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A DRUGS EPIDEMIC IN EAST AFRICA? What have you been smoking?



Politics of poker
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Kampala, Uganda – CUE THE STATISTICS.   

There is a rising concern in both government and welfare circles that the region could be on the brink of a ‘drugs epidemic.’

This could be misleading, and partly a result of our official culture of imitative behaviour.

The seizure and impounding of larger and larger amounts of contraband at our ports, (averaging hundreds of kilos of heroin worth millions of US dollars for example), does not necessarily mean that Africans are either the producers or the end-user of these items, as would be the case at London’s Heathrow airport or through the United States port of San Francisco.

Not all narcotics are equal, and neither are their users. The core market for narcotics globally is poor people in rich countries. This is because, even though poor, they get access to money in real terms (by whatever means) to make the market viable.

There is little evidence to suggest that cocaine, heroin and amphetamines (in short, something that has to come out of a lab) are being manufactured in the region. Simply put: We cannot afford to be either the producers, or primary intended consumers of modern narcotics

Ordinary Africans simply do not have enough numerical strength to make up the necessary aggregated monetary demand, and rich Africans are simply too few to consume the volumes necessary to make fixed supply lines to them worthwhile.

There is little evidence to suggest that the drugs from the spectrum of mainstream narcotics: Cocaine, heroin and amphetamines (in short, something that has to come out of a lab) found in the region, are being manufactured in the region.

Simply put: We cannot afford to be either the producers, or primary intended consumers of modern narcotics.

The more probable explanation is that the generally lenient punishments (themselves evidence of the relative historical rarity of the crime), as well as the easily compromised law enforcement regime, has made East Africa an attractive route for drugs smugglers operating from both Asia and South America, heading onwards to the viable markets of Western Europe.

The region’s average prison sentence for trafficking is life imprisonment, assuming one is not merely subjected to a very large fine. In practice, nobody really gets caught, even when contraband is seized, and there are certainly none of the Asia-style death sentences in place here.

The media of the region exercise sporadic focus on shipments (and sometimes this means whole shiploads) of hard drugs being seized at sea or at some airport. These are couched in ritualised displays of law enforcement, whereby some Big Man presses a button that scuttles the ship, or sets fire to a huge pile of someone’s stash.


If you think about it, a lot of the history of African, and indeed other indigenous peoples, has been about enduring bans for one thing or another, imposed on them by people who are ‘not them.’

This habit was carried on into Africa’s post-Independence period, where “ban” is a well-used component of the lexicon of government.

The trouble with this habit is that it sets up a situation where the baby is thrown in with the dirty bathwater.

Some of these bans were aimed at ‘herbal’ habits already practised by the to-be-colonised people. Other bans were aimed at keeping local people away from habits brought by the colonisers, but deemed too ‘damaging’ to allow natives to use. These were the (in)famous licences natives were required to have in order to legally buy whisky or other such spirits. This gave rise to a third kind of banning, aimed at native adaptations to the new habits, such as bans on the makeshift brewing of spirit liquor.

Much of this was self-serving. In the early 1900s, the native Ugandans began forming co-operative unions as a response to the rigours being brought on by the then new colonial economy. These were banned, as were to be trade union membership, political parties, and certain new economic activities (such as ginning cotton) for the Africans. Even certain religious practices were banned under the 1912 Witchcraft Act, which was not repealed until the late 1950s. Others like hunting wildlife –branded ‘poaching’ – have carried on well into post-Independence.

Despite this, the relationship between marijuana, waragi (illegal moonshine or “war gin” apparently), and the ability of many an underpaid East African colonial foot soldier to just keep on marching is a seriously under-researched African topic.

It is in perhaps this historical context that the indifference to European and American-driven concerns about the alleged ‘proliferation of drugs’ in the region may be understood. Western laws are not really made out of love for Africans, and there is little to suggest it is really proliferating among the citizens themselves anyway

This allows the entire matter to remain in the purview and hands of those managing the state. And that is where the problem begins.

