2017, migrated to work at the Hawassa Industrial Park (HIP), employing around 120,000 mainly women workers at potential full capacity. They face long shifts, low salaries given living costs between 800 to 2000 BIRR a month (US$27–68) and new challenges in an unfamiliar urban context, which are exacerbated by their status and dislocation from familial networks.

The brief description Hall offers above is that of women who form self-help groups on the basis of ethnicity and religion.

While there is a case for understanding ethnicity (or kinship as Archie Mafeje argues) in terms of how it can be an organising element in the labour process, the rigid and impervious colonial conceptions of ethnicity institutionalised by the TPLF cannot be underestimated. As relevant as this is to understand the reproduction of inequalities, in the Ethiopia case, it is also important to weigh how these have been entrenched as an organising principle of society.

The ability to render some groups as vulnerable as in the case of the non-Sidamo women migrant workers in Hawaasa or the migrant farmworkers massacred in Mai-Kadra also needs to be treated with caution. TPLF as a dominant force in the EPRDF coalition had almost three decades with an effective machinery to entrench this in the everyday forms of social, political and economic spheres of society, from ethnic development banks to redrawing provincial borders as in Raya to subsume areas where Amhara ethnic minorities can be disenfranchised.

Beyond this, there is also a dangerous oversimplification of vast periods of history and the association of repressed classes with specific language and cultural groups has fed a dangerous and divisive propaganda. This labels certain language groups as exploiters and oppressors and others victims of dispossession and oppression without a grounded understanding of complex and fluid categories, alongside complex economic and historical processes. These claims have also justified horrific violence by the OLF against the Amharic speaking people such as the disembowelment of pregnant women, the slicing off of the breasts of women and rape.

Progressive scholars, the working class and Ethiopia

Progressive scholars have to build bridges to engage with the intelligentsia in Ethiopia who have persevered through military dictatorship under the Derg in the 1970s and 1980s, and through 27 years of TPLF-dominated rule. Ethiopian scholars have been speaking out, as in this speech in 1994 by Mammo Muhcie in London that is an eerily precise analysis of TPLF as it is today.

In the midst of this conflict, Ethiopian scholars have been repeatedly trying to get their voices heard by the Ethiopian government and the international community. The statement widely shared by African intellectuals (including on roape.net) that presumed Ethiopian scholars cannot speak for themselves therefore came across as deeply condescending. If there is genuine interest in supporting Ethiopian scholars to get their perspectives and analysis on the crisis, and build bridges for meaningful interventions, the first step has to be through a serious and deliberate process of engagement.

There is also a need to pay attention to the accumulation strategies of elites and the manner they fit (or do not fit) within imperialism. Within this, an expanded understanding of a gendered working class is needed, recognising the strategically important role of women’s labour as a source of cheap wage labour. In addition, it is still important to not lose sight of how a liberal government like the PP, in pursuing its own ambitions to assert sovereignty over foreign policy and natural resources, has fallen from grace and is facing the age-old colonial/imperialist strategy of ‘divide and rule’ tactics both at the national level and regional levels through the TPLF, OLF and external actors such as Sudan and Egypt.

This also gives us insight into the accumulation strategy of the EPRDF, which still operates under a constitution and governance system setup by the TPLF dominated government. This draws out a broader lesson to the challenges arising out of an ambitious developmentalist elite in Africa. Although, the TPLF has been subjected to accountability processes after their removal from control of the federal government, there is still a broader lesson here for development in Africa, and this demands further interrogation.

Some on the left have admired the capacity of the ruling class in Ethiopia to pursue developmentalist ambitions with industrial parks as a strategy, for instance. But the limits of this strategy also need to be highlighted, as this also has relied on cheap wage labour and migrant women workers who have been rigidly constrained from organising in trade unions. Wildcat strikes and high turnover of labour has meant this is not a stable accumulation strategy, even on their own terms. It begs a broader question, what is the nature of a viable developmental strategy?

