On February 9, 2014 Evelyn Anite, a former journalist and then a youth Member of Parliament for Northern Uganda, took to her knees and asked the National Resistance Movement (NRM) caucus to pass a resolution ring fencing the party chairmanship— and subsequent candidature for President— for Mr Yoweri Kaguta Museveni.
Word had gone round that Mr John Patrick Amama Mbabazi, Mr Museveni’s long-time political ally and then Prime minister, the party’s Secretary General and Museveni’s de facto number two, had had a strange dream that time had come for him to lead the Party and had therefore hatched a plan to contest against the septuagenarian leader for the Party Chairmanship and win a slot on the national ballot paper as the NRM Flag bearer.
Being a Machiavellian politician and inherently scared of internal competition Mr Museveni chose to pull a fast one and chose to use a youthful legislator to crash the political intentions of his long time comrade. In using her, he also intended to send a message that the revolution, as he is fond of calling his leadership, is now in the hands of the young people.
“I welcomed the Kyankwanzi resolution in the context of party cohesion because of rumours that there were `wanters’ and ‘wanters’ who were conducting themselves in a bad way and also using subversive ways,” Mr Museveni said after winning the Party ticket unopposed.
It immediately became sacrilegious to be associated with Mr Amama Mbabazi. Although he went ahead and contested for President as an independent, he became a political outcast in the party. For her work, Ms Anite was awarded a ministerial position as State Minister for Youth first and now for investment.
How the ring fencing quashed Political hope
Although Mr Mbabazi was not a trusted politician per se— because of his long relationship with Mr Museveni and his fingerprints being all over the repressive legislations and policies in the country—the opposition, weak and divided, had hoped that a challenge from within NRM would be chance at weakening, and probably putting an end to Museveni’s three decade rule. Or at least it would divide a Party so entrenched that there’s a thin line between it and the state.
Being a Machiavellian politician and inherently scared of internal competition Mr Museveni chose to pull a fast one and chose to use a youthful legislator to crash the political intentions of his long time comrade.
Ms Anite’s motion therefore, ensured the maintenance of the political status quo in the lead up to the 2016 General elections: an incumbent with priestly control over the Party and an opposition without any new force other than the usual FDC’s Dr Kizza Besigye.
With the contest for the presidency poised to be with the usual candidates especially after proposals for political reforms before elections were rejected by the majority ruling [party?], in particular the creation of an independent electoral commission, hope for political change was quashed even before the elections.
Just after President Museveni was announced winner, with 5,617,503 votes, or 60.7 per cent, the opposition and the majority youth who had lined up in droves to vote rejected the result.
The voting had been conducted with its fair share of controversies: blocked social media platforms, delayed voting material in most parts of the country like Kampala and Wakiso which had the highest number of voters believed to be opposition.
The opposition declined an invite to the presidential swearing in ceremony. Calls for an international audit of the votes fell on deaf ears. Mr Mbabazi’s election Petition had just been defeated in the Supreme Court and so the ruling party felt they had cemented the win and there was no need for further scrutiny. Frustrated, the youth formed a social media brigade and declared Kizza Besigye, who got 3,270,290 votes (35.37 per cent of the ten million voters that cast ballots) the people’s president. As a nod, the FDC leadership videotaped a mock swearing in ceremony of the ‘people’s president’ and supplied it across social media platforms.
A politically rudderless youth leadership
Shout and quarrelling on social media is seemingly what the youth can do.
Sometime time back in the ninth Parliament, this writer had short conversation with then Health Minister, now Prime Minister Ruhakana Rugunda, on what the former UPC youth winger and President Milton Obote’s protégé thought about the political situation in the country.
Straight up, Ndugu Rugunda, as he is fondly called, responded: “When I was a young man like you, I was politically active. I rose up and spoke against what was wrong with government and we ensured that things changed. Do you expect me to speak against a government I worked to bring in power?”
Unlike in the sixties when then young men like Premier Rugunda benefited from vibrant and powerful students’ associations like the Uganda National Students Association and powerful political party youth leagues, today’s politically aware youth has been denied a platform for political expression—barazas were banned but students associations, especially at universities, which used to be the centers for free political discourse, have largely been monetized.
It used to be lucrative to be an opposition Guild President at Makerere University for one would use the platform to speak to power and push the political youth agenda. Now, it is lucrative because one can easily be identified and taken into NRM fold to eat. Ms Suzan Abbo, who was a vocal Democratic Party member while Makerere University Guild President, crossed to work in State House immediately after graduation.
Ms Anite’s motion therefore, ensured the maintenance of the political status quo in the lead up to the 2016 General elections: an incumbent with priestly control over the Party
Political party Youth Leagues are dead. They hardly issue a statement on the political on goings in the country but become active toward General elections to offer their support for sale to the highest bidder. It is in that period that you see groups like the poor youth coming up demanding money for youth projects then disappear after the elections.
Most of the leaders work to tow their party leaders’ line in anticipation of favours. Once, this writer challenged the then NRM Youth League Secretary General, Robert Rutaro (a former Makerere University Guild President) on why the NRM youth league was not as vibrant as that of South Africa’s ruling African National Congress’ youth league under Julius Malema. His response was to blame poor funding from the party leadership; for a team of young leaders who are not in gainful employment, the focus was on convincing the party chairman to get them jobs.
Little wonder that whenever youth leaders [meet?] from across the country, the fights that are reported in the media are not about ideas but transport refund.
With more than 60 per cent of the population being youth, the lack of a strong youth leadership means that the young people may not have a strong say in the big political transition question, unless their youth representatives in Parliament choose to step forward.