Of the three broad narcotics categories outlined above – ‘native’ drugs, imported drugs for local use, and ‘transit’ drugs, or drugs made for export – each have received a separate but nevertheless state-oriented approach.

For the first category, the aim is the continued policing of native behaviour, in the best ‘traditions’ of the colonial project. At root, it is the general assumption that Africans cannot work out what is best for them, and need to have this discernment imposed.

Only an elite would have the resources and access to participate in today’s drug trade, basically as an enabler, especially since the real market is off the continent

The second, is the management of elite behaviour. Apart from legal narcotics such as alcohol, there is some level of consumption of manufactured ones such as amphetamines, heroin and cocaine. However, like most imported things in the region, these are essentially a ‘luxury’ item affordable mainly to the socio-economic elite. In East Africa, there is actually very little sustainable consumption of such narcotics outside the circles of the rich.

In countries like Afghanistan and Brazil, where narcotics are being manufactured on a much larger scale, there is a certain amount of leakage into their communities of ordinary citizens. But this has perhaps more to do with being near the source, than with actual viable purchasing power.

The real area of activity is in the manufacture of narcotics for export, as well as the exploitation of our weakly governed official spaces as a conduit for narcotics coming in from elsewhere. This is the real cause of Western interest in East Africa’s alleged ‘drugs problem,’ and the real source of local elite interest. Only an elite would have the resources and access to participate in today’s drug trade, basically as an enabler, especially since the real market is off the continent.


In a display of hubris similar to its ‘concerns’ about drugs proliferation in Central America, the US muddies the waters about whether this is a concern about the impact of drug abuse on the global youth, or merely a concern about such narcotics finding their way into the United States and their cousins in Western Europe.

This is a problem of denial.

First, the real crisis is not narcotics as such, but the Western habit of wanting to refine everything already consumed by the human – and even just mammalian – body, to the maximum extent of that product’s physical properties.

The American war in Vietnam had an interesting sideshow in the form of heroin being made in, and smuggled from jungle hideouts in the Golden Triangle of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand to raise finances for pro-American armed groups

Sugar, which is completely consumable in a pre-digested form (thanks to honeybees), or in a natural form in sugar cane and beets, is extracted from the latter two and refined into that ubiquitous granular substance that borders on a poison, is the most familiar example of this.

Together with starch and processed fat, this ‘denatured’ sugar now forms the base of the entire global processed food industry, with all its associated health risks.

Other examples exist. It is an extract from the leaves of the humble coca plant, native to South America, that is the source of cocaine, a mind-blowing intoxicant.

Heroin, most venerable of the ‘modern’ narcotics, is originally derived from morphine, which in itself come out of the poppy plant located mainly in remote Afghanistan.

Most native alcohol manufacture was a fruit fermentation process leading to various kinds of relatively mild wines and beers. By contrast, the emergence and focus on the science of much stronger grain-based spirit liquors: Scottish whisky; Spanish-Mexican tequila; Russian/Scandinavian vodka; French brandies and American bourbons, and even rum from the leftovers of the abovementioned sugar processes, though probably pioneered by the Arabs in Baghdad in the 8th century, seems to have it origins in the same European thinking.

In fact, it is the failure to extract something equally lethal from East Africa’s coca-like, mildly stimulating khat (miraa in Kenya, mairungi in Uganda, etc.) that could confirm my theory that the drug dealers of the world concluded a long time ago that East Africa’s impoverished, rurally scattered citizens were simply not a viable mass-market for refined narcotics, and not worth the implied investment in labs and chemicals.

Second, the ‘proliferation’ has been less of a natural occurrence, and more a consequence of active state participation,

The port city of Hong Kong was famously taken over by Britain in 1862 as a result of the second  (1856-1860) of the Opium Wars in which the Chinese Qing dynasty failed in its attempt to stop forcible smuggling of the drug into China by the British in the name of ‘free trade.’