In addition, the pressures arising out of a gendered understanding of working class dynamics lays a basis to consider what developmental alternatives can be fought for. Such an alternative also demands a rupture from the existing imperialist architecture of power to assert control over resources which destabilises the global financial and geopolitical arrangements that the emerging Eritrea-Ethiopia-Somalia relations pose. Failure to recognise this is akin to enabling the catastrophic outcome of interventions in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, the reason why there has been a robust and vociferous rejection of any possible intervention by the likes of Global Ethiopian Scholars Initiative and Jon Abbink.

Progressives have a responsibility to centre an understanding of imperialism and the national question, as Sam Moyo and Paris Yeros pull together in Reclaiming the Nation, to navigate this terrain and build bridges with the radical intelligentsia and popular formations in Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa who want to construct a transformative agenda themselves. A first step has to be rejecting the ethnonationalist, genocidal agenda of TPLF, OLF and their allies.

This article was published in the Review of African political Economy (ROAPE).

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Wakasighau: The Forgotten Victims of British Colonial Land Dispossession

The effects of the British colonial policy of subjugation through dispossession and exile continue to reverberate among the Wakasighau.

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Wakasighau: The Forgotten Victims of British Colonial Land Dispossession
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Two years have gone by since we last saw Mzee Joshua Mwakesi Mwalilika. He hasn’t changed a bit. His birth certificate says he was born in 1923. This means that Mzee Mwalilika is just two years shy of a hundred. He says that the birth certificate is wrong, that he was actually born in 1921. Mzee Mwalilika is from Taita, of the Wakasighau, a people who were uprooted from their native Kasighau region and exiled by the British to Malindi where they languished for over twenty years.

It all started in August 1915, at a time when Kenya was under British colonial rule and neighbouring Tanzania, then Tanganyika, was under the Germans. World War I had begun and, being so close to the border with Tanganyika, Kasighau was bound to suffer the effects of the war. When the Germans attacked the British, the British took revenge on the local African populations.

“All the houses were torched in the entire Kasighau on August 11th 1915. From Kigongwe, Makwasinyi, Jora, Kiteghe, Bungule, and Rukanga,” recalls Mzee Mwalilika. It was the handiwork of the British; they were on a punitive expedition against the Wakasighau whom the British suspected of having betrayed them to the Germans. A few days prior, the Germans had  carried out a night raid on the British garrison at Kasighau, committing a massacre. This was eight years before Mzee Mwalilika was born.

One version of the events is that after the attack, the Germans wrote a letter to the British claiming that the locals had voluntarily betrayed them, which prompted the British to retaliate. At Rukanga Village in Kasighau, retired teacher Jonathan Mshiri, now aged 71, says that local accounts of the events tell of two individuals from the area who unknowingly directed some Germans who were on a spying mission to where the British had set up camp.

“Two people were harvesting honey in the bush and the soldiers came and interrogated them and said, ‘Can you show us where the wazungu are?’” says Mwalimu Mshiri. “They used the term wazungu not British, so Kinona and Mwashutu thought that these white people were just friends of fellow white people. They did not know that these were Germans.”  The Germans laid waste to the British garrison at Jora in Kasighau and 38 British soldiers, including their captain, were taken captive by the Germans. This enraged the British so much that they decided to exile the entire Kasighau community.

For the Kasighau people, the British chose Malindi. After torching all the houses in the five villages, they rounded up all the people and gathered them at a place that was central to all the villages. “The British chose these open grounds because it gave them a view of Tanganyika where the Germans had come from,” explains Ezra Mdamu, a descendant of the survivors. “They also hoped that some of the villagers would have a better chance of pointing out exactly where the Germans had headed to. The people were also subjected to torture to extract information from them.”

The Wakasighau were then forced to march to Maungu Township, some 35 kilometres by today’s roads. From Maungu to the border at Holili is 144 kilometres using today’s road network, if indeed the German attackers had come through Holili.

The captives were herded into train wagons and taken to Malindi where the British had prepared the ground by forewarning the Giriama that the Wakasighau were cannibals.