A shot at an inclusive government and a weak opposition
After being sworn in, President Museveni appointed over 80 ministers, among them his wife Janet Kataha Museveni, whom he gave the education docket. He also however, appointed army officers, like former Commanders, Katumba Wamala and Abubaker Jeje Odongo to head works and internal affairs respectively.
A retired army general himself, President Museveni believes in deploying soldiers to do assignments he wants to impact people. He, for instance, disbanded National Agriculture Advisory Services (Naads) a lead agriculture project and renamed it Operation Wealth Creation to supply seedlings and supervise agriculture development. It is now being implemented by soldiers under the leadership of his brother Caleb Akandwanaho, also a retired army general.
However, as if to calm the political pressures and public resentment of an election exercise some saw as unfair and influenced, Mr Museveni, when constituting his government, also appointed individuals from the opposition into ministerial positions and others were appointed by the Government Chief Whip to sit on Parliament committees.
Uganda People’s Congress’ Ms Betty Amongi, wife to UPC’s contested president, James Akena (himself a son to Uganda’s first President and UPC founder, the late Apollo Milton Obote), was given the influential Lands Housing & Urban Development Ministry.
Former FDC member and one time presidential candidate under the little known Uganda Federal Alliance, Betty Kamya, was given the Kampala City Council docket.
Democratic Party’s Florence Nakiwala Kiyingi was given State Minister for Youth and Children Affairs.
In Parliament, FDC’s Beatrice Anywar was announced, by the Government (and NRM’s Chief Whip) as vice Chairperson of the House committee on Gender, Labour and Social Development.
After being declared winner of the 2016 elections, Mr Museveni announced from his Rwakitura country home and announced that he will “wipe out the opposition completely in the next five years”.
Although there are several registered political parties, there are only three pronounced opposition political parties in Uganda: The Uganda People’s Congress (founded in 1960 and party to the country’s founding father the late Apollo Milton Obote), the Democratic Party (the oldest party in Uganda founded in 1954) and the Forum for Democratic Change, the home of Mr Museveni’s main challenger, Kizza Besigye.
Apart from the FDC which, thanks to Dr Besigye, manages to keep itself in the news with anti-establishment rallies and is therefore a darling to many youth especially in the city and townships around the country, UPC and DP are shadows of their former selves: dogged in internal political bickering.
In UPC, the Party President, James Akena is accused of trading his father’s party to President Museveni in return for political favours. Many in the party see the appointment of his wife as one such favour. Prior to the 2016 General Elections, Mr Akena announced a “party decision” to work with President. By that time, he had already been branded an NRM mole by a UPC faction led by Joseph Bbosa, a long time UPC member, who accused Mr Akena of having received UShs1 billion to hand over the party to Mr Museveni.
The opposition is weak and uninspiring to the young—many of its former Young Turks and high ranking cadres like former DP’s vice chairman, Mohammad Kezaala have openly looked for financial help from the President Museveni and willingly crossed the political line to be appointed deputy ambassadors without a substantive station.
In the Democratic Party, the president, Nobert Mao has also faced opposition from within, with many accusing him of being Mr Museveni’s project. The Lord Mayor, Erias Lukwago, a strong DP member, for instance shows more loyalty to FDC’s Besigye than to his party President.
The opposition is weak and uninspiring to the young—many of its former Young Turks and high ranking cadres like former DP’s vice chairman, Mohammad Kezaala have openly looked for financial help from the President Museveni and willingly crossed the political line to be appointed deputy ambassadors without a substantive station.
The passing of the Public order management bill has continuously made it difficult for the opposition to mobilize or even sit under a tree in a group without the permission of the police chief. Many in the opposition, therefore, have resorted to being vocal at funerals and those who are more daring try to organize rallies around the city but those are usually easily dispersed by a ruthless, usually trigger-happy, anti-riot police.
Therefore, President Museveni’s appointment of opposition members in his cabinet, Dr Frederick Kisekka-Ntale, a Kampala based political scientist, argues is not a move to create an all-inclusive government but a move to weaken the opposition more and keep himself in power.
The age limit question
In 2005, when he wanted to prolong his stay in power, President Museveni, just as he was to do with Ms Anite twelve years later, picked a then less known Kabula County representative, James Kakooza, to move a motion in Parliament for the removal of term limits. In what was popularized as Kisanja (term limit) project, Members of Parliament were each given shs5 million to “facilitate” their decision making.
Article 102 (b) of the 1995 constitution of the Republic of Uganda, as then amended, says that “A person is not qualified for election as President unless that person is not less than Thirty five years and not more than seventy five years of age.” Now 71 years old, this should ideally be president Museveni’s last term. However, there is already a popular push among NRM legislators to have the constitution amended to remove the age limit clause. That will essentially mean that without term and age limits, president Museveni could stay in power until the grim reaper decides.
“No one can replace Afande Museveni. He has been our leader from during the war and he has to continue leading us until he dies. The constitution was made by men and we can change it any tine we want,” Mr Ibrahim Abiriga, the Arua Municipality member of Parliament told this writer in a recent interview at Parliament. Mr Abiriga, a retired soldier, dresses in all yellow, the NRM party colour seven days a week—he even drives a yellow beetle Volkswagen. He says he would jump on the earliest opportunity to move the motion to remove term limits.
All through the years, President Museveni has always said that the decision to remain in power is not for him to make but for the people through their representatives, the MPs. About the age limit debate, he said in March that he is only concerned about the future of Africa but not “small things like age limit”. This was weeks after his son-in-law, Odrek Rwabogo, wrote a missive calling upon the country to start debating issues of political transition, economic reforms and internal democracy in the ruling party.