The American war in Vietnam had an interesting sideshow in the form of heroin being made in, and smuggled from American-backed jungle hideouts in the Golden Triangle of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand to raise finances for pro-American armed groups in the conflict. Many of these drug consignments ended up being smuggled back to the US itself by returning US military personnel.

In the seminal 1996 Dark Alliance investigative series, the San Jose Mercury News newspaper tells of a similar, but more devastating operation in yet another, more covert US war. At the height of their campaign against ‘communist rebels’ in South America, US intelligence agencies developed a scheme to supply cheap narcotics to poor US citizens so as to create cash flow to finance the anti-communist militias.

This is not to say that the poor had a disposable income. Rather, it meant that addicts would be able to spend less to achieve an even higher level of addictive intoxication. This means in practice that after robbing, cheating, begging and prostituting themselves to each other, these badly damaged persons would have realised the small amounts of money needed to get their ‘fix,’ as constituents of a mass market.

This was to become known as ‘crack cocaine,’ which was more potent, more conveniently consumed (through inhalation), and more addictive per weight unit, than the more middle-class oriented original version.

One man in particular, the (later to be convicted drug-dealer) African-American ‘Freeway Rick; Ross was named as perhaps the person who in partnership with shadowy Latin American and US intelligence figures, basically ignited the ‘crack epidemic’ that devastated African-American communities up and down the West Coast.


Like all things, there is certainly a need for the authorities to be aware of social behaviour, and if necessary, make laws to regulate it. In the same vein, and for the same reason, too much of anything too refined will certainly kill you.

However, the policy makers of East Africa must work to see that that and the laws they produce are not aimed merely at continuing the colonial imperative of policing indigenous behaviour, and are aimed at actually aimed at protecting those vulnerable to either narcotics misuse, and also the social and security implications of having large networks of well-financed criminally minded persons within their jurisdictions.

So far, we see policy caught in a parallel universe. On the one hand, the generally unproductive nature of regional economies (that is, outside the minerals sector, ring-fenced, as it were, for foreign capital) means that the functioning local elite – law enforcement officers, the politically well-connected, capitalisers, etc – are more than likely to be drawn to the management of the narcotics trade as a way of meeting their material aspirations.

In order for the drugs trade to be profitable to the East African elite, it is necessary to keep it in the domain of illegality, so as exploit those in need of illegal assistance around Customs and policing barriers

On the other, there is the burden of an enormously moralising mindset, in which those state actors not directly involved in the business of financing, focus on the problem from a colonial perspective, regardless of the fact that some of the former colonising countries have even legalised, or at least made peace with, some of these narcotics in recent years.

Third, attitudes and laws change, and change again:

The world famous drink Coca-Cola gets its name from originally having actual cocaine as its active ingredient; between 1929 and 1933, alcohol consumption was strictly prohibited in all America’s 50 states;  marijuana use, sometimes recreational, has been ‘decriminalised’ in a few Western European countries and four North American states. In any event, even the punishments and their enforcement around personal consumption have become officially lax.

As for harder drugs, there has been a migration from a punitive regime to a curative one, as addiction has been recognised more as an illness as opposed to an act of deviance.

Let me put it like this: In order for the drugs trade to be profitable to the East African elite, it is necessary to keep it in the domain of illegality, so as exploit those in need of illegal assistance around Customs and policing barriers. This is why it is important to them that the matter of narcotics use must not be separated from the dubious morality behind the current laws of the region, and the need to appear keen to support US and UN initiatives on the matter in the region.

Illegal narcotics are profitable, but not in the way that you may think.

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Kalundi Serumaga is a social and political commentator based in Kampala.

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Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning

Rwandans are welcoming, but the government’s priority must be to solve the internal political problems which produce refugees.



Asylum Pact: Rwanda Must Do Some Political Housecleaning
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The governments of the United Kingdom and Rwanda have signed an agreement to move asylum seekers from the UK to Rwanda for processing. This partnership has been heavily criticized and has been referred to as unethical and inhumane. It has also been opposed by the United Nations Refugee Agency on the grounds that it is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Convention.