At Maungu, the captives were herded into train wagons and taken to Malindi where the British had prepared the ground by forewarning the Giriama that the Wakasighau were cannibals. “What the new hosts did was put poison in the water holes, and this led to many deaths amongst our people,” Mwalimu Mshiri explains.

Macharia Munene, professor of History and International Affairs at the United States International University, says that using exile as punishment summarizes the colonial policy of subjugation and dispossession of local peoples.

“Most of these people who were deported were individuals, people trying to challenge colonial authority,” he says, “but colonialists also deported groups of people, often to hostile, undesirable places.”

Return to Kasighau

The plight of the Kasighau in their new land did not go unnoticed, and various parties, including church organizations, brought pressure to bear on the colonialists to review their position. But it was not until 1936 that the Kasighau people were allowed to return home, only to find most of their land gone.

“All the land around Kasighau Hill was termed as hunting blocks where the British people could hunt. The block here was called ‘66A’, the Kasighau people were only confined to a 10km² block around the hill called ‘Trust Land’. The rest of the land was called ‘Crown Land,’” says Mwalimu Mshiri.

It was not until 1936 that the Kasighau people were allowed to return home, only to find most of their land gone.

After independence in 1963, Crown Land became State Land and some of the remaining land was handed over to ex-WWII British colonial soldiers. The people of Kasighau were not represented at the time and the remaining land was subdivided into ranches that today surround the 10km² settlement area. It is within some of these ranches that mineral deposits and precious stones are found, and there are frequent tussles between the youth, miners and investors.

According to a report titled The Taita Taveta County Integrated Development Plan 2013-2017, only 35 per cent of all landowners possess title deeds. The report says that land adjudication was ongoing to ensure that all landowners possess title deeds. The 2019 census puts the population of Taita Taveta at 340,671. Kasighau Ward alone is home to 13,000 people. The majority say they do not have title deeds.

No land, more problems

In February 2019, a group of young men from Kasighau descended on a disputed mine inside Kasighau Ranch. Around the mining area are mounds of earth and makeshift tents. People selling foodstuffs have followed in the wake of the miners. Those mining say they are simply going for what they believe belongs to them. They do not have the heavy equipment needed for serious mining operations such as earthmovers or elaborate underground mining shafts. They are artisanal miners who rely on simple tools such as hoes, spades and mattocks.

“When we young people saw that we did not have leaders serious on championing our rights, we decided to have our own revolution,” says Elijah Mademu, a youth leader. “We decided to redeem our lost lands, lands rich in mineral resources. There are about 500 young men and women eking out a living from these minerals.”

According to retired Kasighau Location chief Pascal Kizaka, the occupation of the mine can be attributed to population pressure and young people running out of options. “Every economic activity starts with land. Without land, you are like that person who is given water but cannot drink it,” he says.

Prof. Macharia says land ownership remains a significant cause of conflict across much of Kenya where land issues remain unresolved. “The government, particularly the area MP and area governor, because they have power, they should raise the issue and say, these are our people, so process their [land] titles.”

However, Taita Taveta Lands County Executive Committee member Mwandawiro Mghanga disputes the assertion that the county or the leadership at the local level are fully able to resolve the issue of title deeds, arguing that land and natural resources adjudication have not been fully devolved.

“It is true in this matter there are injustices, but on title deed issues even the entire Taita Taveta County has the same problem. In Kasighau the plan is to let them get the title deeds alongside the rest of the county”, he says.

“Of course there are six ranches, agriculturally-driven ranches (ADR’s) and there’s Kasighau Ranch which is very large. . . . There should not be a drive motivated by the capitalist system to grab ranches. What needs to be done is that everyone who needs a title for land to settle should have access to it.”

“Without land, you are like that person who is given water but cannot drink it.”

Land alone might not be the only thorny issue. Chief Kizaka laments that throughout his time living and working in the area, local Kasighau people have noticeably been lagging behind even in education matters. For instance, a 2013 report on inequalities compared Kasighau Ward to neighbouring Mbololo ward and found that only 8 per cent of Kasighau residents have a secondary education or above. A Kenya National Bureau of Statistics report titled Exploring Kenya’s Inequality: Pulling Apart or Pooling Together? shows Kasighau’s literacy rates to be four times less than Mbololo’s 32 per cent of the population who have gone beyond secondary school education.