President Museveni has a penchant for distancing himself from projects that make him look like he wants to stay in power. He likes the I’m-here-because-you-asked-me-to-and-it’s-for-your-own-good line. However, word in the corridors of Parliament is that he has already given deputy Attorney General, Mwesigwa Rukutana the nod to lead the constitution review team that will eventually deliver an age limit free constitution.
“No one can replace Afande Museveni. He has been our leader from during the war and he has to continue leading us until he dies. The constitution was made by men and we can change it any tine we want,” Mr Ibrahim Abiriga, the Arua Municipality member of Parliament told this writer in a recent interview at Parliament.
Coming from the Western part of the country like the President, Mr Rukutana is one of his trusted lieutenants. He has served in cabinet for over 10 years and was part of the legal team that represented him in the Mbabazi Presidential election petition. With a largely NRM dominated Parliament (298 out of the 388 directly seats), the biggest fear by those opposed to the removal of age limits is that the ruling party could easily use the tyranny of numbers to have their way. A number of ruling party legislators this writer has spoken to however say they would have to be paid by Mr Museveni to allow the removal of the age caveat.
An insecure worried population
One mid-morning early this year, Andrew Felix Kaweesi, the Assistant Inspector General of Police and the force’s spokesperson was assassinated by unknown gunmen. It was in a similar way that several other Ugandans had been killed. Two people show up on a bike, shoot at the target and ride off.
Suspects are usually arrested, tortured to confess but none is yet to be placed at any scene of crime.
Hit men continue to kill people and general robbery is on the increase across the country, yet the President has continued to renew the Inspector General of Police, Gen Kale Kayihura’s contract. He has served since 2005.
In the wake of the much publicised police torture of Kaweesi’s murder suspects, the police leadership has continued to give contradicting statements referring to the visibly deep wounds on the suspects as “mild”
Instead of working together to address the security situation and reform the police, Gen Kayihura and cabinet Minister for security, General Henry Tumukunde, are instead engaged in endless catfights, each accusing the other of incompetence.
It is allegedly said that the genesis of this conflict is over the security budget, who should own it and decide on its expenditure. President Museveni feeds off the bickering. He usually sets different agencies against each other by separately asking them to do the same job and have them try to outcompete each other as they fight to win his favour.
In the country side the population is suffering with issues like prolonged drought, army worm and nodding disease in the north; with increasing market prices for house hold necessities like sugar and food stuff. The common man has increasing become apprehensive and worried about the future. The only hope sometimes lies in Parliament where on almost a weekly basis, speaker Rebecca Kadaga is petitioned at least thrice on issues ranging from a deroofed school in a village far away from Kampala to issues like torture in police cells.
The Speaker has always been responsive, using her seat to give directives to government officials and ministers to put things right.
Sometimes she has succeeded, like in when she ordered for an extension of the phone sim card registration deadline to allow for time for people up country to register, sometimes she simply gets winding stories and excuses from government like in the case of torture of people in police cells.
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The Axis-of-Evil Coalition in the Horn of Africa
The “Tripartite Agreement” signed between Ahmed Abiy of Ethiopia, Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo of Somalia, and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea is a “Trojan Horse” deal that could eventually destabilise the entire Horn of Africa region.
The political dynamics in the Horn of Africa have always been tense and volatile. Being a geographically strategic region, it has historically attracted competition among the big powers, with the region’s diversity in terms of population, norms, politics, and history rendering it susceptible to proxy politics emanating mainly from Western countries.
The countries of the Horn of Africa are Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Sudan, South Sudan, and by extension, Kenya, and Uganda. In this article, we focus on Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea. More specifically, we shall examine how the incumbent leaders in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea have created a coalition to extend their terms of office under the pretence of “Horn of Africa Integration”.
The Horn of Africa region has been vulnerable to multipolar politics ever since, at the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, 13 European countries laid claim to Africa’s territories: Britain signed the Rodd Treaty with Menelik II of Ethiopia in 1897 that dominated the country’s administration, Djibouti came under French control while Italy took Somalia, Italian Somaliland, and Eritrea. By 1914, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, all other African countries were under colonial rule.
Russia joined the race during the Cold War and supported the regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia, with President Siad Barre of Somalia and Prime Minister Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia becoming close allies of Russia. But despite their allegiance to the former Soviet Union, the two countries fought a vicious war from 1977 to 1978.
From 1960 to 1969, Somalia was a fledgling democracy led by civilian governments established through peaceful transfer power. The military seized power in 1969, led by Siad Barre who ruled with an iron fist until he was ousted in 1991, leaving in his wake a civil war that killed thousands of Somalis, and pushed thousands more into exile. In 2000, Djibouti called a reconciliation conference that brought together civil society groups and culminated in the formation of the first government since the beginning of the civilian war. The new government was short-lived, however, as the warlords who controlled most of the south-central regions resisted and revolted. In 2004, the second government was formed under the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia under the leadership of the late President Abdullahi Yusuf.
However, this government made the same mistakes as its predecessor, calling on the African Union to send troops to support President Yusuf’s government and escort him to the capital, Mogadishu. The new government and the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—which controlled most of the south-central region—held several meetings in Sudan to try to reach an agreement, but the talks failed. A military confrontation between troops of the Islamic Courts Union the Transitional Federal Government backed by Ethiopian forces ensued and, after a bitter fight and great loss of life, the TFG entered Mogadishu. Following a political fallout between the president and his prime minister, President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned, and the leader of the ICU, Sheekh Sharif, succeed Yusuf after negotiations between the leader of the ICU and the international community.
The first elections since the outbreak of the civil war were held under President Sheekh Sharif and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, a civilian and veteran academic, was elected. Somalia became a federal state with five federal member states under President Hassan who oversaw the implementation of the provisional constitution which had been adopted in August 2012.