Here in Rwanda, we heard the news of the partnership on the day it was signed. The subject has never been debated in the Rwandan parliament and neither had it been canvassed in the local media prior to the announcement.

According to the government’s official press release, the partnership reflects Rwanda’s commitment to protect vulnerable people around the world. It is argued that by relocating migrants to Rwanda, their dignity and rights will be respected and they will be provided with a range of opportunities, including for personal development and employment, in a country that has consistently been ranked among the safest in the world.

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives. Therefore, most Rwandans are sensitive to the plight of those forced to leave their home countries and would be more than willing to make them feel welcome. However, the decision to relocate the migrants to Rwanda raises a number of questions.

The government argues that relocating migrants to Rwanda will address the inequalities in opportunity that push economic migrants to leave their homes. It is not clear how this will work considering that Rwanda is already the most unequal country in the East African region. And while it is indeed seen as among the safest countries in the world, it was however ranked among the bottom five globally in the recently released 2022 World Happiness Index. How would migrants, who may have suffered psychological trauma fare in such an environment, and in a country that is still rebuilding itself?

A considerable number of Rwandans have been refugees and therefore understand the struggle that comes with being an asylum seeker and what it means to receive help from host countries to rebuild lives.

What opportunities can Rwanda provide to the migrants? Between 2018—the year the index was first published—and 2020, Rwanda’s ranking on the Human Capital Index (HCI) has been consistently low. Published by the World Bank, HCI measures which countries are best at mobilising the economic and professional potential of their citizens. Rwanda’s score is lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and it is partly due to this that the government had found it difficult to attract private investment that would create significant levels of employment prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. Unemployment, particularly among the youth, has since worsened.

Despite the accolades Rwanda has received internationally for its development record, Rwanda’s economy has never been driven by a dynamic private or trade sector; it has been driven by aid. The country’s debt reached 73 per cent of GDP in 2021 while its economy has not developed the key areas needed to achieve and secure genuine social and economic transformation for its entire population. In addition to human capital development, these include social capital development, especially mutual trust among citizens considering the country’s unfortunate historical past, establishing good relations with neighbouring states, respect for human rights, and guaranteeing the accountability of public officials.

Rwanda aspires to become an upper middle-income country by 2035 and a high-income country by 2050. In 2000, the country launched a development plan that aimed to transform it into a middle-income country by 2020 on the back on a knowledge economy. That development plan, which has received financial support from various development partners including the UK which contributed over £1 billion, did not deliver the anticipated outcomes. Today the country remains stuck in the category of low-income states. Its structural constraints as a small land-locked country with few natural resources are often cited as an obstacle to development. However, this is exacerbated by current governance in Rwanda, which limits the political space, lacks separation of powers, impedes freedom of expression and represses government critics, making it even harder for Rwanda to reach the desired developmental goals.

Rwanda’s structural constraints as a small land-locked country with no natural resources are often viewed as an obstacle to achieving the anticipated development.

As a result of the foregoing, Rwanda has been producing its own share of refugees, who have sought political and economic asylum in other countries. The UK alone took in 250 Rwandese last year. There are others around the world, the majority of whom have found refuge in different countries in Africa, including countries neighbouring Rwanda. The presence of these refugees has been a source of tension in the region with Kigali accusing neighbouring states of supporting those who want to overthrow the government by force. Some Rwandans have indeed taken up armed struggle, a situation that, if not resolved, threatens long-term security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region. In fact, the UK government’s advice on travel to Rwanda has consistently warned of the unstable security situation near the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

While Rwanda’s intention to help address the global imbalance of opportunity that fuels illegal immigration is laudable, I would recommend that charity start at home. As host of the 26th Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting scheduled for June 2022, and Commonwealth Chair-in-Office for the next two years, the government should seize the opportunity to implement the core values and principles of the Commonwealth, particularly the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression, political and civil rights, and a vibrant civil society. This would enable Rwanda to address its internal social, economic and political challenges, creating a conducive environment for long-term economic development, and durable peace that will not only stop Rwanda from producing refugees but will also render the country ready and capable of economically and socially integrating refugees from less fortunate countries in the future.