“By independence time, we had only three primary schools, in Bungule, Rukanga and Mwakwasinyi. Illiteracy was very high. You can imagine, illiterate parents producing illiterate children,” bemoans Chief Kizaka. “There is no movement. The number of locals in school is very low. Compared to many parts of the country where locals are the majority, here we do not dominate.”

Today, Mwalimu Jonathan Mshiri says the thought of squeezing almost his entire descendants onto 15 acres of land troubles him daily. He knows too well that already the 13,000 Kasighau residents, whose numbers are increasing, are also facing the difficulty of having to make do with 10 square kilometres of land.

“We are the Kasighau people, we belong to this mountain and the surroundings, why are we not being given the priority?” he asks.

It is 6 p.m. and as the sun sets in the west, in the direction of Tanzania, it casts a golden glow on the Kasighau massif, but the dark despair of the Wakasighau remains.

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Big Pharma and the Problem of Vaccine Apartheid

In this report on the TWN-Africa and ROAPE webinar on vaccine imperialism held last month, Cassandra Azumah writes that the unfolding vaccine apartheid which has left Africa with the lowest vaccination rates in the world is another depressing example of the profit and greed of Big Pharma facilitated by imperialist power.

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The webinar on ‘Vaccine Imperialism: Scientific Knowledge, Capacity and Production in Africa’ which took place on 5 August 5, 2021, was organized by the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) in partnership with the Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa). It explored the connections and interplay of Africa’s weak public health systems, the profit and greed of Big Pharma enabled by the governments of the industrialized Global North, and the Covid-19 pandemic from a political economy perspective. This report summarizes the main discussions held during the conference, including an overview of each of the main points discussed. The webinar was the first in a three-part series of webinars scheduled by the two organizations under the theme Africa, Climate Change and the Pandemic: interrelated crises and radical alternatives.

The format of the event involved keynote presentations from three speakers, a five-minute activist update on the COVID-19 situation from two African countries, and an interactive discussion with participants. Chaired by Farai Chipato, a Trebek Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Ottawa and ROAPE editor, the session included presentations from Rob Wallace, an evolutionary epidemiologist and public health geography expert at the Agroecology and Rural Economics Research Corps; Tetteh Hormeku, Head of Programmes at Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Africa) and Marlise Richter, a senior researcher at the Health Justice Initiative in South Africa.

The current state of the pandemic – Rob Wallace

Rob Wallace began the session by providing a global perspective on the current state of the COVID-19 pandemic. He presented data showing that though the total number of vaccinations are increasing, the percentage of people fully vaccinated is concentrated in the West. We are currently experiencing a third wave of the pandemic, which is being driven by the delta variant. Though the cases in Africa are relatively lower than in other parts of the world, it is still a marked increase from the first and second waves which were less severe. This is not the trajectory that was predicted for COVID-19 on the continent in the early days of the pandemic. Marius Gilbert et al had speculated that Africa would be vulnerable to the virus due to a lower public health capacity and underlying co-morbidities that might increase the spread and damage of the virus. However, the incidence of the virus has played out in a different way, Africa’s cases are not as high as that of other continents. The possible reasons that have been given for this are: demographics (a younger population), open housing (which allows greater ventilation), and an ongoing circulation of other types of coronaviruses which have induced a natural, partial immunity in the population.

Wallace also commented on herd immunity, stating that it is not a panacea for defeating the virus. He referenced a paper by Lewis Buss et al on COVID-19 herd immunity in the Brazilian Amazon which found that although 76% of the population had been infected with the virus by October 2020, they had not achieved herd immunity (which is usually estimated at 70-75%), and proliferation of the virus was ongoing. He pointed out that the key lesson from this study is that there is no magical threshold for herd immunity; it may be different for different populations or there may be no threshold at all.