Although there were allegations of corruption, President Hassan’s government was relatively stable. One person one vote elections were scheduled to take place in 2016, but they were postponed for various reasons, including the insecurity caused by the Al-Shabaab and disagreement between the federal government and the leaders of the federal member states and others. Despite the challenges, however, President Hassan Sheikh’s administration pioneered indirect parliamentary elections where 51 delegates from each clan would each elect the members of parliament. Although the process was not considered a fair fight, the transition was smooth. In February 2017, Hassan Sheikh lost his re-election bid, and President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo became his successor. President Farmajo received a warm welcome from the public and many accolades from the international community and the neighbouring countries. Indeed, many Somalis believed that he would be better than his predecessors and would deliver the one person, one vote in 2021.
The situation turned when the government extradited Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) commander Abdikarim Qalbi Dhagah to Ethiopia, leading to a public backlash, protests, and fierce criticism of the government. It was the first time that a Somali person had been extradited to Ethiopia, a country that many Somalis consider the archenemy. Since then, public support for the government has plummeted. Intimidation, attacks, smear campaigns, extrajudicial actions, and incarceration have become the modus operandi of the current government and the Somali people’s hope in Farmajo’s government has declined dramatically. Meanwhile, Farmajo’s government declared the UN Ambassador to Somalia persona non grata and expelled him, leading to international condemnation of his government. The government of Somalia also cut ties with Kenya, a country which has hosted the largest number of Somali refugees since 1991.
It was the first time that a Somali person had been extradited to Ethiopia, a country that many Somalis consider the archenemy.
The mandate of the sitting president ended on 8 February 2021 without elections being held for a successor government. In March 2021, the Somali parliament unilaterally extended the term of the president for another two years, which resulted in a confrontation and a split within the National army. After two weeks of chaos, the parliament reversed its decision.
The long-awaited one person one vote elections became a pipedream and indirect parliamentary elections were maintained albeit with an increase in the number of the delegates from 51 to 101. The May 2022 parliamentary elections were been mired in fraud, favouritism, rigging, and massive irregularities and the country has been plunged into uncertainty.
Historically, Ethiopia has never held free and fair elections. On the contrary, the country has lived under a political dynasty and patrimonial leadership interspersed with coups. There has always been a power struggle between Ethiopia’s diverse communities. The Amhara, who collaborated with the colonial powers, enjoyed the support of the British Administration under the Rodd Treaty of 1897 agreement, and dominated the country’s politics. Both Menelik II and Haile Selassie marginalized other communities, especially the Oromo, the Somali, and Tigrayans. In 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrew Haile Selassie in a coup d’état and moved the country’s allegiance away from the West to the Soviet Union, leading to a proxy war in Ethiopia between the US and Russia. Mengistu was ruthless to his critics, especially the Oromo, Tigray, and Somali; he was known as the “Butcher of Addis Ababa” and the “Red Terror.”
Led by Meles Zenawi, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) ousted Mengistu’s regime in 1991 and Ethiopia adopted federalism under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) coalition party made up of the TPLF, Amhara, Oromo, and the Southern Nations and Nationalities. The first mistake committed by the Zenawi regime was to disregard other communities, particularly the Somalis, who are the third largest community in terms of population. The second mistake was to nullify the results of the elections in the Somali region where the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) had won by a landslide, resulting in a confrontation between the Zenawi regime and the ONLF. After three years of demonstrations emanating from the Oromo region and spreading to the Amhara region, Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn resigned in 2018. It was the first time in Ethiopia that a public office holder had resigned due to pressure from the citizens. Abiy Ahmed took over as prime minister in April 2018.
Eritrea was an Italian colony before World War II, but after Italy was defeated in the war in 1952, the United Nations tried to federate Eritrea to Ethiopia to as a compromise for Ethiopia’s claim of sovereignty and Eritrea’s desire for independence. Unfortunately, after nine years, Haile Selassie dissolved the federation annexed and annexed Eritrea.
As a result, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which was created in 1961, revolted against Haile Selassie. When Haile Selassie was dethroned by the Derg regime, former Prime Minister Mengistu Haile Mariam, who had led the revolution, tried to reach a settlement with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) without success and insurgencies against his rule increased. In 1991, when Mengistu was ousted by the rebel movements led by Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), Prime Minister Meles Zenawi tried to keep Eritrea as part of Ethiopia, leading to renewed conflict with the rebel groups. After two years of fierce fighting Eritrea gained its independence in 1993 but the country has never held an election since; Isaias Afwerki, the first president, is still at the helm. After five years of a territorial dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Badme War erupted in 1998, lasting until 2000 and claiming more than 100,000 lives.
Mengistu was ruthless to his critics, especially the Oromo, Tigray, and Somali; he was known as the “Butcher of Addis Ababa” and the “Red Terror.”
Several peace agreements were brokered, including by the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), the Algiers Comprehensive Peace Accord (ACPA), the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), all culminating in deadlock, and Addis Ababa and Asmara remaining at loggerheads.
Horn of Africa Integration Project
With the exception of April 2018, when the former Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn resigned following three years of demonstrations against EPRDF rule, Ethiopia had never experienced a peaceful transition of power. Abiy Ahmed, who was part of the EPRDF rule, succeeded Desalegn.