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Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement

The elite’s ‘solution’ to the climate crisis is to turn the displaced into exploitable migrant labour. We need a truly internationalist alternative.



Beyond Borders: Why We Need a Truly Internationalist Climate Justice Movement
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“We are not drowning, we are fighting” has become the rallying call for the Pacific Climate Warriors. From UN climate meetings to blockades of Australian coal ports, these young Indigenous defenders from twenty Pacific Island states are raising the alarm of global warming for low-lying atoll nations. Rejecting the narrative of victimisation – “you don’t need my pain or tears to know that we’re in a crisis,” as Samoan Brianna Fruean puts it – they are challenging the fossil fuel industry and colonial giants such as Australia, responsible for the world’s highest per-capita carbon emissions.

Around the world, climate disasters displace around 25.3 million people annually – one person every one to two seconds. In 2016, new displacements caused by climate disasters outnumbered new displacements as a result of persecution by a ratio of three to one. By 2050, an estimated 143 million people will be displaced in just three regions: Africa, South Asia, and Latin America. Some projections for global climate displacement are as high as one billion people.

Mapping who is most vulnerable to displacement reveals the fault lines between rich and poor, between the global North and South, and between whiteness and its Black, Indigenous and racialised others.

Globalised asymmetries of power create migration but constrict mobility. Displaced people – the least responsible for global warming – face militarised borders. While climate change is itself ignored by the political elite, climate migration is presented as a border security issue and the latest excuse for wealthy states to fortify their borders. In 2019, the Australian Defence Forces announced military patrols around Australia’s waters to intercept climate refugees.

The burgeoning terrain of “climate security” prioritises militarised borders, dovetailing perfectly into eco-apartheid. “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the planet,” declares the party of French far-Right politician Marine Le Pen. A US Pentagon-commissioned report on the security implications of climate change encapsulates the hostility to climate refugees: “Borders will be strengthened around the country to hold back unwanted starving immigrants from the Caribbean islands (an especially severe problem), Mexico, and South America.” The US has now launched Operation Vigilant Sentry off the Florida coast and created Homeland Security Task Force Southeast to enforce marine interdiction and deportation in the aftermath of disasters in the Caribbean.

Labour migration as climate mitigation

you broke the ocean in
half to be here.
only to meet nothing that wants you
– Nayyirah Waheed

Parallel to increasing border controls, temporary labour migration is increasingly touted as a climate adaptation strategy. As part of the ‘Nansen Initiative’, a multilateral, state-led project to address climate-induced displacement, the Australian government has put forward its temporary seasonal worker program as a key solution to building climate resilience in the Pacific region. The Australian statement to the Nansen Initiative Intergovernmental Global Consultation was, in fact, delivered not by the environment minister but by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

Beginning in April 2022, the new Pacific Australia Labour Mobility scheme will make it easier for Australian businesses to temporarily insource low-wage workers (what the scheme calls “low-skilled” and “unskilled” workers) from small Pacific island countries including Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Samoa, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Not coincidentally, many of these countries’ ecologies and economies have already been ravaged by Australian colonialism for over one hundred years.

It is not an anomaly that Australia is turning displaced climate refugees into a funnel of temporary labour migration. With growing ungovernable and irregular migration, including climate migration, temporary labour migration programs have become the worldwide template for “well-managed migration.” Elites present labour migration as a double win because high-income countries fill their labour shortage needs without providing job security or citizenship, while low-income countries alleviate structural impoverishment through migrants’ remittances.