Likewise, he contended that defeating COVID-19 has little to do with vaccination as a silver bullet, but much to do with governance and the wellbeing of the population being at the crux of any public health decisions a government would take. A multi-pronged approach should be taken to defeat the virus, one that includes vaccinations, wearing of masks, social distancing, and testing and tracing. He argued however, that in the neoliberal regimes of the industrialised North, dealing with COVID-19 is organized around profit.

This was not the case in the early days of the outbreak. Initially, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in the US were in favour of having open medicine and making sure any pharmaceutical products produced to fight the virus were free to all. To this end, WHO developed the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP). However, the lobbying of Big Pharma and the likes of Bill Gates worked to centre the COVID-19 response around the model of intellectual property rights. This has had a considerable impact on the evolution of the virus, allowing it enough room to evolve such that pharmaceutical companies can make profits by selling booster shots of the vaccine. According to Wallace, this speaks to the “sociopathic nature” of the neoliberal regimes in the Global North who are willing to put the profits of Big Pharma over the lives of people. He opined that we need to act in solidarity to create a system in which disparities between the Global South and Global North are removed.

Health justice and the pandemic in South Africa – Marlise Richter

Marlise Richter’s presentation shed light on the work of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the lessons that can be learnt from their struggles for access to medicines (in particular ARVs). She pointed out that the TRIPS agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – TRIPS – is a legal agreement between member states of the World Trade Organisation) had a big impact on how the HIV/AIDS epidemic was addressed, resulting in a limited number of ARVs reaching the Global South.

The HIV epidemic was particularly acute in South Africa, the number of people living with the virus ballooned from 160,000 in 1992 to over 4.2 million people by 2000. At this time, ARV’s had been developed but were unaffordable in Africa, costing up to US$10,000 a year in 1998.

The TAC used multiple strategies such as skilled legal advocacy, high quality research, social mobilization, demonstrations, and public education to fight the pharmaceutical industry and their abuse of intellectual property rights protections. It joined the case brought by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) against the South African government for allowing parallel importation of drugs in order to bring down prices of medicines. Its intervention contributed to pressuring the PMA to withdraw its claims in 2001. In addition, it applied pressure at the 13th International AIDS Conference in Durban in 2000 by staging a march to highlight the danger of President Mbeki’s AIDS denialism and demanded access to ARVs in Africa.

From 1999 onwards, the TAC also campaigned for a national prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV. This case was won at the high court and precipitated a national ARV roll-out plan in April 2004. Finally, in 2002, TAC and the AIDS Law Project filed a complaint with the Competition Commission against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and Boehringer Ingelheim arguing that they violated the competition law by abusing their dominance in the market and charging excessive prices for ARVs. This forced the companies to reach a settlement in 2003 leading to a drastic cut in ARV prices. By employing these tactics, the TAC and other activists were able to transform both the national and global conversation on drug pricing, eventually leading to South Africa having the largest HIV treatment program globally and pharmaceutical companies reducing the prices of ARVs.

Following the success of the campaigns to provide access to ARVs in Africa, activists in the Global South fought for the Doha Declaration. The Doha Declaration waived some of the provisions in TRIPS in order to prevent public health crises and promote access to medicines for all. However, Richter commented that not many of these flexibilities have been used. She posits that this is due to immense political pressure from the West. The US in particular has singled out governments that seek to use the TRIPS flexibilities and placed them on the US Special 301 Watch List.

Returning to the present, Richter presented data that showed that on 3 August, there have been just under 200 million confirmed cases and over 4.2 million deaths of COVID-19. 28.6% of the world’s population has received at least one dose of the vaccine with 14.8% fully vaccinated. But to give a sense of the disparity in vaccine administration across the world, she indicated that 4.21 billion doses have been administered globally with 38.67 million administered daily, but in low-income countries only 1.1% of people have received at least one dose. Narrowing it down to Africa, only 1.58% of the population has been fully vaccinated. This variance in administered vaccines is also present across the continent. In July 2021, Morocco had 28.9% of its population fully vaccinated, Botswana and South Africa had 5.3% and 5% of their populations fully vaccinated, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo had 0%. These incongruities are also evident when we assess the number of vaccines promised against vaccines delivered, with South Africa receiving only 26% of the vaccines promised. Continuing at the current pace, it would take South Africa two years and three months just to vaccinate 67% of its population.