In the beginning, under Prime Minister Abiy, Ethiopia enjoyed relative press freedom, there was greater inclusion of women in politics, and the 20 years of animosity between Ethiopia and Eritrea came to an end, paving the way for Abiy to receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019. Abiy Ahmed visited Mogadishu in June 2018, where he met his counterpart President Farmajo. In a joint statement, the two leaders talked about strengthening diplomatic and trade relations between their two countries, with Ethiopia pledging to invest in Somalia’s port facilities. But apart from that brief statement, nobody knows precisely what the agenda of Abiy’s meeting with Farmajo was. President Farmajo has also visited Addis Ababa several times, but has not informed Somalia’s parliament what has been agreed between the two leaders. In December 2018, Eritrean president Afwerki visited Mogadishu and had talks with president Farmajo; the agenda of the meeting between the two leaders remains unknown. Somalia’s president also paid a visit to Asmara in July 2018.
Eritrea used to supply weapons and ammunition to the ICU during its conflict with the Somali government of the late President Abdullahi Yusuf, leading the Somali government to accuse Eritrea of supporting the extremist Al-Shabaab rebel group and as a result, the United Nations imposed an embargo on Eritrea in 2009. The UN lifted sanctions on Eritrea in November 2018 after the country reconciled with Ethiopia and Somalia. The leaders of the three countries, Abiy, Farmajo, and Afwerki, signed a little-known “Tripartite Agreement”. In hindsight, Abiy’s reconciliation with Afwerki was to enable Ethiopia to ostracize Ethiopia’s Tigrayan community and launch an attack on the Tigray region. Abiy’s secret agenda came out into the open on 4 November 2020 when he attacked the Tigray region backed by Eritrean troops. The coalition forces have committed gross human rights violations in the Tigray region, which has led to international condemnation against the brutality of the coalition troops and calls for Eritrean forces to withdraw from the Tigray region.
In hindsight, Abiy’s reconciliation with Afwerki was to enable Ethiopia to ostracize Ethiopia’s Tigrayan community and launch an attack on the Tigray region.
Meanwhile, although there is no smoking gun, there is a strong possibility that the Somali troops being trained in Eritrea are involved in the Tigray war. The Somali government had denied that Somali soldiers were sent to Eritrea for training but later confirmed this.
Despite the ongoing civil war and the political discontent in Ethiopia resulting from the delayed polls that were supposed to take place in September 2020, Abiy has decided to remain at the helm by hook or by crook.
The regimes in Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, and Asmara that I have called the axis-of-evil coalition have led the region astray through lack of an adequate response to the protracted drought, the unbridled corruption, the instability, and the internecine conflicts. The reasons behind the “Tripartite Agreement” between the three leaders were not and never have been to serve their respective people, enhance the trade relations, or improve security, but to keep a hold on power through their “Trojan horse” deal. This may lead to a revolt by the oppositions in the three countries that could finally destabilize the entire Horn of Africa region.
Moving or Changing? Reframing the Migration Debate
The purpose of the mass and civilizational migrations of Western Europe was the same as now: not simply to move from one point to another, but also from one type of social status to another, to change one’s social standing in relation to the country of origin.
Do we move to change, or do we move to stay the same?
That seems to depend on who we were, to begin with. In most cases, it seems we move in an attempt to become even more of whatever we think we are.
A good Kenyan friend of mine once (deliberately) caused great offense in a Nairobi nightspot encounter with a group of Ugandans he came across seated at a table. There were six or seven of them, all clearly not just from the same country, but from the same part of the country.
“It always amazes me,” he said looking over their Western Uganda features, “how people will travel separately for thousands of miles only to meet up so as to recreate their villages.
He moved along quickly.
“Most African Migration Remains Intraregional” is a headline on the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies website:
Most African migration remains on the continent, continuing a long-established pattern. Around 21 million documented Africans live in another African country, a figure that is likely an undercount given that many African countries do not track migration. Urban areas in Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt are the main destinations for this inter-African migration, reflecting the relative economic dynamism of these locales.
Among African migrants who have moved off the continent, some 11 million live in Europe, almost 5 million in the Middle East, and more than 3 million in America.
More Africans may be on the move now than at any time since the end of enslavement, or perhaps the two large European wars. Even within the African continent itself. They navigate hostilities in the cause of movement—war, poverty and environmental collapse.
The last 500 years have seen the greatest expression of the idea of migration for the purpose of staying the same (or shall we say, becoming even more of what one is). The world has been transformed by the movement of European peoples, who have left a very visible cultural-linguistic stamp on virtually all corners of the earth. It is rarely properly understood as a form of migration.
It took place in three forms. The first was a search for riches by late feudal Western European states, in a bid to solve their huge public debts, and also enrich the nobility. This was the era of state-sponsored piracy and wars of aggression for plunder against indigenous peoples. The second form was the migration of indentured Europeans to newly conquered colonial spaces. The third was the arrival of refugees fleeing persecution borne of feudal and industrial poverty, which often took religious overtones.
Certainly, new spaces often create new opportunities, but only if the migrants concerned are allowed to explore the fullness of their humanity and creativity. The historical record shows that some humans have done this at the expense of other humans.
A key story of the world today seems to be the story of how those that gained from the mass and civilizational migrations of Western Europe outwards remain determined to keep the world organised in a way that enables them to hold on to those gains at the expense of the places to which they have migrated.
We can understand the invention and development of the modern passport—or at least its modern application—as an earlier expression of that. Originally, passports were akin to visas, issued by authorities at a traveler’s intended destination as permission to move through the territory. However, as described by Giulia Pines in National Geographic, established in 1920 by the League of Nations, “a Western-centric organization trying to get a handle on a post-war world”, the current passport regime “was almost destined to be an object of freedom for the advantaged, and a burden for others”. Today the dominant immigration models (certainly from Europe) seem based around the idea of a fortress designed to keep people out, while allowing those keeping the people out to go into other places at will, and with privilege, to take out what they want.
Certainly, new spaces often create new opportunities, but only if the migrants concerned are allowed to explore the fullness of their humanity and creativity.