Dangerous, low-wage jobs like farm, domestic, and service work that cannot be outsourced are now almost entirely insourced in this way. Insourcing and outsourcing represent two sides of the same neoliberal coin: deliberately deflated labour and political power. Not to be confused with free mobility, temporary labour migration represents an extreme neoliberal approach to the quartet of foreign, climate, immigration, and labour policy, all structured to expand networks of capital accumulation through the creation and disciplining of surplus populations.

The International Labour Organization recognises that temporary migrant workers face forced labour, low wages, poor working conditions, virtual absence of social protection, denial of freedom association and union rights, discrimination and xenophobia, as well as social exclusion. Under these state-sanctioned programs of indentureship, workers are legally tied to an employer and deportable. Temporary migrant workers are kept compliant through the threats of both termination and deportation, revealing the crucial connection between immigration status and precarious labour.

Through temporary labour migration programs, workers’ labour power is first captured by the border and this pliable labour is then exploited by the employer. Denying migrant workers permanent immigration status ensures a steady supply of cheapened labour. Borders are not intended to exclude all people, but to create conditions of ‘deportability’, which increases social and labour precarity. These workers are labelled as ‘foreign’ workers, furthering racist xenophobia against them, including by other workers. While migrant workers are temporary, temporary migration is becoming the permanent neoliberal, state-led model of migration.

Reparations include No Borders

“It’s immoral for the rich to talk about their future children and grandchildren when the children of the Global South are dying now.” – Asad Rehman

Discussions about building fairer and more sustainable political-economic systems have coalesced around a Green New Deal. Most public policy proposals for a Green New Deal in the US, Canada, UK and the EU articulate the need to simultaneously tackle economic inequality, social injustice, and the climate crisis by transforming our extractive and exploitative system towards a low-carbon, feminist, worker and community-controlled care-based society. While a Green New Deal necessarily understands the climate crisis and the crisis of capitalism as interconnected — and not a dichotomy of ‘the environment versus the economy’ — one of its main shortcomings is its bordered scope. As Harpreet Kaur Paul and Dalia Gebrial write: “the Green New Deal has largely been trapped in national imaginations.”

Any Green New Deal that is not internationalist runs the risk of perpetuating climate apartheid and imperialist domination in our warming world. Rich countries must redress the global and asymmetrical dimensions of climate debtunfair trade and financial agreements, military subjugation, vaccine apartheidlabour exploitation, and border securitisation.

It is impossible to think about borders outside the modern nation-state and its entanglements with empire, capitalism, race, caste, gender, sexuality, and ability. Borders are not even fixed lines demarcating territory. Bordering regimes are increasingly layered with drone surveillance, interception of migrant boats, and security controls far beyond states’ territorial limits. From Australia offshoring migrant detention around Oceania to Fortress Europe outsourcing surveillance and interdiction to the Sahel and Middle East, shifting cartographies demarcate our colonial present.

Perhaps most offensively, when colonial countries panic about ‘border crises’ they position themselves as victims. But the genocide, displacement, and movement of millions of people were unequally structured by colonialism for three centuries, with European settlers in the Americas and Oceania, the transatlantic slave trade from Africa, and imported indentured labourers from Asia. Empire, enslavement, and indentureship are the bedrock of global apartheid today, determining who can live where and under what conditions. Borders are structured to uphold this apartheid.

The freedom to stay and the freedom to move, which is to say no borders, is decolonial reparations and redistribution long due.

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The Murang’a Factor in the Upcoming Presidential Elections

The Murang’a people are really yet to decide who they are going to vote for as a president. If they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves. Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Can Jimi Wanjigi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction?



The Murang’a Factor in the Upcoming Presidential Elections
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In the last quarter of 2021, I visited Murang’a County twice: In September, we were in Kandiri in Kigumo constituency. We had gone for a church fundraiser and were hosted by the Anglican Church of Kenya’s (ACK), Kahariro parish, Murang’a South diocese. A month later, I was back, this time to Ihi-gaini deep in Kangema constituency for a burial.