Richter quoted the WHO Director-General saying, “The world is on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure – and the price of this failure will be paid with lives and livelihoods in the world’s poorest countries.” Following from this, she believes that it makes ethical sense and public health sense for vaccines to be distributed equitably amongst the world’s population. In a bid to fight for vaccine equity, South Africa and India co-sponsored the TRIPS waiver in October 2020. If successful, this waiver will bring about flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement which would have an immense impact on the manufactured supplies of vaccines and other medical goods. For the waiver to be passed, a consensus amongst all member states of the WTO needs to be reached. While the waiver is supported by over 100 countries (predominantly in the Global South), it has been blocked most notably by the EU, Australia, Norway and Japan, countries which have enough vaccines to vaccinate their population many times over. Putting this into perspective, in January 2021 the EU had 3.5 vaccines per person and Canada had 9.6 vaccines per person, as compared to 0.2 vaccines per person in the African Union. By blocking this waiver, the industrialised North is further entrenching the extreme inequalities currently faced by the Global South.

Richter concluded her presentation by speaking on a recent development in South Africa, where Pfizer-BioNtech has recently signed a ‘fill and finish’ contract with the Biovac Institute. She claimed that while this is a first step in developing manufacturing capacity, it is not enough to achieve vaccine independence because it does not include the sharing of Pfizer-BioNtech’s technology or know-how. In addition, the ‘fill and finish’ approach does not address issues of security of supply, nor does it allow local manufacturers the freedom to make their own pricing decisions. She believes that if we start from the premise that health is a human right, as the TAC does, we will regard health equity and especially vaccine equity as essential in the struggle against the pandemic.

The political economy of the continuing fight against intellectual property rights negatively affecting public health goods in Africa – Tetteh Hormeku

Tetteh Hormeku’s presentation was centred around the challenges that African countries have confronted in the process of trying to develop their own pharmaceutical capacity. These challenges go beyond the struggles for the TRIPS waiver and include the impact of some of the choices governments have made. He focused on two interrelated points that frame the predicament of African countries in relation to the current vaccine situation:

1) The vaccine process is dominated by pharmaceutical Multinational Corporations (MNCs) based in the advanced industrial countries and supported by their governments. The controversy around the TRIPS waiver is a clear example of the extent to which advanced countries and their MNCs would like to hold on to their place in the international order.

2) On the non-existent domestic pharmaceutical capacity in African countries, Tetteh explained that he uses the phrase “domestic pharmaceutical capacity” because:

  • It does not include a subsidiary of an MNC signing a production agreement with a local African company.
  • The word ‘domestic’ combines both the local character of production and the fact that it is embedded within the nation, its challenges, people, drives and imperatives.
  • It does not refer to nations alone, but also to regional and continental initiatives.
  • It captures pharmaceutical capacity beyond the production of vaccines.

Tetteh provided the following case-study to show how these two points are interrelated. 24 February marked the first shipment of COVID-19 vaccines to Ghana, and there was an optimism that it would be the beginning of a steady supply of vaccines to the country – six months later, less than 2% of the population has been vaccinated. Around the time Ghana received this first shipment, it was in talks with the Cuban government for support on the transfer of technology to improve its pharmaceutical capacity.

This date in February also marked the anniversary of the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in 1966. Six months before the coup Nkrumah’s government had established a state pharmaceutical enterprise. After the coup, the military government tried to hand it over to Abbott Laboratories, an American pharmaceutical company, under such outrageous terms that the resulting backlash from the populace led to the abandonment of this plan.