For me, the greatest contemporary expression of “migration as continuity” has to be the Five Eyes partnership. This was an information-sharing project based on a series of satellites owned by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. Its original name was “Echelon”, and it has grown to function as a space-based listening system, spying on telecommunications on a global scale – basically, space-based phone tapping.
All the countries concerned are the direct products of the global migration and settlement of specifically ethnic English Europeans throughout the so-called New World, plus their country of origin. The method of their settlement are now well known: genocide and all that this implies. The Five Eyes project represents their banding together to protect the gains of their global ethnic settlement project.
In the United States, many families that have become prominent in public life have a history rooted, at least in part, in the stories of immigrants. The Kennedys, who produced first an Ambassador to the United Kingdom, and then through his sons and grandsons, a president, an attorney general, and a few senators, made their fortune as part of a gang of Irish immigrants to America involved in the smuggling of illicit alcohol in the period when the alcohol trade was illegal in the United States.
Recent United States president Donald Trump is descended from a German grandfather who, having arrived in 1880s America as a teenage barber, went on to make money as a land forger, casino operator and brothel keeper. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd president of the United States was the paternal grandson of a trader named Warren, a descendant of Dutch settlers who made his fortune smuggling opium into China in the 1890s.
While it is true that the entire story of how Europeans came to be settled in all the Americas is technically a story of criminality, whether referred to as such or not, the essential point here is that many of the ancestors of these now prominent Americans would not have passed the very same visa application requirements that they impose on present-day applicants.
The purpose of migrations then was the same as it is now: not simply to move from one point to another, but also from one type of social status to another. It was about finding wealth, and through that, buying a respectability that had not been accessible in the country of origin. So, the point of migration was in a sense, not to migrate, but to change one’s social standing.
And once that new situation has been established, then all that is left is to build a defensive ring around that new status. So, previously criminal American families use the proceeds of their crime to build large mansions, and fill the rooms with antiques and heirlooms, and seek the respectability (not to mention business opportunities) of public office.
Many of the ancestors of these now prominent Americans would not have passed the very same visa application requirements that they put to present-day applicants.
European countries that became rich through the plunder of what they now call the “developing world”, build immigration measures designed to keep brown people out while allowing the money keep coming in. They build large cities, monuments and museums, and also rewrote their histories just as the formerly criminal families have done.
Thus the powers that created a world built on migration cannot be taken seriously when they complain about present-day migration.
Migration is as much about the “here” you started from, as it about the “there” you are headed to. It is not about assimilating difference; it is about trying to keep the “here” unchanged, and then to re-allocate ourselves a new place in that old sameness. This is why we go “there”.
This may explain the “old-new” names so common to the mass European migration experience. They carry the names of their origins, and impose them on the new places. Sometimes, they add the word “New” before the old name, and use migrant-settler phrases like “the old country”, “back east”. They then seek to choose a new place to occupy in the old world they seek to recreate, that they could not occupy in the old world itself. But as long as the native still exists, then the settler remains a migrant. And the settler state remains a migrant project.
To recreate the old world, while creating a new place for themselves in it, , such migrants also strive to make the spaces adapt to this new understanding of their presence that they now seek to make real.
I once witness a most ridiculous fight between three Ugandan immigrants in the UK. It took place on the landing of the social housing apartment of two of them, man and wife, against the third, until that moment, their intended house guest. As his contribution to their household, the guest had offered to bring a small refrigerator he owned. However, when the two men went to collect the fridge in a small hired van, the driver explained that traffic laws did not permit both to ride up front with him – one would have to ride in the back with the fridge. The fridge owner, knowing the route better, was nominated to sit up front, to which his friend took great and immediate exception; he certainly had not migrated to London to be consigned to the back of a van like a piece of cargo. After making his way home via public means, and discussing his humiliation with his good wife, the arrangement was called off – occasioning a bitter confrontation with the bewildered would-be guest.
There must have been so many understandings of the meaning of their migration to Britain, but like the Europeans of the New World, the Ugandans had settled on replicating the worst of what they were running from in an attempt to become what they were never going to be allowed to be back home.
A good case in point is the ethnic Irish communities in Boston and New York, whose new-found whiteness—having escaped desperate poverty, oppression and famine under British colonial rule on what were often referred to as “coffin ships” —saw them create some of the most racist and brutal police forces on the East Coast. They did not just migrate physically; they did so socially and economically as well.
It starts even with naming.
The word “migrant” seems to belong more to certain races than to others, although that also changes. When non-white, normally poor people are on the move, they can get labeled all sorts of things: refugees, economic migrants, immigrants, illegals, encroachments, wetbacks and the like.
With white-skinned people, the language was often different. Top of the linguistic league is the word “expatriate”, to refer to any number of European-origin people moving to, or through, or settling in, especially Africa.
According to news reports, some seven million Ukrainians fleeing the Russian invasion were absorbed by their neighboring European countries, most of which are members of the European Union. Another 8 million remain displaced within the war-torn country.
This is an outcome of which the Europeans are proud. They have even emphasized how the racial and cultural similarities between themselves and the Ukrainian refugees have made the process easier, if not a little obligatory.
This sparked off a storm of commentary in which comparisons were made with the troubles earlier sets of refugees (especially from the Middle East and Afghanistan) faced as the fled their own wars and tried to enter Western Europe.
And the greatest irony is that the worst treatment they received en-route was often in the countries of Eastern Europe.
Many European media houses were most explicit in expressing their shock that a war was taking place in Europe (they thought they were now beyond such things), and in supporting the position that the “white Christian” refugees from Ukraine should be welcomed with open arms, unlike the Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians before them.
Human migration was not always like this.