The church function attracted politicians: it had to; they know how to sniff such occasions and if not officially invited, they gate-crash them. Church functions, just like funerals, are perfect platforms for politicians to exhibit their presumed piousness, generosity and their closeness to the respective clergy and the bereaved family.

Well, the other reason they were there, is because they had been invited by the Church leadership. During the electioneering period, the Church is not shy to exploit the politicians’ ambitions: they “blackmail” them for money, because they can mobilise ready audiences for the competing politicians. The politicians on the other hand, are very ready to part with cash. This quid pro quo arrangement is usually an unstated agreement between the Church leadership and the politicians.

The church, which was being fund raised for, being in Kigumo constituency, the area MP Ruth Wangari Mwaniki, promptly showed up. Likewise, the area Member of the County Assembly (MCA) and of course several aspirants for the MP and MCA seats, also showed up.

Church and secular politics often sit cheek by jowl and so, on this day, local politics was the order of the day. I couldn’t have speculated on which side of the political divide Murang’a people were, until the young man Zack Kinuthia Chief Administrative Secretary (CAS) for Sports, Culture and Heritage, took to the rostrum to speak.

A local boy and an Uhuru Kenyatta loyalist, he completely avoided mentioning his name and his “development track record” in central Kenya. Kinuthia has a habit of over-extolling President Uhuru’s virtues whenever and wherever he mounts any platform. By the time he was done speaking, I quickly deduced he was angling to unseat Wangari. I wasn’t wrong; five months later in February 2022, Kinuthia resigned his CAS position to vie for Kigumo on a Party of the National Unity (PNU) ticket.

He spoke briefly, feigned some meeting that was awaiting him elsewhere and left hurriedly, but not before giving his KSh50,000 donation. Apparently, I later learnt that he had been forewarned, ahead of time, that the people were not in a mood to listen to his panegyrics on President Uhuru, Jubilee Party, or anything associated to the two. Kinuthia couldn’t dare run on President Uhuru’s Jubilee Party. His patron-boss’s party is not wanted in Murang’a.

I spent the whole day in Kandiri, talking to people, young and old, men and women and by the time I was leaving, I was certain about one thing; The Murang’a folks didn’t want anything to do with President Uhuru. What I wasn’t sure of is, where their political sympathies lay.

I returned to Murang’a the following month, in the expansive Kangema – it is still huge – even after Mathioya was hived off from the larger Kangema constituency. Funerals provide a good barometer that captures peoples’ political sentiments and even though this burial was not attended by politicians – a few senior government officials were present though; political talk was very much on the peoples’ lips.

What I gathered from the crowd was that President Uhuru had destroyed their livelihood, remember many of the Nairobi city trading, hawking, big downtown real estate and restaurants are run and owned largely by Murang’a people. The famous Nyamakima trading area of downtown Nairobi has been run by Murang’a Kikuyus.

In 2018, their goods were confiscated and declared contrabrand by the government. Many of their businesses went under, this, despite the merchants not only, whole heartedly throwing their support to President Uhuru’s controversial re-election, but contributing handsomely to the presidential kitty. They couldn’t believe what was happening to them: “We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him.”

We voted for him to safeguard our businesses, instead, he destroyed them. So much for supporting him

Last week, I attended a Murang’a County caucus group that was meeting somewhere in Gatundu, in Kiambu County. One of the clearest messages that I got from this group is that the GEMA vote in the August 9, 2022, presidential elections is certainly anti-Uhuru Kenyatta and not necessarily pro-William Ruto.

“The Murang’a people are really yet to decide, (if they have, they are keeping the secret to themselves) on who they are going to vote for as a president. And that’s why you see Uhuru is craftily courting us with all manner of promises, seductions and prophetic messages.” Two weeks ago, President Uhuru was in Murang’a attending an African Independent Pentecostal Church of Africa (AIPCA) church function in Kandara constituency.

At the church, the president yet again threatened to “tell you what’s in my heart and what I believe and why so.” These prophecy-laced threats by the President, to the GEMA nation, in which he has been threatening to show them the sign, have become the butt of crude jokes among Kikuyus.