The creation of a state-owned pharmaceutical enterprise in Ghana and in other African countries in the post-independence era was a reaction to colonial policies which deliberately curtailed the production of knowledge and science across the continent. The aim of developing a pharmaceutical industry domestically was to intervene on three levels:

  • Creating an industry with the technical know-how and the machinery to be able to participate in the production of pharmaceutical products.
  • Creating an industry which is linked to the process of developing and building knowledge and being at the frontiers of knowledge. This involved creating linkages with universities and scholars.
  • Making use of traditional sources of medical knowledge. The state pharmaceutical enterprise was in operation until the 1980s when due to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) it was privatized and unable to compete in the free market.

Tetteh pointed out that two lessons can be taken from this anecdote:

  • The government strongly intervened to ensure pharmaceutical production was linked to public procurement and public policy. The market for the product was guaranteed (army, public hospitals etc.).
  • The government intervened to ensure that certain medical products could not be imported into the country. These interventions were crucial in creating the legal and scientific conditions within which the state-owned enterprise thrived until the SAP period.

A key success of the state pharmaceutical enterprise was that it was able to bargain with Big Pharma on its own terms. At the time, Big Pharma needed to negotiate with the state pharmaceutical enterprise to produce their products locally since they had no access to the Ghanaian market. Although Ghana’s intellectual property rights regime replicated and mimicked some of the standards in the Global North, it was an indication of the amount of space countries in the Global South had to develop their own legislation with respect to intellectual property for public health. However, this option is no longer available to these countries. According to Tetteh, TRIPS inaugurated the monopoly that Big Pharma has over technical know-how for medical products. It has also enabled bio-piracy which allows Big Pharma to appropriate African traditional knowledge and patent it for themselves. In the 1990s, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) tried to create an African model law to enable a fight against bio-piracy but was unsuccessful.

The creation of a state-owned pharmaceutical enterprise in Ghana and in other African countries in the post-independence era was a reaction to colonial policies, which deliberately curtailed the production of knowledge and science across the continent

Tetteh noted that the current situation highlights the importance of getting the TRIPS waiver, as it is a starting point for building domestic pharmaceutical capacity. The waiver goes beyond just patents and encompasses a host of other intellectual property rights such as copyrights, and industrial design. It covers all the important bases for making medicines in a modern context. Looking back to the Doha Declaration, very few countries were able to make real changes to their laws in order to make use of the flexibilities. This was due in part to the entrenchment of TRIPS in other agreements such as AGOA (the African Growth and Opportunity Act) and the EPAs (Economic Partnership Agreements). However, importantly, there was no real commitment by African leaders to making these changes.

Tetteh argued that African leaders are not making the strategic choices that would eventually lead them to developing independent pharmaceutical industries. Suggesting that South-South cooperation is an avenue to address the current issues the continent faces, he argued that instead of using all their funds to buy vaccines, African countries could have allocated some funds to support phase three of Cuba’s vaccine trials. By doing this, they would have been able to negotiate for a consistent relationship in terms of knowledge exchange and the transfer of technology.

Updates on COVID-19 in Senegal and Kenya

Cheikh Tidiane Dieye provided an update on the COVID-19 situation in Senegal. The country recorded its first case of the virus in March 2020. Since then, the government has put in place measures such as curfews, travel restrictions and the banning of public gatherings to contain the spread of the disease. The Senegalese government did not enforce a lockdown because the country has a large informal sector which would have been negatively impacted by a lockdown.

Senegal is currently experiencing its third wave – driven by the delta variant. The total number of cases has increased significantly over the last year, moving from 9,805 cases and 195 deaths in July 2020 to 63,560 cases with 1,365 deaths as of July 2021. This increase in cases has taken a toll on the country as it does not have the healthcare infrastructure to deal with the virus caseload. The vaccination campaign was launched in February this year, with about 1.2 million doses received, 1.8% of the population fully vaccinated and 3% receiving their first dose.