Pythagoras (570-495 BC), the scholar from Ancient Greece, is far less well remembered as a migrant and yet his development as a thinker is attributable to the 22 or so years he spent as a student and researcher in Ancient Egypt. The same applies to Plato, who spent13 years in Egypt.
There is not that much evidence to suggest that Pythagoras failed to explain where he got all his learning from. If anything, he seems to have been quite open in his own writing about his experiences, first as an apprentice and later a fellow scholar in the Egyptian knowledge systems. The racial make-up of Ancient Egypt, and its implications, was far from becoming the political battleground it is today.
Top of the linguistic league is the word “expatriate” to refer to any number of European-origin people moving to, or through, or settling in, especially Africa.
Classic migration was about fitting in. Colonial migration demands that the new space adapt to accommodate the migrant. The idea of migrants and modern migration needs to be looked at again from its proper wider 500-year perspective. People of European descent, with their record of having scattered and forcibly imposed themselves all over the world, should be the last people to express anxieties about immigrants and migration.
With climate change, pandemic cycles, and the economic collapse of the west in full swing, we should also focus on the future of migration. As was with the case for Europeans some two to three hundred years ago, life in Europe is becoming rapidly unlivable for the ordinary European. The combination of the health crisis, the energy crisis, the overall financial crisis and now a stubborn war, suggests that we may be on the threshold of a new wave of migration of poor Europeans, as they seek cheaper places to live.
The advantages to them are many. Large areas of the south of the planet are dominated physically, financially and culturally, by some level of Western values, certainly at a structural level. Just think how many countries in the world use the Greco-Latin origin word “police” to describe law enforcement. These southern spaces have already been sufficiently Westernized to enable a Westerner to live in them without too much of a cultural adjustment on their part. The Westerners are coming back.
This article is part of a series on migration and displacement in and from Africa, co-produced by the Elephant and the Heinrich Boll Foundation’s African Migration Hub, which is housed at its new Horn of Africa Office in Nairobi.
The Iron Grip of the International Monetary System: CFA Franc, Hyper-Imperial Economies and the Democratization of Money
Cameroonian economist Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi died in 1984, either poisoned or by suicide. His ideas about the international monetary system and the CFA franc are worth revisiting.
Despite being one of Africa’s greatest economists, Joseph Tchundjang Pouemi is little known outside Francophone intellectual circles. Writing in the 1970s, he offered a stinging rebuke of orthodox monetary theory and policy from an African perspective that remains relevant decades later. Especially powerful are his criticisms of the international monetary system and the CFA franc, the regional currency in West and Central Africa that has historically been pegged to the French currency—at first the franc, and now the euro.
Pouemi was born on November 13th, 1937, to a Bamiléké family in Bangoua, a village in western Cameroon. After obtaining his baccalaureate and working as a primary school teacher, Pouemi moved to France in 1960, where he studied law, mathematics, and economics at the University of Clermont-Ferrand. Pouemi then worked as a university professor and policy adviser in Cameroon and Cote d’Ivoire. In 1977, he joined the IMF but quit soon after, vehemently disagreeing with its policies. He returned to Cameroon and published his magnum opus, Money, Servitude, and Freedom, in 1980. The recently elected president of Cameroon, Paul Biya, appointed Pouemi head of the University of Douala in August 1983—then fired him a year later. On December 27th, 1984, Pouemi was found dead of an apparent suicide in a hotel room. Some of his friends and students argue he was poisoned by the Biya regime (which still governs Cameroon), while others believe that harassment by Biya’s cronies drove Pouemi to suicide.
International Monetary System
Writing in the turbulent 1970s after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, Pouemi anticipated the three “fundamental flaws” with the international monetary “non-system”: one, using a national currency, the US dollar, as global currency; two, placing the burden of adjustment exclusively on deficit nations; and, three, the “inequity bias” of the foreign reserve system, which makes it a form of “reverse aid.” All three issues have been highlighted by the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Long recognized as a problem, the challenges with using the US dollar as the world’s currency have once again become apparent. Low- and middle-income countries (which include essentially all African countries) have to deal with the vicissitudes of the global financial cycles emanating from the center of the global capitalist system. As the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to combat inflation by engineering a recession—because if borrowing costs rise, people have less money to spend and prices will decrease—they are increasing the debt burden of African governments that have variable-rate loans in US dollars. Already, the World Bank has warned of a looming debt crisis and the potential for another “lost decade” like the 1980s. Moreover, higher interest rates in the US lead to the depreciation of African currencies, making imports more expensive and leading to even higher food and oil prices across the continent.
Pouemi viewed the IMF’s attempt to create a global currency through the 1969 establishment of the special drawing rights (SDR) system as an inadequate response to the problems created by using the US dollar. The issuance of SDRs essentially drops money from the sky into the savings accounts of governments around the world. The IMF has only issued SDRs four times in its history, most recently in August 2021 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. With African governments dealing with falling export earnings and the need to import greater amounts of personal protective equipment—and, eventually, vaccines—there was a clear need to bolster their savings, i.e., foreign reserves. The problem is that the current formula for allocating SDRs provides 60% of them to the richest countries—countries that do not need them, since they can and have borrowed in their own currencies. Of the new 456 billion SDR (approximately US$650 billion), the entire African continent received only 5% (about US$33 billion).
Decades ago, Pouemi had slammed SDRs as “arbitrary in three respects: the determination of their volume, their allocation and the calculation of their value.” Instead, Pouemi advocated for a truly global currency, one that could be issued by a global central bank in response to global recessions and that prioritized financing for the poorest countries. Such a reorientation of SDRs could provide a way of repaying African nations for colonialism and climate change.