Corollary, President Uhuru once again has plucked Polycarp Igathe away from his corporate perch as Equity Bank’s Chief Commercial Officer back to Nairobi’s tumultuous governor seat politics. The first time the bespectacled Igathe was thrown into the deep end of the Nairobi murky politics was in 2017, as Mike Sonko’s deputy governor. After six months, he threw in the towel, lamenting that Sonko couldn’t let him even breathe.

Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people

“Igathe is from Wanjerere in Kigumo, Murang’a, but grew up in Ol Kalou, Nyandarua County,” one of the Mzees told me. “He’s not interested in politics; much less know how it’s played. I’ve spent time with him and confided in me as much. Uhuru has a tendency of (mis)using Murang’a people. President Uhuru wants to use Igathe to control Nairobi. The sad thing is that Igathe doesn’t have the guts to tell Uhuru the brutal fact: I’m really not interested in all these shenanigans, leave me alone. The president is hoping, once again, to hopefully placate the Murang’a people, by pretending to front Igathe. I foresee another terrible disaster ultimately befalling both Igathe and Uhuru.”

Be that as it may, what I got away with from this caucus, after an entire day’s deliberations, is that its keeping it presidential choice close to its chest. My attempts to goad some of the men and women present were fruitless.

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest. Kiambu has produced two presidents from the same family, Nyeri one, President Mwai Kibaki, who died on April 22. The closest Murang’a came to giving the country a president was during Ken Matiba’s time in the 1990s. “But Matiba had suffered a debilitating stroke that incapacitated him,” said one of the mzees. “It was tragic, but there was nothing we could do.”

Murang’a people like reminding everyone that it’s only they, who have yet to produce a president from the GEMA stable, despite being the wealthiest

It is interesting to note that Jimi Wanjigi, the Safina party presidential flagbearer is from Murang’a County. His family hails from Wahundura, in Mathioya constituency. Him and Mwangi wa Iria, the Murang’a County governor are the other two Murang’a prominent persons who have tossed themselves into the presidential race. Wa Iria’s bid which was announced at the beginning of 2022, seems to have stagnated, while Jimi’s seems to be gathering storm.

Are the Murang’a people prepping themselves this time to vote for one of their own? Jimi’s campaign team has crafted a two-pronged strategy that it hopes will endear Kenyans to his presidency. One, a generational, paradigm shift, especially among the youth, targeting mostly post-secondary, tertiary college and university students.

“We believe this group of voters who are basically between the ages of 18–27 years and who comprise more than 65 per cent of total registered voters are the key to turning this election,” said one of his presidential campaign team members. “It matters most how you craft the political message to capture their attention.” So, branding his key message as itwika, it is meant to orchestrate a break from past electoral behaviour that is pegged on traditional ethnic voting patterns.

The other plunk of Jimi’s campaign theme is economic emancipation, quite pointedly as it talks directly to the GEMA nation, especially the Murang’a Kikuyus, who are reputed for their business acumen and entrepreneurial skills. “What Kikuyus cherish most,” said the team member “is someone who will create an enabling business environment and leave the Kikuyus to do their thing. You know, Kikuyus live off business, if you interfere with it, that’s the end of your friendship, it doesn’t matter who you are.”

Can Jimi re-ignite the Murang’a/Matiba popular passion among the GEMA community and re-influence it to vote in a different direction? As all the presidential candidates gear-up this week on who they will eventually pick as their running mates, the GEMA community once more shifts the spotlight on itself, as the most sought-after vote basket.

Both Raila Odinga and William Ruto coalitions – Azimio la Umoja-One Kenya and Kenya Kwanza Alliance – must seek to impress and woe Mt Kenya region by appointing a running mate from one of its ranks. If not, the coalitions fear losing the vote-rich area either to each other, or perhaps to a third party. Murang’a County, may as well, become the conundrum, with which the August 9, presidential race may yet to be unravelled and decided.

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