He stated that Senegal is currently facing two issues:

  1. Lack of access to the vaccines. This is because the country does not have the means to purchase enough vaccines for its population and is currently relying on donations from COVAX. This has resulted in protracted waiting times for the vaccine. These waiting times can cause complications for vaccine administration, since there are people who have received the first dose but must wait for longer than the recommended time of eight weeks to receive their second dose.
  2. A significant part of the population is reluctant to receive vaccines and sensitization campaigns are proving ineffective.

He remarked on one key development in Senegal – the creation of a vaccine manufacturing plant funded by the World Bank, the US, and a few European countries. The plant is expected to produce 300 million doses a year, first of COVID-19 vaccines and then other types of vaccines against endemic diseases. This project will be implemented by the Institut Pasteur de Dakar which already produces yellow fever vaccines.

ROAPE’s Njuki Githethwa provided an update on the COVID-19 situation in Kenya. He mentioned that the delta variant has caused a surge in cases and deaths. There have been currently over 200,000 cases since the pandemic began with the total number of deaths at 4,000 at the end of July. He pointed out that this third wave is affecting the lower classes which were spared in the initial stages of the pandemic. Kenya has received 1.8 million doses of the vaccine, with about 1.7% of Kenyans vaccinated. He noted that if vaccinations continue at this pace, it will take over two years for Kenyans to be fully vaccinated.

A key success of the state pharmaceutical enterprise was that it was able to bargain with Big Pharma on its own terms. At the time, Big Pharma needed to negotiate with the state pharmaceutical enterprise to produce their products locally since they had no access to the Ghanaian market

According to Njuki, the disbursement of vaccines from the West is being portrayed as a symbol of charity, solidarity, and sympathy. This portrayal is underlain by the West positioning themselves as saints while vilifying other countries like India and China. He also mentioned that there is a class dynamic at play in Kenya regarding the distribution of vaccines. People in affluent areas have ease of access whereas the less privileged wait in long queues to get vaccinated. As a result, most of the population, including frontline workers, are yet to be vaccinated. Schools in the country reopened at the end of July, and only about 60% of teachers have been vaccinated. Njuki touched on the fact that there is an optimism that more vaccines are coming, however the government is not doing enough to sensitise the population. There is still a lot of misinformation and superstition surrounding the vaccines.

Moving beyond the state?

The discussion was further enriched by contributions from the participants. Gyekye Tanoh, for example, noted that in the past the presence of state pharmaceutical enterprises around the continent constituted an active and embodied interest. This influenced the way transnational pharmaceutical companies were able to negotiate, severely limiting their power. However, such a thing is not present today on the continent. In fact, a study from the McKinsey Institute pointed to the fact that the pharmaceutical industry has the highest markups in Africa, meaning that while the continent is not the biggest market, it is the most profitable region in the world. Currently, the interests of Big Pharma dominate, he asked, how do we begin to shift this? Is it time to look beyond the state as a leading agent for change? What can progressives do in this situation?

Senegal is currently experiencing its third wave – driven by the delta variant. The total number of cases has increased significantly over the last year, moving from 9,805 cases and 195 deaths in July 2020 to 63,560 cases with 1,365 deaths as of July 2021

In response to Gyekye’s question, Tetteh argued that he does not believe that it is time to look beyond the government. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, the market is created by production and government procurement of pharmaceutical products. Real change cannot be realised without the involvement of the government and well thought out policies. But there is still a role for progressives. Activists need to mobilise and organize around broad paradigmatic changes and clear concrete policy choices that can be implemented in the immediate, medium, and long term.

Wallace added that the objectives of activists in the Global North should be to support the efforts of those in the Global South. This is especially important because COVID-19 is not the only virus that can cause real damage. We need to make structural changes that ensure the Global South is not at the mercy of the Global North whose economic model has contributed to the current situation.

Farai Chipato ended the session by thanking the speakers and participants for their contributions to the fruitful and important discussion. Chipato urged participants to join ROAPE and TWN-Africa for their two upcoming webinars: ‘Popular public health in Africa: lessons from history and Cuba’ and ‘Alternative strategies and politics for the Global South: climate-change and industrialisation.’

This article was originally published in the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE) Journal. 

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