Secondly, unable to get the financing they need, African governments with balance-of-payments deficits (when more money leaves a country than enters in a given year) have no choice but to shrink their economies. Pouemi strongly criticized the IMF, which he dubbed the “Instant Misery Fund” for applying the same “stereotypical, invariable remedies: reduce public expenditures, limit credit, do not subsidize nationalized enterprises” regardless of the source of a country’s deficits. Devaluing the currency is unlikely to work for small countries that are price takers in world markets and instead improves the trade balance by lowering domestic spending. The IMF has become “a veritable policeman to repress governments that attempt to offer their countries a minimum of welfare.” The current international monetary non-system then creates a global “deflationary bias,” since those countries with balance-of-payments deficits must reduce their spending, while those with large surpluses—like Germany, China, Japan, and the Netherlands—face little pressure to decrease their surpluses by spending more.
The third major issue with the current international monetary non-system is that developing countries have to accumulate foreign exchange reserves denominated in “hard” currencies like US dollars and euros, which means they are forced to transfer real resources to richer countries in return for financial assets—mere IOUs. Pouemi claimed that “if the international monetary system was not ‘rigged,’ reserves would be held as other goods like coffee or cocoa, gold for example. But the system is ‘rigged’; coffee reserves are quantified as dollars, pound sterling or non-convertible francs.” Instead, in the late 1970s, governments like that of Rwanda effectively lent coffee to the United States by using export earnings to purchase US treasury bills, whose real value was being quickly eroded by high inflation in the US. Hence, we live in a world where developing countries like China and Brazil lend money to rich governments like that of the US. As Pouemi explains: “The logic of the international monetary system wants the poor to lend to—what am I saying—give to the rich.”
Pouemi was also a harsh critic of the CFA franc, since maintaining the fixed exchange rate to the euro implies abandoning an autonomous monetary policy and the need to restrict commercial bank credit. Pouemi also argued that the potential benefits and costs of currency unions are different for rich and poor countries, and that therefore it is inappropriate to analyze African monetary unions through a European lens. His thoughts are especially relevant at a moment when the future of the CFA franc and West African monetary integration are up for debate.
In theory, by fixing the exchange rate to the euro, the two regional central banks that issue the CFA franc—the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de l’ouest (Central Bank of West African States) and the Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique centrale (Central Bank of Central African States)—have relinquished monetary policy autonomy. They have to mimic the European Central Bank’s policy rates instead of setting interest rates that reflect economic conditions in the CFA zone. The amount of CFA francs in circulation is also limited by the amount of foreign reserves each regional central bank holds in euros. Therefore, “the solidity of the CFA franc is based on restricting M [the money supply], a restriction not desired by the states, but one proceeding from the very architecture of the zone.” As a result, the economies of the CFA franc zone are starved of credit, especially farmers and small businesses, hindering growth and development. In Pouemi’s words, “There is no doubt, the CFA remains fundamentally a currency of the colonial type.”
When discussing the possibilities for a single currency for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Pouemi stressed that the potential benefits and costs of currency union are different for rich and poor countries. “There is not only a difference of perception of the mechanisms of cooperation” between Europe and Africa, “there’s a difference of the conception of common life. Economic cooperation as it is conceived in the industrialized West is the Kennedy Round, North-South dialogue, the EEC, etc.—in other words, essentially ‘customs disarmament’ or common defense; armament is the rule, disarmament the exception.” In Africa, however, economic cooperation is a positive-sum game. Conventional economic theory argues against monetary integration among African countries, since they trade little with each other. But to Pouemi, the goal of monetary integration is precisely to get these countries to trade more with one another. He also questions the view that monetary integration should come last, following the same sequence as the European Union from free trade zone to customs union to common market and, finally, to currency union. “This view is not only imaginary, it is practically non-verified; we have seen examples. Theoretically, it is indefensible: a 10% decrease in tariffs could be … offset by a devaluation of 10%.”
Pouemi also dismissed arguments that Nigeria would dominate the proposed ECOWAS single currency as another example of the classic colonialist tactic of “divide and conquer.” While he acknowledged that “monetary union between unequal partners poses problems,” these are “only problems, open to solutions.” They do not make monetary integration unviable. Such integration need not limit sovereignty. In a regional or continental African monetary union, no “currency would be the reserve of others. Each country would have its own central bank, free to conduct the policy that best suits the directives judged necessary by the government. The only loss of sovereignty following such a union would be the respect of the collective balance. It would not be appropriated by anyone; it would be at the service of all. It would be, for that matter, less a loss of sovereignty than the collective discipline necessary to all communal life.”
Pouemi advocated for an African monetary union with fixed exchange rates between members, the pooling of foreign reserves, and a common unit of account—like the European Currency Unit that preceded the euro. He thought that the debate over whether the CFA franc is overvalued is misguided, since there is no a priori reason for its members to have the same exchange rate. Fixed but adjustable exchange rates—as in the Bretton Woods system or European Monetary System—would allow each nation greater monetary and exchange rate policy autonomy. Settling payments using a common unit of account instead of foreign exchange reserves would help economize on the latter. Moving toward the free movement of capital, goods and labor—as envisioned by the African Continental Free Trade Area—would help diffuse shocks through the monetary union. Finally, such a union would need to have a common policy on capital controls or at least collective supervision of international capital flows.
As Pouemi so eloquently lamented: “History will hold on to the fact that all of [Africa’s] children that have tried to make her respected have perished, one after the other, by African hands, without having the time to serve her.” We do not know what Pouemi could have accomplished had he had the time to serve Africa for longer. All we can do is heed his call that “in Africa, money needs to stop being the domain of a small number of ‘specialists’ pretending to be magicians.”
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